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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  4774 of 2006

PETITIONER: M/s. Srinivasa Rice Mill

RESPONDENT: Employees State Insurance Corporation

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/11/2006

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Dalveer Bhandari

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 24361 of 2004)  

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs.  4777, 4775 and 4776 OF 2006 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 27297, 27330 of 2004, 1680 of 2005)  

S.B. SINHA, J.

Leave granted.

       Applicability of the provisions of the Employees’ State Insurance Act,  1948 (for short "the Act") to the rice mills situate in the State of Andhra  Pradesh arises for question in these matters.  Appellants are owners of  various rice mills situate in the State of Andhra Pradesh.  The operation in  these rice mills is said to be seasonal.  The Act admittedly was made  applicable in relation to the rice mills with effect from 1.8.2000.  Prior to  coming into force of the Act, inspections were carried out and allegedly it  was found that in the mills more than 10 employees were employed.  They  were allegedly asked to comply with the provisions of the Act.  Without,  however, giving an opportunity to explain as to why they have not made any  contribution towards insurance, by a notice dated 20th October, 2000, they  were asked to show cause stating:

"I therefore call upon to explain the reasons if any  as to why you should not be prosecuted, within a  week of receipt of this letter.  If no reply is  received within stipulated time it will be presumed  that you have no valid reasons to explain and  further action will be taken accordingly without  any further notice."

       Suits were filed before the Employees’ Insurance Court under Section  75(1)(g) of the Act.  The question which inter alia was raised therein was as  to whether the aforementioned notice was legal.  By reason of a judgment  and order dated 30.6.2003, the learned Employees’ Insurance Court  dismissed the applications.  Aggrieved thereby and dissatisfied therewith,  appeals were preferred before the High Court purported to be in terms of  Section 82 of the Act.  The said appeals, by reason of the impugned order,  have been dismissed.

       Mr. C. Mukund, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Appellants  would raise three contentions in support of these appeals, viz.,

(i)     Having regard to the definitions of "employees" and "wages" as  also the applicability of the Act in relation to the factories, it was

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obligatory on the part of the authorities under the Act to determine  the question as to whether the establishments are covered under the  Act or not. (ii)    The principles of natural justice, as are required in terms of  Sections 44 and 45 of the Act, having not been complied with, the  impugned notice proposing criminal action against them is void ab  initio.   (iii)   Having regard to the provisions contained in Regulation 10B of the  Employees’ State Insurance (General) Regulations, 1950 (for short  "the Regulations") framed under the Act, it was obligatory on the  part of the Inspector to disclose the details of the employees as also  the wages drawn by them and the said mandatory provisions  having not been complied with, the impugned notice was liable to  be set aside.

       Mr. C.S. Rajan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of  Respondent, on the other hand, submitted:

(i)     The provisions of the Act as contained in Sections 38 to 45 of the  Act lay down a scheme in terms whereof statutory obligations are  on the employer not only to pay the amount of insurance but also  to furnish the details and as the said statutory obligations have not  been carried out, the impugned notice issued by the Employees’  State Insurance Corporation (for short "the Corporation") must be  held to be legal. (ii)    Keeping in view the statutory obligations on the part of the  employer, it is idle to contend that the authorities under the Act  while issuing notice must disclose the details as regards the  employees as also the wages drawn by them. (iii)   The Employees’ Insurance Court as also the High Court has rightly  arrived at a finding that the rice mills run by Appellants are  factories within the meaning of Section 2(12) of the Act and, thus,  it is covered.

       Before we embark upon the rival contentions raised by the learned  counsel for the parties, we may notice certain provisions of the Act.   

       The Act was enacted to provide for certain benefits to employees in  case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and to make provision  for certain other matters in relation thereto.  The Act although extends to  whole of India but in terms of Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act, it may  come into force on such date or dates as the Central Government may, notify  in the official gazette, appoint and different dates may be appointed for  different provisions of the Act and for different States or for different parts  thereof.  

       However, Sub-section (4) of Section 1 states that the Act at the first  instance shall apply to all factories other than seasonal factories provided  that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to a factory or  establishment belonging to or under the control of the Government whose  employees are otherwise in receipt of benefits substantially similar or  superior to the benefits provided under this Act.

       "Contribution" is defined in Section 2(4) of the Act to mean "the sum  of money payable to the corporation by the principal employer in respect of  an employee and includes any amount payable by or on behalf of the  employee in accordance with the provisions of this Act".          

       "Factory" is defined under Section 2(12) of the Act which reads as  under: "2. (12) ’factory’ means any premises including  the precincts thereof\027 (a) whereon ten or more persons are employed or  were employed for wages on any day of the

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preceding twelve months, and in any part of which  a manufacturing process is being carried on with  the aid of power or is ordinarily so carried on, or (b) whereon twenty or more persons are employed  or were employed for wages on any day of the  preceding twelve months, and in any part of which  a manufacturing process is being carried on  without the aid of power or is ordinarily so carried  on, but does not include a mine subject to the  operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952) or a  railway running shed;"

       "Employee" and "wages" have been defined in Sections 2(9) and  2(22) of the Act and are as under:

"2. (9) ’employee’ means any person employed for  wages in or in connection with the work of a  factory or establishment to which this Act applies  and\027 (i) who is directly employed by the principal  employer on any work of, or incidental or  preliminary to or connected with the work of, the  factory or establishment, whether such work is  done by the employee in the factory or  establishment or elsewhere; or (ii) who is employed by or through an immediate  employer on the premises of the factory or  establishment or under the supervision of the  principal employer or his agent on work which is  ordinarily part of the work of the factory or  establishment or which is preliminary to the work  carried on in or incidental to the purpose of the  factory or establishment; or (iii) whose services are temporarily lent or let on  hire to the principal employer by the person with  whom the person whose services are so lent or let  on hire has entered into a contract of service; and includes any person employed for wages on  any work connected with the administration of the  factory or establishment or any part, department or  branch thereof or with the purchase of raw  materials for, or the distribution or sale of the  products of, the factory or establishment or any  person engaged as an apprentice, not being an  apprentice engaged under the Apprentices Act,  1961 (52 of 1961), or under the standing orders of  the establishment; but does not include\027 (a) any member of the Indian naval, military or air  forces; or (b) any person so employed whose wages  (excluding remuneration for overtime work)  exceed Rs       1600 a month:  Provided that an employee whose wages excluding  remuneration for overtime work exceed Rs        1600  a month at any time after (and not before) the  beginning of the contribution period, shall  continue to be an employee until the end of that  period;         *       *       * (22) ’Wages’ means all remuneration paid or  payable in cash to an employee, if the terms of the  contract of employment, express or implied, were  fulfilled and includes any payment to an employee  in respect of any period of authorised leave,

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lockout, strike which is not illegal or lay-off and  other additional remuneration, if any, paid at  intervals not exceeding two months, but does not  include\027 (a) any contribution paid by the employer to any  pension fund or provident fund, or under this Act; (b) any travelling allowance or the value of any  travelling concession; (c) any sum paid to the person employed to defray  special expenses entailed on him by the nature of  his employment; or (d) any gratuity payable on discharge;"

         Section 38 occurring in Chapter IV of the Act provides that all  employees are to be insured in the manner provided by the Act.  Section 39  provides for contributions payable under the Act in respect of the  employees.  Sub-section (4) of Section 39 of the Act reads as under:

"(4) The contributions payable in respect of each  wage period shall ordinarily fall due on the last  day of the wage period, and where an employee is  employed for part of the wage period, or is  employed under two or more employers during the  same wage period, the contributions shall fall due  on such days as may be specified in the  regulations."

       Section 40 of the Act enjoins a duty upon the principal employer to  pay contribution at the first instance.  Section 41 provides for recovery of  contribution.  Section 42 provides for general provisions as to payment of  contributions whereas Section 43 provides for method of payment of  contribution.  Sections 44 and 45, which are relevant for these matters, read  as under:

"44. Employers to furnish returns and maintain  registers in certain cases.--(1) Every principal and  immediate employer shall submit to the  Corporation or to such officer of the Corporation  as it may direct such returns in such form and  containing such particulars relating to persons  employed by him or to any factory or  establishment in respect of which he is the  principal or immediate employer as may be  specified in regulations made in this behalf.

(2) Where in respect of any factory or  establishment the Corporation has reason to  believe that a return should have been submitted  under sub-section (1) but has not been so  submitted, the Corporation may require any person  in charge of the factory or establishment to furnish  such particulars as it may consider necessary for  the purpose of enabling the Corporation to decide  whether the factory or establishment is a factory or  establishment to which this Act applies.   (3) Every principal and immediate employer shall  maintain such registers or records in respect of his  factory or establishment as may be required by  regulations made in this behalf.   45. Inspectors, their functions and duties.--(1) The  Corporation may appoint such persons as  Inspectors, as it thinks fit, for the purposes of this

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Act, within such local limits as it may assign to  them.   (2) Any Inspector appointed by the Corporation  under sub-section (1) (hereinafter referred to as  Inspector), or other official of the Corporation  authorised in this behalf by it, may, for the  purposes of enquiring into the correctness of any  of the particulars stated in any return referred to in  section 44 or for the purpose of ascertaining  whether any of the provisions of this Act has been  complied with--

(a) require any principal or immediate employer to  furnish to him such information as he may  consider necessary for the purposes of this Act; or   (b) at any reasonable time enter any office,  establishment factory or other premises occupied  by such principal or immediate employer and  require any person found in charge thereof lo  produce to such Inspector or other official and  allow him to examine such accounts, books and  other documents relating to the employment of  persons and payment of wages or to furnish to him  such information as he may consider necessary; or   (c) examine, with respect to any matter relevant lo  the purposes aforesaid the principal or immediate  employer, his agent or servant, or any person  found in such factory, establishment, office or  other premises, or any person whom the said  Inspector or other official has reasonable cause to  believe to be or to have been an employee;   (d) make copies of, or lake extracts from, any  register, account book or other document  maintained in such factory, establishment, office or  other premises;   (e) exercise such other powers as may be  prescribed.

(3) An Inspector shall exercise such functions and  perform such duties as may be authorised by the  Corporation or as may be specified in the  regulations."

       Section 97 provides for the power of the Corporation to make  regulations, pursuant whereto the Corporation framed Regulations.   Regulation 10B reads as under:

"10-B. Registration of factories or establishments.- (a) The employer in respect of a factory or an  establishment to which the Act applies for the first  time and to which an employer’s Code No. is not  yet allotted, and the employer in respect of a  factory or an establishment to which the Act  previously applied but has ceased to apply for the  time being, shall furnish to the appropriate  Regional Office not later than fifteen days after the  Act becomes applicable, as the case may be, to the  factory or establishment, a declaration or  registration in writing in Form 10 (hereinafter  referred to as Employer’s Registration Form).

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(b) The employer shall be responsible for the  correctness of all the particulars and information  required for and furnished on the employer’s  registration form. (c) The appropriate Regional Office may direct the  employer who fails to comply with the  requirement of paragraph (a) of this regulation  within the time stated therein, to furnish to that  office Employer’s Registration Form duly  completed within such further time as may be  specified and such employer shall thereupon,  comply with the instructions issued by that office  in this behalf. (d) Upon receipt of the completed Employer’s  Registration Form, the appropriate Regional Office  shall, if satisfied that the factory or the  establishment is one to which the Act applies, allot  to an Employer’s Code Number (unless the factory  or the establishment has already been allotted an  Employer’s Code Number) and shall inform the  employer of that number. (e) The employer shall enter the Employer’s Code  Number on all documents prepared or completed  by him in connection with the Act, the rules and  these regulations and in all correspondence with  appropriate office."

       Indisputably, in terms of the said Regulation, Form 01 has been  prescribed which is required to be filled up by the employer for the purpose  of furnishing return.  

       A notification issued by the appropriate government reads as under:

"S.O. 1842 \026 In exercise of the powers conferred  by sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Employees’  State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948) the Central  Government hereby appoints the 1st August, 2000  as the date on which the provisions of Chapter IV  (except Section 44 and 45 which have already been  brought into force) and Chapter V and VI (except  sub-section (i) of Section 76 and Sections 77, 78,  79 and 81 which have already been brought into  force) of the said Act shall come into force in the  following areas in the State of Andhra Pradesh  namely: -  Areas falling within the limits of revenue villages  of : (i)     Kovvada and Narsimhapuram in  Bheemavaram Manda; (ii)    Vandrum and Cherukuwada in Undi Mandal (iii)   Peda Amiram in Kalla Mandal; and (iv)    Akiveedu in Akiveedu Mandal of West  Godavari District."

       Admittedly, the rice mills are situated within the Narsimhapuram area.   The appointed day therefor was 1st August, 2000.  The factories of  Appellants were inspected prior to that date.  Prior to that date, therefore,  Appellants were not bound to comply with the provisions of the Act.  They  could appoint employees at their own sweet will.  But the period wherefor  the provisions of the Act would be applicable is 12 months preceding the  said date, viz., from 1st August, 1999 to 31st July, 2000.  Compliance of the  requirements of the statutes on the part of the employer, however, would  begin from the appointed day, viz., 1st August, 2000.

       Before an Act is made applicable, in the event, a dispute is raised, the

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authorities exercising statutory power must determine the jurisdictional fact.   Applicability of the Act would be a jurisdictional question.  The Employer is  entitled to raise such a question before the appropriate authority.  Such a  question can also be raised for the first time before a court exercising the  power of judicial review although ordinarily the same should be raised  before the concerned authority as a preliminary issue.  [See Management of  the Express Newspapers (P) Ltd., Madras v. Workers and Others, AIR 1963  SC 569, para 15]

       What would be a jurisdictional fact has recently been stated by this  Court in Arun Kumar & Others v. Union of India & Others [JT 2006 (12)  SC 121] in the following terms:

"\005A "jurisdictional fact" is a fact which must  exist before a Court, Tribunal or an Authority  assumes jurisdiction over a particular matter. A  jurisdictional fact is one on existence or non- existence of which depends jurisdiction of a court,  a tribunal or an authority. It is the fact upon which  an administrative agency’s power to act depends. If  the jurisdictional fact does not exist, the court,  authority or officer cannot act. If a Court or  authority wrongly assumes the existence of such  fact, the order can be questioned by a writ of  certiorari. The underlying principle is that by  erroneously assuming existence of such  jurisdictional fact, no authority can confer upon  itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not  posses."

       It is further stated:

"\005it is clear that existence of ’jurisdictional fact’ is  sine qua non for the exercise of power. If the  jurisdictional fact exists, the authority can proceed  with the case and take an appropriate decision in  accordance with law. Once the authority has  jurisdiction in the matter on existence of  ’jurisdictional fact’, it can decide the ’fact in issue’  or ’adjudicatory fact’. A wrong decision on ’fact in  issue’ or on ’adjudicatory fact’ would not make the  decision of the authority without jurisdiction or  vulnerable provided essential or fundamental fact  as to existence of jurisdiction is present."

       The scheme of the Act does not suggest that all the employees would  come within the purview of the said Act.  Those employees who draw wages  as is defined in Section 2(22) of the Act would be the employees who would  be covered thereunder.  As noticed hereinbefore, inspection of the factories  was carried out prior to the date of coming into force of the Act.  Such  inspections, thus, could have been carried out only in terms of the provisions  contained in Section 45 of the Act, which could mean that the Inspector  would be appointed for the purpose of the Act.  He is authorized under the  Act to enquire into the correctness of any of the particulars stated in any  return referred to in Section 44 or for the purpose of ascertaining whether   any of the provisions has been complied with.  It is, therefore, evident that  any action taken prior to or in furtherance of a report made on an inspection,  prior to coming into force of the Act, would be ultra vires Section 45(2) of  the Act.  Once the inspection is held to be illegal, Respondent could not have  taken any statutory action for imposition of penalty.   

       The question may be considered from another angle.  Appellants  could have been directed to file returns or make their contribution in terms

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of the Act.  Had such a notice been served, they could have shown that they  have appointed employees who do not draw wages within the meaning of  the provisions of the said Act and, thus, they do not come within the purview  thereof.

       In Employees’ State Insurance Corporation v. M.M. Suri &  Associates (P) Ltd. [(1998) 8 SCC 111], keeping in view the provisions of  the Act as also the definition of "employee" as contained in Section 2(9) of  the Act vis-‘-vis the definition of "wages" as contained in Section 2(22)  thereof, this Court stated the law in the following terms:

"There is conflict of decisions of the High Courts.  One view is that for an Act to be applicable to an  establishment, the total number of employees  should be 20 or more (now it is 10 or more)  irrespective of the fact whether all the employees  fall within the definition of "employee" as given in  Section 2(9) meaning thereby that drawing of any  amount of wages is immaterial. The other view is  that these 20 or more persons should be those who  fall within the definition of "employee" as given in  Section 2(9) of the Act getting wages as prescribed  therein. As to what "wages" means has also been  defined. The second view commends to us. It was  submitted that if there are 18 employees drawing  the amount of wages prescribed and only two or  more are drawing more than that, the Act should  be applicable as in any case this is beneficial  legislation. Reliance has been placed on a Division  Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court  in A.P. SEB v. ESI Corpn.1 where the High Court  said that the expression "wages" used under  Section 2(12) must be understood in a wider sense  as meaning any remuneration paid to any person  who is employed in the factory and cannot be  restricted only to remuneration paid to the  employees, who come within the definition of  Section 2(9). Section 2(12), no doubt, uses the  words "persons are employed or were employed  for wages". Stress was, therefore, on the word  "persons" and it is submitted that for the Act to be  applicable, the only criterion is to see if the  establishment has 20 or more persons in its  employment. This interpretation ignores the fact of  wages as defined in Section 2(22). If we refer to  the definition of "factory" when the Act came into  force or at least till 1968 when the Act was  amended by Amending Act 44 of 1966, "factory"  meant any premises "wherein 20 or more persons  are working". This definition of "factory" was  changed and at the relevant time, it was substituted  by the words "employed for wages". The exact  amendment we have already noticed above. When  the word "wages" is specifically introduced in the  section, it can only mean to have reference to what  "wages" mean in Section 2(22) of the Act. It  cannot be given any other meaning as has been  done by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In our  view, therefore, the Act would apply to an  establishment only when the number of employees  is 20 or more and all those employees answer the  description of employee contained in Section 2(9)  of the Act."

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       Section 44 of the Act embraces within its fold the principles of natural  justice.  Sub-section (2) of Section 44 is explicit.  A notice was required to  be issued directly in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 44.  However, from  a perusal of the notice dated 20th October, 2000, it is evident that Appellants  were not directed to comply with the provisions of the Act but were asked as  to why the criminal cases should not be instituted against them purported to  be in terms of Section 85(g) of the Act.

       Mr. V.J. Francis, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent,  has drawn our attention to the fact that letters have been issued on 8.9.2000  and 2.9.2000, as would appear from the aforementioned notice dated 20th  October, 2000.  However, from a perusal of the judgments rendered by the  Employees’ Insurance Court as also the High Court it does not appear that  the records were produced to show that Appellants had been given an  opportunity to comply with the provisions of the Act.

       What would mean by the terms "the preceding 12 months" has been  considered by this Court in the The Employees’ State Insurance Corporation  v. Balaji Weaving Mills and Others [(1997) 11 SCC 96] wherein this Court  opined:

"Section 2(12) defines a "factory" to mean any  premises whereupon 10 or more persons are  employed or were employed for wages on any day  "of the preceding 12 months". In the present case,  the finding of the inspector was not that 10 or more  persons were employed on the day on which he  inspected it, but that on an earlier day, namely, 9- 4-1966, 20 persons had been employed. It was  therefore that the words "on any day of the  preceding 12 months" assumed importance. There  is no provision in the Act to which our attention is  drawn relating to the date upon the basis of which  "the preceding 12 months" have to be calculated. It  seems to us that the only possible answer to the  question why this phrase was used is that it was  intended to apply upon the date upon which the  Act came into force. The Act when it came into  force was intended to apply to those factories in  which 10 or more persons were employed on that  day or had been employed on any day in the  preceding 12 months. By making such provision,  the legislature meant to prevent escapement from  the provisions of the Act. But this does not answer  the question that is before us. The counsel has not  been able to point out what the provision is in  regard to the application of the statute to factories  which are found, after the commencement of the  Act, to have employed more than 10 workers on  any day or days prior to the date of inspection or  advance any submission in that behalf."

         It may be true that Appellants would be bound to comply with the  provisions of the Act, as noticed hereinbefore, for the period 1st August,  1999 to 31st July, 2000, but indisputably they were entitled to show that even  for the said period, the provisions of the Act had no application.  

       The question came up for consideration before the Allahabad High  Court in Employees’ State Insurance Corporation v. M/s. U.P. Hotel and  Restaurants Ltd. and another [1975 Lab. I.C. 1025], wherein a Division  Bench of the High Court opined:

"It was contended by learned counsel for the

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appellant that since the Act sets up an Employees’  Insurance Court for decision of certain disputes  where the employer can get a hearing, it is not  necessary to give a hearing at the stage of the  decision by the Corporation.  We are unable to  agree with this contention.  Whether the function  of the Corporation in deciding the question  whether the Act applies or not to a particular  employer is quasi-judicial or not, does not depend  upon whether there is any further remedy open to  the employer or not.  Learned counsel for the  appellant relied upon a decision of the Supreme  Court in Chandra Bhawan Boarding and Lodging,  Bangalore v. State of Mysore, AIR 1970 sc 2042.   In our opinion, the case supports the view that we  have taken other than the view which the learned  counsel has contended for.  It was held in this case  that the dividing line between administration  power and quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is  being gradually obliterated, that the principles of  natural justice would apply to the exercise of the  administrative power as well.  It would follow  from this decision that the principles of natural  justice would apply even if it were held that the  Corporation was only exercising an administrative  power in deciding whether the Act applied or not  to a particular employer."

       We generally agree with the observations made therein.

       Our attention has, however, been drawn to a decision of the Karnataka  High Court in Employees’ State Insurance Corporation v. Karnataka  Asbestos Cement Products [1991 (63) FLR 638].  In that case the High  Court referred to its earlier decision in E.S.I. Corporation v. Subbaraya  Adiga [1988 (57) FLR 612] wherein it was stated:

"A list of employees prepared by the E.S.I.  Inspector in the course of his visit to an  establishment, in order to find out whether the  provisions of the E.S.I. Act are attracted to it, must  contain the name, father’s name, place from which  the employee hails, the designation, the length of  service, emoluments and the signature or thumb  impression of the employee, as the case may be, if  at that time other persons other than the employees  are present, the names and addresses of at least two  of them with their signatures and also the  signatures of the proprietor or manager or the  person-in-charge of the establishment should be  obtained at the end of the list and a copy of which  be furnished to the establishment."

       On the basis thereof, in Karnataka Asbestos Cement Products (supra),  it was directed: "Learned counsel for the Corporation, Sri R.  Gururajan, submitted that the Employees’  Insurance Court erred in setting aside the demand  of contribution for the period 1st January 1986 to  31st May, 1986, relying on the evidence relating to  earlier period.  That argument overlooks the fact  that the entire proceedings initiated was on the  basis of the report of the inspector in regard to the  previous periods.  If that report had to go, all that  followed on account of the report should also go."

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       Indisputably, it is the statutory obligation of the employers to furnish  the name, father’s name, place from which the employee hails, the  designation, the length of service, emoluments and the signature or thumb  impression of the employee, as the case may be, but the same would not  mean that while issuing a notice, the authorities of the Act are bound to  disclose the same.  They in fact without the names and other details of the  employees furnished by the employer would not know thereabout.   However, Section 45 of the Act empowers the Inspector to take down the  details of such employees.  Presumably, only in a case where discrepancy  arises between the information furnished by the employer and the report that  the Inspector may make pursuant to or in furtherance of these inspections  and in such cases such details may have to be furnished.

       It is, however, not necessary for us to delve deep into the matter as  such a question does not arise in this case.

       We have noticed hereinbefore the findings of the learned Employees’  Insurance Court.  It has proceeded on the basis that the rice mill is a factory.   We will also presume that it was not a seasonal factory.  Even otherwise,  when the provisions of the Act are extended by issuance of notification, re- course cannot be taken to sub-section (4) of Section 1 of the Act.

       We, therefore, are of the opinion that having regard to the facts and  circumstances of this case the interest of justice would be subserved if  Appellants are given an opportunity of hearing.  Keeping in view the fact  that Appellants now know the allegations made against them, no fresh notice  need be served.  Appellants may file their returns and also all other books of  accounts before the authorities under the Act within six weeks from date.   The authorities shall give an opportunity of hearing to them and determine  the question as to whether a jurisdictional fact existed for application of the  provisions of the Act in cases of the respective employers.  In the event, it is  found, upon perusal of all the documents whereupon the employers may rely  upon and on the basis of such information as may be sought for or directed  to be furnished by the authority to the employer and upon hearing them that  the provisions of the Act apply, the authorities may proceed as against them  as is permissible in law.   

       The appeals are allowed to the aforementioned extent.  The impugned  judgment is set aside.  No costs.