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PETITIONER: M/S SAVITA CHEMICALS (PVT) LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DYES & CHEMICAL WORKERS UNION & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       11/12/1998

BENCH: S.B.MAJMUDAR, M. JAGANNADHA RAO.

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT -------- S.B. Majmudar, J. ---------------- The appellant company, on grant of  leave  to  appeal  under Article  136  of  the  Constitution of India, has brought in challenge the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed Writ Petition filed by  Respondent No.1  Union  under  Article 227 of the Constitution of India and quashed the decision of  the  Presiding  Officer,  First Labour Court, Thane.  By the said decision, the First Labour Court,  Thane,  took the view on an application moved by the appellant company that Respondent No.1 union had gone on  an illegal  strike from 30th March, 1983 pursuant to the strike notice dated 14th March, 1983.  In  the  impugned  judgment, learned  Single  Judge  of  the High Court took the contrary view and held that the appellant  had  failed  to  establish that the strike in question was illegal. In   order  to  appreciate  the  grievances  of  the appellant against the decision of the High Court, it will be necessary to have a glance at the background facts. Introductory Facts: ------------------- The  appellant  is  a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and is carrying on the business  of  chemicals  at Thane  in the State of Maharashtra since more than 38 years. Respondent No.1 is a  workers  union  registered  under  the Trade Unions Act, 1926.  Respondent No.1 union had submitted a  charter  of  demand  to the appellant no 1st April, 1981. During negotiations a settlement was arrived at  before  the Conciliation Officer between the parties on 8th March, 1982. The said  settlement  was  valid  up  to December 1984.  The settlement,  inter  alia,  amongst   others,   covered   the following  two  demands;  i) Demand No.14 - Privilege Leave; ii) Demand No.26 Medical Check-up; It is  the  case  of  the appellant   company  that  during  the  subsistence  of  the aforesaid settlement, Respondent No.1 union sent a letter of demand to the Factory Manager of the  appellant  company  on 14th March,  1983.   As per the said letter, various demands were raised and it was submitted by  Respondent  No.1  union

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that it would go on strike on the expiry of 14 days from the date of  service  of  the  notice.   According to Respondent No.1, the said notice was to be  considered  as  notice  for going on  strike.    The  Factory  Manager  of the appellant company sent a reply to the notice  of  Respondent  No.1  on 23rd March,  1983.    Respondent  No.1 union, having gone on strike from 30th March, 1983,  sent  a  replication  on  2nd April, 1983. The appellant company which is governed by  the  Maharashtra Recognition  of  Trade  Unions & Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices  Act,  1971  (hereinafter  referred  to   as   the ’Maharashtra  Act’) filed an application under Section 25 of the Maharashtra Act before the Labour Court, Thane,  seeking a  declaration  that  Respondent  No.1, union had gone on an illegal strike.  In the said  application,  the  appellant’s case  was  that  the  said  strike was illegal under Section 24(1)(i)(a)  and  (i)  of  the  Maharashtra  Act.  The  said application was moved as per the provisions of Section 24(1) read with Section 25(1) of the Maharashtra Act.         The  Labour Court, after hearing the parties, by its order dated 20th May, 1983 came to the conclusion  that  the letter  dated  14th  March,  1983 was not a strike notice as required by law and was also contrary to the  provisions  of Section  24(1)(i)  of  the  Maharashtra  Act. It, therefore, declared that the strike resorted to by the workmen and  the staff members with effect from 30th March, 1983 was illegal. Respondent No.1 challenged the  said  order  of  the Labour  Court  in  the  aforesaid  writ  petition  which was registered as Writ Petition No.2171  of  1983  in  the  High Court.   As  noted earlier, learned single Judge of the High Court, by his order allowed the said writ petition  and  set aside the order of the Labour Court and held that the strike was not  illegal.    The  said decision was rendered on 27th November, 1992.  It is this decision, which  is  brought  on the anvil of scrutiny of this Court in this appeal. RIVAL CONTENTIONS: ----------------- Shri M.C.      Bhandare,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the appellant contended that  the  Labour  Court  was  perfectly justified  in taking the view that the impugned notice dated 14th March, 11983 was not legal and  valid  as  it  violated provisions of Section 24(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Act as the said notice  of  strike  was not in the prescribed form.  He also submitted that the said notice was contrary to Rules 50 and 51 of the Labour Courts (Practice  &  Procedure)  Rules, 1975.   That  the notice did not recite that Respondent No.1 union, being a recognised union, obtained vote  of  majority of  the  members  in favour of the strike before serving the notice as required under Clause (b) of  sub-section  (1)  of Section 24  of the Maharashtra Act.  Consequently, according to the learned senior  counsel  for  the  appellant,  strike would  become  illegal  also  as per Section 24(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Act.  He next contended that the impugned strike was also hit by Section 24(1)(i) of the Maharashtra  Act  as it  was  resorted to pursuant to the said notice, during the period in  which  settlement  of  8th  March,  1982  was  in operation  and  the  notice amongst others was based also in respect of two matters covered by  the  settlement,  namely, Demand No.14  - Privilege Leave and Demand No.  26 - Medical Check-up,  both  of  which  were  settled  pursuant  to  the aforesaid settlement.    It was also contended that once the Labour Court had come to the  conclusion  on  facts  on  the relevant  issue  in the light of the evidence laid before it and appreciated by it, it was not open  to  the  High  Court under  Article  227  to  set aside the findings of fact when

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there was no patent error reflected in the judgment  of  the Labour Court.    He also tried to submit that the High Court should not have entertained the writ petition as  Respondent No.1  had  a  remedy  of going in revision in the Industrial Court under Section 44 of Maharashtra Act though  ultimately the said  contention  was  not  seriously  pressed.  Learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that in any  case the  impugned  strike was clearly violative of the requisite provisions of Section 24 of the Maharashtra Act and  it  was wrongly held by the High Court as not to have resulted in an illegal strike.    It  was,  therefore,  contended  that the decision of the learned Single Judge is required to  be  set aside and the decision rendered by the Labour Court deserves to be upheld. Ms.  Anita Shenoy, learned counsel for  the  Respondent,  on the  other  hand,  submitted  that the appellant company had filed the application under Section 24 read with Section  25 of the Maharashtra Act only on the ground that the strike in question  was  allegedly  illegal  as  per the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) meaning thereby it  was  alleged  that  the notice was not in the prescribed form and also on the ground of  violative  of  Section  24(1)*i);  that no case was even alleged for voiding the notice and the  ultimate  strike  on the   ground   that  provisions  of  Section  24(1)(b)  were violated.  It was  also  submitted  by  her  that  the  main requirements  of  the  prescribed  notice as per Form-I read with Rule 22 of the Rules under the Act were  complied  with by the  said  notice.   That the notice was addressed to the authority of the company in charge of the management of  the factory  at the relevant time; that it was clearly mentioned that  there  were  grounds  indicated  therein  which   were compelling Respondent  No.1 union to go on strike.  Even the time for going on strike was  also  mentioned  as  14  days’ after  the  service  of  the  notice’  that  clause-2 of the prescribed Form-1 could not have applied as it was  not  the case of the appellant company itself before the Labour Court that  Respondent  No.1  was  a  recognised  union as per the Maharashtra Act.  Therefore,  the  asterisk  placed  against clause  2  of  Form-1  which  permitted  the striking off of clause 2 when not applicable gets squarely  applied  to  the facts of  the  present case.  She submitted that in order to be a recognised union.  certificate  was  to  be  issued  in favour of Respondent No.1 union, as seen from the definition of Section  3(13)  of  the Maharashtra Act.  That it was not the case of the appellant that provisions  of  Chapter  III, especially,  Sections  10  to  12 were ever complied with by Respondent No.1 union so as to be treated  as  a  recognised union under  the Maharashtra Act.  Consequently, paragraph 2 of the prescribed Form-I of the  notice  did  not  apply  to Respondent No.1 union.  Therefore, there was no occasion for Respondent  No.1  union to even whisper about obtaining vote of majority of the members in the said notice as tried to be submitted by learned senior counsel for the appellant.    It was  contended  that  the  notice  in question substantially complied with the requirements of the said  prescribed  form of the notice.  Consequently, the Labour Court was in patent error  when  it  took  the view that Respondent No.1 had not given strike notice in the  prescribeed  form  and  on  that score  Section  24(1)(a)  got  attracted on the facts of the present case.  Such a patent error was rightly set aside  by the  High  Court  under  Article  227 of the Constitution of India.  She next contended that as the appellant company did not invoke alleged violation of Section 24(1)(b) before  the Labour  Court,  there  was no question of examining the said ground either by the Labour Court or by the High Court.  She

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submitted that the very fact that the  said  sub-clause  (b) was  not  pressed  in service by the appellant company shows that it neverr  treated  Respondent  No.1  as  a  recognised union.   So  far as the applicability of Section 24(1)(i) is concerned, she submitted that  the  strike  notice  was  not given  during the currency of the settlement with respect to any of the matters  covered  by  the  settlement.    It  was submitted that Demand No.14 regarding the privilege leave as found  in  the settlement only granted crystalisation of the right of the workmen represented by  Respondent  No.1  union for  getting  privilege  leave of 12 days for each completed 240 days of work per year and further privilege leave of one day for  every  additional  12  days  of  work  as  provided therein.   That  the dispute raised in the strike notice did not seek, in any way, to change the basis of the said  grant of  privilege leave but the grievance was entirely different as it pertained to the proper computation of  the  privilege leave as  per  the  terms  of  the  settlement.  In a way it amounted to calling for correct and proper implementation of the settlement for which Respondent No.1  union  could  have filed  a complaint under Section 28 of the Act pertaining to unfair labour practice on the part of the employer as  found in Schedule  IV Item 9 of the Maharashtra Act.  But that did not take away the additional right of  strike  available  to Respondent No.1 union on behalf of its workmen.  It was also submitted  that  the very fact that failure to implement the award was made by the legislature a subbject matter  of  the complaint,  showed  that  such  implementation  would not be covered by the settlement.  It is for the simple reason that if it had already been covered by the settlement,  even  the more  drastic  remedy  of  strike for getting the settlement implemented would have stood barred under Section  24(1)(i). In other words, it was contended that matters covered by the settlement  as  per  Section  24(1)(i)  would  be only those matters which were expressly referred to in the  settlement. Computation  of  the benefit as per the agreed terms in tthe settlement was  not  a  matter  which  was  covered  by  the settlement  but  was  a  matter  even  if arising out of the settlement was one which was consequent upon the settlement. It was an independent matter for which there was no  express provision in  the  settlement.    It  was  posterior  to the settlement and not embeedded therein.  Consequently, Section 24(1)(i) also was not applicable to the facts of the present case and as the Labour Court had committed a patent error in this connection it was rightly corrected by the High  Court. Similar  was  her  contention  regarding  Demand No.26 about Medical Check-up.  It was submitted that the said settlement had nothing to do witth the prevention of discase as  Demand No.26  referred  to  medical treatment for the disease which was already suffered by  the  workmen  due  to  occupational hazards.   Prevention  of such disease which was the subject matter of impugned notice was anterior to  the  question  of medical  check-up  and  was  not covered by the terms of the settlement.  Even on that ground Section  24(1)(i)  did  not get attracted.    That  the High Court rightly corrected the patent error of the Labour Court in  this  connection.    It was,  therefore,  contended that the High Court, in exercise of  its  powers  under  Article  227,   was   justified   in interfering  with  the  order  of  the  Labour  Court and in setting aside the  patently  erroneous  order  of  the  said court.    It  was,  therefore,  submitted  that  the  appeal deserves to be dismissed.  She contended that 40 workmen who were out of job since  more  than  15  years  have  suffered immensely  and  that  their  services  have  been  illegally terminated by the appellant  company.    This  part  of  the

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grievance,  in  our  view, cannot form subject matter of the present proceedings and, therefore, whatever practice on the part of the employer as found in Schedule IV Item 9  of  the Maharashtra Act.   But that did not take away the additional right of strike available to Respondent No.1 union on behalf of its workmen.  It was also submitted  hat  the  very  fact that  failure  to  implement  the  award  was  made  by  the legislature a subject matter of the complaint,  showed  that such implementation would not be covereed by the settlement. It  is  for  the  simple  reason that if it had already been covered by the settlement, even the more drastic  remedy  of strike  for  getting  the  settlement implemented would have stood barred under Seection 24(1)(i).  In  other  words,  it was  contended that matters covered by the settlement as per Section 24(1)(i) would be  only  those  matters  which  were expressly referred to in the settlement.  Computation of the benefit  as per the agreed terms in the settlement was not a matter which was covered by the settlement but was a  matter even  if  arising  out  of  the settlement was one which was consequent upon the  settlement.    It  was  an  independent matter  for  which  there  was  no  express provision in the settlement.  It was posterior  to  the  settlement  and  not embedded therein.    Consequently, Section 24(1)(i) also was not applicable to the facts of the present case and  as  the Labour Court had committed a patent error in this connection it was rightly corrected by the High Court.  Similar was her contention  regarding  Demand  No.26 about Medical Check-up. It was submitted that the said settlement had nothing to  do with  the  prevention of discase as Demand No.26 referred to medical treatment for the disease which was already suffered by the workmen due to occupational hazards.   Prevention  of such disease which was the subject matter of impugned notice was anterior to the question of medical check-up and was not covered by the terms of the settlement.  Even on that ground Section 24(1)(i) did not get attracted.  That the High Court rightly  corrected  the  patent error of the Labour Court in this connection.  It was, therefore, contended that the High Court, in exercise of its  powers  under  Article  227,  was justified  in interfering with the order of the Labour Court and in setting aside the patently  erroneous  order  of  the said court.    It  was, therefore, submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed.  She contended that 40 workmen who were out of job since  more  than  15  years  have  suffered immensely  and  that  their  services  have  been  illegally terminated by the appellant  company.    This  part  of  the grievance,  in  our  view, cannot form subject matter of the present proceedings and, therefore, whatever remedies may be available to the concerned workmen, in this connection,  may be  open  to them in accordance with law. It will be equally open to the appellant company  to  resist  the  said  future proceedings  in  accordance with law if at all that occasion arises. We do not express any opinion  about  the  same.  In this  case, we are concerned with the short question whether the High Court was justified in  setting  aside  the  Labour Court’s  order declaring the strike of the workmen from 30th March, 1983 illegal as per provisions  of  Section  24(1)(i) and Section 24(1)(i) of the Maharashtra Act.          Aforesaid   rival  contentions  give  rise  to  the following points for our consideration: i)     Whether the impugned strike  notice  of  14th  March, 1983 given by Respondent No.1 union on behalf of its members was violative of Section 24(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Act; ii)    Whethever  the impugned strike notice is violative of provision of Section 24(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Act; iii)   Whether the  impugned  strike  notice  was  hit    by

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Section 24(1)(i) of the Maharashtra Act; iv)      Whether   the   High  Court,  in  exercise  of  its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, was justified in interfering with the  findings  reached  by the Labour Court; and v)   What final order? Before  taking  up  the  consideration  of  these  aforesaid points, it will be necessary to have a look at the  relevant statutory  scheme  in  the  light of which the controversies between the parties will have to be resolved. STATUTORY SCHEME: ---------------- The  Maharashtra Act is enacted, amongst others, for the recognition of trade unions for facilitating  collective bargaining  for  certain undertakings, to state their rights and obligations; to confer certain  powers  on  unrecognised unions  and  to  provide  for  declaring certain strikes and lock-outs as illegal strikes and lock-outs,  to  define  and provide   for   the  prevention  of  certain  unfair  labour practices  and  to   constitute   courts   (as   independent machinery)  for  carrying  out  the  purposes  of  according recognition to trade unions. Section 3,  sub-section  (13)  defines  a  recognised  union Chapter  III  deals with recognition of unions and lays down that the provisions of this  chapter  will  apply  to  every undertaking,  wherein  fifty or more employees are employed, or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve  months; Section  12  lays  down  the procedure to be followed by the Industrial Court while granting certificate  of  recognition to the applicant union. Chapter V deals with illegal strikes and  lock-outs. Section 24 covers these topics. The relevant provisions of Section 24 read as under:         "24. Illegal strike  and  lock-out:-  In  this  Act,         unless the context requires otherwise:-         (1)    "illegal  strike"  means  a  strike  which is         commenced or continued.         (a)  without giving to the employer notice of strike         in the prescribed form, or within fourteen  days  of         the giving of such notice;         (b)   where  there    is a recognised union, without         obtaining the vote of the majority of the members of         the union, in favour of the strike before the notice         of the strike is given:         (c)   xxxxxx xxxxx xxxx         (d)   xxxxxx xxxxx xxxx         (e)   xxxxxx xxxxx xxxx         (f)   xxxxxx xxxxx xxxx         (g)   xxxxxx xxxxx xxxx         (h)   xxxxxx xxxxx xxxx         (i)   during any period in which any  settlement  or         award  in  in  operation,  in  respect of any of the         matters covered by the settlement or award."                                        (Emphasis supplied)      Section 25 deals with  procedure  to  be  followed  for getting  the  declaration  whether  strike  or  lock-out  is illegal. Sub-section (1) thereof which is relevant  for  our purpose provides that:         "Where   the   employees  in  any  undertaking  have         proposed to go on strike or have commenced a strike,         the  State  Government  or  the  employeer  of   the         undertaking may make a reference to the Labour Court         for a declaration that such strike is illegal." Sub-section (5) of Section 25 lays down that:         "Where any strike or lock-out declared to be illegal         under  this  section is withdrawn within forty-eight

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       hours of such declaration, such strike  or  lock-out         shall  not,  for the purposes of this Act, be deemed         to be illegal under this Act." Chapter IV deals with Unfair Labour  Practices.  Section  26 thereof which is the first section in that Chapter lays down that:         "unless  the  context  requires  otherwise,  ’unfair         labour practices’ mean any of the  practices  listed         in Schedules II, III and IV." Section   28  prescribes  the  procedure  for  dealing  with complaints relating to unfair labour practices.  Sub-section (1) thereof provides :         "Where any person has engaged in or is  engaging  in         any  unfair  labour  practice, then any union or any         employee  or  any  employer  or  any   Investigating         Officer may, within ninety days of the occurrence of         such unfair labour practice, file a complaint before         the  Court  competent  to  deal  with such complaint         either under section 5, or as the case may be, under         section 7, of this Act:"         Schedulee IV, which is  relevant  for  our  purpose, deals  with  General  Unfair Labour Practices on the part of employers. Item 9 thereof deals with  failure  to  implement award,  settlement  or agreement on the part of the employer which would be treated as general unfair labour practice  on the  part  of  the employers. It is in the background of the aforesaid statutory scheme that  we  have  to  consider  the points which arise for our determination. Point No.1: ----------             The factual matrix relevant for consideration of this  point  indicates,  as  noted  earlier,  that there was settlement arrived at  between  the  appellant  company  and Respondent  No.1  union  on  8th  March, 1982 which, amongst others, settled demand nos. 14 and  26  regarding  privilege leave  and  medical  check-up. We will have occasion to deal with the terms  of  settlement  regarding  these  demands  a little  later  when  we  will  deal  with  point no.3. It is sufficient for the present to  mention  that  the  aforesaid settlement  was  for three years valid up to December, 1984. It is during the subsistence  of  the  aforesaid  settlement that  Respondent  No.1  union sent a letter of demand to the Factory Manager of the  appellant  company  on  14th  March, 1983, as noted earlier. It will be relevant at this stage to refer  to  the exact wording of the said letterr. It read as underr:         "Ref.No.DCWU/146/1983_                  Hand Delivery      Dated 14-3-1983.         The Factory Manager,         Savita Chemicals P. Ltd.,         Plot No.17A, Belapur Road,         Thane.         -----         Sir,                We find that one Shri U.V.  Sinkar  and  Shri         Durga  Prasad  P.S.R.K., working as chemists in your         company have been under the pretext of  retrenchment         and/or slackness of work, removed by you. The ground         advanced  is a cloak though factually the work under         no circumstances was reduced and there  were  junior         most  persons  continued  in  the  employment in the         similar category.         We may also bring to your notice that ever since the         staff members have enrolled themselves as members of         our  union,  your  management  has started harassing

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       them and you have been demanding their  resignations         from the  primary  membership of the union.  Threats         were openly held that the union will  be  liquidated         by the management.         We also find  that  the  workmen  are  subjected  to         harassment  and  the workmen who have been appointed         as  probationers  are  continued   as   probationers         despite  the  fact  that  the law of the land namely         Employment Standing Orders Act  1946  which  becomes         applicable  to  your  establishment  does not permit         continuance of such employees as probationers for an         indifinite period.    "Similarly  there  have   been         illegal  changes  brought  about  in  the  matter of         computing the  privilege  leave."  There  have  been         instances   where   the   workmen   under   fabulous         allegations charge-sheeted  and  removed,  and  many         more are awaiting the charge-sheets. This has become         the  order  of the day, and the lives of the workmen         in the company also have become introlerable.                                    (Emphasis supplied)         There  are  also  difficulties and hazards emanating         from the operations and no effective steps have been         taken by your management to  prevent  such  hazards.         It   is   very   difficult  to  understand  how  the         management has been continuing its operations  in  a         crude  fashion  and  exposing the workmen to serious         types of hazards.  The process  of  sulphonation  is         positively causing dangerous effects on the lives of         the  workmen  and  no  steps of any manner have been         taken either to modify  and/or  cure  the  processes         whereby  the  ingredients or hazards are reduced and         the lives become  tolerable.    Similarly  operation         containing  Polyneuclear  Aromatics  and Alkylate is         capable of causing cancer to the  workmen.    It  is         rather  tragic  that  no  steps  have  been taken to         prevent such processes where large majority  of  the         workmen  not  only in your company but those working         surround your company who are  susceptible  to  such         after  effects  are  given  any  assurance by way of         rectifying the method and taking away the  dangerous         hazards  involved.  Lives  of  the workmen are often         becoming dangerous and under no circumstances, it is         possible for  the  workmen,  considering  the  total         indifference  on  the  part  of  the  management  to         continue operation in the circumstances in which the         management  wants  to  continue  it.  The   workmen,         therefore,  have resolved that the total attitude of         the management towards  resolution of the industrial         dispute and other relevant circumstances  as  stated         hereinabove,  which  are  making  the  lives  of the         workmen very dangerous and are exposing them to  the         dangers  and  therefore,  the  workmen  in  order to         prevent the after effects and such dangers and  also         shabby  treatment  meted out to the workmen and also         the physical  attacks  lodged  against  the  workmen         through   anti-social  elements  employment  by  the         company, to protect themselves and their rights  and         on that account, the workmen have decided to proceed         on strike and that being so, this notice is given to         you.  The  workmen therefore, want you to treat this         letter to be treated as notice of strike and it  may         be  noted  that after the expiry of 14 days from the         date of receipt of this letter hereof,  the  workmen         will  proceed  on strike and the consequence in such         circumstances  flowing  there-from  shall  be   your

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       responsibility which please note.                Thanking you,                                      Yours faithfully                                                  Sd/ -                                      General Secretary The  said  letter  was addressed by Respondent No.1 union to the Factory Manager of the appellant company.  As seen  from this  letter,  the  following  averments  1  to  8 contained therein had nothing to do with Section 24(1)(i) of the  Act. (1)  Firstly  it  was mentioned that one Shri U.V.Sinkar and shri Durga Prasad P.S.R.K., working as chemists were wrongly retrenched.  (2) Secondly the grievance of  Respondent  No.1 union  was  that  the  management  had started harassing the staff members who were enrolled as members of the union  and their  resignations  were  subjected  to  harassment and the workmen  who  had  been  appointed  as   probationers   were continued  as  probationers despite the fact that the law of the land, namely, Employment Standing Orders Act,  1946  did not permit  such  continuance.    Then followed the recitals which have been strongly pressed in service by  the  learned senior   counsel  for  the  appellant,  in  support  of  his submission, which in  his  view  made  the  proposed  strike illegal under  the  relevant  provisions  of Section 24.  It will, therefore, be profitable to extract  the  recitals  in extenso.   It  has been mentioned i second part of paragraph three of the notice as under:         "Similarly there have been illegal changess  brought         about  in  the  matter  of  computing  the privilege         leave." (4)   The   rest  of  the  paragraph  dealt  with  different grievances, namely, that workmen under frivolous allegations were charge-sheeted and removed and many more were  awaiting charge-sheets.   (5)  Then  followed  the  fourth  grievance regarding the difficulties and hazards  emanating  from  the operation  of  the  factory  and that no effective steps had been taken by the management to prevent such  hazards.    It was  recited  that  the  management  had been continuing its operations in a crude fashion and exposing  the  workmen  to serious types  of  hazards.   (6) It was then mentioned that the process of sulphonation was positively causing dangerous effects on the lives of the workmen  and  no  steps  of  any manner  had  been  taken  either  to  modify and/or cure the processes whereby the ingredients or  hazards  were  reduced and the  lives  became  tolerable.  (7) Similarly, operation containing Polynuclear Aromatics and Alkylate was capable of causing cancer to the workmen.  (8) Then the  grievance  was made  that no steps had been taken to prevent such processes where large majority of the workmen not only in the  company but  those  working  in  the surroundings of the company who were susceptible to such after effects were  not  given  any assurance  by  way  of rectifying the method and taking away the dangerous hazards involved.  It was  then  recited  that the  lives  of the workmen were often becoming dangerous and under no circumstances, it was  possible  for  the  workmen, considering  the  total  indiffierence  on  the  part of the management to continue operation  in  the  circumstances  in which the  management  wanted  to continue the work.  It was then recited that the workmen, therefore, had resolved  that considering  the  total attitude of the management regarding resolution of the  industrial  dispute  and  other  relevant circumstances  as stated herein, they had decided to proceed on strike and that being so this notice  was  given  to  the addressee.   It  was  then  mentioned in the notice that the workmen wanted the addressee to treat this letter as  notice of strike and it was to be noted that after the expiry of 14

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days  from  the  date  of receipt of the letter, the workmen would proceed on strike.  The said letter was replied to  on behalf  of the company by its Factory Manager on 23rd March, 1983 refuting the allegations made in the strike notice  and calling  the representatives of the union for discussion and settlement of the matter amicably. It is thereafter that the members of respondent No.1 union went on  strike  from  30th March,  1983 and then sent the replication through the union on 2nd April, 1983 refuting the contents of the reply of the managementt dated 23rd March, 1983.        In the light of the aforesaid factual  matrix,  first question  arises  whether the impugned notice of 14th March, 1983 fell foul on the touch-stone  of  Section  24(1)(a)  of thee   Maharashtra  Act.  Learned  senior  counsel  for  the appellant submitted that the said  notice  was  not  in  the prescribed  form.  For supporting this contention, he relied upon Rule 22 framed by the  State  Government  undr  Section 61(1) of the Act which lays down that:         "the  State  Government may, by notification, in the         Official Gazette, and subject to  the  condition  of         previous  publication,  make  rules for carrying out         the purposes of this Act".     The  relevant  rule  is   found   in   the   Maharashtra recognition  of  Trade  Unions & Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Rules, 1975. Rule 22 is found in Chapter V of  the said rules. It lays down as follows:         "22.  Notice of strike :- The notice of strike under         clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 24 shall be         in the Form I and shall be sent by registered post."     When we turn to Form No.1, we find the  prescribed  form as under:                                 FORM - I                               (See Rule 22)         Name of the Trade Union:         Name  of  5  elected representatives of the workmen,         where no Trade Union exists :         Address...         Dated the... day of ....     .....   19     ,         To,         (Here mention name of the employer and full  address         of the undertaking)         Dear Sir(s)/Madam,                In  accordance  with the provisions contained         in sub-section (1) of section 24 of the  Maharashtra         Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of unfair         Labour Practices Act, 1971, I/We.         (Here insert name of the person(s))         hereby  give  you Notice that I/we propose to call a         strike of the workmen employed in  your  undertaking         propose to go on strike along with the other workmen         employed  in  yourr undertaking form the .....day of         ..... 19 .....   for the reason(s) explained in  the         Annexure attached hereto.         2.  *    This Union being a recognised Union in your         undertaking has obtained the vote of majority of the         memberrs  in  your  undertaking  in  favour  of  the         strike,  before  serving  this  notice on you, under         clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 24  of  the         Act.                                       Yours faitfully                                           Signature         Place.......  General Secretary/Secretary,                        .....   .......   .......                        (Here insert name of the Union)                    *Strike of whichever is not applicable

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                              Annexure                           Statement of Reasons         Copy to:         (1) The Investigating Officer ......         (Here  enter  office  address  of  the Investigating         Officer, for the area concerned)         (2) The Registrar, Industrial Court,             Maharashtra, Bombay.         (3) The Judge, Labour Court .... ......         (Here enter address of the Labour Court,         of the area concerned).         (4) The Commissioner of Labour, Bombay.                            -----------    The learned senior counsel for the appellant relied  upon Rules  50  &  51 of the Labour Courts (Practice & Procedure) Rules, 1975. So far as these rules are concerned,  they  are framed by the Industrial Court of maharashtra in exercise of its  powers  conferred  under  Section 44 of the Maharashtra Act. When we turn to Section 44, we find that it deals  with powers  of  Industrial  Court in connection with exercise of superintendence over all Labour  Courts.  It  lays  down  as follows:         "The  Industrial  Court  shall  have superintendence         over all Labour Courts and may.         (a) call for returns;         (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms         for regulating the practice and  procedure  of  such         Courts in matters not expressly provided for by this         Act, and in particular, for securing the expeditious         disposal of the cases;         (c)  prescribe  form  in  which  books,  entries and         accounts shall be kept by officers  of  any  Courts;         and         (d)  settle  a  table  of  fees  payable for process         issued by a Labour Court or the Industrial Court." It,  therefore,  becomes  obvious  that  the  Labour  Courts (Practice  &  procedure) Rules, 1975 are for guidance of the Labour Courts and for regulating the practice and  procedure of these  courts.   Thus, Rules 50 and 51 which are part and parcel of these rules, cannot have anything to do  with  the format  of the notice of strike which a union has to give to the management as per Section 24(1)(a).   Prescribed  format for the purpose of the said provision will necessarily be as per  Form-I  as was laid down by Rule 22 of the Rules framed by the State Govt.   Rules,  1975  are,  therefore,  totally redundant  and  irrelevant  for  resolving this controversy. We, therefore, do not dilate on the  same.    however,  Shri Bhandare, learned senior counsel for the appellant, contends that  at least prescribed Form-I as per Rule 22 of the Rules framed by the State of Maharashtra is relevant for  deciding this  controversy.  To  that extent he is right. Now, a mere look at the said Form-I shows that the notice must  contain, amongst others, thee following basic requirement:     i)    The  name  of  the  Trade Union giving notice, its address and the date of the notice;    ii)   The name of the employer and full  address  of  the undertaking for which the notice is meant; iii)  Clear  indication  in  the  notice  about the call for strike of the workmen employed in the  undertaking  and  the date from which the strike is to be resorted to;    iv) and the reasons for the proposed strike. It  is  easy  to  visualise  that  if all the aforesaid four requirements  are  fulfilled,  in   substance,   the   basic requirements of Form-I would get satisfied.  It is not as if that the notice must be typed in the samee sequence in which

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Form-I  is  drafted  or  that it must mention Section 24(1). The latter are mere formal requirements.  In substance,  the notice  must  fulfil the aforesaid basic requirements of the prescribed form.  If they are fulfilled,  which  section  of the  Act  applies  to such notice can be easily found out by reference to the Act.  Similarly, whether notice is given by registered post or by hand delivery  is  also  not  a  basic requirement.  It  refers to mode of service.  In the present case, it is not in dispute that notice was  duly  served  on the management.    Sending of copies of notice to mentioneed persons is also not a part of the basic requirement  of  the notice.  When we examine the impugned strike notice, we find that  all  these four basic requirements of Form-I have been complied with in the present case.  the name and address  of the   Trade  Union  which  served  the  notice  are  clearly mentioned, the date of the notice  is  also  indicated,  the nature  of  the  addressee of the notice and his address are also mentioned, namely, it has been addressed to the Factory Manager of the company who was in-charge of the  company  at the relevant time and under whom the workmen proposing to go on strike  were  actually  working.    It  is  also  clearly mentioneed as to forrm which date the strike is proposed  to be  resorted to, as it is mentioned that the strike would be resorted to on the expiry of 14 days from the  date  of  the receipt of  the  letter  cum  notice.    It  is also clearly mentioned that the letter will  be  treated  as  notice  for going on  proposed  strike.    Then follows the heart of the notice, namely, reasons why the proposed strike  has  to  be resorted.   Thus,  all the basic requirements of Form-I have been satisfied.  even the Labour Court took  the  view  that the substance of the notice had to be seen and not its form. Still,  however, it persuaded itself to hold that the notice was not in the prescribeed fform.  The said finding  of  the Labour  Court  was patently illegal and was rightly reversed by tthe High Court in the impugned judgment, Learned  senior counsel for the appellant, Shri Bhandare, however, submitted that  requirement  of paragraph 2 of the said Form-I was not complied with in the present case.  It is not  mentioned  in the  notice  that  the  Union  beeing a recognised union has obtained the vote of  majority  of  the  members  to  go  on strike.   It  must  be  kept  in  view that this clause 2 of Form-I being an asterisk which says that any  portion  which is  not applicable has to be struck off when not applicable. It was not the case of  the  appellannt  at  any  time  that Respondent  no.1  Union  was  recognised union under the Act having  followed  the  equirements  and  had  obtained   the certificate  of  a  recognised union under Section 12 of the Act.  On the contrary, when we turn to the application filed by the appellant before the Labour Court, we  find  that  it was  the case of the appellant itsef before the Labour Court that the  Union  was  a  registered  Union  and  claimed  to represent  the  employees  employed  by the applicant in the said factory.  It was not the case of the  appellant  before the  Labour  Court  in the application Under Section 25 that respondent No.1 Union was a recognised union under the  Act. Not only that, the application sought to invoke only Section 24(1)(a) and Section 24(1)(i) of the Maharashtra Act and did not  invoke  Section  24(1)(b) of the Act which deals with a recognised union.  It is also the case  of  Respondent  no.1 that  it  is  not a recognised union under the Act, Thus, it was almost an admitted position on  the  record  before  the Labour Court that Respondent no.1 Union was not a recognised union under  the  Act.   Once that conclusion is reached, it becomes obvious that paragraph 2 of the form-I did not apply to the facts of the present case and had to  be  treated  to

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have  been  struck-off  for  the  purpose  of issuing strike notice by Respondent no.1 Union to  the  appellant  company. Consequently,  the  finding  of  the  Labour  Court that the impugned notice was not in a prescribed form and  therefore, would  result  in  the  strike  of  30th March, 1983 onwards becoming  an  illegal  strike  being  contrary  to   Section 24(1)(a)  of the Maharashtra Act must be held to be patently erroneous and was rightly sett aside by the  High  COurt  in writ jurisdication.   In fact, on this aspect, two views are not possible at all and only one view which appealed to  the High  Court  is  the only possible and permissible view. The view taken by the  Labour  COurt  was  clearly  contrary  to evidence  on  record  and  had to be treated as perverse and patently illegal. It  must,  therefore,  be  held  that  the impugned   notice   of  strike  was  not  violative  of  the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) of the  Maharashtra  Act.  It must  be  held  that  the  said notice was a perfectly valid strike notice as required by the said  provision  read  with Rule  22  and  Form-I  of  the relevant M.R.T. and P.U.I.P., Rules, 1975. The first  point  is,  therefore,  answered  in negative, in favour of Respondent no.1 Union and against the appellant company. Point No.2: This takes us to the consideration  of  Point  No.2,  It  is obvious  that  it  was not the case of the appellant company before  the  Labour  Court  that  the  impugned  strike  was contrary  to  the provisions of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act, In fact, as seen  earlier,  it  was  not  the  case  of  the appellant   company   that  Respondent  no.1  Union,  was  a recognised union under the Act at the relevant time when  it gave the  impugned  notice.    COnsequently, the appellant’s case before the Labour Court for getting the strike declared illegal was based only on the violation of Section  24(1)(a) of   the   Act.  The  Labour  Court  has  also  treated  the proceedings accordingly and the ultimate  decision  rendered by  the  Labour  Court is also to the effect that the strike notice of  14th  March,  1983  was  no  notice  in  law  and violative  of  provisions of Section 24(1)(i). In substance, the Labour Court had no occasion to  consider  the  question whether  it  was  violative  also of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act. It is also, in this connection, perttinent to note  the prayer  in the application moved by the appellant before the Labour Court under Section 25 of the Act.  the  said  prayer reads as under:         "The  Applicant  prays that the Hon’ble Court may be         pleased to declare:         (i) That the strike resorted to by  the  workmen  as         well  as  by  the  staff  members  employed  in  the         Applicant’s factory commencing from 30-3-83 at their         respective  shift  schedule  timings  and  continued         thereafter  every day in all the shifts and which is         still  continuing  in  an   illegal   strike   under         Sec.24(1)(a) & (i) of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971." It, therefore, becomes  obvious  that  it  is  not  open  to learned  senior counsel for the appellant - Shri Bhandare to submit that the impugned strike notice was violative of  the provision of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act. Consequently, this point  does not arise for our consideration and must be held to be redundant and is not applicable to the  facts  of  the present  case.  It  must, therefore, be held while answering this point that the impougned strike notice cannot  be  said to  be violative of the provision of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act for the aforesaid reasons. Point No.3: ----------

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      So far as this point is concerned, it requires a more closer scrutiny. As we have seen earlier, there was  also  a bunding  settlement  between  the parties in connection with demand nos. 14 and 26. We shall first deal  with  settlement on demand no.14 regarding Privilege Leave.       So  far  as  this  demand is concerned, the settlement reads as under:         "Demand No.14 : PRIVILEGE LEAVE:         -------------------------------            The existing practice of 12 days  leave  for  the         first  240  days  worked and 1 day for every 12 days         worked beyond 240 days shall  continue  and  in  all         other  respect  the  privisions  of  Factory Act and         existing rules shall apply."    A mere look at the settlement on this Item shows that  it was  agreed  between  the  parties  that  the  then existing practice of  granting  12  days  privilege  leave  for  each completed  240 days work per year and one day more for every additional 12 days of work beyond 240 days was  to  continue and in all other respects thee provisions of Factory Act and existing  rules  were to apply. Now, the question is whether any part of this settlement on privilege leave was sought to be by-passed or challenged in the impugned notice so  as  to get voided on the touchstone of Section 24(1)(i) of the Act, The said provision  lays  down  that  "Illegal  strike" means  a  strike  which is commenced or continued during any period in which any settlement or award is in operation,  in respect  of  any of the matters covered by the settlement or award.  The question is whether the proposed strike, amongst others, was concerning the grievances in connection with any matter "covered" by the settlement.  A conjoint  reading  of relevant  clauses  of  settlement  on demand No.14 regarding Privilege Leave  shows  that  it  was  settled  between  the parties  that  during  the continuation of the settlement, a workman would be entitled to claim only 12 days for 240 days of work and 1 day for  every  additional  12  days  of  work beyond 240  days thereafter in a given year.  It was not the case of Respondent No.1 Union  in  the  impugned  notice  of strike  that  they  wanted  any more days of privilege leave after 240 days of  work  in  a  year  by  way  of  grant  of privilege  leave  vis-avis  the number of days worked during the year.  The impugned strike  notice,  as  noted  earlier, recited  an  entirly different grievance, namely, that there were  illegal  changes  brought  about  in  the  matter   of computing privilege  leave.   Actual and correct computation of privilege leave on the basis of actual days worked  in  a year  for concerned workers was not covereed by the terms of the settlement.        This    grievance    pertained     to non-implementation   of   the  agreed  settlement  regarding privilege leave and had nothing to do with the claim for any extra privilege leave in addition to that which  was  agreed to between  the  parties.    To  take an analogy, the rights crystalised in the decree stand  on  an  entirely  different ffooting   as   compared   to  the  grievance  in  execution proceedings  regarding  non-implementation  of  the  settled rights under the decree.  The grievance made in the impugned strike  notice  did  not  pertain to any modification of the crystalised rights regarding privilege leave granted to  the workmen under the settlement but it pertained to an entirely different grievance based on a situation which was posterior to  settlement of rights and obligations regarding privilege leave between the parties.   Thus,  as  seen  earlier,  this grievance about non-implementation of the crystallised terms of settlement cannot be said to be a matter "covered" by the settlement  for  purposes  of  the  difinition  of  "Illegal

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strike" referred to above.  It can be said to  be  amounting to  a grievance in connection with non-implementation of the settlement in its true and correct perspective.    That,  of course,  would  also  amount  to allegation of unfair labour practice on the part of  the  employer  as  reflected  by  a conjoint reading of section 26 and Schedule IV Item 9 of the Act, as  noted earlier.  But the allegation of unfair labour practice on the part of the management  has  nothing  to  do with  the  question  whether it also amounts to going behind the settlement.  Thus, the strike notice referred to a claim which arose subsequent to the settlement in connection  with non-implementation of the main terms of the settlement.  The Labour  Court  was  patently  in error when it took the view that because of the  alternative  remedy  available  to  the workmen  of  filing  a complaint about alleged unfair labour practice on the part of the management, they could not  have resorted  to  a  more  drastic  remedy  of  strike under the provisions of the Maharashtra Act.    Nothing  in  this  Act could  be  relied  upon to show that if any grievance of the workmen is covered by unfair labour practice alleged against the employer, they cannot resort to strike.  However learned senior counsel for  the  appellant  Shri  Bhandare,  rightly submitted  that  such  a more drastic remedy was of the last resort. He was also right when he submitted that when a less drastic  remedy  was  available,  the  workmen  should  have resorted  to  the  same for maintaining industrial peace and production. However, that would be in  the  realm  of  trade union policy. It may be more prudent for a union of workmen, with  a  view  to  having  industrial  peace  and  continued production as well  as  for  not  disrupting  continuity  of employment  of  workmen, to resort to negotiations, and that if needed, to go in the Labour Court  with  complaint  under Section  28  on  the ground of unfair labour practice by the employer  for  the   alleged   non-implementation   of   the settlement.  It  may  also  be  an  ideal  solution  of  the problems. But what is ideal may not necessarily be filed  by a  more  militant  body  of workmen. It may in the long run, prove to be a more drastic remedy for the  workmen  as  they would  suffer  pangs of unemployment and starvation not only for themselves but also for the members of  their  families. But  only  because  such  better and more purdent remedy was available, it cannot be said that the extreme step of strike resorted to be the Union by not following  such  remedy  was per  se  illegal  unless  it fell within the fore-corners of Section 24(1)(i) of the Maharashtra Act. It is also easy  to visualise   that  the  same  Maharashtra  legislature  which enacted Section 24(1)(i) also enacted Schedule IV Item 9  by treating  it  to be an unfair labour practice on the part of the employer. The Maharashtra Act  laid  down  two  separate provisions  in  connection  with  illegal  strike as well as unfair labour practice  by  the  employer.  What  is  unfair labour  practice  on  the  part  of  the  employer cannot be pressed in service by the management to  show  that  workers making grievances regarding the same could not have resorted to  the  strike  in  connection  with the same unfair labour practice and if they did so the strike only  on  that  score became  an  illegal  strike,  especially  when  it  was  not contrary to any of the provisions of Section 24(1).  In  any case,  the  grievance  regarding  non-implementation  of the settlement is not treated by the legislature to be a  matter "covered"  by  the  settlement  as  both  these  topics  are separately dealt with it by enacting Section 24(1)(i) on the one hand and Schedule IV Item 9 of the Act on the other. But  leaving  aside  these aspects of the matter, it becomes clear that the intention  of  the  legislature  by  enacting

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24(1)(i)  is  that during any period in which any settlement is in operation if strike is restorted to by  the  union  or the  workmen  in connection with any matter "covered" by the settlement the strike would be illegal. Therefore,  it  must be  shown that the strike has been resorted to in connection with any matter covered  by  the  settlement.  It  therefore necessarily  means  that  the  terms of the settlement, when read, must indicate that they encompassed any  matter  which is made the subject matter of the strike notice. We must see the  express  terms of settlement with a view to finding out as to which matters are  covered  by  the  settlement.  This necessarly  would  connote  that  the  settlement in express terms must refer to a matter which is  subsequently  made  a subject  matter  of  notice  of  strike. When we turn to the settlement of demand no. 14 regarding  privilege  leave,  we find  that  how 12 days leave for the first 240 days of work in a year and 1 day for  every  additional  12  days  worked beyond  240 days worked are computed in a given year, is not a mater which is  at  all  indicated  or  mentioned  in  the settlement.  All  that  the settlement has guaranteed is the right of the workmen to earn 12 days privilege leave for 240 days worked in a year and additional one day  for  every  12 days  beyond  240  days  worked  in  a  year.  The  question regarding the correct method of  computation  of  the  leave under  the  settlement is not expressly covered by the terms of the said settlement. Any grievance in connection with the same therefore, has to be treated to be outside the  compass of  the  settlement. In this connection, it is profitable to note that the phrase "covered by the settlement" as found in the said clause of Section 24 is not defined by the Act  nor it  is  defined by the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 or by the Central Act. namely, the Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947.  Definition  section  3  sub-section (18) lays down as under :         "words and expressions used  in  this  Act  and  not         defined  therein,  but  defined  in  the  Bombay Act         shall, in relation  to  an  industry  to  which  the         provisions   of  the  Bombay  Act  apply,  have  the         meanings assigned to them by the Bombay Act  and  in         any  other case, shall have the meanings assigned to         them by the Central Act." Bombay Act is defined as Bombay Industrial Relations Act  by section  3,  sub-section  (1)  and  the  Central  Act  means Industrial Disputes Act,  1947  as  defined  by  Section  3, sub-section (2).    In any of these Acts the terms "covered" has not been defined.    We  can,  therefore,  turn  to  the general dictionary  meaning  of the term "covered".  When we undertake this exercise, we find the term "cover" defined by Concise Oxford Dictionary, Seventh Edition at  page  219  to mean, amongst  others "include, comprise, deal with".  It is pertinent to note that the legislature in  its  wisdome  has not construed a strike to be illegal if the same is resorted to during any period of settlement which is in operation, in respect   of  any  of  the  matters  "arising  out  of  such settlement".  The term  "covered"  is  more  restrictive  in nature   as  compared  to  the  term  "arising  out  of"  or "referable to".  If the phraseology  employed  in  the  said provision  was to the effect any of the matters "arising out of or "referable to any settlement", learned senior  counsel for  the  appellant  would have been right in his contention that implementation of the settlement also would be a matter "arising out of " the settlement or may be "referable to the settlement.  But these words are  conspicuously  absent  and only the phrase "matters covered by the settlement" has been employed  by  the  legislature to treat any strike regarding

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such covered matters in a settlemtn to amount to an  illegal strike.   The term "arising from" has also a precise meaning as  found  at  page  46  of  the  aforesaid  Concise  Oxford Dictionary   which   states  that  the  word  "arise"  menas "originate; be born; come into notice or  result  (from  out of)".  Question of implementation of the terms of settlement may be said nto be a matter "arising out of" the  settlement or  "referable  to"  the  settlement but it is certainly not "covered" by the settlement. Therefore, it is far from being "covered" by the  settlement.  In  Black’s  Law  Dictionary, Fifth Edition, at page 99 the term "arising out of" has been indicated  to  have a special meaning relating to a decision in the case of Newman V. Bennett (Kansas  Reports).  It  has been  mentioned  in  the  said  dictionary  that  the "words "arising out of employment" refer to the origin of the cause of the injury". Thus the term "arising out of employment" in this case was held to refer to a grievance whose origin  was found   in   the  employment  concerned  as  noted  in  this dictionary.  Similarly,  if  the  words  "arising   out   of settlement"   were   employed  by  the  legislature  in  the aforesaid clause, then it could  have  been  said  that  any grievance  regarding  non-implementation of the terms of the settlement would have its origin in the settlement. However, as such a pharaseology is conspicuously absent in  the  said clause,  it  must be held that the legislature in its wisdom wanted to incidate a situation where parties to the  binding settlement  cannot  resort to strike or lack out as the case amy be, in connection with  these  matters  which  were  not expressly  so  covered and referred to in the settlement and thus matters which were expressly not so  covered  could  be made   the  subject  matter  of  grievance  by  the  parties concerned during the arriving of such settlement  and  if  a strike  is  resorted  to  by  the  lunion of workmen on that ground, it could not be said that the said strike  would  be hit  ny  the provisions of Section 24(1)(i) of the Act. As a result of the aforesaid conclusion, it must be held that the impugned strike notice was not violative of Section 24(1)(i) Act  so  far  as  the  grievence  regarding  computation  of privilege leave was concerned. The Labour Corut had patently erred  in mis-reading the relevant provisions of the Act and the express terms  of  the  settlement  while  reaching  the conclusion  that the impugned notice refers to the grievance regarding non-implementation  of  the  settlement  terms  in concetion  with privilege leave and had, therefore, violated the aforesaid provisions of the Act. This patent  error  was rightly  set  aside  by  the  High  Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227. It was further contended by learned  senior  counsel for  the  appellant  that,  in any case, the impugned strike notice was also violative of the  aforesaid  provisions,  in connection with  the  settlement  regarding  demand  no.  26 providing for medical  check-up.    It,  therefore,  becomes necessary to look at the terms of the settlement on the said demand reads as under :            "Demand No.  26 :  MEDICAL CHECK UP            The Company shall get  at  its  expense  all  the            confirmed workmen medically examined i.e.  X-ray,            blood  and Urine examination and medical check up            at the beginning of  the  year  and  the  reports            obtained.  If during this check up any workman is            found  suffering  from any dements arising out of            the chemicals of gas emanating from  the  process            in  the  factory  the  management  will  bear the            medical expenses for his  immediate  and  initial            treatment".

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So far as  this  contention  is  concerned,  Shri  Bhandare, learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellant  is on a still weaker footing.  The settlement regarding medical  check  up deals  with  the  rights  of  the  workmen  to  get  medical re-imbursement and the procedure for the medical  nomination of the  workmen suffering from any ailment or disease.  This right would arise under the settlement  in  connection  with those workmen who have already got afflicted by occupational ailments.   This  has nothing to do with the grievance found in the impugned strike notice regarding the  health  hazards suffered  by the workmen and preventive measures required to be taken by the company in this connection.  This  grievance found  in  the  notice is based on the dictum "prevention is better than cure".  The settlement regarding demand no.   26 pertaining  to  medical check up deals with the procedure to be followed and the rights available to the workman after he has suffered from occupational diseases.  The strike  notice referred  to an independent grievance in connection with the situation wherein a disease on  proper  preventive  measures could be  avoided.    It  also  referred  to  various health hazards due to the working conditions of the workmen.  These grievances  are  entirely  foreign  to  the  terms  of   the settlement regarding   medical   check   up.    We  fail  to appreciate as to how the Labour Court could persuade  itself to  hold  that  the terms of settlement regarding demand no. 26 were also  sought  to  be  contravened  by  the  impugned demands in the notice.  The said finding of the Labour Court to  say  least, was totally contrary to the express terms of the settlement of demand no.  26.  Such a patently erroneous finding had to be set  aside  by  the  High  Court  in  writ proceedings and no fault can be found with the High Court in undertaking such  an  exercise.  The valiant attempt of Shri Bhandare, learned senior  counsel  for  the  appellant,  for getting  the  impugned  strike  declared  as illegal on this ground is found to be wholly  without  any  substance.    It must, therefore, be held that the impugned strike notice was not  violative  of provisions of Section 24(1)(i) of the Act and had nothing to do with settlement on demand nos.  14 and 26.  The third point for determination is to be answered  in negative  against  the appellant and in favour of Respondent no.1. Point NO.  4. So  far as this point is concerned, placing reliance on various decisions of this  court  namely,  Harish  Vishnu Kamath Vs.    Syed  Ahmad  Ishaque  and Others, 1955 (1) SCR 1104, Nagendra Nath Bora & Anr.  vs.   The  Commissioner  of Hills  Division  &  Appeals, Assam, and Others 1958 SCR 1240 and Sadhu Ram vs.  Delhi Transport Corporation, AIR 1984  SC 1467,  learned  senior  counsel  for the appellant submitted that unless there was a patent error committed by the Labour Court, the High Court  under  Article  227  could  not  have interfered  with  the  findings of the Labour Court as if it was bearing an appeal.  There cannot be any dispute  on  the said settled  legal  position.    Under  Article  227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court  could  not  have  set aside any finding reached by the lower authorities where two views  were possible and unless those findings were found to be patently bad and suffering from clear errors of law.   As we  have  already  discussed earlier while considering point nos.  1 and 3, the findings reached by the Labour  Court  on the  relevant  terms  were patently erroneous and dehors the factual and legal position on record.    The  said  patently illegal  findings  could  not  have  been countenanced under Article 227 of the Constitution of Indian by the High  court and  the  High  Court  would  have  failed  to  exercise its

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jurisdiction if it had not set aside such  patently  illegal findings of  the  Labour Court.  Consequently, on this point the appellant has no case.  Point  No.    4  is,  therefore, answered  in negative against the appellant and in favour of the respondent. Point No. 5: In view of our conclusions on the aforesaid  points, the  inevitable  result  is  that  this  appeal fails and is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no orders as to costs.