M/S. SANGHVI RECONDITIONERS PVT. LTD. Vs UNION OF INDIA .
Case number: C.A. No.-001435-001435 / 2003
Diary number: 17158 / 2002
Advocates: BINA GUPTA Vs
ANIL KATIYAR
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1435 OF 2003
M/S SANGHVI RECONDITIONERS PVT. LTD.
— APPELLANT
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. — RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
D.K. JAIN, J.:
1. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the final
judgment and order dated 23rd April, 2002 rendered by the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.633 of 2002,
whereby the High Court has dismissed the writ petition, affirming
the decision of the Settlement Commission, Customs and Central
Excise, Mumbai (hereinafter referred to as, “the Settlement
Commission”).
2. The facts, giving rise to the present appeal, may be summarised
thus:
The appellant is an importer and ship repair unit registered with
the Director General of Shipping, Government of India. On the basis
of the intelligence gathered, premises of the appellant were searched
by the officers of the Customs Commissionerate, Mumbai in
December, 1997, resulting in the recovery of incriminating
documents. The investigations revealed that the appellant had
clandestinely availed of benefit of import duty Exemption Notification
No.211/83-Cus dated 23rd July, 1983, as amended, on the import of
multiple consignments of engineering cargo as “Ship Spares”. Based
on the material collected in the course of investigations, two show
cause notices dated 29th December, 1997 and 17th June, 1998, were
issued to the appellant, demanding customs duty of Rs.3,12,030/-
and Rs.65,66,076/- respectively (totalling Rs.68,78,106/-). Upon
consideration of the reply furnished by the appellant, the
Commissioner of Customs (Preventive), Mumbai by his order dated
26th February, 1999 confirmed the demand of customs duty of
2
Rs.68,78,106/-, besides penalty and interest under Section 28AB of
the Customs Act, 1962 (for short “the Act”).
3. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal to the erstwhile
Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal. However,
the said appeal was withdrawn by the appellant on the ground that
they proposed to prefer an application in terms of Section 127MA of
the Act before the Settlement Commission, constituted under the Act
and have their case settled under Chapter XIVA of the Act. The
appeal was permitted to be withdrawn. The appellant, thereafter, on
17th October, 2000, filed an application under Section 127B of the Act
with the Settlement Commission, disclosing and admitting a duty
liability of Rs.20,98,786/-.
4. On receiving the application, the Settlement Commission called
for the statutory report from the Jurisdictional Commissioner in terms
of Section 127C of the Act. In his report, it was submitted by the
Commissioner that out of 18 consignments, in respect of 10 imports,
the appellant had imported spare parts of Caterpillars and while
clearing the cargo, they submitted transhipment permit/shipping bills
to the Customs Authorities declaring the cargo as ‘ship spares’ meant
3
for repairs of ocean going vessels. However, in the course of
investigation, documents, viz., sales bills, account registers, etc.
retrieved from the appellant, revealed the sale of these goods to one
M/s Mehta Earthmovers. In fact, diversion of these goods was
admitted by the appellant during investigation and they voluntarily
deposited Rs.15 lakhs towards duty liability against these 10 imports.
As regards the 2nd show cause notice, the stand of the Commissioner
was that one M/s Elektronik Lab, a partnership firm dealing in sales
and servicing/maintenance of ship spares and navigation equipment,
had placed purchase orders on the appellant for import of spare parts
to be fitted on ocean going vessels, as they were not registered with
the Director General of Shipping as a ship repair unit and were not
eligible for duty free imports under the aforementioned Notification.
The appellant imported the spare parts and sold the same to M/s
Elektronik Lab; in contravention of the exemption notification.
5. Taking into consideration the report of the Commissioner and
the case records, the Settlement Commission, vide order dated 8th
February, 2001, allowed the application of the appellant to be
proceeded with under sub-Section (1) of Section 127C of the Act.
4
The amount of additional duty determined to be payable under sub-
Section (3) of said Section was duly paid by the appellant.
6. At the next hearing before the Settlement Commission, it was
asserted on behalf of the appellant that they had fulfilled all the
conditions as stipulated in Notification No.211/83 dated 23rd July,
1983 and that no spare parts, so imported, were sold by them to M/s
Elektronik Lab. The stand of the appellant was that they had installed
the imported equipment on the ocean going vessels with the
assistance of M/s Elektronik Lab, who were the authorised agents of
the foreign supplier, M/s Kelvin Hughes, in India from whom the
appellant had imported the goods. It was argued that the said
Notification did not prohibit an importer from taking assistance of a
third party in the repair of the ships. It was reiterated that all the “ship
spares” imported by the appellant were fitted in the ocean going
vessels directly by them with the assistance of M/s Elektronik Lab
and, therefore, all the conditions, stipulated in the Notification, were
fulfilled. Apparently, the Settlement Commission was not convinced
with the explanation offered by the appellant. On the contrary, the
Settlement Commission felt that the appellant had transferred/sold
the imported goods to M/s Elektronik Lab; as pleaded by the
5
Commissioner. Accordingly, vide order dated 24th September, 2001,
the Settlement Commission directed the Commissioner to submit his
final report along with the relevant material to establish that the goods
imported by the appellant were actually sold to M/s Elektronik Lab.
7. In his final report dated 27th September, 2001, the
Commissioner submitted that the appellant had imported navigational
equipments, such as, Radar System, SART, NATEX and EPIRB in
pursuance of the Purchase Orders placed by M/s Elektronik Lab on
them; delivered the cargo on board the ships of M/s Dredging
Corporation, M/s Chowgule Steamships Ltd. and M/s Essar Coastal
Ltd. and the purchaser, M/s Elektronik Lab, subsequently carried out
installation of the said equipments on board the ships owned by the
above three shipping companies. The stand of the Commissioner
was that since M/s Elektronik Lab, who had purchased the imported
spare parts from the appellant for the purpose of fitting on board the
ships of the said three shipping companies, was not registered with
the Director General of Shipping, they were not eligible to claim
benefit of exemption Notification, and, therefore, they routed the
imports through the appellant and further, since the “spare parts”
imported for carrying out repairs of the ships were not actually used
6
by the appellant and had been sold to M/s Elektronik Lab; prior to its
usage on ships, the appellant was also not entitled to the benefit of
duty exemption under the said Notification. It was also pointed out
that the rates of the spare parts charged by M/s Elektronik Lab to the
ship owners for the same items were higher than those charged by
the appellant from them, which undisputedly showed the value
addition.
8. Upon consideration of the information furnished by the
Commissioner, particularly the fact that the appellant had given
details of the “consignee” as the ship owners, without disclosing the
sale of imported “spare parts” to M/s Elektronik Lab, the Settlement
Commission was satisfied that there was suppression of facts on the
part of the appellant so as to avail of the benefit of duty exemption
fraudulently. According to the Settlement Commission, the sale of
ship spares/navigational equipments by the appellant to M/s
Elektronik Lab was an independent transaction, distinct from the
subsequent sale by the latter to the ship owners, which was in the
nature of home consumption. Finally, concluding that the Revenue
had been able to produce documentary evidence showing sale of
imported “spare parts” by the appellant to M/s Elektronik Lab, who in
7
turn sold the same items to ship owners, the appellant could not claim
any benefit under exemption Notification No.211/83, the Settlement
Commission sustained the demand of duty of Rs.47,79,320/- in
respect of 8 consignments sold by the appellant to M/s Elektronik
Lab. The Settlement Commission, thus, confirmed the additional
customs duty of Rs.68,78,106/- demanded from the appellant under
the order of adjudication by the Commissioner. Inter alia, observing
that though the appellant had not made a full and true disclosure of
their duty liability but had cooperated with the Settlement
Commission, the Settlement Commission waived penalty in excess of
Rs.18 lakhs and granted total immunity to the appellant from
prosecution. The Settlement Commission also held that since the
case of the appellant pertained to a period prior to April, 1995, when
Section 28AB of the Act was inserted by the Finance Act, 1996,
interest on delayed payment of duty could not be levied on the
appellant.
9. Being dissatisfied with the order passed by the Settlement
Commission, the appellant took the matter to the High Court by
preferring the aforementioned writ petition. Before the High Court, an
application was moved by the appellant for amendment of the writ
8
petition, seeking to urge an additional ground to the effect that some
of the consignments of “spare parts” having been imported under the
procedure to be followed for “Transhipment” or for “warehoused
goods for exportation”, no customs duty was payable by virtue of the
provisions contained in Sections 54 and 69 of the Act. Although, the
amendment was allowed by the High Court in order to examine
whether the initial stand, based on the exemption notification, could
go hand in hand with the case now sought to be pleaded in the
amended petition, but, ultimately, the High Court did not permit the
appellant to urge the additional ground relating to the applicability of
Sections 54 and 69 of the Act. The High Court was of the view that
since the ground now sought to be raised was in fact contradictory to
the earlier stand, at this belated stage, a fresh ground could not be
entertained. As stated above, the High Court has dismissed the writ
petition. Aggrieved by the said decision, the appellant is before us in
this appeal.
10. Assailing the decisions of the Settlement Commission as also
of the High Court, Mr. S.K. Bagaria, learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant, strenuously urged that the High Court
committed a serious illegality in declining to entertain the additional
9
ground regarding applicability of Sections 54 and 69 of the Act in
respect of 8 consignments in question, particularly when the point
raised was a pure question of law going to the root of the matter and
did not involve any investigation of facts. In support of the contention
that a pure question of law can be raised for the first time even before
this Court, reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in
Tarini Kamal Pandit & Ors. Vs. Prafulla Kumar Chatterjee (Dead)
by Legal Representatives1, Ajaib Singh Vs. State of Punjab2,
Municipal Corporation of the City of Jabalpur Vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh & Anr.3, Collector of Central Excise,
Ahmedabad Vs. Pioma Industries and Imperial Soda Factory4.
Relying on Jyotendrasinhji Vs. S.I. Tripathi & Ors.5 and Paul
Industries (India) Vs. Union of India & Ors.6, it was contended that
the finality clause contained in Section 127J of the Act did not bar the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to
interfere with the order passed by the Settlement Commission when it
was contrary to the provisions of the Act. It was urged that instead of
outrightly declining to go into the merits of the additional ground 1 (1979) 3 SCC 280 2 (2000) 4 SCC 510 3 (1963) 2 SCR 135 4 (1997) 10 SCC 400 5 1993 Supp (3) SCC 389 6 (2004) 13 SCC 340
10
raised, at best, the High Court could have given an opportunity to the
Revenue to meet the stand of the appellant. It was also contended
that the expression “clearance of the goods for home consumption”
under Section 47 of the Act has a definite connotation and meaning
under the Act and the imported goods can be cleared for home
consumption only when a bill of entry for home consumption is filed; it
is assessed; duties assessed are paid and an order is passed by the
proper officer for clearance of the goods for home consumption,
which is not the case here, as no bill of entry for home consumption
was filed. Learned counsel was at pains to explain that the said
consignments were correctly released for transhipment and re-export
and the conditions as stipulated in Sections 54 and 69 of the Act
having been complied with, no customs duty was leviable on the said
8 consignments. It was, thus, pleaded that the matter deserved to be
remitted back to the High Court for reconsideration on merits.
11. Mr. H.P. Rawal, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing
on behalf of the Revenue, on the other hand, supporting the decision
of the Settlement Commission as also of the High Court strenuously
urged that having specifically pleaded before the Commissioner of
Customs in adjudication proceedings and also in the application
11
before the Settlement Commission that there was no sale of the
imported equipment to M/s Elektronik Lab and that they were brought
into the picture for the purpose of installation and regular
maintenance of the said equipment and, therefore, there was no
impediment in their availing of benefit under the Exemption
Notification, the subsequent change in their stance that even sale of
these parts to M/s Elektronik Lab for the purpose of installation on
ocean going vessels was not prohibited under the said Notification or
that 8 consignments were otherwise exempt from payment of
customs duty under Sections 54 and 69 of the Act, clearly shows that
even before the Settlement Commission, the appellant had not made
a full and true disclosure of the duty liability under the Act. It was
argued that the Settlement Commission having itself recorded a
finding that the appellant had not made a full and true disclosure of
their duty liability, their application ought to have been rejected by the
Settlement Commission on this ground alone. Referring to the
invoices raised by the appellant on M/s Elektronik Lab, learned
counsel submitted that the documents on record clearly establish that
the transactions between the appellant and M/s Elektronik Lab were
purely trading transactions, which not only show the untruthfulness of
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the appellant’s initial stance but also prove the violation of the order
passed in favour of the appellant permitting re-export of the
consignments in question. As regards the plea of the appellant that
these consignments were not exigible to any duty in terms of
Sections 54 and 69 of the Act, learned counsel submitted that apart
from the fact that it involved determination of disputed questions of
fact, an application under Section 127B of the Act for determination of
question whether an item is dutiable or not, was not maintainable
before the Settlement Commission. In support of the proposition,
learned counsel relied on the decision of the Delhi High Court in
Commissioner of C. Ex., Visakhapatnam Vs. True Woods Pvt.
Ltd.7 Relying heavily on the decision of this Court in Union of India
Vs. Anil Chanana8 and a decision of the Bombay High Court in C.I.T.
Mumbai City XIV, Mumbai Vs. The Income Tax Settlement
Commission, Mumbai & Ors.9, wherein while explaining the concept
of compounding in terms of Rule 6 of the Customs (Compounding of
Offences) Rules, 2005, which confers power on the compounding
authority to grant immunity from prosecution to a person who has
made full and true disclosure of facts relating to the case and has
7 2006 (199) E.L.T. 388 (Delhi) 8 2008 (222) E.L.T. 481 (S.C.) 9 2000 (246) ITR 63 (Bom)
13
cooperated in the proceedings before him, it was held that
applications for compounding ought to be disallowed if there are
demonstrable contradictions or inconsistencies or incompleteness in
the case of the applicant, learned counsel asserted that in the light
of the facts found by the Settlement Commission and affirmed by the
High Court, the appellant does not deserve any further relief.
12. Before adverting to the merits of the issues raised on behalf of
the parties, it would be appropriate to briefly notice the scheme of
Chapter XIVA of the Act. The said Chapter was inserted in the Act by
the Finance Act, 1998 (Act 21 of 1998) with effect from 1st August,
1998, for setting up of Customs and Central Excise Settlement
Commission on lines of similar Commission already functioning under
the Income Tax Act, 1961 since its incarnation on the
recommendation of Justice Wanchoo Committee. The proceedings
under the Chapter commence by an application being made under
Section 127B, relevant part whereof reads thus:
“127B. Application for settlement of cases.- (1) Any importer, exporter or any other person (hereinafter in this Chapter referred to as the applicant) may, at any stage of a case relating to him, make an application in such form and in such manner as may be specified by rules, and containing a full and true disclosure of his duty liability
14
which has not been disclosed before the proper officer, the manner in which such liability has been incurred, the additional amount of customs duty accepted to be payable by him and such other particulars as may be specified by rules including the particulars of such dutiable goods in respect of which he admits short levy on account of misclassification or otherwise of goods, to the Settlement Commission to have the case settled and such application shall be disposed of in the manner hereinafter provided:………”
13. It is manifest from a bare reading of the provision that in the
application filed under Section 127B, an applicant is required to make
a full and true disclosure of his duty liability, which he had failed to
disclose before the proper officer. He is also required to exhaustively
explain to the Settlement Commission the manner in which such
liability has been incurred; the additional amount of customs duty
accepted to be payable by him as also the price of such dutiable
goods in respect of which he admits short levy on account of
misclassification or otherwise of goods. In other words, the applicant
is supposed to make a clean breast of his affairs in regard to short
levy or non payment of customs duty admitted to be payable by him.
14. Section 127C of the Act prescribes the procedure to be
followed by the Settlement Commission on receipt of an application
under Section 127B of the Act. The section mandates that on receipt
15
of an application under Section 127B, the Settlement Commission
shall call for a report from the Commissioner of Customs having
jurisdiction and on the basis of the materials contained in such report
and having regard to the nature and circumstances of the case or the
complexity of the investigation involved therein, the Settlement
Commission may allow the application to be proceeded with or reject
the application.
15. Section 127E empowers the Settlement Commission to reopen
the completed proceedings in appropriate cases, while Section 127F
confers all the powers upon the Settlement Commission, which are
vested in an officer of the Customs under the Act. Section 127H
empowers the Settlement Commission to grant immunity from penalty
and prosecution, with or without conditions, in cases where it is
satisfied that the assessee has made a full and true disclosure of his
duty liability. Under Section 127-I, the Settlement Commission can
send back the matter to the proper officer where it finds that the
applicant is not cooperating with it. Section 127J declares that every
order of settlement passed under sub-Section (7) of Section 127C
shall be conclusive as to the matters stated therein and no matter
covered by such order shall, save as otherwise provided in Chapter
16
XIVA, be reopened in any proceeding under the Act or under any
other law for the time being in force.
16. To appreciate the rival submissions in this behalf, it would be
appropriate at this juncture to refer to Exemption Notification
No.211/83 dated 23rd July, 1983. In so far as it is relevant for this
appeal, the Notification reads as follows:
“Exemption to capital goods, raw materials and consumables for repairs of ocean-going vessels - In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-Section (1) of Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), the Central Government, being satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do, hereby exempts capital goods, components, raw materials and consumables, when imported into India for repairs of Ocean-going vessels by the ship repair unit registered with the Director General of Shipping, Government of India, from the whole of the duty of customs leviable thereon under the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (51 of 1975), and from the whole of the additional duty leviable thereon under Section 3 of the said Customs Tariff Act, subject to the following conditions, namely:-
(1) the importer shall maintain a proper account of import, use and consumption of the capital goods, components, raw materials and consumables imported into India for the aforesaid purpose and shall submit such account periodically to the Collector of Customs in such form and in such manner as may be specified by the said Collector;
17
(2) the importer, by the execution of a bond in such form and for such sum as may be specified by the Collector of Customs, binds himself to pay on demand an amount equal to the duty leviable:-
(a) on goods which are capital goods, as are not proved to the satisfaction of the Collector of Customs to have been installed or otherwise used for the aforesaid purpose:
(b) on goods which are components, raw material and consumables, as are not proved to the satisfaction of the Collector of Customs to have been used or consumed for the aforesaid purpose; within a period of three months from the date of importation thereof or within such extended period as the Collector of Customs, on being satisfied that there is sufficient cause for not installing, using or consuming them, as the case may be, for the aforesaid purpose within the said period, allow. ………………………………………….. …………………………………………..”
17. It is clear from the language of the Notification that in order to
avail of the benefit of exemption from whole of the duty of customs
leviable under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, twin conditions, viz., (1)
capital goods, components, etc. are required for repairs of ocean
going vessels, and (2) the ship repair unit should be registered with
the Director General of Shipping, Government of India, are to be
18
fulfilled. Both the conditions are cumulative and admit of no
exception. Being the foundation for availing the benefits under the
notification, both the conditions have to be strictly complied with.
Besides, under the Notification, an importer is also required to
maintain a proper account of import, use and consumption of the
capital goods, components, etc. imported for the aforesaid purpose in
a prescribed form and failure to satisfy the Collector about their
installation or consumption for the said purpose makes the importer
liable to pay an amount equal to the duty payable on such goods. It
is a settled position in law that Exemption Notifications have to be
strictly construed. A person claiming the benefit of exemption
notification, must show that he satisfies the eligibility criteria. (See:
Kartar Rolling Mills Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, New
Delhi10, Eagle Flask Industries Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central
Excise, Pune11 and Msco. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Ors.12 )
18. With this background, we may now advert to the facts at hand
to examine if the findings recorded by the Settlement Commission
and the view taken by the High court in the judgment in appeal,
10 (2006) 4 SCC 772 11 2004 (171) E.L.T. 296 (S.C.) 12 1985 (19) E.L.T. 15
19
holding that the appellant could not be permitted to urge additional
ground was justified or hit by the contentions to the contrary raised on
behalf of the appellant.
19. In so far as the first issue is concerned, we feel that it would be
expedient to extract the stand of the appellant before the Settlement
Commission, which is as follows:
“During the hearing the learned Advocate of the applicant gave his written submission. He argued that the applicant has fulfilled the conditions of Notification No.211/83. All the end use bonds have been finalised. The Commission asked the applicant whether he has sold the material to M/s Elektronik Lab. The applicant submitted that he has not sold the goods to M/s Elektronik Lab. He is the importer and he installed the equipment on the vessel with the assistance of M/s Elektronik Lab. M/s Elektronik Lab is the authorised agent in India of the foreign supplier M/s Kelvin Hughes from whom the applicant imported the goods. He argued that the Notification does not say that the imported cannot get the assistance from a third party. The Commission asked him about his argument on the statement of Shri K.D. Motta, Manager of M/s Sanghvi Reconditioners that the signature of representatives of M/s Shipping Corpn. of India were forged by him. The applicant submitted that he is admitting it and he is guilty of that. The Commission further asked him on not admitting the duty of Rs.47,79,320/-. The applicant submitted that the ship spares were imported and fitted in the ocean going vessels directly by him with the assistance of M/s Elektronik Lab. and, therefore, he fulfilled the conditions of Notification No.211/83. The Commission drew his attention to some of the invoices issued by M/s Sanghvi Reconditioners to M/s Elektronik
20
Lab which showed that the goods were cleared from Customs and delivered to M/s Elektronik Lab. If it is so, it appears that the applicant has transferred/sold the goods to M/s Elektronik Lab. To this query of the Commission, the applicant submitted that it is only a language mistake and all the bills do not show this and these invoices are issued only for collecting the money.”
20. It is evident from the afore-extracted paragraph that the
unequivocal stand of the appellant was that the material imported by
them was installed/used for repairs of ocean going vessels directly by
them with the assistance of M/s Elektronik Lab, an authorised agent
in India of the foreign supplier from whom the appellant had imported
the goods. It was pleaded that the Exemption Notification did not bar
the importer getting assistance from a third party for installation of the
equipment on the vessels. The appellant stood its ground even when
they were confronted by the Settlement Commission with some
invoices, showing that the goods imported were got cleared from
Customs and delivered to M/s Elektronik Lab. When the Settlement
Commission asked the Revenue to submit further report to establish
their case that the goods imported by the appellant were actually sold
by them to M/s Elektronik Lab, the Revenue produced sale invoices
and delivery challans, showing sale of imported cargo by the
appellant to M/s Elektronik Lab, who in turn, sold these goods to the
21
ship owners for which necessary documents, such as, bills were
raised. Taking into consideration the documents on record and the
sale pattern of the goods and not the value addition, the Settlement
Commission came to the conclusion that in the first instance, the
goods in question were sold by the appellant to M/s Elektronik Lab
and then by the latter to the ship owners under the cover of their own
sales invoices and, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to duty
exemption under the said Notification. Similarly, M/s Elektronik Lab
were also not eligible for duty exemption under the said Notification
because they were not registered with the Director General of
Shipping, Government of India, as required under the Exemption
Notification. As stated above, before the High Court an unsuccessful
attempt was made to lay more emphasis on exemption from payment
of customs duty on eight consignments in terms of Sections 54 and
69 of the Act and not under the Exemption Notification No.211/83-
CUS dated 23rd July, 1983. Thus, there was a shift in the stand of the
appellant before the High Court when sale of the imported
components by them to a third party stood proved on the basis of
overwhelming documentary evidence on record, disentitling them to
the benefit of the exemption notification. In the final analysis, the High
22
court came to the conclusion, and in our opinion correctly, that in the
light of the material available on record, the order of the Settlement
Commission did not suffer from any error warranting its interference.
21. In so far as the second issue with regard to the applicability of
Sections 54 and 69 of the Act is concerned, in our view, it was too
late in the day for the appellant to raise such a plea. In the first
instance, if the appellant felt that these 8 consignments were
intended for transhipment and were cleared from the warehouse for
exportation and, therefore, no import duty was payable, there was no
occasion for them to withdraw their appeal before the Tribunal and
prefer an application before the Settlement Commission, more so
when in respect of the remaining consignment, they had accepted
and paid the customs duty. We feel that when according to the
appellant, no customs duty was payable in respect of the 8
consignments, then on the plain language of Section 127B of the Act,
appellant’s application before the Settlement Commission was not
maintainable. In our view, an application under Section 127B of the
Act would be maintainable only if it discloses duty liability, which had
not been disclosed to the proper officer. Obviously, a disclosure
contemplated by the said Section is in the nature of voluntary
23
disclosure of the concealed additional customs duty. Secondly,
indubitably, such a plea was neither raised before the adjudicating
authority in response to the show cause notices issued to the
appellant nor before the Tribunal as also before the Settlement
Commission. Even before the High Court, in the original writ petition,
such a plea was not raised and it was only by way of an amendment
application, that an additional ground was sought to be raised.
Though it is true that there is no bar in the High court and for that
matter this Court entertaining an additional ground, involving a pure
question of law, but on facts at hand, in the light of the findings of the
Settlement Commission, based on documentary evidence that the
goods in question imported by the appellant were actually sold by
them to M/s Elektronik Lab, before these were used for repair of
ocean going ships, it cannot be held that the additional ground did not
involve any investigation into facts. Documents on record show that
the bills of transhipment as also bills of export were filed by the
appellant before the proper officer after the property in the said goods
had passed to M/s Elektronik Lab. It is clear that since M/s Elektronik
Lab. was not registered with the Director General of Shipping, they
were not eligible to avail of duty exemption under the said notification,
24
they entered into an arrangement with the appellant, a registered ship
repairing unit, to import the goods for repair of ocean going vessels
without payment of import duty under the Exemption Notification.
Thus, the sole object of the transactions was to avail of duty
exemption under the said notification. Additionally, in order to claim
the benefit of the Exemption Notification, the components,
consumables etc. had to be used by the importer himself for repair of
the vessels and not through someone else, who incidentally was not
even named in the shipping bills. Moreover, proper accounts of
imports, use and consumption of such goods was to be maintained
by the importer, and in the event of failure to render the account for
such consumption, the importer was liable to pay the customs duty as
may be demanded by the Commissioner of Customs. However, once
the imported goods were sold to a third party, the appellant was
incapacitated from maintaining and rendering the account to the
Commissioner in terms of the notification. All these factors go to
show that the additional ground sought to be raised before the High
Court was not only an after thought, adjudication thereon did involve
investigation into facts and, therefore, the decision of the High court
in not entertaining the additional ground did not suffer from any
25
infirmity.
22. We also find substance in the contention of learned counsel for
the Revenue that having observed that the appellant had not made a
full and true disclosure, their application should have been rejected
by the Settlement Commission on that count itself and no relief
should have been granted to the appellant. However, in view of the
fact that order dated 8th February, 2001 passed by the Settlement
Commission allowing the application of the appellant to be proceeded
was not challenged by the Commissioner nor such a plea was urged
by the Revenue before the High Court or in their reply to the present
appeal, we find it difficult to reject the application at this stage,
though, having perused some of the documents available on record,
we are convinced that the appellant had not made a full and true
disclosure of its affairs before the Settlement Commission. Be that as
it may, we are of the opinion that having opted to get their customs
duty liability settled by the Settlement Commission, under Chapter
XIVA of the Act, the appellant cannot be permitted to dissect the
Settlement Commission’s order with a view to accept what is
favourable to them and reject what is not. As observed by Krishna
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Iyer, J. in CIT Vs. B.N. Bhattacharjee13, the recommendation of
Wanchoo Committee was a compromise measure of a statutory
settlement machinery, where a big evader could make a disclosure,
disgorge what the Commission fixes and thus buy quittance for
himself and accelerate recovery of taxes in arrears by the State,
although less than what may be fixed after long protracted litigation
and recovery proceedings. It is manifest from the procedure laid
down in Section 127C of the Act that interim order under sub-Section
(1) of Section 127C as also the final order under sub-Section (7) of
the said Section are to be made by the Settlement Commission after
examination of the reports of the Commissioner of Customs or its
Commissioner (Investigation). Obviously, these reports are
submitted on the disclosures made in the application under Section
127B of the Act and, therefore, the applicant cannot be permitted to
resile from his pleadings in the application at any stage of
proceedings before the Settlement Commission or set up a new case
before the higher Fora.
23. Having considered the rival submissions with reference to the
pleadings, the provisions of Section 127B of the Act and exemption
13 (1979) 4 SCC 121
27
notification No.211/83 dated 23rd July, 1983, we are of the opinion
that the order of the Settlement Commission did not suffer from any
error, legal or factual, and, therefore, the High Court was fully justified
in dismissing the writ petition.
24. In view of the foregoing discussion, we see no merit in this
appeal. The appeal is dismissed accordingly with costs, quantified at
Rs.50,000/-.
.…………………………………J. (D.K. JAIN)
..….…………………………….J. (T.S. THAKUR)
NEW DELHI; FEBRUARY 5, 2010
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