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CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  2064 of 2002

PETITIONER: M/s Sangham Tape  Company

RESPONDENT: Hans Raj

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/09/2004

BENCH: N. Santosh Hegde & S.B. Sinha

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

S.B. SINHA, J :

       This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 30.4.2001  passed by a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Civil  Writ Petition No.8231 of 2000 whereby and whereunder the writ petition  filed by the Respondent  herein questioning the order of the Labour Court  dated 11.5.2000 setting aside an ex parte award in favour of the  Respondent  herein,  was allowed.

FACTS :         The Respondent was appointed as a Machineman by the Appellant in  1980.  The Appellant contended that the Respondent had been absenting  from duties off and on but he had been allowed to join his duties in different  periods.  On or about 09.11.1991, a complaint petition was filed by him  through the trade union before the Labour Inspector Circle III Jalandhar on  an allegation that the management had not provided him and other similarly  situated persons duties since 8.11.1991.  The said complaint was registered  as Ref. No. 87/91 wherein a settlement was arrived at, pursuant whereto or  in furtherance whereof the Respondent  is said to have received a sum of Rs.  2675.70 in full and final settlement of his dues.  Despite the said settlement,  on or about 17.11.1992,  he allegedly filed a reference petition before the  Labour Court, Jalandhar which was marked as Reference No.87 of 1991,  claiming his reinstatement with full back-wages, continuity of service and all  consequential service benefits.   

       An ex parte award was passed by the said Labour Court on 5.2.1996.     

The Appellant purportedly upon coming to know about the  pronouncement of the said ex parte award, moved an application for setting  aside the same.  By reason of an order dated 11.5.2000, the ex parte award  was set aside.  Contending that that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to  set aside the ex parte award after a lapse of 30 days from the date of  publication of the award, the respondent herein filed a writ petition before  the Punjab and Haryana High Court which was marked  as Civil Writ  Petition No.8231 of 2000.  By reason of the impugned judgment, the High  Court set aside the order of the Labour Court.  Being aggrieved by and  dissatisfied therewith, the appellant is in appeal before us.

Mr. Neeraj Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the  Appellant, would submit that having regard to the fact that the provisions of  Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to an  industrial adjudication, the Labour Court must be held to have ample  jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte award, if sufficient cause therefor is  shown.   The learned counsel would further submit that such exercise of  jurisdiction by the Labour Court cannot be limited to a period of 30 days  from the date of publication of the award.  Reliance, in this connection,  has  been placed  on  Anil Sood vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court II [2001 (2)

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SCALE 193].

An industrial adjudication is governed by the provisions of the  Industrial Disputes Act,  1947 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act) and the  rules framed thereunder.  The  rules framed under the Act may provide for  applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.  Once the  provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are made applicable to the  industrial adjudication, indisputably the provisions of Order IX Rule 13  thereof would be attracted.   But unlike an ordinary Civil Court, the  Industrial Tribunals and the Labour Courts have limited jurisdiction in that  behalf.  An award made by an industrial court becomes enforceable under  Section 17A of the Act on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its  publication.  Once the award becomes enforceable, the Industrial Tribunal  and/or Labour Court becomes  functus officio.

This Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs. Central Government Industrial  Tribunal and Others [(1980) Supp. SCC 420] held that the Tribunal does not  become functus officio provided an application for setting aside the award is  filed  within thirty days of publication of award having regard to the  provisions contained in Section 11 of the Act and Rules 22 and 24 of the  Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 stating :      "The contention that the Tribunal had become functus  officio and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the  ex parte award and that the Central Government alone  could set it aside, does not commend to us. Sub-section  (3) of Section 20 of the Act provides that the proceedings  before the Tribunal would be deemed to continue till the  date on which the award becomes enforceable under  Section 17-A. Under Section 17-A of the Act, an award    becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the  date of its publication under Section 17. The proceedings  with regard to a reference under Section 10 of the Act  are, therefore, not deemed to be concluded until the  expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. Till  then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute  referred to it for adjudication and up to that date it has the  power to entertain an application in connection with such  dispute. That stage is not reached till the award becomes  enforceable under Section 17-A. In the instant case, the  Tribunal made the ex parte award on December 9, 1976.  That award was published by the Central Government in  the Gazette of India dated December 25, 1976. The  application for setting aside the ex parte award was filed  by respondent 3, acting on behalf of respondents 5 to 17  on January 19, 1977 i. e, before the expiry of 30 days of  its publication and was, therefore, rightly entertained by  the Tribunal\005."  

The said decision is, therefore, an authority for the proposition that  while an Industrial Court will have jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte award  but having regard to the provision contained in Section 17A of the Act, an  application therefor must be filed before the expiry of 30 days from the  publication thereof. Till then Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute  referred to it for adjudication  and only upto that date, it has the power to  entertain an application in connection with such dispute.  

It is not in dispute that in the instant case, the High Court found as of  fact that the application for setting aside the award was filed before the  Labor Court after one month of the publication of the award.   

In view of this Court’s decision in Grindlays Bank (supra), such   jurisdiction could be exercised by the Labour Court within a limited time  frame, namely, within thirty days from the date of  publication of the award.   Once an award becomes enforceable in terms of Section 17A of the Act,  the  Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, does not retain any

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jurisdiction in relation to setting aside of an award passed by it.  In other  words, upon the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of the award  in the gazette, the same having become enforceable, the Labour Court would  become functus officio.   

Grindlays Bank (supra) has been followed in Satnam Verma vs.  Union of India [(1984) Supp. SCC 712] and J.K. Synthetics Ltd. vs.  Collector of Central Excise [(1996) 6 SCC 92].    

This Court in Anil Sood (supra) did not lay down any law to the  contrary.  The contention  raised on the part of  Mr. Jain to the effect that in  fact in that case an application for setting aside an award was made long  after 30 days cannot be accepted for more than one reason.   Firstly,  a fact  situation obtaining in one case cannot be said to be  a precedent for  another.  [See   Mehboob Dawood Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra \026 (2004) 2 SCC  362]. Secondly, from a perusal of the said decision,   it does not appear that  any date of  publication of the award was mentioned therein so as to  establish that even on fact, the application was made  30 days after the  expiry of publication of the award.  Furthermore, the said decision appears  to have been rendered on concession.

For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in this appeal which is  accordingly dismissed.  No costs.