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PETITIONER: M/S S.M.  DYECHEM LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M/S CADBURY (INDIA) LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       09/05/2000

BENCH: M.J.Rao, Y.K.Sabharwal

JUDGMENT:

M.  JAGANNADHA RAO, J.       Leave  granted.   In trade mark cases, the tension  is between   protectionism  on  the   one  hand  and   allowing competition  on  the other.  In the late nineteenth  century where  law  was regarded as a science, the legal  formalists laid down principles and legal rules, treating trade mark as ’property’.   In  the  beginning  of  this  century,   legal realists  laid  emphasis  on   pragmatic  considerations  of economic   policies  and  "real   world  results"  and   the ’likelihood  of  confusion’.  Of late, the  tension  between protectionism  and competition has increased.  ( See  Vol.59 ’Law  and Contemporary Problems, 1996, No.2 P.5 at p.14) ( A Personal  Note on Trade Mark etc.  by Milton Handler).  This is  a plaintiff’s appeal against the judgment of the Gujarat High  Court in A.F.O.  No.  203 of 1999 dated 24.8.1999,  by which the High Court of Gujarat allowed the appeal preferred by  the  respondent-defendant  and set aside  the  temporary injunction  which was initially granted on 25.2.99 and which was  confirmed on 23.3.99.  The injunction was sought by the appellant  to  restrain the respondent from using  the  word PICNIC  as  it  allegedly amounted to  infringement  of  the appellants’  registered  trade mark for the use of the  word PIKNIK.   The suit was on the basis of infringement of trade mark  and also on the basis of passing off.  The brief facts of    the   case   are    as   follows:     The    appellant company(plaintiff)  claimed that it started business in 1988 in   four  products  like   potato,  chips,  potato  wafers, corn-pops  and preparations made of rice and rice flour.  In January  1989  it started using the trade mark  PIKNIK.   It applied  for  registration on 17.2.1989 of the said word  in class  29 ( for preserved dried and cooked fruit  vegetables etc.   including  all  goods  included in  class  29)  under application  No.   505531B.   Plaintiff   also  applied  for registration  of  same  trade mark in class 30  (  for  tea, coffee,   corns,  jaggery   etc.   including   confectionery chocolates,  honey etc.) under application 505532.  A  third application  under  same  name was ( for  beverages,  beers, mineral  and irrigated water) under application No.  505533. Registration was granted on 29.7.1994 after advertisement on 1.9.93.   The  appellant renewed the trade mark last  for  7 years  from 17.2.1996.  Respondent-defendant was found using the  mark ’PICNIC’ for chocolates.  Appellant gave notice on 16.3.1998.   Respondent replied on 7.4.98.  Thereafter,  the appellant  filed  the  suit on 18.2.1999  based  on  alleged infringement  of trade mark 505532 and passing off.  Pending

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the  suit, appellant applied for temporary injunction.  (The respondent  filed an application on 19.3.1999 in the  Bombay High  Court for rectification and the same is pending).  The respondent-defendant   contended  in    this   interlocutory application  that ’CADBURY’S PICNIC’ was introduced in  1998 for chocolates.  It was registered earlier under No.  329970 in  class  30  of  4th  schedule  in  1977  for  dairy  milk chocolates,  wafers bar, dairy milk chocolate, confectionery etc.   (  The said trade mark expired after 7 years and  was not  renewed).   Defendant applied for rectification of  the plaintiff’s  trade  mark  by   application  dated   19.3.99. Defendant  had  also  filed  a  subsequent  application  for registration  of CADBURY PICNIC in August 1999 ( appln.  No. 712676).   It  pleaded  that CADBURY  PICNIC  and/or  PICNIC and/or  label  with  the  said word was  registered  by  the defendant’s  parent  company in over 110 countries all  over the  world and the defendant had transborder reputation  and goodwill.   The  plaintiff could not claim monopoly  in  the variations  of  the ordinary dictionary word PICNIC  or  any misspelling  thereof.   Plaintiff had never intended  to  do business  in chocolates.  Its main business was in dyes  and chemicals.   Its business in food products was ancillary and fell  under NAMKINS and PAPADS.  Even otherwise, both labels were  different in essential features.  The registration  by plaintiff  was only of a label and could not be and was  not of  the word PIKNIK.  The said word was a misspelling of  an ordinary   dictionary  word  and   was  not   "distinctive." Registration thereof under section 9 was invalid.  There was also  delay  in filing the suit on 18.2.1999 and  injunction could  not  be  granted.   The trial  Court  held  that  the plaintiffs’  registration of the word PIKNIK ( including for chocolates)  was  and  is  in force,  that  the  defendant’s earlier registration had expired, that the defendant did not oppose   registration  by  plaintiff,   that  there  was  no unreasonable  delay  in filing the suit, that injunction  in these  circumstances could not be refused even if there  was some  delay, plaintiff had a prima facie case and balance of convenience  was  in plaintiff’s favour.  It held  that  the defendants’  mark  was ’deceptively similar’ within  section 2(1)(d)  of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958,  that confusion could be created in the minds of purchasers either because  the  marks  were similar visually  or  ocularly  or phonetically.   Here  there was clear phonetic  resemblance. The  contention  that what was registered was the label  and not the word ’PIKNIK’ could not be accepted.  The ’essential features’  of the trade marks were similar.  Section 2(1)(f) referred  to  ‘mark’ as including a device  brand,  heading, label, ticket, name, signature, word, letter, numeral or any combination  thereof.   Even if the ’essential features’  of the  words  ’PIKNIK’  were  taken  into  consideration,  the defendant’s  mark ’PICNIC’ was deceptively and  phonetically similar.   The  defendant  had cleverly  designed  the  word ’PICNIC’  by change of spelling and the word was so designed on  its label in large letters.  The plaintiff’s trade  mark was  registered under class 30 which included  ’chocolates’. Section 9(1)(d) or (e) would not help the defendant inasmuch as  the plea that this was a common dictionary word was  not correct.   In fact the defendant had himself registered  the word  PICNIC  in  1977  in  India  and  the  same  word  was registered  in other countries.  Defendant had again applied in  India  in 1998-1999 for registration of the  same  word. Section  28  of  the  Act conferred  a  statutory  right  on plaintiff  on  account of registration.  The said  mark  was registered  without  opposition  under section 21.   On  the above   reasoning,  the  trial   Court   granted   temporary

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injunction  in  favour of the appellant.  On appeal  by  the defendant,  the  High Court reversed the judgment  and  held that  the  word  PIKNIK could not be  called  an  ’essential feature’.   The plaintiff’s label consisted of the  peculiar script  of  the word ’PIKNIK’ in a curved fashion  with  the caricature  of a little boy with a hat in between the  words ’K’  and  ’N’.  The script and the figure of the little  boy were  the essential features and not the word ’PIKNIK’.  The plaintiff’s label had to be looked at as a whole.  Plaintiff was  marketing potato chips and potato wafers in a polythene pouch  and not chocolates, though plaintiff had registration under  class  30  for chocolates.  Defendant  was  marketing under  trade  label ’Cadbury’s PICNIC’ in a polythene  pouch and  hence  both  marks were different.  Defendant  was  not using  the  plaintiff’s label with the caricature of a  boy. It  was  true  there was phonetic similarity  but  the  word ’PIKNIK’  was  a misspelling of the common  dictionary  word PICNIC and hence could not be the subject of any proprietary right.   Here the products too were different and there  was no  confusion.   The fact that the plaintiff was  using  the word  ’PIKNIK’  could  not be compared to cases  where  well known trade names were under use - like Cadbury - and if the defendant  used the word PICNIC along with the word Cadbury, for  a  different product, there could be  no  infringement. Cadbury was a household name in India and defendant had been marketing  chocolates since 1948.  The said word had  almost become synonymous with chocolates in India as in the case of ’Cadbury Dairy Milk’, ’Cadbury Five Star’ etc.  The same was true  with ’Cadbury Picnic’.  There was absolutely no  scope for  deception.  There was neither infringement nor  passing off.   Based  on this reasoning the High Court  allowed  the appeal  of the respondent-defendant and set aside the  order of  temporary  injunction.  In this appeal,  learned  senior counsel  for  the  appellant-plaintiff Sri  P.   Chidambaram contended   that   the  defendants,  by  merely   filing   a rectification  application on 19.3.99, after the  appellants filed   the  suit  on  18.2.99   for  injunction  based   on infringement, could not scuttle the suit or this application for  temporary  injunction.  In the present suit or  in  the application,  the respondent could not raise a defence  that the registration of the plaintiff’s trade mark was "invalid" on the ground that the word PIKNIK was not "distinctive" and that it was akin to a dictionary word or that the trade mark did not satisfy various clauses of section 9(1).  Section 31 raised  a presumption of validity of plaintiff’s  registered mark.   It was sufficient if the plaintiff’s mark had became distinct  even  by  the actual date  of  registration.   For purposes  of section 31, the deeming clause in section 23(1) did  not apply.  Under section 32 of the Act, if seven years had  elapsed  from the date of registration ( i.e.  date  of application  for registration as deemed by section 23), then the  plea  of  invalidity  of  registration,  namely,   that plaintiff’s   registration   of    trade    mark   was   not ’distinctive’,  could  not  be raised in this  suit  nor  in defence  to  this application nor even in the  rectification proceedings.   Seven  years  had elapsed  by  17.2.96,  long before  the  defence in the suit was raised as also  by  the date   of  filing  of   the  rectification  application   on 19.3.1999.   Date of the registration in section 32  [unlike the  position under section 31(2)] was to be deemed as  date of  application  for registration in view of section  23(1). Hence the defendant could not be permitted to raise any plea that  the  word  ’PIKNIK’ was not ’distinctive’  by  17.2.89 within  section  9.  In this context, the decision  of  this Court  in  National  Bell Co.  vs.  Metal  Goods  Mfg.   Co.

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[1970  (3)  SCC  665] was relevant.   Learned  counsel  also argued  that under section 2(j) and 2(v), ’mark’ included  a label.   In any event, the plaintiff’s trade mark was  valid as  it fell within the various clauses of section 9, even if it  be  assumed that section 32 did not bar the  defendant’s plea.   In  view of the rights conferred by registration  of the  trade  mark under section 28, it must be held that  the trade  mark was infringed within section 29 inasmuch as  the defendant  used its mark which was ’deceptively similar’  to the  plaintiff’s  trade mark.  Apart from the right  arising out  of  infringement, the defendant was guilty of  ’passing off’  of the defendant’s goods as the plaintiff’s goods.  In view  of  the principles laid down in American Cyanamid  Vs. Ethicon  Ltd.  (1975(1) All.  E.R.504(HL), it is  sufficient if  a triable issue is raised.  No prima facie case need  be proved.   Hence  the appellant should be  granted  temporary injunction.   On the other hand, learned senior counsel  for the  defendant  Sri Dushyant Dave contended that even if  in view  of section 111(5) of the Act, the temporary injunction applications could go on, the defence that plaintiff’s trade mark  was  invalid as it did come within section 9 could  be raised  in  these  interlocutory  proceedings.   Plaintiff’s trade  mark was invalid as the conditions in section 9  were not  satisfied and in any event, being akin to a  dictionary word,  it was not "distinctive" within section 9(1)(e).  The presumption under section 31(2) did not apply and the bar in section  32  also  did not apply since seven years  had  not elapsed  from  "the date of registration", by the  time  the defence  was  raised in this suit that plaintiff’s mark  was not  distinctive.   In any event, the case fell  within  the exceptions mentioned in section 32 and in particular the one in  section 32(e).  Counsel also contended that there was no deception  within  section 29 read with section  2(d).   The plaintiff’s  mark  was  the entire label and  not  the  word ’PIKNIK’ alone.  The conditions specified in section 29 were not  satisfied.   Further, the defendant’s mark  PICNIC  had cross-border  reputation in 110 countries over a long period and the use of the said word in India would not infringe the plaintiff’s trade mark nor would such use amount to ’passing off’ defendant’s goods as the plaintiff’s goods.  In view of Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd.  Vs.  Hindustan Lever Ltd.  ( 1999(7) SCC 1), the relative strength of the case above need be  considered.  On these contentions, the following  points arise  for consideration:  (1) Whether the defendant  could, in   the  present  interlocutory   proceedings,   based   on infringement  and  passing off, raise any defence  that  the registration  of  plaintiff’s  mark   was  itself  "invalid" because the plaintiff’s mark did not satisfy the ingredients of  clauses  (a)  to  (e)  of   section  9(1)  and  was,  in particular,  not  "distinctive"  as   required  by   section 9(1)(e)?   (2)  Whether, on the other hand, plaintiff  could rely  on the presumption in section 31 and also contend that under  Section 32 the "validity" of the registration of  the plaintiff’s  mark  had become conclusive on the expiry of  7 years  long before defence was raised in the suit (such time reckoned  from  date of application for rectification  under section  23(1)) and whether there were any exceptions to the said bar?  (3) Whether, assuming that section 31 and section 32  did not come in the way of the defendant, on merits  the word  ’PIKNIK’  was  not  distinctive and  did  not  satisfy section  9(1)(e)?   (4) For grant of  temporary  injunction, should the Court go by principle of prima facie case ( apart from  balance of convenience) or comparative strength of the case  of  either parties or by finding out if the  plaintiff has  raised  a ’triable issue’?  (5) Whether, assuming  that

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plaintiff’s registration was valid, the comparative strength of  the case on the question of infringement is in favour of plaintiff?   (6)  Whether, alternatively, the plaintiff  had made out that for grant of temporary injunction treating the suit as a ’passing off’ action, the relative strength of the case,  was  in  plaintiff’s favour?  (7) Whether  there  was unreasonable  delay  on the part of the plaintiff in  filing suit and whether the High Court was justified in interfering in  appeal in interlocutory proceedings?  POINT 1, 2 and  3: The provisions of section 111 deal with ’stay of proceedings where  the  validity  of registration of the trade  mark  is questioned  etc.’.  In the present case, while the plaintiff appellant  has  filed  the  present   suit  on  18.2.99  for permanent  injunction etc.  against the defendant-respondent on  the  ground  of ’infringement’ and  ’passing  off’,  the defendant  has  filed  an application for  rectification  on 19.3.99  in  the High Court of Bombay.  Now Section  111  is intended to protect the plaintiff.  The defendant, by filing a  rectification  proceeding later in the High Court  cannot preclude  the plaintiff from seeking interim relief in  view of  section 111(5).  Under section 111(1)(a), if in any suit the  defendant  pleads  invalidity under section  9  of  the plaintiff’s trade mark, then, (i) the Civil Court trying the infringement  suit  shall  stay the  suit  if  rectification proceedings  are  pending.   (ii) if no  such  rectification proceedings  are  pending, the Civil Court has to  raise  an issue as to validity of plaintiff’s trade mark and refer the parties  to  the  High Court to seek  rectification.   Under clause  (2)  if  a  rectification application  is  filed  as directed,  the  suit  is  to be  stayed  till  rectification proceedings  are over.  If such an application is not  filed for  rectification,  it  shall be deemed that  the  plea  is abandoned  by defendant.  Under section 111(5), even if  the suit  is to be stayed pending rectification proceedings, the plaintiff  can file and have interlocutory applications  for temporary  injunction  etc.  to be disposed of.   The  point raised  by the learned senior counsel for the appellant  Sri P.   Chidambaram  is  that the policy of the Act is  not  to allow  the  defendant  to raise any issue  relating  to  the "invalidity" of the plaintiff’s trade mark as a defence in a Civil  Suit for infringement at any time at the pleasure  of the  defendant  and  that a question as to validity  can  be decided  only  in  rectification proceedings,  provided,  on facts,  such  proceedings  are in time (  as  prescribed  in section  32) and are otherwise maintainable.  If such issues cannot  be  raised in the main suit itself, they  cannot  be raised even in interlocutory proceedings.  It is pointed out that even where no rectification proceedings are pending, if a  question relating to the "invalidity" of registration  of plaintiff’s  mark  is  raised in defence, the Court  has  to direct  the  defendant to move for rectification and  is  to adjourn  the suit.  Learned senior counsel, in this context, pointed out the distinction, between the Trade Marks Act and the  Patents  Act,  by referring us to section  107  of  the Patents Act, 1970.  That section reads as follows:  "Section 107-  Defences, etc.  in suits for infringement:  (1) In any suit  for infringement of a patent, every ground on which it may  be  revoked  under section 64 shall be available  as  a ground  for defence.  (2) In any suit for infringement of  a patent  by the making, using or importation of any  machine, apparatus or other article or by the using of any process or by  the importation, use or distribution of any medicine  or drug,  it  shall be a ground for defence that  such  making, using, importation or distribution is in accordance with any one  or more of the conditions specified in section 47."  It

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is  true  that under section 107 of the Patents Act,  it  is permissible  in  any suit for infringement of a patent,  for the  defendant to raise all pleas in defence which he  could have  raised under section 64 of the Act for revocation  and there  is no similar provision in the Trade Marks Act, 1958. However,  the question is as to what extent under the  Trade Marks  Act, 1958 sections 31 and 32, come in the way of  the defendant.    Now  section  9(1)   sets  down  the   various requisites  for  a "valid" registration of a trade  mark  in parts  A and B of the register.  Section 9(1) is to be  read alongwith  section 9(3) which defines the word ’distinctive’ used  in  section  9(1)(e).   Section 9  reads  as  follows: "Section 9:  Requisites for registration in Parts A and B of the  register - (1) A trade mark shall not be registered  in Part  A of the register unless it contains or consists of at least one of the following essential particulars, namely:  - (a) the name of a company, individual or firm represented in a  special  or particular manner;  (b) the signature of  the applicant  for  registration  or  some  predecessor  in  his business;   (c) one or more invented words;  (d) one or more words having no direct reference to the character or quality of  the  goods  and  not being, according  to  its  ordinary signification,  a  geographical  name  or  a  surname  or  a personal name or any common abbreviation thereof or the name of  a  sect  caste  or  tribe   in  India;   (e)  any  other distinctive  mark.  (2) .................................... (3)   For  the  purposes  of   this  Act,   the   expression ’distinctive’ in relation to the goods in respect of which a trade  mark  is proposed to be registered means  adapted  to distinguish  goods  with which the proprietor of  the  trade mark  is  or  may be connected in the course of  trade  from goods  in  the  case of which no  such  connection  subsists either  generally or, where the trade mark is proposed to be registered subject to limitations, in relation to use within the extent of the registration." For the present, we are not referring  to  the  other sub- clauses of section 9.   If  a trade  mark  does not satisfy section 9, it is well  settled that  it is to be treated as ’invalid’.  The defence of  the defendant-respondent  based  on section 9(c),(d) and (e)  is that  the word ’PIKNIK’ is akin to a dictionary word and  is not  an inventive word nor a word having no direct  relation to  the character or quality of goods nor a distinctive word and  hence sub- clauses (c), (d) (e) of section 9(1) do  not apply  and the registration of the plaintiff’s trade mark is in itself invalid.  This brings us to sections 31 and 32 for deciding  whether the plea can be raised in defence in these interlocutory   proceedings.    Section   31   states   that registration  is  to  be prima facie evidence  of  validity. Section  31 reads as follows:  "Section 31:  Registration to be  prima  facie  evidence of validity - (1)  In  all  legal proceedings  relating to a trade mark registered under  this Act  (including application under section 56), the  original registration  of  the  trade  mark  and  of  all  subsequent assignments  and  transmissions of the trade mark  shall  be prima  facie  evidence of the validity thereof.  (2) In  all legal  proceedings  as aforesaid a trade mark registered  in Part  A  of the register shall not be held to be invalid  on the  ground  that it was not a registrable trade mark  under section  9 except upon evidence of distinctiveness and  that such  evidence  was  not submitted to the  Registrar  before registration,  in all legal proceedings as aforesaid, if  it is  proved  that  the  trade  mark  had  been  used  by  the registered proprietor or his predecessor in title as to have become  distinctive at the date of registration." Section 32 deals  with  conclusive proof of validity of the trade  mark

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and  reads  as  follows:  "Section 32:  Registration  to  be conclusive as to validity after seven years - Subject to the provisions  of  section  35  and section 46,  in  all  legal proceedings relating to a trade mark registered in Part A of the register ( including applications under section 56), the original  registration  of  the trade mark shall  after  the expiration   of   seven  years  from   the  date   of   such registration, be taken to be valid in all respects unless it is  proved - (a) that the original registration was obtained by  fraud;   or  (b) that the trade mark was  registered  in contravention  of  the  provision of section 11  or  offends against  the  provision  of  that section  on  the  date  of commencement of the proceedings;  or (c) that the trade mark was  not at the commencement of the proceedings, distinctive of the goods of the registered proprietor." While section 31 raises a presumption as to validity of registration, section 32  bars  any such question being raised after seven  years, subject  of  course  to some exceptions.  In our  view,  any decision  on  the question of ‘validity’ of the  appellant’s trade  raised as a defence in the present application  filed under  Order  39  Rule  1 CPC will  seriously  jeopardise  a decision  on the same issue now pending in the rectification proceedings  filed  by  the respondent in  the  Bombay  High Court.   We  would  therefore not go into  the  question  of ’validity’  or  ’distinctiveness’ of the  plaintiff’s  trade mark nor into the applicability of National Bell Co.  Case ( 1970(3)  SCC  665) as those issues are to be decided in  the rectification proceedings.  We are of the view that the case before us can be disposed of by considering whether there is prima facie any deception and hence infringement and whether there is any ’passing off’.  Points 1, 2 and 3 are therefore not decided.  POINT 4:  This point deals with the principles applicable  for grant of temporary injunction in trade  mark cases.   Before American Cyanamid Co,.  vs.  Ethicon Ltd.  ( 1975(1)  ALL E.R.  504(HL), it was customary for the  Courts to go into prima facie case in trade mark cases for grant or refusal  of temporary injunction.  But in American Cyanamid, it  was observed that it was sufficient if a "triable issue" was  presented  by the plaintiff and the merits need not  be gone  into.  The said judgment was referred to by this Court in  Wander  Ltd.  Vs.  Antox India (P) Ltd.  ( 1990  Supple. SCC  727).   The  judgment in Wander Ltd.  was  followed  in Power  Control  Appliances Vs.  Sumeet Machines  (P)Ltd.   ( 1994(2)  SCC  448).  But in Gujarat Bottling Co.  Ltd.   Vs. Coca Cola Co.  ( 1995(5) SCC 545), this Court again adverted to  the prima facie case principle while granting  temporary injunction.   All these rulings have been reviewed  recently in Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd.  Vs.  Hindustan Lever Ltd. (1999(7)  SCC  1).  It was pointed to this Court that  there was  considerable  criticism of the principles laid down  in American   Cyanamid.   (  See   also  Floyd,   Interlocutory Injunctions  since  Cyanamid  (  1983 E 1  PR  238),  (Cole, Interlocutory Injunctions in U.K.  Patent Cases ( 1979.  E 1 PR  71)  (  see  also Edenborough M  and  Tritton,  American Cyanamid revisited (1996 E1 PR 234) and Philipps in 1997 JBL 486).   This Court referred to the recent judgment of Laddie in  UK.   In  U.K., Laddie, J.  reconsidered  the  principle recently  and explained American Cyanamid in his judgment in Series  5  Software Vs.  Clark ( 1996(1) All  ER  853(Ch.D). The  learned Judge observed that in American Cyanamid,  Lord Diplock  did not lay down that the relative strength of  the case  of each party need not be gone into.  Thereafter, this Court  in Palmolive case has referred to Laddie J’s view and said  that  the  view  of Laddie, J.  is  correct  and  that American  Cyanamid cannot be understood as having laid  down

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anything  inconsistent with the ’old practice’.  We may also add  that  now  the courts in England go into  the  question whether  the  plaintiff is likely or unlikely to win in  the suit  i.e.  into the comparative strength of the case of the rival  parties  -  apart  from the question  of  balance  of convenience.   [See again Laddie, J.  in Barclay’s Bank  Inc Vs.   R.B.S.  Advanta ( 1998 RPC 307)] where such a question is  posed  and  where  Series   5  Software  was   followed. Therefore,  in trade mark matters, it is now necessary to go into  the question of ‘comparable strength’ of the cases  of either party, apart from balance of convenience.  Point 4 is decided accordingly.  POINT 5:  Under this point, we propose to  trace  the  legal  principles  applicable  to  cases  of infringement with particular reference to dissimilarities in essential features of a devise or mark.  Under section 29 of the  Act, a plaintiff in a suit on basis of infringement has to  prove  not  only that his trade mark is infringed  by  a person  who is not a registered proprietor of the mark or  a registered  user thereof but that the said person is using a mark in the course of his trade, "which is identical with or deceptively  similar to the trade mark of the plaintiff,  in such  manner  as to render the use of the mark likely to  be mistaken as the registered trade mark".  Under section 2(d), the  words "deceptively similar" are defined as follows:  "a mark  shall  be deemed to be deceptively similar to  another mark  if  it  so nearly resembles that other mark as  to  be likely  to deceive or cause confusion".  We shall now  refer to  the broad principles applicable to infringement  actions and  in  particular to devices, labels and composite  marks. Essential  Features if copied:  It is well-settled that  the plaintiff   must  prove  that   essential  features  of  his registered  mark  have  been  copied.   The  onus  to  prove ’deception’  is  on  the part of the plaintiff  who  alleges infringement.   A  mark is said to be infringed  by  another trader  if,  even without using the whole of it, the  latter uses  one  or  more  of   its  "essential  features".    The identification of an essential feature depends partly on the courts’  own  judgment  and  partly on  the  burden  of  the evidence  that  is  placed before it.  Ascertainment  of  an essential  feature is not to be by ocular test alone;  it is impossible  to  exclude consideration of the sound of  words forming part or the whole of the mark.  (Kerly, Law of Trade Marks  and Trade Names, 11th Ed.  1983, para 14.21).  It  is no answer to a charge of infringement - as contrasted with a passing  off  action  - that the  defendant’s  mark,  whilst including  the plaintiff’s mark, includes other matters too. Still  less  is it an answer that by something outside  that actual  mark the defendant has distinguished his goods  from those  of the plaintiff - by adding his own name (Kerly para 14.22).   But  this principle is not absolute.  It  is  also accepted  that  addition of his own name by defendant is  an element  to be considered and may turn the scales in  favour of the defendant.  In same para 14.22, Kerly says:  "But the use  of the defendant’s name as part of the mark  complained of  is an element to be considered and in some cases it  has turned  the  scale  in  his favour" (Jewsbury  &  Brown  Vs. Andrew  &  Atkinson (1911) 28.  R.P.C.  293)" Jewsbury  case was  a  case relating to infringement.  (Of course, in  para 14.25  Kerly  also  refers  to   cases  where  addition   of defendant’s  a  name has not turned the scales).  So far  as resemblance  in  words  is   concerned,  Justice  Parker  in Pianotist  Co’s Application (Pianola):(1906) 23 RPC 774  (at 777)  has stated as follows:  "You must take the two  words. You  must  judge  of them, both by their look and  by  their sound.   You must consider the goods to which they are to be

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applied.   You must consider the nature and kind of customer who  would  be likely to buy the goods.  In fact,  you  must consider  all  the  surrounding circumstances and  you  must further  consider what is likely to happen if each of  these trade  marks is used in a normal way as a trade mark for the goods of the respective owners of the marks.  If considering all  those  circumstances, you come to the  conclusion  that there  will  be confusion - that is to say, not  necessarily that one man will be injured and the other will gain illicit benefit,  but  there  will be confusion in the mind  of  the public  which will lead to confusion in the goods - then you may   refuse  registration,  or   rather  you  must   refuse registration  in  that case".  This dictum has  been  quoted with  approval  by  this Court in  Amritdhara  Pharmacy  Vs. Satya  Deo Gupta ( AIR 1963 SC 449) and Roche Vs.   Geoffrey Manners and Co.Pvt.  Ltd.  ( AIR 1970 SC 2062).  Devices and Composite  Marks:  But the considerations relating to words, however,  differ  appreciably  when device marks are  to  be compared or when a device mark is to be compared with a word mark.   ( Kerly para 17.07).  After referring to the factors mentioned  by Parker, J.  in the above case, it is stated in Halsbury’s  Laws of England, (Vol.38, 3rd Ed., para 986)  as follows:   "These considerations differ to some extent  when device  marks  are being compared or when a device  mark  is compared  with  a  word mark."  Dissimilarity  in  essential features  in devices and composite marks more important than some  similarity:   It has been stressed for  the  appellant that  since  the  word  PICNIC is used  by  defendant  while plaintiff  is  using  its  misspelling PIKNIK,  this  is  an essential feature which is similar phonetically or visually, and  there  is  therefore infringement.  It is  argued  that presence  of even one essential feature in defendant’s  mark is  sufficient.  In our opinion, in the case of devices  and composite  marks, the above principle has not been  strictly applied.   The  English  Courts have laid emphasis  more  on dissimilarities  in  essential  features   rather  than   on similarity.   The "whole thing" principle is based on  first impression  as  seen  by the Court.  We shall now  refer  to these  principles laid down in the English cases.  When  the question  arises  whether  a  mark applied  for  bears  such resemblance  to another mark as to be likely to deceive,  it should  be  determined  by considering what is  the  leading character  of each.  The one might contain many, even  most, of  the same elements as the other, and yet the leading,  or it  may  be the only, impression left on the mind  might  be very different.  On the other hand, a critical comparison of the  two marks might disclose numerous points of difference, and  yet the idea which would remain with any person  seeing them  apart at different times might be the same.  Thus,  it is clear that a mark is infringed if the essential features, or  essential  particulars of it, are copied.  In  cases  of device marks, especially, it is helpful before comparing the marks,   to  consider  what  are   the  essentials  of   the plaintiff’s  device.  ( Kerly para 17.08) The trade mark  is the  whole  thing  -  the whole picture on each  has  to  be considered.   There may be differences in the parts of  each mark,  but it is important to consider the mode in which the parts   are   put  together  and   to  judge   whether   the dissimilarity  of  the part or parts is enough to  make  the whole  dissimilar.   It  has  been said  that  if  the  only resemblances  between  two  marks  are in  parts  which  are common, so that the owner of the one has taken nothing which is  peculiar  to the other, then there is at all  events  no infringement,  at  any  rate  unless  the  plaintiff  had  a distinctive  arrangement of the common elements.  ( But this

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approach  is  hardly suited to a comparison of  word  marks; and  even  in relation to label marks or other  features  of get-up, it would be more appropriate to consider the case as a  whole, with due regard to the background provided by  any other  marks  shown  to  be  in use  (  Kerly  para  17.17). Therefore,  the question is whether the defendant has, -  so far  as  the  common  feature is  concerned,  -  copied  any distinctive  arrangement  of  the common elements?   Or  has copied any unusual feature of the common element ( Crispin’s Appln.(1917)  34  RPC 249) ( see Kerly para  17.19,  fn.77). The  marks,  names  or  get-up   concerned  must  always  be considered  as the whole thing, as the true test is  whether the  totality  of  the  impression  given  both  orally  and visually  is  such  that  it is  likely  to  cause  mistake, deception or confusion (Halsbury Vol.38, 3rd Ed.  para 987). We  next come to the crucial test laid down by Evershed M.R. in Broadhead’s Application [( 1950) 67 RPC 209 at 215] which was  a  case  relating to opposition to  registration.   The Master of Rolls followed the observations of Lord Russell in Coca  Cola  Co.  of Canada Vs.  Pepsi Cola Co.  of Canada  ( which  was  an infringement action )[(1942) 59 RPC 127)  and observed  as follows:  "Where you get a common  denominator, you must in looking at the competing formulas, pay much more regard  to the parts of the formulas which are not common  - although  it does not flow from that that you must treat the words  as  though  the common part was not  there  at  all". Where  common  marks are included in the rival trade  marks, more  regard  is to be paid to the parts not common and  the proper  course is to look at the marks as whole, but at  the same  time  not  to disregard the parts  which  are  common. Halsbury  (  3rd Ed.  para 992) also says:  where there  are common  elements  to two or more marks, more regard must  be paid  to the parts that are not common but the common  parts cannot  be disregarded.  (Coca Cola Co.  of Canada Ltd.  vs. Pepsi Cola Co.  of Canada Ltd.  (1942 (1) All.E.R.  615(PC). The  above  principles have been laid down in  English  law. Decisions  of  this Court -infringement, essential  features and  the  whole  thing  This Court has  laid  down  in  Corn Products  Refining  Co.  Vs.  Shangrila Food  Products  Ltd. (AIR 1960 SC 142), which was a case of infringement, that it would  be  for  the court to decide whether the  marks  were similar.   It was observed that "in deciding the question of similarity  between  two  marks,  the   marks  have  to   be considered  as  a  whole".  Again in  K.K.   Chinna  Krishna Chettiar  Vs.   Sri  Ambal and Co.  and Anr.  (AIR  1970  SC 146), where the question of similarity arose at the stage of opposition  to the appellant’s mark by the respondents ( who had  a registered trade mark), it was observed that:  "it is for  the court to decide the question on a comparison of the competing marks as a whole." The resemblance between the two marks  must be considered with reference to the ear as  well as  the  eye".  In Roche and Co.  Vs.  Geoffrey Manners  and Co.Pvt.   Ltd.   (  AIR  1970  SC  2062),  the  question  of ’deceptive  similarity’  was  raised by the  appellant  (  a registered   trade   mark  holder)   for  removal   of   the respondent’s trade mark, in rectification proceedings.  (The decision  is relevant in an infringement action except  that the  burden  of  proof in an infringement action is  on  the plaintiff  while  in an application for rectification it  is the  applicant).   It was again observed in the  above  case that:   "it  is  necessary  to apply  both  the  visual  and phonetic  tests".  "It is also important that the marks must be  compared  as  whole".   "The true test  is  whether  the totality  of  the  proposed trade mark is such  that  it  is likely  to  cause deception or confusion or mistake  in  the

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minds of persons accustomed to the existing trade mark".  In yet  another case of an infringement action, Parle  Products (P)  Ltd.   Vs.  J.P.  and Co., Mysore ( AIR 1972 SC  1359), the  question  was in relation to a wrapper with  the  words ’Gluco  biscuit’  and  the  particular  colour  scheme,  the general  get  up used for sale of Parle’s Gluco Biscuit’  so printed on the wrapper.  There was a farmyard with a girl in the centre carrying a pail of water and cows and hens around her  in  the background of a farm-house.  The defendant  was selling  biscuits  with  the name ’Glucose  Biscuits’.   The wrapper contained picture of a girl supporting with one hand a  bundle  of  hay on her head and carrying a sickle  and  a bundle of food, with cows and hens around, in the background of  a building.  This Court held, on those facts, that in an infringement action, it was sufficient if there was ’overall similarity’  as would mislead a person usually dealing  with one to accept the other if offered to him.  Here the packets were  of the same size and the colour scheme and design were having close resemblance.  The marks should not be kept side by  side  and  compared.   The essential  features  of  both marking  were  a  girl  with one  arm  raised  and  carrying something in the other while the cows or hens were near her, in the background of a house.  The decision of this Court in Durga Dutt Sharma Vs.  Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories (   AIR   1965   SC   980),     was   a   case   where   the respondent-registered  holder of the trade mark opposed  the appellant’s  registration.  The question of deception  arose in  that  context.   Both  were  using  the  word  ’Navratna Pharmaceutical  laboratories’  in  connection with  sale  of Ayurvedic  medicines.  It was held that for judging  whether the  later  mark  was deceptive, it was  sufficient  if  the similarity was so close visually, phonetically or otherwise. If  the essential features had been proved to be adopted  by the  opposite party, that was sufficient.  The fact that the get-up,  packing and other writing or marks on the goods  or packets  showed  marked difference was not material,  though such  features could be material in a passing-off action and the  defendant  might  escape   liability  by  showing  some additional  matter to distinguish his goods.  The purpose of comparison  was  to  see  if  the  essential  features  were different.   The  object of inquiry was to find out  if  the defendant’s  mark was as a whole similar to the  plaintiff’s registered   mark.   Ruston  and   Hornsby  Ltd.   Vs.   The Zamindara  Engineering  Co.  ( 1969(2) SCC 727) was again  a case  of  an infringement action.  It was admitted that  the words  ’Ruston and Rustam’ were deceptively similar and  the fact  that  to  the  latter, "India" was  suffixed  made  no difference.  The court pointed out the difference between an infringement  action and a passing off action and held  that if  there was colourable imitation, the fact that the get up was  different  was not relevant in an  infringement  action though  it might have had relevance in a passing off action, and  in that context referred to Saville Perfumery Ltd.  Vs. Jump  Perfect  Ltd.   [(1941) 58 RPC 147  (161)].   Broadly, under  our law as seen above, it can be said that stress  is laid  down on common features rather than on differences  on essential  features,  except  for a passing reference  to  a limited  extent  in  one   case.   Difference  in  essential features  are also relevant under Indian Law:  It appears to us  that this Court did not have occasion to decide, as  far as  we  are  able  to see, an issue where  there  were  also differences in essential features nor to consider the extent to  which  the differences are to be given  importance  over similarities.   Such  a question has arisen in  the  present case  and that is why we have referred to the principles  of

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English  Law  relating to differences in essential  features which  principles, in our opinion, are equally applicable in our  country.   Application of Principles to facts  of  this case:   If  differences in essential features are  relevant, the  next  question is as to what is the position on  facts. The  first  question therefore is as to what, on the  facts, are  the essential features of the plaintiff’s mark?  It  is clear  that  apart  from  the  word  PIKNIK,  the  essential features are also the special script of these words in block letters and the curve in which these words are inscribed and the  caricature of the boy with a hat occurring between  the words  K and N on the plaintiff’s mark.  On the other  hand, the  defendant’s  mark  contains  the   words  PICNIC  in  a straightline,  the script is normal and the words  ‘Cadbury’ are  written  above the words PICNIC.  Neither the  peculiar script nor the curve nor the boy with a hat are found in the defendant’s  mark.   It  is  true  that  there  is  phonetic similarity  and  use  of the word PICNIC.  But what  is  the effect  of the dissimilarities?  This is the crucial part of the case.  It is here that sufficient care is to be taken in applying  the  principles.  In our opinion, in  the  present case,  three  tests to which reference has been made  above, have  to  be applied.  The first one is this:  Is there  any special  aspect of the common feature which has been copied? The second test will be with reference to the ‘mode in which the  parts  are  put together differently?  That is  to  say whether  the dissimilarity of the part or parts is enough to mark  the whole thing dissimilar (Kerly para 17.17  referred to  above).  The third test is whether When there are common elements,  should one not pay more regard to the parts which are  not common, while at the same time not disregarding the common  parts?   What  is the first impression?  As  to  the first  test, whether there are any peculiar features of  the common  part  which  have been copied, it is seen  that  the peculiar aspects of the common features of PIKNIK namely the peculiar  script and the curve have not been copied;   then, as  to the second test, we have to see the dissimilarity  in the  part  or  parts  and if it has  made  the  whole  thing dissimilar.   Absence of the peculiar script in the letters, the  curve and the absence of the caricature of the boy with a  hat,  in  our  view,  have  made  the  whole  thing  look dissimilar.   Then,  as to the third test, the  above  three dissimilarities  have  to be given more importance than  the phonetic similarity or the similarity in the use of the word PICNIC for PIKNIK.  That is how these three tests have to be applied  in  this case.  On first impression, we are of  the view  that  the dissimilarities appear to be clear and  more striking  to  the naked eye than any similarity between  the marks.   Thus,  on  the whole, the  essential  features  are different.   Learned  senior counsel for the respondent  had also  strongly  relied on Registrar, Trade Marks Vs.   Ashok Chandra  Rakhit  ( AIR 1955 SC 558) to contend that, in  any event,  the plaintiff had registered only the label and  not the  words PIKNIK.  In that case, this Court quoted  (P.565) the following words from Pinto Vs.  Badman [1891 (8) RPC 181 (at  191)] to the following effect:  "The truth is that  the label  does  not consist of each particular part of it,  but consists  of the combination of them all." We do not propose to  go  into the applicability of the above decision to  the case  before  us.   There,  the  question  was  whether  the Registrar  could insist that a particular word contained  in the  label should be disclaimed.  In the result, we hold  on the  question of infringement that on an examination of  the relative  strength of the pleas, as stated in Palmolive,  it is  shown that the chances, on facts, are more in favour  of

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the  defendant  rather than in favour of the  plaintiff  and that  the plaintiff is not entitled to temporary injunction. This  finding  on facts is confined to  these  interlocutory proceedings only.  Deceive or confuse:  Our discussion under this  head is again in the context of the relevant  strength of  the  case  of the parties and for the  purposes  of  the temporary  injunction as laid down in Palmolive.  Section 29 uses  the  words ‘deceptively similar’ and  section  2(1)(d) defines  ‘deceptively  similar’ as situations where  one  is ‘deceiving’  others or ‘confusing’ others.  We have to  keep in  view  the  distinction between the words  ‘deceive’  and ‘confuse’  used in section 2(1)(d).  These words which occur in  the  various trade mark statutes have been explained  in Parker-Knoll  vs.   Knoll International [(1962) RPC  265(HL) (pp.273-274)]  by Lord Denning as follows:  "Looking to  the natural meaning of the words, I would make two observations: first,  the  offending  mark must ‘so nearly  resemble’  the registered  mark  as  to  be ‘likely’ to  deceive  or  cause confusion.   It is not necessary that it should be  intended to  deceive or intended to cause confusion.  You do not have to  look into the mind of the user to see what he  intended. It  is its probable effect on ordinary people which you have to  consider.  No doubt, if you find that he did not  intend to  deceive or cause confusion, you will give him credit for success  in  his intentions.  You will not hesitate to  hold that  his use of it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. But  if he had no such intention, and was completely honest, then  you will look carefully to see whether it is likely to deceive  or  cause confusion before you find him  guilty  of infringement.   Secondly,  ‘to  deceive’ is one  thing.   To cause ‘confusion’ is another.  The difference is this:  when you  deceive  a man, you tell him a lie.  You make  a  false representation  to  him and thereby cause him to  believe  a thing  to  be  true  which  is false.  You  may  not  do  it knowingly,  or intentionally but still you do it, and so you deceive  him.   But you may cause confusion without  telling him   a   lie  at  all,   and  without  making   any   false representation  to him.  You may indeed tell him the  truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, but still you may cause  confusion in his mind, not by any fault of yours, but because  he has not the knowledge or ability to  distinguish it from the other pieces of truth known to him or because he may  not even take the trouble to do so." The above  passage has been quoted by this Court in Roche vs.  Geoffrey Manners [AIR  1970 SC 2062 (2064)].  Therefore if, in a given  case, the  essential  features have been copied, the intention  to deceive  or  to  cause  confusion  is  not  relevant  in  an infringement  action.   Even  if, without  an  intention  to deceive,  a  false  representation  is   made,  it  can   be sufficient.    Similarly,   confusion     may   be   created unintentionally  but  yet  the purchaser of  goods  may  get confused  for he does not have the knowledge of facts  which can  enable  him not to get confused.  In the present  case, this aspect need not detain us in as much as we have already held  that the relative strength of the case is in favour of the  defendant.   Further this aspect is connected with  the type  of  buyer  whom the law has in mind and  we  shall  be presently  dealing  with  this  aspect   also.   It  is  not necessary for us to go into the contention of the respondent that  the  defendant  was  using the word  PICNIC  in  other countries  over a long period along with the word  ‘Cadbury’ and  that a question of transborder reputation protects  the defendant.   Reliance  is  placed   for  the  respondent  on N.R.Dongre  vs.   Whirlpool Corporation and Anr.  [1996  (5) SCC  714] for this purpose.  We do not think it necessary to

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go  into  this  aspect.  Such a question, if raised  in  the suit,  can  be gone into on its own merits.  For  the  above reasons,  we  hold  that  on the question  of  the  relative strength,  the  decision must go in favour of the  defendant that  there is no infringement and the High Court was  right in  refusing  temporary  injunction.   Point  5  is  decided accordingly.   Point  6:   Passing   off  and  infringement- differences:   Here  the  point is in relation  to  relative strength  of  the parties on the question of ‘passing  off’. As  discussed  under  Point 5, the proof of  resemblance  or similarity  in  cases  of passing off and  infringement  are different.   In  a passing off action additions, get  up  or trade-dress  might  be relevant to enable the  defendant  to escape.   In  infringement cases, such facts do  not  assume relevance.    [  See  Durga   Dutt  Sharma  Vs.    Navaratna Phamaceutical  Laboratories Ltd.  (AIR 1965 SC 980);  Ruston &  Hornsby  Ltd.  Vs.  The Zamindara Engineering Co.  (  AIR 1970  SC 1649) and Wander Ltd.  Vs.  Antox India Pvt.   Ltd. ( 1990 Supple.  SCC 727)].  It is possible that, on the same facts,  a  suit  for  passing off may fail but  a  suit  for infringement  may succeed because the additions, the get  up and  trade  dress  may  enable a defendant to  escape  in  a passing  off  action.   A somewhat similar  but  interesting situation  arose  in  a dispute between two  companies.   In N.S.Thread  &  Co.  vs.  James Chadwick & Bros.   [AIR  1948 Mad.   481], the passing off action failed.  But  thereafter James  Chadwick  Co.  succeeded in an appeal arising out  of the  registration  proceedings  and the  said  judgment  was confirmed  by  this  Court in N.S.Thread & Co.   vs.   James Chadwick  & Bros.  [AIR 1953 SC 357].  It was held that  the judgment in the passing off case could not be relied upon by the  opposite  side in latter registration proceedings.   In the  same tone, Halsbury (Trade Marks, 4th Ed., 1984 Vol.48, para  187) says that in a passing off action the "degree  of similarity  of the name, mark or other features concerned is important  but  not necessarily decisive, so that an  action for  infringement of a registered trade mark may succeed  on the  same  facts  where a passing off action fails  or  vice versa".   As  to  vice-versa, Kerly says  (para  16.12),  an infringement  action  may fail where plaintiff cannot  prove registration  or that its registration extends to the  goods or  to all the goods in question or because the registration is  invalid and yet the plaintiff may show that by imitating the  mark  or  otherwise,  the defendant has  done  what  is calculated  to pass off his goods as those of plaintiff.  In Schweppes  Ltd.   vs.   Gibbens (1905) 22 RPC  601(HL)  Lord Halsbury  said, while dealing with a passing off action that "the  whole  question in these cases is whether the thing  - taken  in its entirety, looking at the whole thing - is such that  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things  a  person  with reasonable  comprehension  and with proper insight would  be deceived".   Defendant’s name on his goods is an  indication of there being no case of passing off:  In the present case, defendant’s  goods  contain  the words  ‘Cadbury’  on  their wrapper.  As per the principle laid down in Fisons Ltd.  vs. E.J.Godwin  [(1976)  RPC  653], the occurrence of  the  name ‘Cadbury’  on  the  defendant’s wrapper is a  factor  to  be considered  while  deciding  the question  of  passing  off. Similarly  in  King & Co.  Ltd.  vs.  Gillard and Co.   Ltd. [22  RPC 327] and Cadbury-Schweppes pty Ltd.  vs.  The  Pub. Squash  Ltd.  (1981) RPC 429, it was held that the  presence of  defendant’s  name  on his goods was an  indication  that there  was  no  passing  off, even if the  trade  dress  was similar.  The fact that the defendant’s wrapper contains the word  ‘Cadbury’ above the words PICNIC is therefore a factor

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which  is  to be taken into account.  Buyer’s ignorance  and chances  of  being deceived:  As to scope of a  buyer  being deceived,  in a passing off action, the following principles have to be borne in mind.  Lord Romer, LJ has said in Payton & Co.  vs.  Snelling Lampard & Co.  (1900) 17 RPC 48 that it is  a  misconception to refer to the confusion that  can  be created  upon  an ignorant customer.  The kind  of  customer that  the  Courts  ought to think of in these cases  is  the customer who knows the distinguishing characteristics of the plaintiff’s  goods, those characteristics which  distinguish his  goods from other goods in the market so far as  relates to general characteristics.  If he does not know that, he is not  a customer whose views can properly be regarded by  the Court.   [See  the  cases quoted in N.S.Thread  &  Co.   vs. Chadwick  & Bros.  (AIR 1948 Mad.  481), which was a passing off  action].  In Schweppes’ case, Lord Halsbury said, if  a person  is  so careless that he does not look and  does  not treat  the  label  fairly  but   takes  the  bottle  without sufficient consideration and without reading what is written very plainly indeed up the face of the label, you cannot say he is deceived.  In our view, the trial Court in the present case went wrong in principle in holding that there was scope for a purchaser being misled.  The conclusion was arrived at without  noticing  the above principles.  In the result,  on the  question  of passing off, the relative strength of  the case  again appears to us to be more in defendant’s  favour. Point  6  is  decided accordingly.  Point 7:  The  issue  of laches of the appellant-plaintiff, though relied upon by the respondent,  does  not, in view of our finding at  Point  5, assume  any  significance  in  this  case.   Coming  to  the question   whether   the  appellate   court  was  right   in interfering  with  the discretion of the trial Court and  in vacating  injunction,  we  are of the view that,  on  facts, interference  was  justifiable.   If wrong  principles  were applied  by the trial Court under Order 39, Rule 1 CPC,  the appellate  Court could certainly interfere in  interlocutory proceedings  under  Order 39, Rule 1 CPC.  Here,  the  trial Court  gave  importance to phonetic similarity and  did  not refer  to the differences in essential features.  It did not also have the wary customer in mind.  On the other hand, the High Court’s approach in this behalf was right as it noticed the  dissimilarities in the essential features and concluded that  viewed  as a whole, there was neither  similarity  nor scope  for  deception nor confusion.  (No doubt both  Courts went  into  the validity of the plaintiff’s registered  mark and  into  the  question of ‘distinctiveness’  of  the  word PIKNIK  under section 9(1)(e).  But in our view that was not necessary).  Thus, when wrong principles were applied by the trial  Court  while refusing temporary injunction, the  High Court  could  certainly  interfere.    Point  7  is  decided accordingly.   In the result, the appeal is dismissed.   We, however,  reiterate  the  direction given by High  Court  in regard  to maintenance of accounts and the undertaking to be given  by  the  defendant for damages, if any, that  may  be granted  in the suit, in case the suit succeeds.  We make it clear  that the above findings on facts are for the  purpose of  the temporary injunction and will not come in the way of the  Court in the suit to decide the matter on the  evidence produced.