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PETITIONER: M/s.  S. K. G. SUGAR LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/04/1974

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH RAY, A.N. (CJ) MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN ALAGIRISWAMI, A. GOSWAMI, P.K.

CITATION:  1974 AIR 1533            1975 SCR  (1) 312  1974 SCC  (4) 827  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1977 SC1361  (200)  RF         1980 SC1124  (18)

ACT: The  Bihar  Sugar  Factories  Control  Act,  (7  of   1937)- Provisions  re  :  production, supply  and  distribution  of sugar  held to be in conflict with provisions  of  Essential Commodities  Act (10 of 1955)-Validity of taxing  provisions of  Bihar Act, if affected-President’s Act 8 of  1969-Effect of.

HEADNOTE: The  Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act, (7 of 1937),  was  a temporary  Act the life of which was extended from  time  to time  and  Bihar  Act 7 of 1955  reenacted  it  permanently. Bihar  Act  17  of 1963 substituted in  the  Act,  with  re- trospective effect from January 1, 1962, a new s. 29,  which empowered  the  State Government to impose  by  notification cess  and tax on sugarcane.  The Constitutional validity  of the  Act was challenged and the High Court held the Act  un- constitutional  and  invalid.  When the matter  came  up  on appeal to this Court (A. K.   Jain’s  case ([1969] 2  S.C.C. 340) it was held that if Bihar Act of 1937 provides anything contrary  to  rule 3(3) of the Sugar Cane  (Control)  Order, 1955,  issued  under the Essential Commodities Act  1955  it must  be  held to have been altered as per Art. 372  of  the Constitution.   In  January,  1968, an  Ordinance  was  pro- mulgated  by  the  Governor  of Bihar,  and  s.  35  of  the Ordinance  corresponded to s. 29 inserted by  the  1963-Act. Sec.  50 of the Ordinance revealed Bihar Act 7 of 1937,  and s.  50(2) contained a saving and validating  provision  with regard  to anything done, tax imposed or liability  incurred etc. under the Repealed Act.  A notification under s. 35  of the Ordinance imposing a tax was issued by the Government in February,    1968.    Successive    Ordinances    thereafter promulgated  by  the Governor validated  the  provisions  or anything  done  thereunder.   In  August  1969,  during  the President’s Rule, the Bihar Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and  Purchase) Act, (Presidents Act 8 of 1969)  was  Passed.

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Sec.  66(1)  of the Act provided  that  notwithstanding  any judgment, decree or order by any court all cesses and  taxes imposed  or  collected under any State law before  the  com- mencement  of  the Act shall be deemd to have  been  validly imposed  etc.,  as  if  the Act had been  in  force  at  all material times. With respect to certain purchases of sugar cane made by  the petitioner  in  January  1968  the  respondent  State   sent requisitions to the petitioner for realisation of cane  cess and purchase tax due under the notification under Bihar  Act 7  of 1937.  The petitioner challenged the imposition  in  a petition  under Art. 32, on the ground that  the  imposition was without the authority of law. Dismissing the petition, HELD  :  The validity of the impugned notification  and  the cess  and  tax  imposed thereunder has  to  be  judged  with reference to successive Ordinances and the President’s  Act. By virtue of the legal fiction introduced by the  validating provision  in s. 66(1) of the President’s Act, the  impugned notification  will  be  deemed  to  have  been  issued   not necessarily  under  the  Ordinance of  1968  but  under  the President’s Act itself deriving its legal force and validity directly from the latter. (1)  The  Bihar Ordinance of 1968 was within the  competence of the Governor under Art. 213 of the Constitution.  The two conditions  required  by that Article are satisfied  in  the present case.  The State legislature was not in session  and the   Governor  was  satisfied  as  to  the   necessity   of promulgating the ordinance.  The Governor is the sole  judge as  to the existence of the necessary circumstances and  his satisfaction is not a justiciable matter. State  of  Punjab  v. Sat Pal Dang,  [1969]  1  S.C.R.  633, followed. (2)  (i)  The  taxing provisions of the Bihar  Act  of  1937 never  lost  their validity and continue,] to be  in  force. The notification issued under the Bihar Act 313 of  1937  and continued under the latter Acts  imposing  the taxes or cesses also remained operative during the period in question till it was replaced by another notification  under the  Ordinance  of 1968.  It is therefore incorrect  to  say that  there was any period during which the tax  was  levied without the authority of law.  The taxing provisions of  the Bihar Act were neither rendered inoperative by Art.  254(1), nor repealed or altered by the competent legislature  within the contemplation of Art. 372 of the Constitution.  The  Act of  1937  dealt  with two distinct  and  ,separate  matters, namely.  (a)  the  regulation  of  production,  supply   and distribution   of  sugar  cane,  and  (b)   imposition   and collection  of  cesses and taxes in respect of  sugar  cane. Matter (a) was referable to Entry 33 of the Concurrent  List and matter (b) to Entry 52 of the State List.  The Essential Commodities Act (Central Act of 1955) related to matter  (b) only.   In  the  light of Art. 372 the Bihar  Act  would  be deemed  to have been repealed with effect from the  date  on which  the Central Act came into force (April 1, 1955)  only in  so  far  as  it  controlled  or  authorised  control  of production  supply  and  distribution  of,  and  trade   and commerce in sugar cane.  The taxing provisions of the  Bihar Act were not in any way repugnant to the Central Act or  any other law passed by Parliament. [317C-318D; 319F] (ii) The observations of_the High Court while striking  down the  Act, though very widely expressed, must be confined  to the  precise points for determination that arose before  it. The  High Court was not concerned with the validity  of  the

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taxing provisions of the Bihar Act.  The question before the High   Court   was  the  conflict  between   the   Essential Commodities  Act and the Sugar Control Order,  1955,  issued thereunder on the one hand, and the Bihar Act of 1937 on the other,  because  the regulation of price  of  sugarcane  was expressly dealt with by the Bihar Act.  Thus only that  part of  the Bihar Act came out) for consideration which  related to  Entry 13 of the Concurrent List and that part  could  be said  to  be  inconsistent  with the  Central  Act,  but  no question  of  the validity of the taxing provisions  of  the Bihar Act arose before the High Court. [319A-D] (iii)     The   matters  relatable  to  Entry  33   of   the Concurrent  List  in the Act were severable from  the  other provisions  of  the  Act.   There  was  no  competition   or collision between the taxing provisions of the Bihar Act and those of the Central Act.  The two existed side by side  and each  remains  operative in its own distinct  field  without interfering with the other. [319D-E] (iv) A  Legislature has the power to make a law  imposing  a tax retrospectively or validate defective laws by subsequent legislation or even past unlawful collections, the power  of validation  being ancillary to and included in the power  to legislate on a particular subject. [320C] (vi) The  language  of  the  validating  provisions  of  the President’s  Act  are of wide amplitude, and even if  it  is assumed  that  the Essential Commodities Act  had  cast  any doubt   on  or  introduced  any  infirmity  in  the   taxing provisions  of the State Act, the same had been  removed  or cured  by  s. 66(1) of the President’s Act  which  not  only nullify the effect if any, of the judgment of the High Court on  the  taxing  provisions  of the Act  of  1937  but  also validates  the imposition, assessment or collection  of  all cesses and taxes imposed under any State with  retrospective effect  as if the President’s Act had been in force  at  all material  times  including the period in question,  that  is January, 1968. [320D-E]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 370 of 1969. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. P.   K. Chatterjee, N. H. Hingorani and Rathin Das, for  the appellant. L.   N. Sinha, Solicitor General, R. K. Garg, S. C.  Agarwal and S. S. Bhatnagar, for respondent no. 1 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA,  J.-In  this  petition under  Article  32  of  the Constitution,  the  petitioner,  a  Private  Ltd.   Company, challenges the validity of the 314 Cane  Cess  and Purchase tax levied on it for the  month  of January,  1968.   Respondents 1, 2 and 3 are  the  State  of Bihar,  Certificate Officer and the Collector of  Champaran, respectively. The facts are these There was in force in the State of Bihar a  pre-Constitution law known as Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act, 1937 (Act  7 of  1937).  By notification issued under s. 29 of that  Act, cane  cess and purchase tax were being levied in respect  of sugar  cane intended to be used or used in a sugar  factory. It was a temporary enactment.  Originally, it was to  remain in  force  until June 30, 1941.  But its life  was  extended from  time  to time by different amending  Acts.   The  last

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extension was made by Bihar Act 6 of 1950 upto January   30, 1955,  which came into force on January 9, 1950 when it  was published  in  the Bihar  Government  Gazette.   Thereafter, Bihar Act 7 of 1955 which came into force on March 30, 1955, amended s. 1(3) of Act 6 of 1950 extending the life of Act 7 of  1937, indefinitely beyond June 30, 1955.  In  the  mean- time,   the  Essential  Commodities  Act  No.  10  of   1955 (hereinafter   called  the  Central  Act)  was  enacted   by Parliament.  After the assent of the President, it came into force  on April 1, 1955.  Section 16(1) (b) of  the  Central Act expressly repealed "any other law in force in any  State immediately before the commencement of this Act in so far as such   law  controls  or  authorises  the  control  of   the production,  supply  and  distribution  of,  and  trade  and commerce in, any essential commodity." Bihar  Act  17  of 1963 substituted in Act 7  of  1937  with retrospective effect from January 1, 1962, this new  Section 29 :               "Cess and tax on cane-The State Government may               by notification impose-               (a)   a  cess  not  exceeding  fifty-one  naya               paise  per quintal on the entry  of  sugarcane               into   a   local  area,  specified   in   such               notification,  for  consumption, use  or  sale               therein;               (b)   a tax not exceeding fifty-one naya paise               per quintal on the purchase of sugarcane by or               on behalf of the occupier of a factory;               Provided that such tax shall not be payable in               respect of sugarcane for which a cess  imposed               under clause (a) is payable." The  Government of Bihar, acting under this Section,  issued and  published  a notification on October 21, 1963,  in  the Gazette whereby cane cess and purchase tax at certain  rates were   levied   in  the  local  areas   specified   in   the notification. The  constitutional validity of Bihar Act 7 of 1937 and  the rules framed thereunder was challenged by a writ petition in the High Court of Patna which by its judgment, dated July 4, 1966, in A. K. Jain and anr. v. Union of India,(1) held  Act 7   of   1937  and  the  rules  framed  thereunder   to   be unconstitutional and invalid.  On appeal against that (1)  1968 Pat.  Law Journal Reports p. 179                             315 judgment  this  Court in A. K. Jain and others v.  Union  of India  and  ors.(1)  held that if the Bihar Act  7  of  1937 provides  anything  contrary to Rule 3(3) of  the  Sugarcane (Control) Order 1955, issued under the Central Act, it  must be  held  to have been altered in view of Art.  372  of  the Constitution.   The  Patna High Court followed  its  earlier decision  in A. K. Jain’s case, in Sugauli Sugar Works  Pvt. Ltd. v. Cooperative Development and Cane Marketing  Union(2) and  in  Belsand  Sugar  Co. Ltd.  v.  Thakur  Girja  Nandan Singh(3). After Bihar Act 7 of 1937 was struck down by the High Court, no  legislative measures were taken until January  12,  1968 when  Ordinance  No. 3 was promulgated by  the  Governor  of Bihar with instructions of the President. Section 35 of the Ordinance corresponded to s.29 inserted in Act  7 of 1937 by the Amending Act of 1963,  excepting  that the  maximum rate of the cess/tax leviable was fixed  at  67 paise per quintal. Section  50  of the Ordinance repealed the Bihar  Act  7  of 1937.  Its sub-section (2) contained a saving and validating provision  with  regard  to anything done,  tax  imposed  or

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liability incurred etc. under the Repealed Act 7 of 1937. A  notification  under  s.  35 imposing  a  tax  under  this Ordinance  3 of 1968, however, was issued by the  Government on  February 16, 1968.  Ordinance No. 3 lapsed  on  February 28,  1968, on which date, another Ordinance (No. 6 of  1968) was promulgated.  Sub-sections (1) ’and (2) of s. 35 of this Ordinance were the same as those of the preceding  Ordinance excepting  that a second proviso to sub-s.(1) was  added  in these terms :               "Provided further that any tax imposed by  the               State  Government in respect of  the  crushing                             year 1967-68 under the provisions of t he  Bihar               Sugarcane (Regulation of supply and  purchase)               Ordinance 1968 (Bihar Ordinance No. 3 of 1968)               shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  effectively               imposed " from the date of enforcement of  the               Ordinance. By  s.  35(3) Ordinance 3 of 1968 was repealed.  But  s.  50 saved and validated everything done under Act 7 of 1937  and the repealed Ordinance. On July 4, 1968, the Governor promulgated Bihar Ordinance  4 of  1969.   It provided that except its ss. 1 and  52  which came into force at once, the remaining provisions "shall  be deemed  to  have come into force from the 25th  June  1969". Section 49 reproduced the taxing provisions contained in its preceding   Ordinance.   Section  66  contained   validating provisions  analogous  to  those  found  in  the   preceding Ordinance :               Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or  order               of   any  court,  all      cesses  and   taxes               imposed, assessed or collected (1)  [1969] 2 S.C.C. 340. (2)  Misc.   J. Case No. 1344 of 1964 decided by Patna  High Court on July 29, 1966. (3) AIR 1969 Pat. 8. 31 6 .lm15 or  purporting to have been imposed, assessed  or  collected under  any State Law, before the 25th June, 1968,  shall  be deemed  to have been validly imposed, assessed or  collected in  accordance  with law as if this Ordinance  had  been  in force  at  all  material times when such  cess  or  tax  was imposed, assessed or collected, and accordingly.... On  August  31,  1969 during  the  President’s  Rule,  Bihar Sugarcane  (Regulation  of Supply and  Purchase)  Act,  1969 (President’s  Act 8 of 1969) was passed.  Section  66(1)  of that Act provided :               "Notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order               of  any court, all cesses and  taxes  imposed,               assessed  or collected or purporting  to  have               been imposed, assessed or collected under  any               State  law,  before the commencement  of  this               Act,  shall  be deemed to  have  been  validly                             imposed,  assessed or collected  in  a ccordance               with  law as if this Act had been in force  at               all  material times when such cess or tax  was               imposed,    assessed    or    collected    and               accordingly...." In  January  1968, the petitioner  purchased  sugarcane  for production  of  sugar  in its  factory  from  the  sugarcane growers  of the area allotted to its factory on  payment  of the price fixed by the State Government.  Respondent 1  sent four requisitions for realization of cane cess and  purchase

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tax  said  to  be due under the Bihar Act 7  of  1937.   The demand notices were issued under s.5 of the Bihar and Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act 4 of 1914.  One of such  notices was   a   demand  of  Rs.  1,71,543/56P.   alleged   to   be cess/purchase tax dues for January, 1968. The  petitioner challenges these impositions and  consequent requisitions and demands on several grounds out of which the following have been canvassed before us :               (1)   Bihar  Act 7 of 1937 and Act 7  of  1955               which  attempted to make it permanent and  the               notification  issued thereunder  imposing  the               cess  and  tax  in  question,  were   declared               unconstitutional and invalid by the Patna High               Court in A.     K. Jain’s case (supra) on July               4, 1966 and that decision was affirmed by this               Court  in appeal.  There was no law  in  force               authorising  the  levy of  the  cess/tax  till               January  12,  1968 when Bihar Ordinance  6  of               1968 was promulgated;               (2)   The   2nd  proviso  to  s.35  of   Bihar               Ordinance 6 of 1968 is invalid.  Section 35 of               Ordinance  3  and  6 of 1968 per  se  did  not               impose  any tax.  It only empowered the  State               Government to do so by notification, and  that               too prospectively.  The second proviso  cannot               operate  to give retrospective effect  to  the               notification,   dated   February   16,   1968.               Reference has been made to Hukam Chand etc. v.               Union of India and ors.(1) (1) [1973] 1 S.C.R. 896. 317               (3)   The second proviso to s.35 of  Ordinance               6 of 1968 antedated the imposition of tax from               January 12, 1968, the date of promulgation  of               the first Ordinance 3 of 1968.  Assuming  this               proviso to be valid, there was no notification               imposing  the tax, in existence for the  period               from January 1, 1968 to January 11, 1968.  Any               tax  or cess levied for this uncovered  period               was without the authority of law :               (4)   The Bihar Ordinance 3 of 1968 was beyond               the  competence of the Governor under  Article               213  of the Constitution because there was  no               urgency for, the promulgation of the Ordinance               and the power was exercised malafide-. We  shall  take the last contention  first.   Barring  those cases where the Governor has to obtain previous  instruction from  the  President,  the Governor’s  power  to  promulgate Ordinances  under  Art. 213 is subject  to  two  conditions, namely :               (a)that  the house or houses, as the case  may               be,  of the State Legislature must not  be  in               session when the Ordinance is issued; and  (b)               the  Governor  must  be satisfied  as  to  the               existence  of  circumstances which  render  it               necessary for him take immediate action. There  is no dispute with regard to the satisfaction of  the first  condition.   Existence  of  condition  (b)  only   is questioned.   It is however well-settled that the  necessity of  immediate action and of promulgating an Ordinance  is  a matter  purely  for  the  subjective  satisfaction  of   the Governor.   He is the sole Judge as to the existence of  the circumstances  necessitating  the making of.  an  Ordinance. His satisfaction is not a justiciable matter.  It cannot  be questioned  on ground of error of judgment or  otherwise  in

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court-see State of Punjab v. Sat Pal Dang(1) The  contention is  devoid of merit.  Moreover, after the coming into  force of  the President’s Act 8 of 1969, this question had  become merely academic. This   takes  us  to  the  other  contentions.    They   are interlinked.   To  us,  none of them  appears  to  be  well- founded. The first question is, whether after the commencement of the Central  Act  on April 1, 1955, the whole of Act 7  of  1937 became  ’void’  and  inoperative  ?  The  question   further resolves  itself into the issue : To what extent  this  pre- Constitution Act 7 of 1937 was repugnant to the Central Act, and, in consequence stood repealed or altered ? Act  7 of 1937 dealt with two distinct and separate  matters viz.,   (a)  the  regulation  of  production,   supply   and distribution   of   sugar-cane,  and  (b)   imposition   and collection of cesses and taxes in respect of sugarcane. Matter (a) was referable to Entry 33 of the Concurrent  List (III)  and matter (b) to Entry 52 of the State List (11)  in the  7th Schedule of the Constitution which  corresponds  to Entry 49 of the Provincial Legislative List (List II) of the Government  of India Act, 1935.  The Central Act 10 of  1955 related to matter (b) only. ]Bihar Act 7 of (1)  [1969] 1 S.C.R. 633. 318 1937 and Bihar Act 7 of 1955 which purported to reenact  the former permanently, in so far as it provided for  regulation of production, supply and distribution of sugarcane a matter falling under Entry 33 of the Concurrent List- was repugnant to  the Central Act 10 of 1955, and, in view of Article  254 of  the  Constitution, to the extent of that  repugnancy  or inconsistency would be void.  In the light of Article 372 of the Constitution read with s. 16(1) (b) of the Central  Act, the  Bihar  Act would be deemed to have been  repealed  with effect from April 1, 1955, only in so far as, it  controlled or  authorised  the control of the  production,  supply  and distribution of, and trade and commerce in sugar-cane.   The taxing  provisions  of  the Bihar Act were not  in  any  way repugnant  to  the Central Act or any other  law  passed  by Parliament.   Those taxing provisions, as  already  noticed, fall  under Entry 52, List II and that was why s.16  of  the Central  Act  confined the repeal only to  those  provisions which  were  covered  by Entry 33,  list  Ill.   The  taxing provisions  of  the Bihar Act, therefore, never  lost  their validity  and  continued to be in force.   The  notification issued  under the Bihar Acts of 1937, (and  continued  under the  Acts of 1955 and 1963), imposing the tax or cess,  also remained  operative during the period in question,. till  it was  replaced by another notification issued on January  12, 1968  under  the  Ordinance 3 of  1968.   It  is  therefore, incorrect  to  say that there was any period, much  less  in January  1968, during which the tax. was levied without  the authority of law. Mr. Chatterjee, however, contended that the Patna High Court had in A. K. Jain’s case (supra) struck down the Bihar Act 7 of  1937 in its entirety and that decision was  affirmed  in appeal by this Court.  In this connection he has invited our attention  to  the observations of the High Court in  A.  K. Jain’s case and in Belsand Sugar Company’s case (supra). The observations in question in A. K. Jain’s case are               "Assuming  here that Bihar Act 7 of  1937  ’is               severable  and  can  be  bifurcated  into  two               parts,  one dealing with the control of  sugar               industry,  a topic falling under Entry  52  of               List I and the other dealing with sugarcane, a

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             topic,  as  held by me  above,  falling  under               Entry  33  of List III, it  follows  that  the               Central Parliament was competent under Article               246 to repeal law in relation to sugarcane and               thus  the Bihar Act and the Rules in  relation               to   sugarcane  stood  repealed   and   became               unenforceable    in   accordance   with    the               provisions    of    Article   372    of    the               Constitution."               The  above remarks were reechoed by  the  same               High Court Belsand Sugar Co’s case thus :               "The   State  Legislature..........  was   not               competent  to enact...... and. to  extend  the               life of even the severable part of Bihar Act 7               of 1937, without taking recourse to the proce-               dure  prescribed in clause (2) of Article  254               of the Constitution, but, unfortunately, Bihar               Act  7 of 1955 did not receive the  assent  of               the President, and, therefore, being repugnant               to  certain provisions of the Central Act,  it               could not have any effect, and it was void  on               this ground as well." 319 The   observations  extracted  above,  though  very   widely expressed,  must  be  confined to, the  precise  points  for determination  that  had  arisen  in  those  cases.    These observations  were apparently made in the context  of  those matters  in  the Bihar Act which were  either  referable  to Entry  52,  Union  List or Entry 33,  Concurrent  List.   In neither  of those cases, the High Court, was concerned  with the  validity  of the taxing provisions of  the  Bihar  Act, covered by Entry 52 of the State List.  In A. K. Jain’s case (supra), the only question that fell for determination  was, whether Sections 3 and 7 of the Central Act IO of 1955,  and Clause 3 (iii) of the Sugar Control Order 1955 issued  under that  Act, were valid and within the legislative  competence of  Parliament.   It was contended that  the  regulation  of price  of sugarcane was expressly dealt with by Bihar Act  7 of 1937 and the action taken against the petitioners by  the police and the Magistrate was without jurisdiction being  in contravention of Bihar Act and the rules framed  thereunder. Thus   only  that  part  of  the  Bihar  Act  came  up   for consideration  which related to Entry 33 of  the  Concurrent List  and which only could be said to be  inconsistent  with the Central Act.  No question of the validity of the  taxing provisions of the Bihar Act arose in that case. Even  the  High Court found that the  matters  relatable  to Entry  33,  Concurrent List were severable  from  the  other provisions  of  the Act.  Before us also, it  has  not  been seriously urged that the taxing provisions of the Bihar  Act were  so  interwoven  and inextricably  connected  with  the provisions  referable to Entry 33 List III, that  the  whole Act would stand or fall together.  There was no  competition or collision between the taxing provisions of the Bihar  Act and,  those of the Central Act.  The two exist side by  side and each remains operative in its own distinct field without interfering with the other. It  will bear repetition that the taxing provisions  of  the Bihar Act were advisedly kept out of the purview of s. 16(1) (b) of the Central Act which repealed the State laws only in so  far  as  they controlled or authorised  control  of  the production,  supply  and  distribution  of  sugarcane.   The taking  provisions of the Bihar Act therefore  were  neither rendered  inoperative  by Article 254(1),  nor  repealed  or altered   by   the   competent   Legislature   within    the

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contemplation of Article 372 of the Constitution. It  is important to recall that when A. K. Jain’s case  came up  in  appeal,  this Court, did not  endorse  the  sweeping proposition sought to be spelled out by the petitioners from the  wide  language used by the High Court in  the  extracts above.   The only reference to the Bihar Act, made  by  this Court, was as follows               ".....  Sub-rule (3) of Rule (3)  specifically               provides  that unless there is an I  agreement               in writing to the contrary between the parties               the  purchaser  shall pay to  the  seller  the               price  of  the sugarcane purchased  within  14               days  from  the date of the  delivery  of  the               sugarcane.   This is a specific  mandate.   If               the   Bihar  Act  provides  anything  to   the               contrary  the same must be held to  have  been               altered   in  view  of  Article  372  of   the               Constitution (emphasis added) 320 Since the taxing provisions of the Bihar Act do not  contain "anything  contrary" to the Central Act, they could  not  in the light of the observations of this Court, be held to have been altered in view of Article 372.  Indeed, as pointed out already,  the  Court in that case was not at  all  concerned with the taxing provisions of the Bihar Act. In   view  of  the  above  discussion  the   conclusion   is inescapable that the taxing provisions of the Bihar Act 7 of 1937,  as  re-enacted permanently by Bihar Act  7  of  1955, continued  to  be  operative and validly  in  force  at  all material times, even after the enactment of the Central Act. Further,  the  successive  Ordinances  promulgated  by   the Governor  validated by way of abundant caution those  taxing provisions or anything done thereunder. It is well-settled that within its competence, a Legislature has the, power to make a law imposing a tax  retrospectively or  validate  defective laws by subsequent  legislation,  or even  past  unlawful collections, the  power  of  validation being ancillary to and included in the power to legislate on a particular subject. We have extracted earlier in this judgment, such  validating provisions in s. 66 of the Bihar Ordinance 4 of 1969 and  s. 66(1)  of  the President’s Act 8 of 1969.  The  language  of these provisions is of the widest amplitude; and, even if it is  assumed  that the Central Act had cast any doubt  on  or introduced  any  infirmity in the taxing provisions  of  the State Act, the same had been removed or cured by s. 66(1) of the President’s Act which not only nullifies the effect,  if any,  of  the  judgment  of the High  Court  on  the  taxing provisions  of the Bihar Act 7 of 1937, but  also  validates the  imposition, assessment or collection of all cesses  and taxes imposed under any state law with retrospective  effect as if the President’s Act had been in force at all  material times including the period in question i.e. of January 1968. The  validity of the impugned notification and the cess  and tax  imposed thereunder has to be judged with  reference  to the  successive  Ordinances and finally to  the  President’s Act.   By  virtue  of the legal fiction  introduced  by  the validating provision in s. 66(1), the impugned  notification will be deemed to have been issued not necessarily under the Ordinance  No.  3  of 1968 but under  the  President’s  Act, itself, deriving its legal force and validity directly  from the latter. For  the foregoing reasons, we negative the  contentions  of the petitioners and dismiss this petition with costs. V.P.S.                       Petition dismissed.

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