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PETITIONER: M/S.  RAMAN & RAMAN LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF MADRAS & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/02/1959

BENCH:

ACT:        Motor  Vehicles-Legislation empowering State  Government  to        issue   orders   and   directions-Interpretation-Nature   of        jurisdiction  conferred-Such orders and directions,  if  law        regulating   rights   of  Parties-Motor   Vehicles   (Madras        Amendment) Act, 1948 (XX of 1948), s. 43A.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant and the fourth respondent along  with  others were  applicants for a stage carriage permit.  The  Regional Transport Authority after hearing the applicants granted the permit to the appellant.  On appeal by the fourth respondent the  Central Road Traffic Board set aside the order  of  the Regional  Transport Authority and granted the permit to  the fourth respondent.  The appellant moved the State Government in revision but to no effect.  He thereafter moved the  High Court  under  Art.  226 of the Constitution for  a  writ  of certiorari  quashing the orders of the Central Road  Traffic Board and the State Government.  The single judge who  heard the matter quashed 228 the said orders and directed the State Transport   Appellate Tribunal, which was constituted in place of the Central Road Traffic  Board, to dispose of the appeal according  to  law. On  a  Letters Patent appeal by the fourth  respondent,  the Appellate Bench of the High Court set aside the order of the single  judge  and restored the order of  the  Central  Road Traffic  Board.   Hence this appeal by special  leave.   The point for determination in the appeal was whether the  order granting  the permit to the appellant made by  the  Regional Transport  Authority on the basis of an order issued by  the State  Government  under s. 43A of the Motor  Vehicles  Act, 1939,  as amended by the Motor Vehicles  (Madras  Amendment) Act, 1948, could be set aside on the basis of another  order imposing new restrictions issued thereunder while the appeal was  pending before the Central Road Traffic Board and  thus involved  the question as to whether an order  or  direction issued  by the State Government under S. 43A of the Act  had the  force  of law, so as to create a vested  right  in  the appellant. Held (per jafer Imam and Subba Rao, jj.), that s. 43A of the Motor  Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by the Motor  Vehicles (Madras  Amendment) Act, 1948, properly construed,  must  be given a restricted meaning and the jurisdiction it conferred on  the State Government must be confined to  administrative functions.   An  order or direction made thereunder  by  the State  Government, therefore, could not have the  status  of law  regulating  rights of parties and must partake  of  the character of an administrative order.

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C.   S.  S. Motor Service, Tenkasi v. The State  of  Madras, I.L.R. 1953 Mad. 304 and Gopalakrishnan Motor Transport Co., Ltd.  v.  Secretary, Regional Transport  Authority,  Krishna District, Vijayawada, A.I.R. (1957) A.P. 882, approved. Consequently,  in the instant case, the appellant could  not be said to have acquired a vested right that was defeated by a  new law enforced pending the appeal and the order of  the Central Road Traffic Board could not be set aside merely  on the ground that it had decided the appeal on the basis of an order  issued subsequent to the grant of the permit if  such order was otherwise in public interest. Per Sarkar, J.-It could hardly be said that the rule that  a court   hearing  an  appeal  from  a  decision  should   not ordinarily  take into consideration a law passed  subsequent to  that  decision had application  where  a  quasi-judicial tribunal  heard  an  appeal  from  another  such   tribunal. Consequently, in the instant case, it could not be said that there was an error of law apparent on the face of the record so  as to attract a writ of certiorari and the  appeal  must fail on that ground. No applicant for a permit under the Motor Vehicles Act could have a substantive right to the permit vested in him and 229 the  granting  or  refusal  of  a  permit  by  the  Regional Transport Authority could not operate as res judicata. It  was unnecessary for the purpose of the present  case  to decide  what  kind of orders could be issued  by  the  State Government under s. 43A of the Act, for whatever its nature, administrative or otherwise, if an order under that  section entitled  a person to its observance, and there  was  hardly any  doubt as to that, it would be a law a mistake of  which would  justify  the  issue of a writ of  certiorari  at  his instance. The Mayor of Rochester v. The Queen, (1858) EL.  BL. &  E.L. 1924; 120 E.R. 791, referred to. Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, [1958] S.C.R. 1240, distinguished.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 37 of 1958. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated September 14, 1956, of the Madras High Court in Writ  Appeal No. 64 of 1956, arising out of the judgment and order  dated May 1, 1956, of the said High Court in Writ Petition No. 852 of 1955. G.   S. Pathak, R. Ganapathy lyer and O. Gopalakrishnan, for the appellant. A.   V.  Viswanatha  Sastri,  J. B.  Dadachanji  and  S.  N. Andley, for respondent No. 4. 1959.   February  18.  The judgment of Imam and  Subba  Rao, JJ., was delivered by Subba Rao, J. Sarkar, J., delivered  a separate judgment. SUBBA  RAO,  J.-This  appeal by Special  Leave  against  the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at  Madras   raises the question of interpretation of S.    43A  of  the   Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939), as     amended by the Motor Vehicles  (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948 (Mad.  XX  of  1948), hereinafter  referred to as the Act.  On February 19,  1955, the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, Madras State, the second  respondent herein, called for applications under  s. 57(2) of the Act for grant of a stage carriage permit on the Saliamangalam Kodavasal route.  The appellant and the fourth respondent, K. M. Shanmugam, Proprietor, K. M. S. Transport,

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Ammapet,  Tanjore District, along with others,  applied  for the  grant  of  the said  permit.   The  Regional  Transport Authority 230 at  its  meeting held on April 19, 1955, after  hearing  the representations of the applicants, granted the permit to the appellant.   The fourth respondent and two others  preferred appeals  against the said order to the Central Road  Traffic Board,  Madras,  the third respondent herein.   The  Central Road  Traffic, Board by its order dated June 25,  1955,  set aside  the  order of the Regional  Transport  Authority  and granted the permit to the fourth respondent.  The  appellant preferred  a  Revision Petition against that  order  to  the first  respondent,  the  State  of  Madras,  but  the  first respondent rejected the petition by its order dated  October 14,  1955.  Thereafter, the appellant filed a Writ  Petition (No. 852 of 1955) in the High Court of Madras under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash the orders of the Central  Road Traffic Board and the State of Madras.  Rajagopalan, J.,  of the said High Court by his order dated May 1, 1956,  quashed the order of the Government and directed the State Transport Appellate  Tribunal which had been constituted in  place  of the  Central Road Traffic Board to dispose of the appeal  in accordance  with law.  Against the judgment of  the  learned Judge,  the fourth respondent preferred an appeal under  the Letters  Patent and the Appellate Bench of that High  Court, consisting  of  Rajamannar, C. J., and  Ramaswami,  J.,  set aside  the order of RajagopaIan, J., and restored the  order of  the  Central  Road Traffic Board.   The  appellant  with special leave filed the present appeal against that judgment of the High Court. Mr.  Pathak, appearing for the appellant, raised  before  us the following two points: (i) The appeal filed by the fourth respondent  against  the  order of  the  Regional  Transport Authority  to the Central Road Traffic Board was  barred  by limitation and the Board acted illegally in disposing of the appeal without deciding the question of limitation; and (ii) the  appellant  had the fundamental right to  carry  on  the business  of  transport subject to  reasonable  restrictions imposed by law as on the date he applied for a permit or  at any  rate when the Regional Transport Authority  issued  the permit to him, and that the Central Road 231 Traffic Board committed an error, evident on the face of the record,  in disposing of the appeal in accordance  with  the new  restrictions  imposed by law made  pending  the  appeal before it.  Stated as a legal proposition, the contention is that  the appellant had acquired a vested right to carry  on the  business  of transport and that the same could  not  be defeated by a subsequent law made pending the appeal,  which was only prospective in character. The  first  argument need  not detain us,  for  the  learned Counsel, in view of the finding of the High Court that as  a matter of fact the appeal to the Central Road Traffic  Board was  not  barred, fairly did not press it before  us.   This leaves us with the second and the only argument in the case. To appreciate the contention it is necessary to set out some more relevant facts: On March 28, 1953, the Government  made an order, G. O. Ms. No. 1037 Home, purporting to be under s. 43A of the Act.  The material part of that order reads: "  (1) That additional buses should not be permitted to  ply on existing routes unless there is a clear need for increase in  the  number of buses plying on a  particular  route  and wasteful  competition  should  be  discouraged  but  healthy competition where there is room should be encouraged and,

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(2)that  the  transport  authorities  while  granting  stage carriage permits should work up to the minimum of 5  permits with a spare bus for each operator and the issue of  permits should be so regulated as not to encourage benamidars on one hand and inefficient operators on the other." On November 15, 1954, in supersession of paragraph 2 of  the above order, the Government issued an order, G.   O. Ms. No. 3353 Home, to the following effect: "  The  Governor of Madras hereby directs that  each  viable stage carriage unit in this State shall consist of not  less than  10  buses  and that in the matter of  grant  of  stage carriage permits, other things being equal, and with a  view to  build up such viable units, the following shall  be  the order of preference 232 (1)Operators with less than 10 buses but nearer the mark  of 10. (2)  Operators with 10 and more buses. (3)  Others including new entrants. The Government also directs that in order to facilitate  the amalgamation  of  existing  small units  into  viable  units transfer of permits shall be allowed liberally." On June 15, 1955, the Government issued another order, G. O. Ms.  No. 1689 Home, whereby the Central Road  Traffic  Board was informed that pending further orders of Government after re-examination of the question of formation of viable  units of stage carriages, the orders in para. (2) of G. O. Ms. No. 1037  Home dated 28th March, 1953, would be in  force.   The effect  of this order was that the first order was  restored pending final orders. When  the Regional Transport Authority issued the permit  in favour of the appellant, G. O. Ms. No. 3353 Home dated  15th November,  1954,  was in force, and when  the  Central  Road Traffic Board made the order giving the permit to the fourth respondent,  G. O. Ms. No. 1689 Home dated 15th June,  1955, was  in  operation.  Apart from  other  considerations,  the Regional Transport Authority relied upon the former G. O. in preferring  the  appellant to other  applicants,  while  the Central  Road Traffic Board referred to G. O. Ms.  No.  1037 Home dated 28th March, 1953, which was restored by the later G. O. in preferring the fourth respondent to the  appellant. We shall give further details of the orders of the  Regional Transport  Authority  and  the  Appellate  Tribunal  in  the context  of  another  argument, but, for  the  present,  the aforesaid facts would suffice. It  would be convenient at this stage, before entering  into the  controversial  question, to state briefly some  of  the well-established principles relevant to the question raised: (i) A citizen has a fundamental right to ply motor  vehicles on public pathways under Art. 19(1)(g) of the  Constitution, and  any  infringement  of that right by the  State  can  be justified  only if it falls within the scope of  Art.  19(6) thereof-See C. S. S.                             233 Motor  Service,  Tenkasi  v. The State, of  Madras  (1)  and Saghir  Ahmad  v. The State of U. P. (2);  (ii)  proceedings before  tribunals issuing permits are of  quasi-judicial  in character-See  C. S. S. Motor Service, Tenkasi v. The  State of  Madras  (1) and New Prakash Transport Co.  Ltd.  v.  New Suwarna Transport Co. Ltd. (3) ; (iii) a new law which takes away  or impairs vested rights acquired under existing  laws must  be  deemed to be intended not  to  have  retrospective operation, unless such law makes it retrospective  expressly or  by  implication-See  Maxwell on  the  Interpretation  of Statutes,   p.  215;  Garikapatti  Veeraya  v.  N.   Subbiah

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Chowdhury (4 ) and Seth Gulab Chand v. Kudilal (5); and (iv) the  same principle applies to a law made pending an  appeal before an appellate Court-See P. M. Seshadri v. Province  of Madras  (6).  So much is not, and cannot, de  disputed.   We shall  assume that the said principles apply to a  law  made pending  an  appeal  against an order  of  a  quasi-judicial tribunal.   The  main  controversy centres  round  the  fact whether  the  orders made and the directions issued  by  the State Government under s. 43A of the Act are " laws " as  to attract  the operation of the aforesaid  principles.   While Mr. Pathak says that the said directions are as much laws as those  of  the  provisions  of  a  statute  or  rules   made thereunder,  Mr. A. Viswanatha Sastri contends that,  having regard  to  the  scheme of the Motor Vehicles  Act  and  the different  sections of the Act vesting powers in  the  State Government  with regard to different matters dealt  with  by the  Act, the power conferred on the State Government  under s.  43A  is a power to make orders or  issue  directions  in respect    of   administrative   matters   regulating    the relationship between the State Government and the  Transport Authorities and that such orders do not affect the  legality or  the validity of judicial acts of the  said  authorities. To  appreciate  the rival contentions, it  is  necessary  to consider the relevant provisions of the Act.      (1) I.L.R. 1953 Mad. 304, 330, 334.(2) [1955] 1  S.C.R. 707, 719.      (3) [1957] S.C.R. 98, 118.(4) [1957] S.C.R. 488, 515.      (5) [1959] S.C.R. 313, 322.(6) A.I.R 1954 Mad. 543. 30 234 The Act, which is a Central Act, was passed in the year 1939 and  subsequently it was amended from time to time  both  by Parliament  and  also by the local legislatures.   The  main object of the Act is to regulate the motor traffic in  every State in the interest of the Vs public.  Chapter 11 contains provisions  relating  to  licensing  of  drivers  of   motor vehicles.   Chapter III prescribes for the  registration  of motor  vehicles.   Chapter IV provides for  the  control  of transport  vehicles.   Chapter  V  lays  down  the   general provisions regarding construction, equipment and maintenance of  motor  vehicles.  Chapter VI regulates  the  control  of traffic.   Chapter  VIII deals with the insurance  of  motor vehicles against third party risks.  Chapter IX defines  the offences,  lays  down  the  penalties  and  prescribes   the procedure  for detecting offences and  enforcing  penalties. Chapter  X deals with miscellaneous matters.  Every  Chapter contains  a  specific provision conferring a  power  on  the State  Government to make rules for the purpose of  carrying into  effect the provisions of that Chapter.  To  carry  out the  objects of the Act, the State Government is  authorized to  create  a  hierarchy  of  officers  such  as  the  State Transport  Authority, the Regional Transport Authority,  the Registering Authority, etc.  Such Authorities are  entrusted with  administrative  as well as  quasi-judicial  functions. Chapter IV with which we are now concerned follows the  same pattern.   Its  general heading is "  Control  of  Transport Vehicles  ".  Section 42 prohibits the owners  of  transport vehicles  from  using  them  in  any  public  place  without permits.   Section  43  empowers  the  State  Government  to control  road  transport.   Section  44  enables  the  State Government  to constitute Transport Authorities to  exercise and discharge the specified powers and functions.  Under  s. 44(4)  the State Transport Authority is authorized to  issue directions  to  any  Regional Transport  Authority  and  the latter shall be guided by such directions.  Sections 46, 47,

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48,  57,  60  and 64 prescribe the procedure  for  issue  of permits and also create a hierarchy of Tribunals for hearing of applications and disposal of appeals.  The said procedure is clearly quasi-judicial in character and has                             235 been held to be so by this Court.  Sections 67 and 68 confer a  power on the State Government to make rules  to  regulate the operation of transport carriages and also to make  rules for  the purpose of carrying into effect the  provisions  of this Chapter. Under   the   aforesaid  provisions  and  the   rules   made thereunder,  the  State  Transport  Authority  is  made  the administrative  head of all the other Transport  Authorities functioning in the State, and the Central Road Traffic Board the  appellate  authority  in  the  hierarchy  of  Tribunals constituted  under the Act.  As the administrative head  the State  Transport Authority is authorized under s.  44(4)  of the  Act  to  issue directions  to  any  Regional  Transport Authority,  who shall be guided by such directions.   As  an appellate  tribunal  the  Central  Road  Traffic  Board   is empowered  to dispose of the appeals preferred  against  the orders made by the subordinate authorities under the Act  in respect  of specified matters.  But the Central Act did  not make any provision enabling the State Governments to control either the quasi-judicial or the administrative wings of the machinery provided under the Act.  While the State Transport Authority   could  issue  directions  to   other   Transport Authorities  constituted under the Act, a  State  Government could not likewise issue any directions either to the  State Transport  Authority or to its subordinate authorities.   So too,  while  the  Central Road Traffic Board  could  in  its appellate jurisdiction set aside or modify the orders of the subordinate  tribunals,  the State Government was not  in  a position  to set aside the improper orders of the  tribunals under  the  Act.  Presumably, therefore, to bring  the  said authorities under its control, both on the judicial and  the administrative wings, Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948  ((Mad.  XX of 1948), was passed and it became  law  on December 21, 1948.  Among other amendments, ss. 43A and  64A were inserted in the Act.  Section 43A reads: " The State Government may issue such orders and  directions of  a  general character as it may consider  necessary,,  in respect  of  any matter relating to road transport,  to  the State Transport Authority or 236 a Regional Transport Authority; and such Transport Authority shall give effect to all such orders and directions." Section 64A is to the following effect: "  The  State  Government  may, on  its  own  motion  or  on application  made to it, call for the records of  any  order passed  or  proceeding  taken  under  this  Chapter  by  any authority  or officer subordinate to it, for the purpose  of satisfying   itself  as  to  the  legality,  regularity   or propriety  of such order or proceeding and  after  examining such  records, may pass such orders in reference thereto  as it thinks fit." So far as s. 64A is concerned, in express terms it confers a judicial power on the State Government to keep a subordinate judicial  tribunal within bounds.  Section 64A,  along  with ss. 45 to 57, 60 and 64, forms a complete code in respect of the  quasi-judicial disposals of the issue of permits.   The permits  should be issued in accordance with the  provisions of  the  Act and the rules framed thereunder  following  the judicial procedure.  The words used in s. 43A are very wide. It  says  that  the State Government may  issue  orders  and

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directions of a general character in respect of any  matters relating  to road transport.  Divorced from the context  and the  setting  in  which  the new  section  appears,  it  may comprehend  any orders or directions of a general  character in respect of road transport; and, if so construed, it would not  only subvert the other provisions of the Act  but  also would   be   vulnerable   to  attack  on   the   ground   of constitutional invalidity.  It would entrust the  Government with a naked arbitrary power capable of being used to compel quasi-judicial tribunals to dispose of cases in a particular way;  it would enable them to couch the order in  a  general way to induce a tribunal to come to a particular decision in a  given  case; and it would be destructive  of  the  entire judicial procedure envisaged by the Act and the rules framed thereunder in the matter of disposal of specified questions. It  would be attributing to the legislature an  incongruity, for  the State Government could issue directions in  respect of  which  it  could  make  rules  ignoring  the  safeguards provided in the                             237 making of the rules.  Section 133 lays down that every power to  make rules given by the Act is subject to the  condition of the rules being made after previous publication.  It also enjoins  on the Central and the State Governments  to  place the  said rules for not less than fourteen days  before  the appropriate  legislature  and  the rules so  made  shall  be subject to such modification as the legislature may make  in such session in which they are so laid.  All these  salutary precautions can be ignored if the directions given under  s. 43A  are  given the status of law; on the other hand,  if  a restrictive meaning is given as it should be in the context, there  would be a happy correlation of the functions of  the various bodies under the Act, including the Government.  The Government’s  legislative power is recognised under  ss.  67 and 68 of the Act; its judicial power is maintained under s. 64A  and its administrative power is affirmed under s.  43A. Chapter  IV  and the rules made thereunder  confer  adminis- trative powers on the Regional Transport Authorities and the State  Transport Authority.  Section 43A enables  the  State Government to make orders and issue directions of a  general character  in  respect of those functions to  implement  the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder; and the said  authorities shall give effect to all such  orders  and directions. The context in which and the setting wherein the section  is inserted also lend support to the said conclusion.   Section 42  describes  the necessity for permits and s.  43  confers specific powers on the Government to control road transport. Section  43A  coming  thereafter  and  before  the  sections conferring quasi-judicial powers on tribunals is  indicative of the fact that the jurisdiction conferred under s. 43A  is confined  to administrative functions of the Government  and the tribunals rather than to their judicial functions;  for, if the section was intended to confer legislative power,  it should  have found its place after s. 64A or somewhere  near the end of the Chapter.  Though it is not a conclusive test, the placing of the provisions of ss. 43A and 64A, which were inserted  by the same Amending Act is also a pointer to  the intention of the 238 legislature,  namely,  that s. 43A was  intended  to  govern administrative functions of the tribunals. The  terms of the section and the manner of  issuing  orders and directions thereunder also support the same  conclusion. The legislature used two words in the section: (i) order and

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(ii) directions.  Whenever it intended to affect the  rights of parties, it used the word " rules ", but in this  section it  designedly used the words appropriate to the control  of administrative machinery.  The words " directions and  order "  are defined in one of the Law Lexicons thus: "  Direction contains most of instruction in it; order most of authority. Directions  should  be  followed;  orders  obeyed.   It   is necessary  to  direct  those  who  are  unable  to  act  for themselves; it is necessary to order those whose business it is  to execute the orders.  " The said meaning of the  words is more appropriate to administrative control rather than to rules  of  law affecting rights of  parties.   Further,  the declaration   in  the  section  that  the  orders  and   the directions  under  the  section  shall  be  binding  on  the authorities  concerned is indicative of the fact  that  they are  not laws, for if they are laws, no such declaration  is necessary.   What is more, they need not even  be  published and  may,  if the Government so desires, take  the  form  of secret  communication to the authorities concerned.  Nor  is there any basis for the argument that as the directions  are issued  under  a  statutory power, they are "  laws  ".  The source  of  the power does not affect the character  of  the things done in exercise of that power.  Whether it is a  law or an administrative direction depends upon the character or nature  of the orders or directions authorized to be  issued in  exercise  of  the  power  conferred.   That  should   be determined  on  other  considerations  adverted  to  by   us already.   Our  view is in accord with that expressed  by  a Division  Bench of the Madras High Court in C. S.  S.  Motor Service,  Tenkasi  v. The State of Madras  (1).   There  the constitutional  validity of ss. 42, 43A, 47, 48 and  64A  of the Act was questioned.  In dealing with s. 43A, Venkatarama Ayyar, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, observed at p. 335 thus (1)  I.L.R. 1953 Mad. 304, 330, 334. 239 "Coming next to section 43A, it is argued that it confers on the Provincial Government wide and unlimited powers to issue all  such  orders and directions of a general  character  as they may consider necessary, that the transport  authorities are  bound under that section to give effect to such  orders and  directions,  that  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  the Government  from even issuing directions with  reference  to the judicial functions which those authorities have to  dis- charge  under  the Act, that it could not be  expected  that such  directions would be disregarded by  those  authorities and  that in practice the provisions of section 47 could  be evaded.   Reference  is  also made to  the  fact  that  this section  was  introduced for nullifying the  effect  of  the decision in Sri Rama Vilas Service Ltd. v. The Road  Traffic Board,  Madras  (1)  where it was held  that  the  transport authorities  had failed in the discharge of  their  judicial function  in  meekly  giving  effect  to  an  order  of  the Government  which was opposed to the provisions of the  Act. Section 43-A appears to be intended to clothe the Government with  authority  to issue directions  of  an  administrative character  and in that view it would be valid.  No  specific order  or direction of the Government is attacked  in  these proceedings  as  invalid  and  the  discussion  is   largely academic.   The  section  must itself be held  to  be  valid though particular orders passed thereunder might be open  to challenge as unconstitutional." From  the  aforesaid observations, it is manifest  that  the learned Judge construed s. 43A as conferring a power on  the State  Government to issue directions of  an  administrative

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character.   If the construction was otherwise, the  learned Judge would have held that the section was  constitutionally bad  as he had held in regard to other sections.   The  High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Gopalakrishna Motor Transport Co. Ltd.  v.  Secretary, Regional Transport  Authority,  Krishna District,  Vijayawada (2) had also considered the  scope  of the  provisions  of  s. 43A.  There,  the  State  Government issued  an  order under s. 43A of the  Act  prescribing  the manner of checking a bus for over- (1) (1948) 1 M.L.J. 85. (2) A.I.R. 1957 A.P. 882. loading.   The procedure prescribed was not followed by  the Regional Transport Authority, which was empowered to suspend the  permit on the ground of overloading under s. 60 of  the Act.   One  of  the  contentions  raised  was  that  as  the mandatory direction given by s the State Government under s. 43A  was not followed, the Regional Transport  Authority  in exercising  its  powers under s. 60 should  have  held  that there was no over-loading.  In rejecting this plea, the High Court observed at p. 885 thus: "  Government  has power to frame rules and  also  to  issue administrative  directions  of  a  general  character  under Section 43-A of the Act.............. In so far as the order was  couched  in mandatory terms, it is incumbent  upon  the officers concerned to comply with it. Any instruction given under Section 43-A cannot override the discretionary  power conferred upon the Transport  Authority under section 60........ We, therefore, hold that the  order of the Government contained only administrative instructions issued  under  Section 43-A.  It is true that some  of  the, administrative  instructions impose a mandatory duty on  the officers concerned and if they do not discharge their  duty, Government may take disciplinary action against them.   But, in  our  view, non-compliance with those  directions  cannot affect  the  finding  the  Authority  arrived  at  on  other material on the question of over-loading." In  the present case, the learned Chief Justice, who  was  a party to the decision in C. S. S. Motor Service v. The State of  Madras  (1), presumably on the basis  of  that  judgment observed thus: " In our opinion, these Government orders, which are in  the nature of general administrative directions to the transport authorities, do not vest any rights, indefeasible  rights-in any applicant for a stage carriage permit ". The result of the discussion may be summarised thus:   The appellant had a fundamental right to carry (1) I.L.R. 1953 Mad, 3f30, 334. 241 on  his  motor  transport  business  subject  to  reasonable restrictions  imposed upon that right by law.  Some  of  the provisions  of  Chapter  IV of the  Act  contain  reasonable restrictions  on the said right.  He was given a  permit  on the  basis of the law imposing the said restrictions on  his right.   The orders made and the directions issued under  s. 43A  could  cover  only  the  administrative  field  of  the officers  concerned  and  therefore  any  direction   issued thereunder was not law regulating the rights of the parties. The order made and the directions issued under s. 43A of the Act  cannot obviously add to the  considerations  prescribed under s. 47 on the basis of which the tribunal is  empowered to  issue or refuse permit, as the case may be.  There  was, therefore, no change in the law pending the appeal so as  to affect  the  appellant’s  vested right  in  this  view,  the appellant  cannot question the validity of the order of  the Central Road Traffic Board on the ground that it decided the

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appeal on a law that was made subsequent to the issue of the permit to him. The same result could be arrived at by different process  of reasoning.   The appellant had a fundamental right to  carry on  the  business of motor transport subject  to  reasonable restrictions  imposed  by  law  under  Art.  19(6)  of   the Constitution.   The Act imposed reasonable restrictions  oil the  said  right.  One such restriction was that  the  State Government may issue such orders and directions of a general character  as it’ may consider necessary in respect  of  any matter  relating  to road transport to the  State  Transport Authority.  When the appellant applied for a permit, be must be  deemed  to have bad the knowledge of the fact  that  his application  would  be disposed of by  the  State  Transport Authority  in  accordance with orders and  directions  of  a general  character  issued, by the  State  Government.   The directions were not now law that came into existence pending the  appeal,  but  only  issued under  a  law  that  was  in existence even at the time he applied for a permit.  The law was  that  embodied in s. 43A of the Act, namely,  that  the Government could issue directions binding on the authorities 31 242 concerned  and  that  law was a  pre-existing  one  and  the application  had to be disposed of subject to that law  till it  was  finally  terminated  by an  order  of  the  highest tribunal  in the hierarchy.  In this view also there are  no merits in the appellant’s contention. Now coming to the merits of the case, the contentions of the parties  may  be stated thus: The learned  Counsel  for  the respondents  contends that there is no  material  difference between G. O. Ms. No. 1037 and G. O. Ms. No. 3353, except in regard  to one circumstance, which is not material  for  the present  purpose:  while in the former G. O.,  the  argument proceeds, the transport authority is directed to work up  to a  minimum of five units with a spare bus, under the  latter G. O., the viable unit fixed is not less than ten buses  and the  authority  concerned  is directed to work  up  to  that limit.   It is pointed out that the only difference,  is  in the   measure  of  a  viable  unit  and  that   the   fourth respondent’s  case falls squarely within the first  category in the order of preference prescribed in G. O. Ms. No.  3353 of  1954.   The learned Counsel for the  appellant  contends that  the order of preference is based upon the  achievement of  the object, namely, building up of viable units  of  ten permits  and  that the appellant admittedly  had  only  four permits  and,  therefore, far below the viable unit  and  he could  not be given preference in a competition between  him and  the appellant, who had more than thirty  permits.   The problem presented can only be solved by a reasonable  inter- pretation  of the plain words used in G. O. Ms. No. 3353  of 1954  read  along  with the expressed object  sought  to  be achieved  thereby.  It will be convenient at this  stage  to read the said order omitting the unnecessary words: G.   O. Ms. No. 3353 Home dated 15th November, 1954. "   The   Planning  Commission  has   made   the   following recommendation in respect of Road Transport service : ’It  is desirable for the existing private operators’  units to  amalgamate, wherever possible, into big viable units  to enable  them to achieve better returns and  maintain  better standards of operation 243 The  Government considered that it will be in the  interests of  the public if road transport services are  conducted  by operators having at least toil stage carriages and they have

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therefore decided that each viable unit should consist of at least ten stage carriages. In  exercise of the powers conferred by Section 43-A of  the Motor  Vehicles Act, 1939 (Central Act IV of 1939),  and  in supersession of the orders issued in paragraph (ii) of G. O. Ms. 1037, Home dated 28th March 1953, the Governor of Madras hereby directs that each viable stage carriage unit in  this State  shall consist of not less than 10 buses and  that  in the matter of grant of stage carriage permits, other things- being  equal, and that with a view to build up  such  viable units, the following shall be the order of preference 1.   Operators with less than 10 buses, but nearer the  mark of ten. 2.   Operators with 10 and more buses. 3.   Others including new entrants. The  Governor also directs that in order to  facilitate  the amalgamation  of  existing  small units  into  viable  units transfer of permits shall be allowed liberally." The G. O., Was issued to achieve the object of inducing  the operators  to amalgamate wherever possible, into big  viable units to enable them to achieved better returns and maintain better standards of operation.  The Government decided  that a  unit of at least ten buses would be necessary to  achieve that  object.   To implement that policy, it  directed  that each  viable stage carriage unit should consist of not  less than  ten  buses  and with a view to build  up  such  viable units, it directed that, other things being equal, the order of  preference  contained therein should be  followed.   The order  of  preference contained three  categories,  one  ex- cluding  the other.  They did not provide for any  rules  of preference  inter se of operators coming within each one  of the categories.  Presumably, that was left to be decided  by the   transport   authorities,   having   regard   to    the considerations mentioned in s. 47.  The argument 244 of  the learned Counsel for the fourth respondent  is  based upon the first category, which reads: "  Operators with less than 10 buses but nearer the mark  of 10  ". He contends that, having regard to the object of  the G.  O., namely, to build up a viable stage carriage unit  of ten,  in  the absence of an operator  with  stage  carriages nearer to the mark of ten than the fourth respondent, he  is entitled to a permit in preference to the appellant provided other  things  are equal between them.  In respect  of  this argument, emphasis is laid upon the word "nearer " and it is said  that  the  said word indicates a  rule  of  preference between operators coming within that category, namely,  that an  operator like the fourth respondent is to be  preferred, if there is no other operator nearer than him to the mark of ten.   This argument is attractive, but, in our view, it  is inconsistent with the scheme of the order.  It is true  that the phraseology of category (1) has not been happily  worded and perhaps grammatically not correct.  But the intention is fairly  obvious.   For one thing the rule of  preference  is based upon the achievement of the object, i.e., the building up of a viable unit of ten permits, for the other, the  rule of  preference  is  only  to  govern  the  three  categories mentioned therein and not inter se between those falling  in each category.  The word " others " in category (3)  becomes meaningless, if operators far below the mark of ten  permits fall  within  the  first  category.   The  more   reasonable interpretation  and that is in accord with the intention  of the State Government is that other things being equal, in  a competition  between  the  three  categories  of   operators mentioned  in  the order, operators nearer the mark  of  ten

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shall  be preferred.  In the absence of any  such  operator, operators with ten or more buses should be given the  second preference.   In the absence of such operators,  others,  i. e.,  operators  who are not nearer the mark of ten  and  new entrants,   will  have  to  be  preferred.   This  rule   of preference  was not expected to cause any injustice  as  the restriction  on the transfer of permits was removed and  the small  operators were permitted to amalgamate  the  existing units into viable units.                             245 This  policy  did  not achieve  the  expected  results,  but encouraged  monopolies; with the result that the  Government had  to cancel the order of June 15,1955, within  about  six months from the making of it; but that circumstance does not affect the construction of the clause.  We, therefore,  hold that  on a strict inter pretation of the G. O. Ms. No.  3353 of 1954, the fourth respondent would not have been  entitled to the permit. But as we have held that the said order was not law but  was only  an administrative direction, it could not  affect  the validity of the order of the Central Road Traffic Board,  if it  made the order, having regard to the consideration  laid down  in s. 47 of the Act.  The main consideration under  s. 47  of  the  Act is that the  Regional  Transport  Authority shall, in deciding whether to grant or refuse such  carriage permit, have regard to the interest of the public generally. The Central Road Traffic Board, after having found that  the appellant had other advantages such as he operated a  three- route  permit  touching  the route under  appeal,  that  his record  was  satisfactory and that he was  not  inefficient, came  to  the conclusion that by giving the  permit  to  the fourth respondent, it would be encouraging not only  healthy competition  but also would be enabling him to work  out  to the  minimum of five permits.  It is true that if  the  1954 order should govern the selection, the main reason given  by the  Board would be wrong.  Whether a small unit or a  large unit  would  be viable or would be in the  interest  of  the public  is  always a debatable point and it is  possible  to take  conflicting views on the question.  One view  is  that ail  operator  who  is described as  fleet-owner  will  have considerable  experience  in the business and will be  in  a position to keep a workshop and additional buses to meet any emergency and therefore he would be in a better position  to operate the service without break and keep up the timings in the  interest of the public than a stray bus operator.   The alternative view is that encouragement of large viable units will tend -to monopoly and the freedom from competition will bring  about deterioration in service.  Oil the other  hand, new entrants and operators 246 Owning  a  few  buses  will  incentive  to  bestow   greater attention to tile public needs, particularly in view of  the competition from others in the same field.  That both  views are  possible  is  evident  from the  fact  that  the  State Government  has  been  changing its views so  often  on  the subject;  and indeed the cancellation of G. O. Ms. No.  3353 of  1954,  within  six months from the date  of  its  issue, presumably on the basis of the experience gained during that period,  is a clear indication that in the opinion  of  the, Government,  encouragement  of large units was  not  in  the interest of public.  If that be so, one cannot say that  the Central  Road Traffic Board acted without jurisdiction  when it accepted the view that the smaller units would be more in the  interest of the public rather than larger units  ;  nor the  fact  that  it  accepted the  prevailing  view  of  the

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Government  on  the subject would make it any  the  less  an order  within its jurisdiction, provided the said  view  was germane to one or other matters stated in s. 47 of the  Act. As  pointed out by us, both the views are possible  and  the Board was well within its rights in holding that the  public interest  would  be served if the permit was  given  to  the fourth respondent, in the circumstances of the case. In  this view, no other question arises  for  consideration. The order of the Madras High Court is correct and the appeal is dismissed with costs. SARKAR,  J.--The appellant before us is a company  operating public  motor  bus  services in the State  of  Madras.   Its grievance  is that it has been wrongly refused a  permit  to run a bus. Motor  bus  services transporting passengers on  the  public highways for consideration, called stage carriage  services, are  controlled by ss. 42 to 68 contained in Chapter  IV  of the  Motor  Vehicles Act, 1939.  The Act  provides  that  no vehicle  can be used as a stage carriage save in  accordance with a permit granted by a regional Transport Authority  set up by the State Government.  Section 47 of the Act lays down certain  matters  to which a  Regional  Transport  Authority shall have regard in deciding whether to grant or refuse a                             247 stage  carriage permit, one of which is the interest of  the public  generally.   Section 68 of the  Act  authorises  the State  Government to make rules for the purpose of  carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter IV.  The rules  framed under  this  section do not contain anything  to  guide  the Regional  Transport Authority in the matter of granting  the permits  save  that r. 150 provides that it " shall  in  all matters be subject to the orders of the Government and shall give  effect to all orders passed by the Government  whether on  appeal or otherwise." Section 43- A of the  Act  however gives  the  State  Government  power  to  issue  orders  and directions  to the Regional Transport Authority.  That  sec- tion is in these terms " The State Government may issue such orders and  directions of  a  general character as it may  consider  necessary,  in respect  of  any matter relating to road transport,  to  the State Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority; and  such Transport Authority shall give effect to all  such orders and directions." We  are not concerned with the State Transport Authority  in this  case.   The  Act  is a Central Act  and  s.  43-A  was introduced  into it by an amendment made by the  legislature of  the Province of Madras.  The Government of  Madras  from time  to  time issued orders under  this  section  providing certain  considerations  for the guidance  of  the  Regional Transport Authorities in deciding applications for the  rant of permits for stage carriages.  The appellant’s  contention is  that  the permit was refused to it by  applying  one  of these orders which was not applicable to its case.   Section 64  of the Act permits an appeal to an  appellate  authority from an order of a Regional Transport Authority refusing  to grant  a permit.  This appellate authority in the  State  of Madras  is called the Central Road Traffic  Board.   Section 64-  A  which  again  was introduced  into  the  Act  by  an amendment  of  the legislature of the  Province  of  Madras, empowers the Government to look into the records of any case concerning  the grant of a permit and pass such order as  it thought fit. Now as to the facts of this case, on March 28, 1953, 248 the  Government issued an order tinder s. 43-A marked G.  O.

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Ms.  No.  1037  laying down  certain  considerations  to  be observed  in  granting permits.  On November 15,  1954,  the Government issued another order marked G.    O. Ms. No. 3353 superseding the second of     G.   O.  Ms.  No.   1037   and substituting fresh provisions in   its  place.  As I do  not consider it necessary to discuss the terms of these  orders, it will tend to clarity to proceed on the basis as if G.  O. Ms. No. 3353 superseded G. O. Ms. No. 1037 wholly. The appellant, the respondent No. 4 and eight other  persons had   applied  for  the  permit  for  a  route   for   which applications had been invited.  It does not appear from  the record when these applications had been made, but it appears that  on  April 9, 1955, the  Regional  Transport  Authority after  hearing  all  the competing  applicants  granted  the permit  to the appellant applying G. O. Ms. No.  3353,  this being the order then in force.  Soon thereafter, namely,  on May 20, 1955, the Government passed under the same section a fresh order being (’J. O. Ms. No. 1403 cancelling G. O.  Ms. No. 3353 and on June 15, 1955, it passed another order being G.  O. Ms. No. 1689 which, for the purpose of this  case  it may be said, had the effect of restoring G.  O.   Ms.    No. 1037. On or about June 23, 1955, the respondent No. 4, who will be referred  to as the respondent as he is the only  contesting respondent, preferred an appeal to the Central Road  Traffic Board  against  the  decision  of  the  Regional   Transport Authority.   It may be that some of the  other  disappointed applicants for the permit also preferred similar appeals but with  them we are not concerned.  The Board  considered  the representations  of  all the parties before it and  made  an order  on June 25, 1955, setting aside the decision  of  the Regional Transport Authority and granting the permit to  the respondent.   According  to the appellant,  in  making  this order the Board followed G. O. Ms. No. 1037.  The  complaint of the appellant is that the Board went wrong in doing so as G.  O.  Ms. No. 1037 was not in force when  the  appellant’s application   was  considered  by  the  Regional   Transport Authority but had been brought  into force subsequently, and as the Board was  only hearing  an appeal from the Regional Transport Authority  it was bound to decide the case according to the order in force when the Regional Transport Authority made its decision  and was  not entitled to decide it according to an  order  which came  into existence subsequently.  The appellant  took  the matter up to the Government under s. 64-A of the Act but the Government refused to interfere. The appellant then moved the High Court at Madras for a writ of certiorari quashing the orders of the Board granting  the permit  to the respondent and of the Government refusing  to interfere.   Rajagopalan,  J., who  heard  the  application, thought  that  the  Government had failed  to  exercise  its jurisdiction  by  not  deciding a point  raised  before  it, namely, whether the appeal to the Board had been made within the prescribed time.  He, therefore, set aside the order  of the Government and sent the case back for reconsideration. The  respondent  went  up  in  appeal  from  the  order   of Rajagopalan, J. The appeal was heard by a bench of the  same High  Court consisting of Rajamannar, C. J., and  Ramaswami, J.,  and  was  allowed.   The  learned  Chief  Justice   who delivered the judgment of the court, held that  Rajagopalan, J., was not right in thinking that the Government had failed to decide whether the appeal to the Board had been filed  by the respondent within the prescribed time.  He rejected  the contention of the appellant that the order of the Board  was liable to be set aside inasmuch as it had been made pursuant

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to G. O. Ms. No. 1037 which was not the order in force  when the  Regional  Transport  Authority heard  the  matter.   He observed, " these Government orders, which are in the nature of  general  administrative  directions  to  the   transport authorities, do not vest any rights, indefeasible  rights-in any applicant for a stage carriage permit ". He also held, " It  cannot be said that because on the date of the  disposal of  the  application by the Regional Transport  Authority  a particular G. O. was in force, any one had a vested 32 250 right  conferred on him by that G. O. We think  that it  was permissible  to  the Central Road Traffic  Board  to  decide between  the claimants on -the basis of the  G.O. which  was in  force  at  the time the appeal  was  being  heard."  The appellant  has  now come to this Court by special  leave  in appeal against this judgment. Only  one point has been argued by Mr. Pathak  appearing  in support of the appeal.  He said that the Board was a  quasi- judicial  tribunal  and  an order made by  it  is  therefore liable  to be quashed by a writ of certiorari if that  order discloses an error apparent on the face of it.  He then said that the order of the Board of June 25, 1955, was  erroneous in law as it decided the case by the terms of G. O. Ms.  No. 1037,  which  was brought into force after the date  of  the decision  of  the Regional Transport Authority and  bad  not been  given a retrospective operation, and the  Board  which was hearing an appeal from the Regional Transport Authority, could  only decide whether that Authority had gone wrong  in the  application of the provisions in force at the  time  of the  hearing before it, namely, the provisions contained  in G.  O.  Ms.  No. 3353.  He also said  that  such  error  was apparent  on  the  face of the record as the  Board  in  its decision  stated that it was deciding the case by G. O.  Ms. No. 1037. It has not been contended before us that the Board is not  a quasi-judicial Tribunal.  It clearly is so.  In view of  the many decisions of this Court in similar matters it would  be impossible  to  take a contrary view.  Then again  it  is  a principle firmly established and accepted by this Court that a  writ  of  certiorari can issue where the  decision  of  a tribunal discloses an error of law apparent on its face.   I am  also  clear in my mind that if it was an error  for  the Board  to  have  followed G. O. Ms.  No.  1037,  such  error appeared  on  the  face of its decisions  for  it  expressly purported  to  be guided by G. O. Ms. No.  1037.   The  only questions  that remain are whether this was an error and  an apparent error.  These I now proceed to discuss. It is true that G. O. Ms. No. 1037 which had been 251 superseded  by G. O. Ms. No. 3353 on November 15, 1954,  was revived by G. O. Ms. No. 1689 issued on June 15, 1955, i.e., after  the  date of the decision of the  Regional  Transport Authority  given on April 9, 1955, when G. O. Ms.  No.  3353 prevailed.   I will assume now that G. O. Ms. No.  1689  did not bring back G. O. Ms. No. 1037 with retrospective  force. Was the Board then wrong in a plying G. O. Ms. No. 1037 when it   decided   the  appeal  from  the   Regional   Transport Authority’s decision ? I do not think so. It may be that when one regular and ordinary court bears  an appeal  from the decision of another such court, it  cannot, generally speaking, take into consideration a law which  has been  passed since that decision.  But it is far from  clear that the same rule applies when an appeal from the order  of a quasi-judicial tribunal is heard by another such tribunal,

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as  is  the  case  here.  No authority  to  warrant  such  a proposition  was cited and as at present advised, I  am  not prepared  to  assent to it.  In any case, it can  safely  be said,  and it is enough for the purpose of this case  to  do so, that it is far from clear that a quasi-judicial tribunal like  the  one before us is not entitled in  hearing  appeal from  another such tribunal to apply a rule which  has  come into  existence since the decision under appeal.  If  it  is not  so  clear there of course is no error apparent  on  the face of the record. It  cannot  be  overlooked  that  such  a  tribunal  is  not enforcing a vested right which one party has against another or others.  The tribunal is to choose from amongst a  number of  persons  the  fittest  to  be  granted  a  permit.   The overriding interest in the selection is of one who is not  a party  to  the proceedings, namely, the  travelling  public. The  lower  tribunal is entitled to be heard  on  an  appeal under  s.  64, a procedure which is wholly  inapplicable  in appeals from the decisions of what are called courts of law. As a general rule, a court gives effect at the trial to  the substantive  rights of the parties existing at the  date  of the writ and it is for this reason that a change in the  law cannot  ordinarily  be taken into account in  appeals.   Now such a consideration does not prevail in the 252 present case.  It is not said that a person when he makes an application  for  a  permit acquires a  right  to  have  his application  decided by the order under the section then  in force.   All  that is said is that the  Transport  Authority must  consider  the applications according to the  order  in force at the time it hears them.  If this is so, as I  think it  is,  then  the  basis  for  saying  that  the  appellate authority  cannot consider a Government order  issued  since the  order  under appeal was  made,  completely  disappears. Another  reason  given for the view that a court  of  appeal cannot take into consideration a new law is that, " a matter of substantive right which has become res judicata cannot be upset  by a subsequent general change of the law": see Re  a Debtor,  Exparte  Debtor (1).  Now it does not  seem  to  me possible  to  say  that  an applicant for  a  permit  has  a substantive  right to the permit vested in him.  Nor  is  it possible to conceive of the decision of a Regional Transport Authority  in  granting  or refusing to grant  a  permit  as having any operation by way  of res judicata.  It  therefore seems  to  me  that there is no  warrant  for  applying  the general rule applicable to a court of law hearing an  appeal from  a  similar subordinate court which  prevents  it  from taking notice of a new law, to tribunals such as those  with which this case is concerned. I  wish to add one thing more on this subject.  Even in  the case  of appeals strictly so called, the court  hearing  the appeal  may  take  cognisance of new  laws  which  are  made applicable to pending cases: see Quilter v. Mapleson (2).  I have  so long been proceeding on the assumption that  G.  O. Ms.  No.  1689 had no retrospective effect at all.   Now  it seems to me that there is at least grave doubt if G. O.  Ms. No. 1689 which revived G. O. Ms. No. 1037, was not  intended to  be applied to pending appeals.  It was directed only  to the Central Road Traffic Board which heard appeals, and this would  indicate  that it was intended that the  Board  would follow  it  in deciding the appeals that were  then  pending before  it.   It is not therefore clear that G. O.  Ms.  No. 1689 was not intended to (1) [1936] Ch. 237, 243.                   (2) (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 672.

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253 have  at least this retrospective effect.  If it did,  which on  the form of the order it may well be said to have  done, then that would be another reason for saying that it is  not clear that the Board was in error in applying it. In  my view therefore it has not been shown that  the  Board committed  an error apparent on the face of its decision  in applying  G. O. Ms. No. 1037 to the appellant’s case.   This appeal must therefore fail. Before  leaving the case I wish to express my opinion  on  a matter  which was pressed on behalf of the  respondent.   It was said that only administrative orders could be made under s.  43-A which orders were not laws, and therefore an  error with regard to them would not be an error of law which would warrant the issue of a certiorari.  I am unable to assent to this  contention.  To my mind the question is not solved  by describing the orders as administrative orders, a term as to the meaning of which, I confess, I am not clear.  So it does not  seem  to  me to be necessary to enquire  what  kind  of orders  could  be issued under s. 43-A.  In my  view  if  an order under the section is one to the observance of which  a person is entitled, that would be a law, a mistake of  which would  justify the issue of the writ at his  instance.   The whole justification for a writ of certiorari is to  prevent, where no other remedy is available, a patent injustice being allowed  to  stand.   It would be strange if  a  person  was entitled  to  the observance of a rule and was held  not  to have a remedy for its breach.  It can make no difference  by what  name  that rule is called.  I wish to read here  as  a salutary advice to follow, what Pollock C. B. and Martin  B. said  in The Mayor of Rochester v. The Queen  (1)  regarding the writ, " Instead of being astute to discover reasons  for not applying this great constitutional remedy for error  and mis-government, we think it our duty to be vigilant to apply it  in every case to which, by any reasonable  construction, it can be made applicable." The real question thus is whether the applicants for permits were entitled to the observance of the orders (1)  (1858) EL.  BL. & EL. 1024,1033; 120 E.R. 791. 254 with  which we are dealing. I think they clearly  were.  The orders  were made under a statutory provision.  That  itself would  make  them binding.  Further, the  statute  expressly says that the " Transport Authority shall give effect to all such  orders and directions ". The statute applies  to  all; every  one  is entitled to the benefit of  it.   Any  person interested  has  therefore a right to claim  that  an  order passed under the section shall be observed by the  Transport Authorities.   The respondent himself made such a claim  and has got the benefit of one of these orders. It  was  however  said that it is true  that  the  Transport Authorities owed a duty to observe the orders but that was a duty they owed to the Government alone and that a breach  of this  duty only exposed them to disciplinary action  by  the Government  but did not vitiate their decisions.  I find  no words  in  the  section so to limit the scope  of  the  duty imposed  by it on the Transport Authorities.  The nature  of the orders makes it impossible to think that it was intended to visit a breach by disciplinary action only.  These orders lay  down  principles to be applied in  deciding  whether  a person should or should not be given a permit.  They  affect persons materially ; they affect persons’ living . I find it very  difficult  to think that the only  sanction  for  such rules can be disciplinary action.  It seems to me  abhorrent that  judicial  bodies  should in  the  discharge  of  their

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functions be subjected to disciplinary action.  Then I think it  would certainly be a very unusual statute which sets  up quasi-judicial   tribunals  with  power  to  affect   people materially  and binds the tribunals on pain of  disciplinary action  only  to proceed according to rules made  under  its authority  but  gives  the persons deeply  affected  by  the tribunal’s decision no right to claim that the rules  should be  observed.  I am unable to hold that the  Motor  Vehicles Act is a statute of this kind. I  ought to refer to the case of Nagendra Nath Bora  v.  The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam (1).  That was  a  case  concerning a licensing  authority  for  liquor -hops.  It was there said that a (1)  [1958] S-C.R. 1240.                             255 breach  of  certain  executive instructions  issued  to  the licensing authority did not amount to error of law.  I think that  case  is  clearly  distinguishable.   It  dealt   with executive instructions and therefore not such as were issued under  a statutory power.  There is nothing to show that  it was  the  bounden  duty  of  the  tribunal,  the   licensing authority, to obey these instructions.  Had it not been that a  hierachy  of  appeals had been  provided  for,  it  would perhaps  have been held in that case that the authority  was not a quasi-judicial authority at all.  Furthermore, it  was held there that no one had an inherent right to a settlement of  a liquor shop.  Therefore it seems to me that that  case does  not help in deciding the effect of the  orders  issued under  s. 43-A.  It is interesting to note that it was  said in  that case referring to the writ of certiorari at p.  412 that, " its purpose is only to determine, on an  examination of  the record, whether the inferior tribunal  has  exceeded its jurisdiction or has not proceeded in accordance with the essential  requirements  of  law  which  it  was  meant   to administer."  The  words  "  law  which  it  was  meant   to administer   "   are  very   significant.    The   Transport Authorities  in  the present case were  certainly  meant  to administer the orders issued under s. 43-A. There  is  one  thing more that I wish to  observe  in  this connection.  It may be that an order which it is the bounden duty  of  the  Transport Authority to obey  may  give  it  a certain amount of discretion, but that in my view would riot make  the order any the less a law.  If the  discretion  has been duly exercised, there would be no error of law for  the law  itself gives the discretion.  It would be  the  bounden duty of the tribunal to observe that law and so if necessary to exercise the discretion given by it. For the reasons earlier mentioned, however, I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. Appeal dismissed. 256