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PETITIONER: M/S. RAHABHAR PRODUCTION PVT. LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAJENDRA K. TANDON

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       26/03/1998

BENCH: S. SAGHIR AHMAD, G.B. PATTANAIK

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          J U D G M E N T S. SGHIR AHMAD, J.      Leave granted. 2.   Ground floor  of premises  G-47, Kirti  Nagar, New Delhi was let out  in November,  1963 by  Daulat Rai  Tandon, father of the present respondent,  to the  appellant for  the residence  of its employee, Shri  K.K. Chaudhry,  who,  subsequently,  vacated  the premises and  shifted to  his own  flat at  C-II/29-C, DDA Flats, Janak Puri,  Pankha Road,  New Delhi and since than, the premises are in  occupation of  Shri Raj Chaudhry, another employee of the appellant, against  whom eviction  proceedings, on  the ground of sub-letting, are pending. 3.   The respondent  was employed  as Deputy  Chief  Engineer  in Northern Railway and retired from service, while posted at Delhi, on 23.7.87.  He filed  a petition  under Section 14C of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short, ’the Act’) for eviction of the appellant, but  the petition was dismissed by the Rent Controller on 4.5.93. The Revision filed against that order was dismissed by the High  Court. The  respondent, then,  approached this Court in Civil Appeal  No. 10475 of 1996 (arising out of SLP(C) No.8337 of 1994) which  was allowed  and the  case was  remanded to the Rent Controller for  a fresh  decision in the light of the Judgment in Anand Swaroop Vohra vs. Bhim Sen Bahri & Anr., (1995) 5 SCC 372. 4.   On the initiation of remand proceedings, the appellant moved an application  under Section  25B(4) and  (5) of the Act, before the  Rent   Controller,  for   leave  to   contest  the  eviction proceedings but  the leave  was refused  and  the  appellant  was directed to  hand-over possession  of the premises in question to the respondent.  This order  was challenged by the appellant in a Revision filed  before the  Delhi Court  High Court which, by the impugned judgement  dated 15.10.97, dismissed the Revision giving him time  till 31st  December, 1997  to vacate  the premises  and deliver possession  to the  respondent. That is how the matter is in this Court. 5.   Mr.  Gopal  Subramaniam,  learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the appellant, has vehemently contended that an order for eviction of the tenant  cannot be passed by the Rent Controller under Section 14C of  the Act unless it is found, as a  fact, that the premises were bona  fide required  by the  landlord for  his own  use  and occupation. It  is contended that the law does not allow the Rent

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Controller  or   the  High  Court  to  act  mechanically  on  the application of  the landlord and grant him the relief of eviction merely on  his asking through an application under Section 14C of the Act.  It is  also contended  that the  discretion of the Rent Controller and  that of  the High  Court to allow or not to allow the eviction  petition against  a sitting  tenant cannot be taken away  by   any  legislative   measure  and   unless  "bona   fide requirement" of  the landlord or, for that  matter, of any member of his  family, is  established on the material placed on record, the application  cannot be  allowed  and  the  tenant  cannot  be evicted even under that provision of the Act. 6.   Mr. Harish  Salve, learned  Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent contends  in reply  that in  proceedings under Section 14C of  the Act,  "bona fide  requirement" is  not required to be established by the landlord as the words, "bona fide requirement" do  not  occur  in  that  Section  in  contradistinction  to  the provisions contained  in Section  14(1)(e) of the Act under which also eviction  proceedings can  be initiated against a tenant but only on  the ground  of "bona  fide requirement". It is contended that  absence  of  these  words  in  Section  14C  indicates  the legislative intent  to obviate  the difficulty  of a  landlord by enabling him  to get  immediate possession  of  his  premises  in occupation of  a tenant provided he (landlord) was in the service of Central  Government of  Delhi Administration  and  has  either retired or was about to retire. 7.   Senior Counsel  on both  sides have put forward before us in their own  inimitable style attractive arguments compelling us to decide which  argument  is  real  attractive  and  which  of  the arguments looks  to be  artificially attractive  under a  mask of "distinguishable" or "not applicable" decisions. 8.   The Act  which was  brought on the Statute book in 1958 is a composite  legislation   in  the   sense  that   while  providing protection to  the  tenants  who,  under  common  law,  including Transfer of  Property Act, could be evicted from the premises let out to  them, at  any time  by the landlord on the termination of their tenancy,  it restricts  the right of the landlords to evict the tenants  at their  will. The  Act is  thus beneficial as also restrictive in  nature. The  Courts are, therefore, under a legal compulsion to  harmoniously read  the provisions of the Act so as to balance  the rights of the landlord and the obligations of the tenant towards each other keeping in mind that one of the objects of the  legislature while  enacting  the  Act  was  to  curb  the tendency of the greedy landlords to throw out the tenants, paying lower rent,  in the  name of personal occupation and rent out the premises at the market rate. 9.   Section 14 of the Act contains a specific prohibition that a court or  Rent Controller  shall not pass any order or decree for recovery of possession from tenants in respect of the premises in their occupation.  The Proviso  appended to  Sub-section  (1)  of Section 14,  however, carves  out certain exceptions and sets out the grounds  on which  the Controller  may make  an order for the recovery of  possession. One  such ground  is contained in clause (e) thereof which reads as under :      "(e)  that  the  premises  let  for      residential purposes  are  required      bona  fide   by  the  landlord  for      occupation  as   a  residence   for      himself or  for any  member of  his      family dependent  on him,  if he is      the  owner   thereof,  or  for  any      person  for   whose   benefit   the      premises  are  held  and  that  the      landlord  or  such  person  has  no      other      reasonably      suitable      residential accommodation.

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    Explanation --  For the purposes of      this clause,  "premises let out for      residential purposes"  include  any      premises which  having been let for      use as a residence are, without the      consent  of   the  landlord,   used      incidentally  for   commercial   or      other purposes." 10.  This Clause  gives a  right to the landlord to seek eviction of the  tenant from  the premises  let out to him for residential purposes, provided  such premises  are bona  fide required by the landlord for his own occupation.  It is under this provision that the  landlords,  generally,  approach  the  Rent  Controller  for eviction  of   the  tenants   for  their   personal   bona   fide requirements. 11.  By the  Delhi Control  (Amendment) Act,  1976 (18  of 1976), which came into force with effect from 1.12.1975, Section 14A was introduced in  the Act  which gave  special  rights,  to  recover immediate possession,  to a  landlord  who,  being  a  person  in occupation of  any residential  premises allotted  to him  by the Central Government  or by  any local  authority, is  required  to vacate such  residential accommodation  on  the  ground  that  he already owns,  in the  Union Territory  of Delhi,  a  residential accommodation either  in his  own name of in the name of his wife and dependent  child. 12.  The Act  was further  amended  by  the  Delhi  Rent  Control (Amendment) Act,  1988 (57  of 1988)  with effect  from 5.10.1988 when three  new Sections,  namely, Section  14B, 14C  & 14D  were introduced in the Act. 13.  Under Section 14B, right to recover immediate possession has been given to a released or retired person from any Armed Forces, if the  premises  let  out  by  him  are  required  for  his  own residence.  Similarly,   under  Section  14C,  right  to  recover immediate possession  has been  given to  a retired  or likely to retire employee  of  the  Central  Government  or  of  the  Delhi Administration. Under Section 14D, as widow, if the premises were let out  by her  of by her husband, has also been given the right to recover immediate possession of the premises. 14.  The amendments  introduced in  1976 and  1988 thus created a class of  landlords who  were bestowed  with  special  rights  to recover  immediate   possession  from   tenants  occupying  their premises provided such premises were required by them, except the landlord under  Section 14A,  for their  own occupation.  Section 14C, with which we are concerned in the present case, provides as under :-      "14C. Right   to  recover immediate      possession of premises to accrue to      Central   Government    and   Delhi      Administration employees :      (1) Where the landlord is a retired      employee of  the Central Government      or of the Delhi Administration, and      the premises  let out  by  him  are      required  for  his  own  residence,      such employee  may, within one year      from the date of  his retirement or      within a  period of  one year  from      the date  of  commencement  of  the      Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act,      1988 whichever  is later  apply  to      the Controller  for recovering  the      immediate   possession    of   such      premises.      (2)  Where   the  landlord   is  an      employee of  the Central Government

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    or of  the Delhi Administration and      has a  period of less than one year      preceding   the    date   of    his      retirement and the premises let out      by him  are required by him for his      own residence after his retirement,      he may, at any time within a period      of one  year before the date of his      retirement, apply to the Controller      for   recovering    the   immediate      possession of such premises.      (3) Where  the landlord referred to      in sub-section  (1) of  sub-section      (2)  has  let  out  more  than  one      premises, it  shall be  open to him      to make  an application  under that      sub-section in  respect of only one      of the premises chosen by him." 15.  This Section  intends to  provide a  house to a landlord who becomes homeless  on retirement. It is for this reason that it is further provided  in Sub-Section  (3) of  Section 14C that if the landlord had  let out  more than  one premises, he shall indicate his choice  for the  premises which he intends to occupy. If this is done  by him  and the  choice is  indicated for  a  particular premises, it  will not  be open  to the tenant either to say that the landlord  owns another  house or to contend that the landlord should have  sought eviction  of the  tenant occupying  the other house particularly  as the  indication of  "choice"  will  be  in consonance with  the legislative  intent reflected in Section 14C to provide  immediately a house to a retired employee without the issue relating to the "other house" being permitted to be raised. This principle  is directly  related to a landlord who becomes or is likely  to become  homeless on retirement but not to landlords who are already in occupation of a house, owned by them, and seek eviction of  the tenant  from their  other house,  or, where  the landlord is  in occupation  of a  part of his own house and seeks eviction of  the tenant  from the other part. In such a case, the tenant may  raise  objections  with  respect  to  the  landlord’s requirement, particularly  as the  requirement, on  retirement of likely retirement,  cannot possibly,  not in  all  cases,  become urgent overnight.  To repeat, the purpose is to provide a home to a homeless  so that  he may  lead a peaceful and quiet life after retirement. 16.  We  may  now  proceed  to  consider  the  contentious  issue relating to  omission of  the words  "bona fide  requirement"  in Section 14C  as against  Section 14(1)(e)  where these  words  do prominently occur. 17.  The proceedings  under the  two provisions, though common in nature, in  the sense,  that both  relate to eviction of tenants, are basically  different. While  under Section 14(1)(e), a tenant can be  compelled to  vacate the  premises to  make room  for the landlord. who  genuinely and bona fide requires it, under Section 14C, the  landlord has  to have  a  particular  legal  status  or character, namely,  that  he  should  have  either  retired  from service or was about to retire within a year of initiation of the eviction proceedings. Under Section 14(1)(e), an enquiry into the "bona fide  requirement" of  the landlord  has to  be necessarily held as  eviction of  the tenant  cannot be  ordered unless  that requirement is  established as  a fact. Whether enquiry into this vital factor is also required to be held under Section 14C is the question which  has to  be answered keeping in view the fact that the  legislature,   while  enacting  this  provision,  manifestly intended that  a landlord  who has  retired from  service  of  is likely to  retired who  has retired  from service of is likely to retire, would immediately require a house for his own occupation.

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18.  The phrase "Bona fide need" of Bona fide requirement" occurs not only  in the  Delhi Rent  Control Act but in the Rent Control legislation of  other States  also. What  is the  meaning of this phrase has  been considered  innumerable times  by  various  High Courts as also by this Court and requires no citations to explain its legal  implications. Even  then reference  may be made to the decision of  this Court  in Ram  Das vs.  Ishwar Chander  &  Ors. (1988) 3  SCC 131  = AIR  1988 SC 1122, in which it was indicated that "bona  fide need" should be genuine, honest and conceived in good faith.  It was  also indicated  that landlord’s  desire  for possession,  however   honest  it   might  otherwise   be,   has, inevitably, a  subjective element  in it.  The "desire" to become "requirement" must  have the  objective element of a "need" which can be  decided only  by taking  all relevant  circumstances into consideration so  that the protection afforded to a tenant is not rendered illusory  or whittled down. These observations were made in respect  of  the  provisions  contained  in  E.P.  Urban  Rent Restriction Act, 1949. 19.  The  distinction   between  "Desire"  and  "Need"  was  also considered in  Amarjit Singh  vs. Khatoon  Qamarain, (1986) 4 SCC 736, which construing Section 14(1)(e) of the Act. 20.  In Section  14(1)(e) as  also under  Section 14C,  it is the requirement of  the landlord  which  constitutes  the  basis  for tenant’s eviction.  If the requirement has to be genuine and bona fide, under  Section 14(1)(e),  can it  be said  that because the words "bona  fide"  have  not  been  used  in  Section  14C,  the requirement of the landlord may not be bona fide or genuine. This meaning, obviously,  cannot be given to Section 14C. No landlord, and even  a landlord  under Section 14C, can be permitted to come to Court  for eviction of the tenant for his requirement which is not real, genuine or bona fide. The tenant cannot be evicted on a false plea  of requirement or "feigned requirement". The omission of the  words "bona  fide", therefore,  does not  make much  of a difference. 21.  Applications of the landlords for eviction of tenants on the ground of  bona fide  requirement under  Section 14(1)(e)  or for recovery of  possession under  Section 14A to 14D are disposed of in the  manner indicated  in Chapter  IIIA  which  is  headed  as "Summary Trial of Certain Applications". The procedure set out in Section 25B,  occurring in  that Chapter,  indicated that when an application is made to the Rent Controller and summons are issued to the  tenant, the latter, namely, the tenant cannot contest the application of  the landlord  for his  eviction unless he obtains Leave under  Section 25B(4),  Sub-sections (4),  (5) and  (6)  of Section 25B,  which are  relevant for  purposes of this case, are reproduced below :      "(4) The tenant on whom the summons      is  duly  served  (whether  in  the      ordinary way or by registered post)      in the  form specified in the Third      Schedule  shall   not  contest  the      prayer  for   eviction   from   the      premises   unless   he   files   an      affidavit stating  the  grounds  on      which  he   seeks  to  contest  the      application   for    eviction   and      obtains leave  from the  Controller      as  hereinafter  provided;  and  in      default  of   his   appearance   in      pursuance of  the  summons  or  his      obtaining such leave, the statement      made  by   the  landlord   in   the      application for  eviction shall  be      deemed  to   the  admitted  by  the      tenant and  the applicant  shall be

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    entitled to  an order  for eviction      on the ground aforesaid.      (5) The  Controller shall  give  to      the tenant  leave  to  contest  the      application if  the affidavit filed      by the  tenant discloses such facts      as would  disentitle  the  landlord      from obtaining  an  order  for  the      recovery  of   possession  of   the      premises on the ground specified in      clause (e)  of the  proviso to sub-      section (1)  of section 14 or under      section 14A.      (6) Where  leave is  granted to the      tenant to  contest the application,      the Controller  shall commence  the      hearing of the application as early      as practicable." 22.  These provisions  indicate that  in order to obtain leave to contest the  application of  the landlord, the tenant has to file an affidavit  stating the grounds on which he proposes to contest that application. If that affidavit discloses such facts as would disentitle the  landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession,  the Controller  would grant  leave to the tenant. once the  leave is  granted, the  application is  required to  be disposed  of  in  accordance  with  the  practice  and  procedure applicable to  a Court  of Small  Causes. The  order of  the Rent Controller finally  allowing or dismissing the application of the landlord  for   recovery  of   possession,  has   not  been  made appealable, but  a Revision  has been provided against that order under Sub-section (8) of Section 25B. 23.  Section 25B  thus provides  a uniform procedure for disposal of the  applications filed  either under  Section 14(1)(e), or by the "classified"  landlords under  any of  the Sections,  namely, 14A, 14B 14C or 14D. 24.  As against  the right  of the  landlord to seek his tenant’s eviction under  Section 14C  of the  Act,  the  extent  of  right available to such tenant, in defending those proceedings, may now be considered. 25.  We have  already seen  that Section  25B provides  a uniform procedure for  both categories  of tenants,  namely, those  whose eviction is  sought under  Section 14(1)(e)  and  those  who  are sought to be evicted under Section 14A to 14D. In both the cases, the tenant  has to seek the leave of the Controller to defend the proceedings by  filing an  affidavit, setting  out the grounds on which he proposes to contest the application of the landlord. 26.  Concentrating on  Section 14C  alone and  not travelling  to other cognate  Section, namely,  14A, 14B and 14D, a tenant while seeking permission  of the  Controller  to  defend  the  eviction proceedings, under Section 25B of the Act, can legitimately raise the plea,  for example,  that the landlord has either not retired or was  not likely  to retire from service within one year of the initiation of proceedings or that the landlord, after retirement, has taken  up employment  elsewhere or  has been  given any other lucrative assignment  including the facility of a "Quarter" or an assignment commensurate  with his  earlier status and, therefore, may say  that the  landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation.  The tenant  may also indicate that the landlord, in order  to augment  his income after retirement, wanted only to let out  the premises again on higher rent and to save sufficient portion of  rental earnings,  the himself  had  chosen  or  might chosen to live in a tenanted accommodation on cheaper rent. These pleas (may  be, many more such pleas, as human ingenuity knows no bounds) would  definitely touch  the "bona fides" of the landlord and, therefore,  cannot be  denied to a tenant on the ground that

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the landlord,  having retired  from service  or likely to retire, has to   be  presumed to  require the  accommodation for  his own occupation. 27.  Integrating these two factors together, namely, the right of the landlord  to  recover  immediate  possession  and  the  right available to  a tenant to raise pleas in defence to indicate that the premises,  in spite of retirement of likely retirement of the landlord, are not required by him, what emerges out is that while the landlord  has to  establish his  "requirement",  which  means "real" and not "feigned", the tenant can show that it is not so. 28.  In Surjit Singh Kalra vs. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 87, a Three-Judge Bench of this Court laid down as under :-      "20.  The   tenant  of   course  is      entitled  to   raise  all  relevant      contentions as against the claim of      the classified  landlords. The fact      that there  is no  reference to the      word  bona   fide  requirement   in      Section  14-B   to  14-D  does  not      absolve the  landlord from  proving      that his  requirement is  bona fide      or the  tenant must  be a bona fide      one.   There    is   also    enough      indication  in   support  of   this      construction  from   the  title  of      Section 25-B  which states "special      procedure  for   the  disposal   of      applications for  eviction  on  the      ground of bona fide requirement." 29.  This decision,  therefore, concedes  to the tenant his right to defend  the proceedings initiated under Section 14C by showing that the requirement of the landlord was not bona fide. 30.  In the  above case,  an earlier decision in Busching Schmitz Private Limited  vs. P.T. Menghani, (1977) 2 SCC 835, which dealt with the  scope of  Section 14A of the Act was considered and the view expressed therein was reiterated by observing as under :-      "The   social   setting   demanding      summary proceedings,  the nature of      the subject  matter and, above all,      the legislative  diction which  has      been deliberately  designed, differ      in   the    two   provisions.   The      Controller’s power to give leave to      contest the application filed under      Section (14)(1)(e)  or Section 14-A      is cribbed  by the  condition  that      the ‘affidavit  filed by the tenant      discloses  such   facts  as   would      disentitle   the    landlord   from      obtaining an order for the recovery      of possession  of the  premises  on      the  ground   specified’   in   the      respective  sections.  Needless  to      state, therefore, if an application      is filed under Section 14-B or 14-C      or  14-D,  the  tenant’s  right  to      contest the application is narrowed      down  and   is  restricted  to  the      parameters   of    the   respective      sections. He cannot widen the scope      of  his  defence  by  relying  upon      Section 14(1)(e).  We find  nothing      contrary to  our view  in Precision      Steel &  Engineering Works  v. Prem      Deva  Niranjan   Deva  Tayal.  Sub-

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    section (5)  of Section 25 is self-      contained and  Order 37  Rule 3 CPC      has no  part  to  play  there.  We,      therefore,  reiterate   the   views      expressed   in   Busching   Schmitz      Private Limited case." 31.  The Court  thus restricted  the defence of the tenant to the parameters of  Section 14C  and placed a further restriction that the tenant  cannot widen the scope of his defence by relying upon Section 14(1)(e). 32.  In another  case, namely,  E.M.C. Steel  Ltd., Calcutta  vs. Union of India & Another. (1991) 2 SCC 101, while considering the provisions of  Section 140  under which  a widow  has a  right to recover immediate  possession of  the premises in occupation of a tenant, it was laid down as under:-      "Section 14-D  makes no distinction      between the  landladies who  become      widows before and after letting out      of t  he premises.  It merely  says      that where  the landlady is a widow      and the promises are let out by her      or by  her husband, are required by      her for  her own residence, she may      apply   to   the   Controller   for      recovering the immediate possession      of such  premises. The  language of      the section in that respect is very      clear. The premises might have been      let out  by her  as a widow or they      might have  been  let  out  by  her      husband or  even by  herself before      she   had    become   widow.    The      legislature  wanted   to   give   a      special privilege  to the  landlady      who  is   a  widow  notwithstanding      whether the  premises were  let out      before or  after she  became widow.      Such conferment  of special benefit      on a  widow-landlady is permissible      even  under   the   provisions   of      Article 15(3)  of the  Constitution      which is  an clauses (1) and (2) of      that  article.   It   states   that      nothing in  the said  article shall      prevent the  State from  making any      special  provision  for  women  and      children. A  widow is undoubtedly a      vulnerable person  in  our  society      and requires special protection. We      further     see  no  merit  in  the      contention  that   if  the  benefit      given by Section 14-D is allowed to      be availed  of by  widows, they may      make a  business of it. There is no      warrant for such apprehension. For,      in the first instance, the right to      recover  possession  under  Section      14-D can be availed of by the widow      only once.  That  is  a  sufficient      guarantee against  the abuse of the      privilege granted  by the  section.      Secondly, she has to prove her bona      fide need for the occupation of the      premises in  question for  her  own      residence like  any other landlord.

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    Thirdly, the  provisions of Section      19 of  the Act  come into   play in      her case  also, when  the order for      possession on  the ground  of  bona      fide requirement  for occupation as      residence is made in her favour." 33.  The Court,  in the above case, did not accept the contention of the tenant that the privilege given to the widow may be abused by her and she may make a business of it. The Court held that the right available  to a  widow under  Section 14B can be availed of only once.  The Court  also held  that the  widow like  any other landlord, has  to prove here bona fide need for the occupation of the premises  for her  own residence.  The Three-Judge Bench thus reiterated it  twice, once  in proceeding  under Section  14B and again in  proceeding under  Section 14D, that even the classified landlords have to prove their genuine need for the requirement of the premises in question for their own occupation. 34.  The decision  in  Surjit  Singh  Kalra’s  case  (supra)  was considered by  this Court  in Anand  Swaroop Vohra  vs. Bhim  Sen Bahri and another , (1994) 5 SCC 372 and was followed explaining, in the  process,  an  earlier  decision  in  Narain  Kahmman  vs. Pradumar Kumar  Jain, (1985)  1 SCC  1, by  observing that  under Section 14A,  the right  to recover  immediate possession  can be exercised by  the landlord  as soon as he is served with a notice to vacate  the government  accommodation allotted to him. In such proceedings, the  landlord, in  view of  the language employed in that Section,  has not to show that the premises are required for his own  residence. On  the contrary,  the right  available to  a landlord  under   Section  14B  to  14D  is  dependent  upon  the requirement to  show that  the premises  shall be occupied by the landlord for  his own  residence. The  Court did  not, therefore, digress from  the view  propounded in  Surjit Singh  Kalra’s case (supra) that  while the  landlord has  to show  and establish his bona fide  need, the tenant can plead and prove that the premises were not bona fide required by the landlord. 35.  In V.  Rajaswari vs. Bombay Tyres Intl. Ltd., (1995) Supp. 3 SCC 172,  the Court  held that  under Section 15B, the tenant has practically no  defence whatsoever and has to yield possession if it is  proved that (i) that the landlady is a widow; and (ii) the premises are required by her for her own residence. 36.  In J.P.  Hingorani vs.  Ash ok Kharbanda and another, (1995) Supp. 3  SCC 185,  it was  laid  down  that  if  a  landlord,  on retirement, lets out the premises to a tenant, he cannot initiate proceedings for the eviction of that tenant under Section 14C but has to approach the Rent Controller under Section 14(1)(e) as the fact that  the premises  were let  out after retirement indicates that the  immediate need  of the  landlord has  vanished and  the premises were not required by him for immediate occupation. 37.  In  view   of  the  statutory  provisions  discussed  above, specially in  view of the fact that while introducing Section 14A to 14D  in the  Act, no amendment was made in Section 25B, we may summarise  the legal position relating to eviction in proceedings landlord under Section 14C, as under :      (1) Proceedings   under Section 14C           can be initiated by a landlord           who was  in the service of the           Central  Government  or  Delhi           Administration and has retired           from service  or is  likely to           retire within  one year of the           initiation of proceedings, but           the   retirement   or   likely           retirement  of   the  landlord           does  not   give  rise   to  a           presumption that  the premises

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         are bona fide required by him.           The landlord has also to plead           and show that after retirement           or  likely   retirement,    no           fresh  assignment   has   been           taken up  or is  likely to  be           taken  up   by  him  with  the           facility  of  a    residential           "Quarter".      (ii) Possession can be recovered by           the landlord  only  for  real,           genuine and bona fide need and           not for "feigned" need.      (ii) Proceedings  under Section 14C           can  be  contested  only  when           leave to contest is granted by           the Rent  Controller;  whether           leave  would   be  granted  or           refused would  depend upon the           nature  of   pleas  raised  of           circumstances  shown   by  the           tenant in  his affidavit filed           before the Rent Controller.      (iv) Section 25B does not place any           restriction on  the  right  of           the tenant  to raise  pleas in           defence within  the parameters           of Section  14C, namely,  that           he can  plead and  prove  that           notwithstanding the retirement           or likely  retirement  of  the           landlord, the premises are not           required by  him for  his  own           residence. No  plea  regarding           the  size  of  the  landlord’s           family  or  the  tenant’s  own           family, whether  it was likely           to   increases    with   son’s           marriage  or   decrease   with           daughter’s  marriage,  can  be           raised by  the tenant  nor can           be raise  any plea  as to  the           extent  of   accommodation  or           floor  area   or   comparative           hardship of  partial  eviction           etc.     as      these     are           considerations which  are  not           relevant  under  Section  14C.           If, however,  the landlord  is           already in  occupation of  his           own house, part of which is in           occupation of  a tenant (as in           the  instant  case)  or  where           whole of  the hose,  owned  by           the  landlord,   is   in   his           personal  occupation   and  he           makes   an   application   for           eviction of a tenant occupying           another house, the need of the           landlord,  with  reference  to           his family  strength  and  the           extent  of  accommodation,  at           his disposal,  will have to be           examined     vis-a-vis     his           requirement.

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    (v)  Expeditious  enquiry  need  be           held or  else the landlord, if           he has  already  retired  from           service will  be literally  on           the   "street"    during   the           pendency  of  the  proceedings           which, undoubtedly,  take long           to  conclude  particularly  as           one party, namely, the tenant,           is  inherently  interested  in           delayed  disposal.   I  f  the           tenant was  allowed to contest           Section 14C  application  also           with that attitude, giving him           the  liberty   to  place   all           possible obstacles  to  retard           the pace  of the  proceedings,           legislative     intent      of           providing immediate possession           of the  house to a retired, or           likely  to   retire  landlord,           would be frustrated. 38.  Let us  now examine this case in the light of the above principles. 39.  The facts  established in  this case  indicate that the respondent was  a Central  Government employee.  He was last posted at  Delhi as Dy. Chief Engineer, Northern Railway and retired from  service on  23rd  July,  1987.  He  filed  the application under  Section 14C within time. He indicated his choice for the premises in question comprising of the ground floor, first  and second  floors. The  ground  floor  is  in occupation of  the appellant  while  the  first  and  second floors are  in occupation  of the respondent. The respondent has sought  eviction of  the appellant from the ground floor on the  ground that the entire premises are required by him, particularly as  the accommodation  at   his disposal on the first and  second floors is insufficient. It is pleaded that while he  requires three  bed rooms  separately for  his on, daughter and  for himself  and his  wife,  another  room  is required for  his office  where  he  proposes  to  carry  on consultancy  work  after  having  retired  as  Deputy  Chief Engineer from the Northern Railway. He also requires another room for his guests, specially his three sisters who, though married, quite often visit the respondent, who is their only brother and after the death of their parents, their brother, namely the respondent is the only nearest relation whom they visit on  all possible  occasions. For  these  reasons,  the entire accommodation  on the  ground floor  is needed by the respondent  by   way  of   additional   accommodation.   The respondent  also   owns  another  house  in  Delhi.  He  has explained and  established  his  need  for  this  particular premises for  which he  has  also  indicated  his  "choice". Apparently, the  need appears  to be  a need  falling  under Section 14(1)(e),  but the  fact remains  that the  need for additional accommodation  of one  room or  the ground floor, which would  also include the facility of car-parking, which the respondent, otherwise, has been parking on the road, has arisen on his retirement. 40.  We  have  also  examined  the  facts  set  out  by  the appellant in  his affidavit filed before the Rent Controller for leave  to defend  the present proceedings. The pleas, in our opinion,  do not disentitle the landlord from recovering possession of the premises in question particularly when the respondent has clearly set out in his petition that although he owned  one more house, he wanted this particular premises

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for his  own need.  The choice,  and, sufficient  reasons in support  thereof,   having  thus   been  indicated   by  the respondent, the  plea of  the  appellant  about  alternative accommodation being  available to  the  landlord  cannot  be sustained. 41.  We have,  ourselves, examined  the facts  here to avoid the agony  of a  protracted litigation by remanding the case to  the   Rent  Controller,   particularly  as   we  see  no justification to  interfere with  the judgment passed by the High Court by which the appellant has been required to hand- over vacant  possession  to  the  respondent.  We,  however, provide that  before possession is actually delivered to the respondent, he  shall file  an  affidavit  before  the  Rent Controller stating,  in the  form of an undertaking, that no part of the premises in question comprising of ground floor, first floor and the second floor shall be let out by him for one year from the data of taking over possession. In case of breach of that undertaking, the tenant would become entitled to regain  the possession  of the premises on an application made by him before the Rent Controller.      Subject  to  the  above  observations,  the  appeal  is dismissed without any order as to costs.