ITEM NO.126               COURT NO.9             SECTION XV

           S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A                          RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 5840 OF 2004

M/S. QAZI NOORUL H.H.H. PETROL PUMP &ANR          Appellant (s)

                VERSUS

DY. DIRECTOR, E.S.I. CORPORATION                  Respondent(s)

(With appln(s)  for  exemption from filing  O.T.,directions  and prayer for  interim relief  and  office report ))

Date: 29/07/2009  This Appeal was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MARKANDEY KATJU         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.L. DATTU

For Appellant(s) Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi, Sr. Adv. Mr. Prateek Dwivedi, Adv. Ms. Vandana Mishra, Adv. Mr. Manish Kumar, Adv. Mr. Ashutosh Kr. Sharma, Adv.for  

                   Mr. Shail Kumar Dwivedi,Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. V.J. Francis,Adv.

          UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following                                O R D E R  

The appeal is dismissed in terms of the Reportable signed order. No costs.

 (Parveen Kr. Chawla)

Court Master ( Indu Satija) Court Master

[Reportable Signed Order is placed on the File]

REPORTABLE         

     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5840 OF 2004

M/s. Qazi Noorul H.H.H.  Petrol Pump & Another ..Appellants

versus

Dy.Director, ESI Corporation ..Respondent

O R D E R

Heard learned counsel for the parties. This  Appeal  has  been  filed  against  the  impugned  judgment  of  the  

Allahabad High Court dated 24th January, 2003 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition  

No.53564 of 2002.  By the impugned judgment, the High Court has dismissed the  

writ petition filed by the appellant herein.

The  appellant  is  running  a  petrol  pump  (public  retail  outlet)  for  

dispensing petrol/diesel.  He filed the aforesaid Writ Petition No. 53564 of 2002 in  

the High Court of Allahabad challenging an order dated 17th October, 2002 issued  

by the Deputy Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation, Regional Office,  

Kanpur directing the appellant to make contribution under the Employees' State  

Insurance Act, 1948 (for short 'the Act') from August, 1993 to May,  

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2000 and interest on the aforesaid amount failing which recovery shall be issued  

under Sections 45-C and 45-G of the Act.

The short question in this case is whether the appellant is covered by the  

Act.  Section 1(4) of the Act states that the Act, in the first instance, shall apply to all  

factories.  Section 2(12) of the Act provides:

“(12) “factory”  means  any  premises  including  the  precincts thereof--

(a) whereon ten or more persons are employed or were  employed  for  wages  on  any  day  of  the  preceding  twelve  months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is  being  carried  on  with  the  aid  of  power  or  is  ordinarily  so  carried on, or

(b) whereon twenty  or more persons  are  employed or  were employed for wages on any day of the preceding twelve  months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is  being carried on without the aid of power or is ordinarily so  carried on, but does not include a mine subject to the operation  of  the  Mines  Act,  1952  (35  of  1952)  or  a  railway  running  shed;)”

The expressions “manufacturing process” as well as “power” used in the  

Act have been given the same meaning as in the Factories Act, 1948, vide Sections  

2(14-AA) and Section 2(15-C) of the Act.

Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948 defines   

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“manufacturing process” as follows:

“(k) “manufacturing process” means process for--

(i) making,  altering,  repairing,  ornamenting,  finishing,  packing,  oiling,  washing,  cleaning,  breaking  up,  demolishing,  or otherwise treating or adapting any article

or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery  or disposal, or

(ii)pumping oil, water, sewage or any other substance, or (iii)generating, transforming or transmitting power, or (iv)composing  types  for  printing,  printing  by  letter  press,  

lithography, photogravure or other similar process or book  binding;

(v)constructing,  reconstructing,  repairing,  refitting,  finishing  or breaking up ships or vessels; or

(vi)preserving or storing any article in cold storage;”

A perusal  of  the  aforesaid  provision  shows  that  pumping oil  is  also  a  

manufacturing process.

In  this  connection,  it  may  be  stated  that  the  words  “manufacturing  

process” in different statutes have different meanings.  For instance, in the Central  

Excise Act, 1944, the word “manufacture” means bringing into existence a different  

commodity,  though  this  is  not  the  definition  of  “manufacturing  process”  in  the  

Factories Act, 1948. We cannot apply the definition of “manufacturing process” in  

one Statute to another Statute.  

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Section 2(k), sub-clause (ii) of the Factories Act, 1948 states that pumping  

oil is a manufacturing process.  Admittedly, the appellant does the work of pumping  

oil.  When we go to a Petrol Pump for getting petrol or diesel,  the petrol or diesel is  

in a tank and it does not on its own flow from the tank to the pipe and thereafter  

into the vehicle, but only by means of a pump by using power.

Learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant  has  submitted  that  we  

should see the object and intention of the Statute.  It is well settled that once the  

Statute is clear, the literal Rule of Interpretation applies, and  there is no need to go  

into  the  object  and  intention  of  the  Statute  (vide  article  entitled  'A  Note  on

Interpretation  of  Statutes'  by  Markandey  Katju,  J.,  published  in  the  Journal  

Section of AIR 2007 SC page 22). In the present case, Section 2(14-AA) of the Act  

states that “manufacturing process” shall  have the meaning assigned to it in the  

Factories  Act,  1948.  In the Factories  Act,  1948,  Section 2(k)  of  the Act includes  

pumping oil as a manufacturing process.     

In our opinion, the only rule of interpretation which applies to the facts of  

the present case is the Literal Rule of Interpretation, which means that we should go  

simply by  

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the wording of the Statute and nothing else and there is no scope for applying any  

other Rule of Interpretation.  In our opinion, the language used in Section 2(k)(ii) of  

the Factories Act, 1948 is clear.  Hence, the Act applies to the appellant and the  

respondent was right in issuing notice to the appellant for  making contribution and  

interest thereon for the period in question.   

Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. No costs.  However, we reduce the  

rate of interest to 10% on the principal amount.

..........................J. [MARKANDEY KATJU]

NEW DELHI; ..........................J. JULY 29, 2009. [H.L. DATTU]