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PETITIONER: M/S PUNJAB TIN SUPPLY CO., CHANDIGARH ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/10/1983

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1984 AIR   87            1984 SCR  (1) 428  1984 SCC  (1) 206        1983 SCALE  (2)503  CITATOR INFO :  R          1984 SC 121  (31)  R          1986 SC 244  (7,14,15)  F          1987 SC2117  (28,31)  D          1992 SC1806  (7)

ACT:      The East  Punjab Urban  Rent Restriction  Act, 1949  as modified by  the East  Punjab  Urban  Rent  Restriction  Act (Extension to  Chandigarh) Act.  1974- Sec.  3-Validity  of. Whether  Union  Territory  of  Chandigarh,  Home  Department Notification No.  352-LD-73/602 dated  January 31,  1973  as modified by notifications dated September 24, 1973 and Sept. 24,1974 issued  under sec.  3  valid  Whether  Notifications operate prospectively.      Interpretation of statutes-Rule of-Object and policy of statute need not always be strictly confined to preamble and provisions of statute.      Interpretation of  statutes-Rule of-Whether  a  statute operates  retrospectively-Does   not  depend   primarily  on language of statute-Court to see surrounding circumstances.

HEADNOTE:      By enacting  the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (Extension to  Chandigarh) Act,  1974 the Parliament brought into force  with effect  from November  4,  1972,  the  East Punjab Urban  Rent Restriction  Act, 1949 which was in force in the former State of Punjab with the modifications set out in its  schedule in  the Union  Territory of  Chandigarh and validated all actions taken, notifications issued and orders made or  purported to  have been taken, issued or made under the 1949  Act. Sec.  3 of  the Act of 1949 provided that the Central  Government   may  exempt   any  building  from  the application  of  the  Act.  Under  that  section  the  Chief Commissioner  of  Chandigarh  issued  a  notification  dated January 31,  1973 stating  that the  provisions of  the  Act shall not  apply to buildings, constructed in the urban area of Chandigarh,  for a  period of five years with effect from the date  the sewerage  connection is  granted in respect of such  buildings.   This   notification   was   modified   by notifications dated  September 24,  1973 and Sept. 24, 1974. The petitioners  questioned the  validity of s. 3 of the Act of 1949  and notifications  issued thereunder on the grounds

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that s.  3 suffered from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative  power;   that  the  exemption  granted  by  the notification dated  January 3, 1973 as modified by the later notifications was outside the scope of the object and policy of the Act and at the same time discriminatory, and that the power to  issue notifications under s. 3 of the Act could be exercised by  the Central Government only. It was also urged that the notification had prospective operation. 429      Dismissing the petitions, ^      HELD: Section  3 of  the Act  does not  suffer from the vice of  excessive delegation  of legislative  power and  is also not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. [439 F]      P. J.  Irani v.  The State  of Madras.  [1962] 2 S.C.R. 169; State  of Madhya  Pradesh  v.  Kanhaiyalal,  [1970]  15 M.P.L.J.  973;  and  Sadhu  Singh  v.  The  District  Board, Gurdaspur &  Anr. (Civil  Appeal No. 2594 of 1966 decided on October 29, 1968) referred to.      The preamble  and the  provisions of a statute no doubt assist the  Court in  finding out  its object and policy but its object  and policy  need not always be strictly confined to its  preamble and  the provisions contained therein. [440 D]      In the  instant case,  the object and policy of the Act appears to be slightly wider than some of the key provisions of the  Act namely  fixation of  fair rent and prevention of unreasonable eviction  of tenants.  The policy and object of the Act generally is mitigation of hardship of tenants. Such mitigation can  be attained by several measures, one of them being creation  of incentive to persons with capital who are otherwise reluctant  to invest  in the  construction of  new buildings in view of the chilling effect of the rent control laws. As a part of the said scheme in order to persuade them to invest  in the construction of new buildings exemption is granted to  them from  the operation  of the Act for a short period of  five years  so that  whatever may be the hardship for the  time being to the tenants of the new buildings, the new buildings  so constructed  may after  the expiry  of the period of  exemption be  available for  the pool  of housing accommodation  controlled   by   the   Act.   The   impugned notification is  not therefore, ultra vires section 3 of the Act as  in its  true effect,  it advances the scheme, object and purposes  of  the  Act  which  are  articulated  in  the preamble and the substantive provisions of the Act. Moreover the classification  of buildings into exempted buildings and unexempted buildings brought about by the notification bears a just  and reasonable  nexus to  the object  to be achieved namely the  creation of  additional housing accommodation to meet the  growing need  of persons who have no accommodation to  reside  or  to  carry  on  business  and  it  cannot  be considered as discriminatory or arbitrary or unreasonable in view of  the shortness  of the period of exemption available in the case of each exempted building. [440 E-441 B]      Art. 239(1)  of the  Constitution provides that save as otherwise provided  by Parliament  by law,  Union  Territory shall be  administered by  the President  acting through  an administrator to  be appointed  by him with such designation as he  may specify.  Under a notification issued on November 1, 1966,  the President  has directed that the administrator (the Chief  Commissioner) shall  in relation  to  the  Union Territory of  Chandigarh exercise  and discharge with effect from November  1, 1966 the powers and functions of the State Government under  any law  which is  extended to  the  Union Territory of  Chandigarh. The Act is a State law which is so

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extended to Union Territory through the Extension Act. It is further seen that s. 3 (8) (b) (iii) of the General Clauses 430 Act  defines   ’Central  Government’   in  relation  to  the administration  of   a  Union  Territory  as  including  the administrator  thereof   acting  within  the  scope  of  the authority given  to him  under Art. 239 of the Constitution. The Union  of India  which is  a party  to these proceedings does not  dispute the authority of the Chief Commissioner to issue the  notification referred  to above. Moreover s. 4 of the Extension  Act clearly validates the notifications which had been  issued or  purported to have been issued under the Act before  the date  of the Extension Act by declaring that they shall  be deemed  to be valid and effective. [441 G-442 E]      Uttam Bala  Ravankar v.  Asstt. Collector  of Customs & Central Excise Goa & Anr., [1971]1 S.C.R. 714 referred to.      All laws  which  affect  substantive  rights  generally operate prospectively  and there  is a  presumption  against their retrospectivity  if  they  affect  vested  rights  and obligations unless  the  legislative  intent  is  clear  and compulsive Such  retrospective effect  may  be  given  where there are express words giving retrospective effect or where the   language    used   necessarily   implies   that   such retrospective operation  is  intended.  Hence  the  question whether a  statutory provision  has retrospective  effect or not depends  primarily  on  the  language  in  which  it  is couched. If  the language  is clear  and unambiguous  effect will have  to be  given to  the  provision  in  question  in accordance with its tenor. If the language is not clear then the Court  has  to  decide  whether  in  the  light  of  the surrounding Circumstances  retrospective  effect  should  be given to it or not. [443 D-F]      In the  instant case a reading of the notification does not clearly indicate that the Chief Commissioner intended to grant  exemption   in  respect   of  any  of  the  buildings constructed prior  to January  31, 1973.  There was  also no compelling reason  for giving  exemption to  buildings which had already  been constructed  as the  object of issuing the notification was  only  to  encourage  construction  of  new buildings thereafter  and not  to take  away  the  statutory protection already  extended to  tenants of  buildings which had come  into existence  prior to  January  31,  1973.  The notification applies only to those buildings which are given sewerage connection  or electric  connection  or  which  are occupied, as  the case may be, on or after January 31, 1973. [443 H-444 F; 346 C]      The notification impugned in the instant case stands by itself and  it is  not to  be construed in the background of the  provision   of  s.   2  of  the  U.P.  Urban  Buildings (Regulation of  Letting, Rent  and Eviction) Act, 1972. [446 A]      Om Prakash  Gupta v.  Dig Vajendrapal  Gupta, [1982]  2 S.C.C. 61;  Ratan Lal  Shinghal v.  Smt. Murti Devi, (A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 635); Shri Ram Saroop Rai v. Smt. Lilavati, [1980] 3 S.C.C.  452; Strawboard  Manufacturing Co.  Ltd. v.  Gupta Mill Workers Union,[1953] S.C.R. 439; Dr. Indramani Pyarelal Gupta. v. W.R. Nathu & Ors., [1963]1 S.C.R. 721; and Income- Tax Officer,  Alleppey v.  M.C. Ponnoose  & Ors.,  [1970]  1 S.C.R. 678 referred to. 431

JUDGMENT:

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    ORIGINAL JURISDICTION  : Writ  Petitions Nos.  6372-80, 9604, 9935-41,  9943-44, 9946-56  and 10001  of 1982, 13-18, 83, 393,  410, 682,  914-25, 928,  1108-11,  2742-52,  2770, 2898, 3330-33,  3362, 3543, 3875-79, 3941, 3946, 3950, 4241, 4242, 4815-16, 4826, 4829, 4834-37, 5183, 5574, 5717, & 7891 of 1983,  7016, 8189-8206  & 9346  of 1982,  4614-20,  5188, 5845, 7489,  8212, 8612, 8875-76, 8886-88, 8268-69, 8348-50, 8382, 8384,  9082-83, 9094,  9129, 9133,  9134, 9145,  9147, 9262, 9562, 9862,9864 and 9876-78 of 1983.           (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)      Advocates For The Petitioners:      O.P. Verma      Sanjeev Walia, J.S. Sahpuri and M.P. Jha.      Shrinath Singh and A. Gupta.      A.K. Goel.      C.M. Nayyar.      P.N. Puri, M.K. Dua and Sudarshan Goel.      V.M. Tarkunde and Anil. B. Divan, H.K. Puri.      S.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri and M.K. Dua.      R.P. Bhatt, Ashok Mathur and Parveen Kumar.      A.R. Ganguli.      S.K. Bisaria.      S.K. Sabarwal.      B.S. Shant, D.K. Garg and M.M. Kashyap, S.K. Bagga.      Advocates for the Petitioners:      B.R. Kapur, Sanjiv Madon, S.R. Srivastava, D.D. Sharma, S.M.  Ashri,   Shankar  Ghose,   M/s.  D.P.  Mukharji,  G.S. Chatterjee, B.S.  Shant,  M.M.  Kashyap,  T.S.  Arora,  S.K. Ghambir, Shrinath  Singh, A.P.  Mohanti, Swaraj  Kaushal, B. Kanta Rao and P.H. Parekh. 432      Advocates For The Respondents:      R.P. Jagga      S.C.  Manchanda,   P.R.  Mridul,  Harbanslal  and  P.A. Francis.      R.P. Jagga, Miss Kailash Mehta, Vimal Dave, A. Minocha, Jeetendra Sharma, Janardhan Sharma, P. Gaur, Atul Jain, Prem Malhotra, M.M.  Kshatriya, Dr.  Meera Agarwal,  R.C.  Misra, Jitendra Sharma,  D.P. Mukharji,  Randhir  Jain,  Ramesh  C. Pathak, Satish  Vig, E.C. Agarwal, V.K. Panditha, R. Satish, C.K. Mahajan  Ashok Grover,  Mohan Pandey,  J.K. Jain,  R.S. Bindra, J.D.  Jain, K.L. Taneja, S. Srinivasan, E.M.S. Anam, M.K. Dua,  N.K. Agarwala,  R.P. Jagga,  S.K. Bagga,  Ms.  S. Bagga, C.P.  Wig, Miss. Rani Chhabra, Mukul Mudgal, N.S. Das Bhal, Ashuni Kumar, R.N. Poddar, C.V. Subba Rao.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      VENKATARAMIAH, J.  In these  petitions under Article 32 of the  Constitution, the  petitioners have  questioned  the constitutional validity  of the Home Department Notification No.  352-LD-73/602   dated  January  31,  1973  (hereinafter referred to  as ’the  Notification’) as modified by the Home Department Notification  No. 2294-LD-73/3474 dated September 24, 1973  and the  Home Department Notification No. 3205-LD- 74/3614  dated  September  24,  1974  issued  by  the  Chief Commissioner of  the Union  Territory  of  Chandigarh  under section 3  of the  East Punjab  Urban Rent  Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter  referred to as ’the Act’) exempting every building constructed  in the  urban area of Chandigarh for a period of  five years from the respective date applicable to it from  the operation  of the Act and issuing certain other directions in that behalf. Incidentally the petitioners have also questioned the validity of section 3 of the Act.      For a  proper appreciation  of the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to refer briefly to the history of the relevant provisions of law. The area now known as the

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Union Territory  of Chandigarh  was a  part of  the State of Punjab as  it existed  prior to the coming into force of the Punjab Reorganization  Act. 1966  (Act  31  of  1966).  With effect from  November 1,  1966 i.e.  the appointed day under section 4  of the said Act the Union Territory of Chandigarh came into  existence and  thereupon the  said area ceased to from part  of the  erst while State of Punjab. Section 87 of the Punjab Reorganization 433 Act, 1966  conferred power  on  the  Central  Government  to extend   by   notification   with   such   restrictions   or modifications as  it thought  fit any enactment which was in force in  a State  at the  date of  the notification  to the Union Territory  of Chandigarh.  Whereas section  88 of that Act provided  for the territorial extent of laws, section 89 dealt with  the power  to adapt  laws, with  the  object  of providing as  far as  possible for the continuity of laws in force in  the several parts of the erstwhile State of Punjab in the  successor States  namely the  States of  Punjab  and Haryana and the Union Territory of Chandigarh.      The Act  i.e. the  East Punjab  Urban Restriction  Act, 1949  was   a  law   which  had   been  enacted  before  the commencement of  the Constitution  and continued  to  be  in operation even after the commencement of the Constitution in the erstwhile State of Punjab by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution.  But the  Act had  not been  brought  into force in  the  area  constituting  the  Union  Territory  of Chandigarh by the State Government of the erstwhile State of Punjab. By  the Notification  No. 13/1/66-CHD dated November 1, 1966  issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, the  President authorised  the Administrator of the Union Territory  of Chandigarh  i.e. the  Chief Commissioner thereof, in  relation to  the said territory to exercise and discharge with  effect from  November 1, 1966 the powers and functions of the State Government under any such law. On the basis  of   the  above   notification  and   other  relevant provisions of  law and  notifications which  had been issued from time  to time  to which  a detailed  reference  is  not necessary, the  Chief  Commissioner  issued  a  notification bringing the  Act into  force  in  the  Union  Territory  of Chandigarh  with  certain  modifications  with  effect  from November 4,  1972. The validity of the said notification was challenged before  the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The High Court  quashed the  said notification  by its  judgment dated October  9, 1974  holding that  the Act  had not  been effectively brought  into force  in the  Union Territory  of Chandigarh  by   virtue  of   that  notification  (vide  Dr. Harkishan Singh  v. Union  of India  & Ors).(1)  It  is  not necessary to  deal with  the reasons given by the High Court in support  of its  judgment  since  the  legal  infirmities pointed out  by  the  High  Court  were  set  right  by  the Parliament by  the enactment  of the  East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act  (Extension of Chandigarh) Act, 1974 (Act 54 of 1974)  (hereinafter referred  to as  ’the Extension Act’) the relevant part of which reads as follows: 434      "1.  This Act may be called the East Punjab Urban  Rent      Restriction Act (Extension to Chandigarh) Act, 1974.      2.   In this Act, "The Act" means the East Punjab Urban      Rent Restriction  Act, 1949  as it extended to, and was      in force,  in certain  areas in  the pre-reorganisation      State of Punjab (being areas which were administered by      municipal   committees,    cantonment   boards,    town      committees or notified area committees or area notified      as  urban   areas  for   the  purposes   of  that  Act)

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    immediately before the 1st day of November, 1966.      3.   Notwithstanding   anything    contained   in   any      judgment, decree  or order  of any court, the Act shall      subject to  the modifications specified in the Schedule      be in force in and be deemed to have been in force with      effect from  the 4th day of November, 1972 in the Union      Territory of Chandigarh as if the provisions of the Act      as so modified had been included in and formed part, of      this section  and as  if this section had been in force      at all material times.      4.   (1)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  any      judgment, decrees  or order of any court, anything done      or any  action taken  (including  any  notification  or      direction issued  or rents  fixed or permission granted      or oder  made) or  purported to have been done or taken      under the  Act shall  be deemed  to  be  as  valid  and      effective as  if the provisions of this Act had been in      force at all material times when such thing was done or      such action was taken.      (2)  Nothing in this Act shall render any person guilty      of any  offence for any contravention of the provisions      of the  Act which  occurred before  the commencement of      this Act.                         THE SCHEDULE                       (See Section 3)                   Modifications in the Act      1.  Throughout   the  Act,   for   "State   Government"      substitute "Central Government". 435      2. Section  1, for sub-sections (2) and (3), substitute      "(2) It  extends to  all the  urban areas  in the Union      Territory of Chandigarh".      3. Section 2.-      (i) after clause (d), insert-      (dd) "Notification"  means a  notification published in      the Official Gazettee".      (ii) for clause (j), substitute-      ’(j)  "urban   area"  means   the  area   comprised  in      Chandigarh as defined in Clause (d) of Section 2 of the      Capital of  Punjab (Development  and  Regulation)  Act,      1952 and  includes such  other area  comprised  in  the      Union Territory of Chandigarh as the Central Government      may, having regard to the density of the population and      the nature  and extent  of the  accommodation available      therein  and   other  relevant   factors,  declare   by      notification to be urban for the purposes of this Act."      4. For Section 20, substitute-           "20.   (1)   The   Central   Government   may   by      notification make  rules, for  the purpose  of carrying      out all or any of the provisions of this Act.                (2) Every  rule made under this Section shall      be laid as soon as may be after it is made, before each      House of Parliament, while it is in session for a total      period of  thirty days  which may  be comprised  in one      session or  in two or more successive sessions, and if,      before the  expiry of the session immediately following      the session  or the successive sessions aforesaid, both      Houses agree  in making any modification in the rule or      both Houses agree that the rule should not be made, the      rule  shall   thereafter  have  effect,  only  in  such      modified form  or be  of no effect, as the case may be;      so however,  that any  such modification  or  annulment      shall be  without prejudice to the validity of anything      previously done under that rule". 436

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    Thereafter in  exercise  of  the  powers  conferred  by section 3  of the  Act the  Chief Commissioner  published  a notification dated  January 31, 1973 exempting the buildings referred to  therein from  the  operation  of  the  Act.  It reads:-           "No. 352-LD-73/602  dated  January  31,  1973.  In      exercise of  the powers  conferred by  section 3 of the      East Punjab  Urban Rent  Restriction Act,  1949 (Punjab      Act No.  III of  1949),  as  applicable  to  the  Union      Territory  of   Chandigarh,  the   Chief  Commissioner,      Chandigarh, is pleased to direct that the provisions of      the said  Act shall not apply to buildings, constructed      in the  urban area  of Chandigarh, for a period of five      years with effect from the date the sewerage connection      is  granted   in  respect  of  such  buildings  by  the      competent  authority  under  rule  112  of  the  Punjab      Capital (Development  and Regulation)  Building  Rules,      1952."      This was  followed by the issue of another notification dated September 24, 1973 which is as follows:-      "No.  2294-LD-73/3474   -In  partial   modification  of Chandigarh Administration,  Home Department/Notification No. 532-LD-73/602  dated  the  31st  January,  1973,  the  Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh  is  pleased  to  direct  that  the period of five years’ exemption shall be computed as under:      (a)  Where sewerage  connection can  be given, from the           date such  connection is  granted by the competent           authority;      (b)  Where sewerage  connection cannot  be granted,  as           for instance, in the case of booths, from the date           electric  connection   is  first   given  by   the           competent authority.      (c)  In case not covered in categories (a) or (b) above           from the date the building is actually occupied."      Again on  June 11,  1982  a  further  notification  was issued as follows: 437           "No.  LD-82/10.11.-  In  partial  modification  of      Chandigarh Administration, Home Department Notification      No. 352-LD-73/602  dated the  31st January,  1973  read      with   Chandigarh    Administration   Home   Department      Notification  No.   2294-LD-73/3474,  dated   the  24th      September, 1973 and in exercise of the powers conferred      by section  3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction      Act, 1949  as applicable  to  the  Union  Territory  of      Chandigarh,  the   Chief  Commissioner,  Chandigarh  is      pleased to direct that the period of 5 years’ exemption      shall be computed in the manner indicated below:      (a)  Where sewerage  connection can  be given, from the           date such  connection is  granted by the competent           authority;      (b)  Where sewerage  connection cannot  be granted,  as           for instance, in the case of booths, from the date           electric  connection   is  first   given  by   the           competent authority;      (c)  Where sewerage  connection has  already been given           and new  building is constructed in addition to or           over and  above the existing building and has been           separately let  out, from the date new building is           actually occupied;      (d)  In cases not covered in categories above, from the           date the building is actually occupied."      On September  24,  1974,  the  Chief  Commissioner  had issued earlier another notification which read thus:      "No. 3205-LD-74/3614.

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         In exercise  of the  powers conferred by section 3      of the  East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 as      applicable to  the Union  Territory of  Chandigarh, the      Chief Commissioner,  Chandigarh is  pleased  to  direct      that the provisions of Section 13 of the said Act shall      not apply to buildings, exempted from the provisions of      the Act  for a  period of  five years  vide  Chandigarh      Administration Notification No. 352-LD-73/602 dated the      31st January, 438      1973 in  respect of  decrees passed  by Civil Courts in      suits for  ejectment of  tenants in possession of these      buildings instituted  by  the  landlords  against  such      tenants during  the period  of exemption  whether  such      decrees  were  or  are  passed  during  the  period  of      exemption or at any time thereafter."      The Extension Act merely brought into force with effect from November  4, 1972, the Act which was an Act in force in the former State of Punjab with the modifications set out in its Schedule  in  the  Union  Territory  of  Chandigarh  and validated all actions taken, notifications issued and orders made or  purported to  have been  taken issued or made under the Act.  Having done  that  it  withdrew  from  the  scene. Thereafter the  Act as  modified by  the Extension Act alone has to  be looked  into to  consider its effect on the Union Territory of  Chandigarh.  As  observed  by  this  Court  in Rajputana Mining  Agencies Ltd.  v. Union of India & Anr.(1) ’there is  neither precedent  nor warrant for the assumption that when one Act applies another Act to some territory, the latter Act  must be  taken to  be incorporated in the former Act. It  may be  otherwise, if there were words to show that the earlier  Act is  to be deemed to be reenacted by the new Act.’ The  Act in the instant case was only extended but not re-enacted. We  should, therefore, proceed on the assumption that the  Act itself  with the  amendments was in force with effect from  November 4,  1972 in  the  Union  Territory  of Chandigarh. Every building that was in existence on that day and which  was constructed thereafter came to be governed by the Act  as amended  by the Extension Act. It was on January 31, 1973 that the Chief Commissioner issued-the notification under section  3 of  the Act  exempting a  certain class  of buildings namely  new buildings  for a  period of five years calculated  from  the  relevant  date  applicable  to  them. Section 3  of the  Act as amended by the Extension Act reads thus:           "3. The  Central Government may direct that all or      any of  the provisions  of this  Act shall not apply to      any particular  building or rented land or any class of      buildings or rented lands."      The notification  dated January  31, 1973 and the other notifications modifying it are already set out above. 439      Several contentions  have been  urged on  behalf of the petitioners in  support of their case. Their first attack is directed against  section 3  of the  Act itself. It is urged that  the   said  section   which  authorises   the  Central Government  to   issue   notifications   exempting   certain buildings or  class of  buildings suffers  from the  vice of excessive delegation  of legislative  power. This contention need not  detain us  long because  of the  decision in  P.J. Irani v.  The State  of Madras(1) in which section 13 of the Madras Buildings  (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 (Madras Act XXV of 1949) which read as:           "Notwithstanding anything  contained in  this  Act      the State  Government may by a notification in the Fort

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    St. George  Gazette exempt  any building  or  class  of      buildings from  all or  any of  the provisions  of this      Act," was upheld by a Constitution Bench of this Court. This Court did not  also notice  any infirmity  in section  3(2) of the Madhya Pradesh  Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (41 of 1961) which read as:           "The Government  may, by  notification exempt from      all  or   any  of   the  provisions  of  this  Act  any      accommodation  which   is  owned   by  any  educational      religious or  charitable institution  or by any nursing      or maternity home, the whole of the income derived from      which is  utilised for that institution or nursing home      or maternity home." while deciding  the case  of  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  v. Kanhaiyalal.(2) In  fact the  very section i.e. section 3 of the Act  has been  held by this Court not to suffer from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power (See Sadhu Singh v.  The District Board, Gurdaspur & Anr.(3) It is also held in that case that section 3 is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. This contention, therefore, fails.      The next  contention is  that the  exemption granted by the notification  in these  cases being outside the scope of the object  and policy  of the  Act and  at  the  same  time discriminatory is  liable to  be struck  down. The  argument proceeds on  the assumption that the policy and object of an Act can be gathered only from its preamble 440 and the provisions contained therein and that in the instant case since  the preamble  of the Act stated that it had been enacted to restrict the increase of rent of certain premises situated within  the limits  of urban areas and the eviction of tenants therefrom and the Act has made provision only for those  purposes  mentioned  in  the  preamble,  the  Central Government which  is only a delegate of the Parliament could not exempt  totally certain new buildings from the operation of  the   Act,  thus  enabling  greedy  landlord  to  charge excessive rents and to evict at their sweet will the tenants who did not submit to their wishes. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the administration of the Union Territory of Chandigarh  it is  pleaded that the object of issuing the notification is  to encourage  construction of new buildings in the  urban area  of Chandigarh  so that  as the supply of housing accommodation  increased, the pressure on the tenant as a class may decrease.      The preamble  and the  provisions of a statute no doubt assist the  Court in  finding out  its object and policy but its object  and policy  need not always be strictly confined to its  preamble and  the provisions  contained therein. The object and  policy of the Act which is now before us appears to be  slightly wider than some of the key provisions of the Act  namely   fixation  of   fair  rent  and  prevention  of unreasonable eviction  of  tenants.  The  acute  problem  of shortage of  urban housing  as we  all  know  has  become  a permanent feature  throughout India. It is on account of the shortage of  the  number  of  houses  in  urban  areas,  the landlords get  an opportunity  to exploit tenants who are in need of  housing accommodation  by compelling  them to enter into unconscionable  bargains. The  Act is  passed as one of the measures  taken to  mitigate the  hardship caused to the tenants. The  policy and  object of  the  Act  generally  is mitigation of  the hardship  of tenants. Such mitigation can be attained  by several measures, one of them being creation of incentive  to persons  with  capital  who  are  otherwise reluctant to  invest in the construction of new buildings in

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view of  the chilling  effect of the rent control laws. As a part of  the said scheme in order to persuade them to invest in the construction of new buildings exemption is granted to them from  the operation  of the  Act for  a short period of five years so that whatever may be the hardship for the time being to the tenants of the new buildings, the new buildings so constructed  may  after  the  expiry  of  the  period  of exemption be available for the pool of housing accommodation controlled by  the Act.  The impugned  notification is  not, therefore, ultra  vires section  3 of the Act as in its true effect, 441 it advances the scheme, object and purposes of the Act which are  articulated   in  the   preamble  and  the  substantive provisions  of  the  Act.  Moreover  the  classification  of buildings into  exempted buildings  and unexempted buildings brought  about   by  the   notification  bears  a  just  and reasonable nexus  to the  object to  be achieved  namely the creation of  additional housing  accommodation to  meet  the growing needs of persons who have no accommodation to reside or to  carry on  business and  it cannot  be  considered  as discriminatory or  arbitrary or  unreasonable in view of the shortness of  the period  of exemption available in the case of each  exempted building.  The  exemption  granted  for  a period of  five years  only serves as an incentive as stated above and  does not  create a class of landlords who are for ever kept  outside the  scope of  the Act.  The notification tries to  balance the  interests of the landlords on the one hand and of the tenants on the other in a reasonable way. We do not,  therefore,  agree  with  the  submission  that  the notification either  falls outside  the object and policy of the statute or is discriminatory.      The next  submission made  on behalf of the petitioners is that  the notification  dated January  31, 1973  and  the other  subsequent   notifications  issued   by   the   Chief Commissioner  are  of  no  effect  since  according  to  the petitioners, the  power to  issue such  notifications  under section 3  of the  Act  can  be  exercised  by  the  Central Government only. On behalf of the respondents i.e. the Union of India  and the  administration of  the Union Territory of Chandigarh, it is urged that although the Central Government is vested  with the power to issue orders under section 3 of the Act, the said power can be exercised concurrently by the Chief Commissioner of the Union Territory of Chandigarh also by virtue  of Article  239(1) of  the Constitution read with the notification  issued by the President there-under and of the definition  of the expression ’Central Government’ given in section 3(8) of General Clauses Act, 1897.      Clause (1)  of Article  239 of  the Constitution  reads thus:           "239. (1) Save as otherwise provided by Parliament      by law,  every Union territory shall be administered by      the President  acting, to such extent as he thinks fit,      through an  administrator to  be appointed  by him with      such designation as he may specify."      The administrator  of the Union Territory of Chandigarh is called  the  Chief  Commissioner.  Under  a  notification issued on 442 November 1,  1966,  the  President  has  directed  that  the administrator (the  Chief Commissioner) shall in relation to the Union  Territory of  Chandigarh exercise  and  discharge with effect  from November  1, 1966 the powers and functions of the  State Government  under any law which is extended to the Union  Territory of  Chandigarh. The  Act is a State law

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which is  so extended  to the  Union Territory  through  the Extension Act  which is  only a corollary to sections 87, 88 and 89 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966. It is further seen that section 3 (8) (b) (iii) of the General Clauses Act defines   ’Central    Government’   in   relation   to   the administration  of   a  Union  Territory  as  including  the administrator  thereof   acting  within  the  scope  of  the authority  given   to  him   under  Article   239   of   the Constitution. The  Union of  India which is a party to these proceedings does  not dispute  the authority  of  the  Chief Commissioner to  issue the  notifications referred to above. In Uttam  Bala Ravankar  v. Asstt.  Collector of  Customs  & Central Excise, Goa & Anr.(1) this Court has applied section 3(8) of  the General  Clauses Act  to uphold  a notification issued by  the Lt.  Governor of  Goa,  Daman  and  Diu  (the administrator of  the Union  Territory) where  the power  to issue it was exercisable by the Central Government. Moreover section  4  of  the  Extension  Act  clearly  validates  the notifications which  had been  issued or  purported to  have been issued  under the  Act before the date of the Extension Act by  declaring that  they shall  be deemed  to valid  and effective. We  do not,  therefore, find  any merit  in  this contention too.      We shall  next  deal  with  the  question  whether  the notification  issued   under  section   3  of  the  Act  has retrospective effect.  This question affects those buildings which were  constructed in the sense that they satisfied the criteria applicable  to them  prior  to  the  issue  of  the notification. It  is urged  on behalf of the tenants of such buildings that  the notification  is only prospective in its operation and  the benefit  of the  exemption accorded by it cannot be  claimed by  the landlords  of such buildings. The stand of  the  administration  of  the  Union  Territory  of Chandigarh is  also the  same. The submission made on behalf of the  Chandigarh administration  is that the notifications take within their sweep only such buildings as are completed in the sense fulfilling the criteria laid down therein after the notifications  were brought into force. The landlords of certain buildings,  however, claim  that all buildings which were given 443 sewerage connection  within  five  years  prior  to  January 31,1973 or buildings to which such sewerage connection could not be given but which were given electric connection within five years  prior to  January 31,1973  or in  any other case buildings which  were occupied  within five  years prior  to January 31,1973  should  also  be  treated  as  having  been exempted from  the operation of the Act for a period of five years from  the respective dates applicable to them In other words, it  is urged  by them  that all  the buildings  which satisfied any  of the  above conditions  on or after January 31,1968 would be entitled to the exemption in question for a period of  five years.  It is further contended by them that any decree  for eviction that may have been obtained by them in respect  of such  buildings  in  civil  courts  in  suits instituted by them during the period of such exemption would be executable  notwithstanding the  provisions contained  in Section 13 of the Act.      All laws  which  affect  substantive  rights  generally operate prospectively  and there  is a  presumption  against their retrospectivity  if  they  affect  vested  rights  and obligations unless  the  legislative  intent  is  clear  and compulsive. Such  retrospective effect  may be  given  where there are express words giving retrospective effect or where the   language    used   necessarily   implies   that   such

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retrospective operation  is  intended.  Hence  the  question whether a  statutory provision  has retrospective  effect or not depends  primarily  on  the  language  in  which  it  is couched. If  the language  is clear  and unambiguous  effect will have  to be  given to  the  provision  in  question  in accordance with its tenor. If the language is not clear then the Court  has  to  decide  whether  in  the  light  of  the surrounding circumstances  retrospective  effect  should  be given to it or not.      In these  cases  the  document  which  has  got  to  be construed is  a notification  issued under  section 3 of the Act by  the Chief Commissioner who is only a delegate of the Legislature. It is to be noted that there is no dispute that as soon  as the  Act came into force on November 4, 1972 all the buildings  which had been constructed prior to that date came within  the scope  of the  Act. The Act also applied to all the  buildings which  were  constructed  thereafter  and before January  31, 1973  on which date the notification was issued. The  point for consideration is whether on the issue of the notification on January 31, 1973 any such building to which the Act already applied was taken out of the operation of the  Act. A  reading of the notification does not clearly indicate that the Chief 444 Commissioner intended  to grant  exemption in respect of any of the  buildings constructed  prior to  January  31,  1973. While the  words ’buildings constructed in the urban area of Chandigarh for  a period  of five years with effect from the date the  sewerage connection is granted’ which are found in the  notification  refer  to  all  the  buildings  to  which sewerage  connection  is  granted  after  the  date  of  the notification, they  do  not  necessarily  mean  and  include buildings which  had been  given sewerage  connection within five years  prior to that date. There was also no compelling reason for  giving exemption  to buildings which had already been constructed  as the  object of issuing the notification as mentioned  earlier was  only to encourage construction of new buildings  thereafter and not to take away the statutory protection already  extended to  the  tenants  of  buildings which had come into existence prior to January 31, 1973. The landlords of  these buildings have, however, relied upon the decision  of   this  Court   in  Om  Prakash  Gupta  v.  Dig Vajendrapal Gupta(1) in support of their contention. In that case, the  Court had  to construe  the  provisions  of  sub- section (2)  of  section  2  of  the  U.P.  Urban  Buildings (Regulation of  Letting, Rent  and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act 13 of 1972), the relevant part of which read thus:      "Except as  provided in  sub-section (5) of section 12,      sub-section (1-A)  of section  21, sub-section  (2)  of      section 24,  sections 24-A,  24-B, 24-C  or sub-section      (3) of section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a      building during  a period of ten years from the date on      which its construction is completed:           xxx                 xxx                  xxx      Explanation 1.-For  the purposes  of this sub-section,-      (a) the  construction of  a building shall be deemed to      have been completed on the date on which the completion      thereof is  reported to  or otherwise  recorded by  the      local authority having jurisdiction, and in the case of      a building subject to assessment, the date on which the      first assessment  thereof comes  into effect, and where      the said  dates are different, the earliest of the said      dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or      assessment, the  date on  which it is actually occupied      (not including  occupation merely  for the  purposes of

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    supervising the 445      construction   or    guarding   the    building   under      construction) for the first time."      In the  above case,  the Court  held that the aforesaid provision had  retrospective effect and applied to buildings constructed prior  to the  date on  which the  said Act came into force  provided they satisfied the conditions mentioned therein.      The above provision appears as part of section 2 of the U.P. Act  referred to above which exempted many existing and future buildings  which satisfied the conditions referred to in clauses  (a) to  (f) of  sub-section (1), sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) thereof. The said exemption was given by the statute  itself. It  may be  stated  here  that  at  the instance of one of the parties to the Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.  3573 of  1979 (Suresh  Chand v.  Gulam  Chisti) which was  disposed of by the same judgment, a review of the above judgment  has been  granted and  by an  order made  on October 7, 1983 the case is directed to be reheard. Moreover on the  construction of  the above  provision, there are two earlier decisions-one  in Ratan  Lal Shinghal  v. Smt. Murti Devi(1) decided  on August 21, 1979 in which it is held that the said  provision has  no retrospective effect but is only prospective in  operation and another in Shri Ram Saroop Rai v. Smt.  Lilavati(2) decided  on May  7,  1980  in  which  a contrary view  is taken.  Section 2  of the  said  U.P.  Act requires to  be  considered  in  the  setting  in  which  it appears. We  are of  the view  that  any  decision  on  that provision has to be confined to that provision and cannot be extended to the present case by analogy.      There is  one other  distinction which  is sought to be made between an exemption granted by a notification which is issued by  a delegate  of the  Legislature who  is not given power by  the Legislature  to issue  a  notification  having retrospective  effect   and  an  exemption  granted  by  the Legislature itself  on the basis of the observations made in Strawboard Manufacturing  Co. Ltd.  v.  Gupta  Mill  Workers Union, Dr.  Indramani Pyarelal  Gupta v.  W. R. Nathu & Ors. and Income-tax Officer, Alleppey v. M.C. Ponnoose & Ors. 446      It is  not necessary  to deal  with the above point any further since  we are  of the  view  that  the  notification impugned in these cases stands by itself and it is not to be construed in  the background  of the provisions of section 2 of the U.P. Act referred to above.      On a careful consideration of the question we feel that the benefit  of  the  notification  cannot  be  extended  to buildings  which  were  given  the  sewerage  connection  or electric connection  or which were occupied, as the case may be, prior  to January 31, 1973. Those buildings are governed by the  provisions of  the Act  and any  decrees  passed  in respect of  them are  governed by section 13 of the Act. The notification applies only to those buildings which are given sewerage connection  or electric  connection  or  which  are occupied, as the case may be, on or after January 31, 1973.      In the  result we declare that section 3 of the Act and the notification  dated  January  31,  1973  and  the  other notifications  impugned   in  these   cases  are  valid  and effective. We  further declare that the exemption granted by the notification  dated January  31, 1973  applies  only  to those buildings  which  are  given  sewerage  connection  or electric connection  or which  are occupied, as the case may be, on  or after January 31, 1973 and not to those buildings which satisfied  any of  the said  conditions before January

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31, 1973.      The petitions are accordingly disposed of. No costs. H.S.K.                                  Petitions dismissed. 447