http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  5761 of 2007

PETITIONER: M/s Nopany Investments (P) Ltd

RESPONDENT: Santokh Singh (HUF)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/12/2007

BENCH: Tarun Chatterjee & P.Sathasivam

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

CIVIL APPEAL NO 5761 OF 2007 [Arising out of SLP [C] No. 9963 of 2007]

TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.

1.      Leave granted.

2.      This appeal has been preferred before us, assailing the judgment  and decree dated 19th of April, 2007, passed by the High Court of  Delhi, whereby, the High Court had dismissed the appeal of the  appellant, thereby affirming the judgments of the courts below  decreeing the eviction suit filed at the instance of the respondent  against the appellant.   3.      The facts leading to the filing of this appeal may be stated as  follows. 4.      On 16th of July, 1980, the appellant entered into a lease with Dr.  Santokh Singh HUF for a period of 4 years, with respect to the  property situated at N-112, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi (for short  "the suit premises"), at a monthly rent of Rs. 3500/-. Accordingly, at  the expiry of the afore said period of 4 years, a notice of eviction  dated 5th of April, 1984 was issued which was followed by filing an  Eviction petition No. 432 of 1984 before the Additional Rent  Controller by Jasraj Singh, claiming himself to be the Karta of Dr.  Santokh Singh HUF. The Additional Rent Controller passed an order  directing the appellant for payment of rent at the rate of Rs. 3500/-.  After coming into force of Section 6A of the Delhi Rent Control Act,  a notice dated 9th of January, 1992 was sent by Jasraj Singh, in the  above capacity, to the appellant for enhancement of rent by 10 percent  and also termination of tenancy of the appellant. In reply to this  notice, the appellant denied the right of the respondent to enhance the  rent. Another notice dated 31st of March 1992 was sent afresh by the  respondent notifying the appellant that the rent stood enhanced by 10  percent while the tenancy stood terminated w.e.f. 16/17th of July,  1992. The aforesaid eviction petition No. 432 of 1984 was withdrawn  on 20th of August, 1992 by Jasraj Singh. Thereafter, a notice dated 3rd  of September, 1992 was sent by Jasraj Singh asking the appellant to  vacate the suit property to which the appellant did not concede and  refused to vacate the same by a reply dated 24th of September, 1992.  On 6th of February, 1993, Dr. Santokh Singh HUF, through Jasraj  Singh, claiming himself to be the Karta of the HUF, instituted a suit  seeking eviction of the appellant from the suit premises. The trial  court decreed the respondent’s suit for possession, against which an  appeal was preferred before the Additional District Judge, Delhi. The  first appellate court dismissed the appeal summarily. Against this  order of the first appellate court, a second appeal, being R.S.A. No.  146 of 2003, was preferred before the High Court of Delhi, which  remanded the matter to the first appellate court for fresh

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

consideration. In pursuance of this direction of the High Court, the  first appellate court, after fresh consideration of the matter, affirmed  the judgment passed by the Trial court thereby dismissing the appeal  of the appellant herein. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the  order of the first appellate court, the appellant preferred a second  appeal, being R.S.A. No. 209 of 2005, before the High Court of Delhi,  which, however, was also dismissed.   It is this decision of the High  Court of Delhi, which is impugned in this appeal and in respect of  which leave has already been granted.  5.      The pivotal questions, inter alia, in the facts and circumstances  of this case, which warrant our determination are as follows:  (i)     Whether Jasraj Singh could file the suit for eviction, in the  capacity of the Karta of Dr. Santokh Singh HUF, when,  admittedly, an elder member of the aforesaid HUF was  alive ?  (ii)    Whether the High Court was right in concluding that the  first appellate court had duly dealt with all the issues  involved and re-appreciated evidence as provided under  O.41 R.31 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short "the  CPC") ? (iii)   Whether the contractual tenancy between the landlord  and tenant came to an end merely by filing an Eviction  Petition and whether the landlord could seek  enhancement of rent simultaneously or post termination  of tenancy ? (iv)    Whether the landlord could issue a notice under Section  6A of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (in short "the  Act") for increase of rent without seeking leave of the  rent controller during the pendency of an order under  Section 15 of the Act directing the tenant to deposit rent  on a month to month basis ? 6.      We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. As regards  the first issue, as noted hereinabove, the learned senior counsel Mr.  Gupta appearing on behalf of the appellant had questioned the  maintainability of the suit filed at the instance of Jasraj Singh,  claiming himself to be the Karta of Dr. Santokh Singh HUF. The  learned counsel Mr. Gupta strongly argued before us that in view of  the settled principal of law that the junior member in a joint family  cannot deal with the joint family property as Karta so long as the elder  brother is available, the respondent herein, who is admittedly a junior  member of the family, could not have instituted the eviction suit,  claiming himself to be the Karta of the family. In support of this  argument, the learned senior counsel Mr. Gupta has placed reliance on  the decisions of this court in Sunil Kumar and another Vs. Ram  Prakash and others [(1988) 2 SCC 77] and Tribhovan Das Haribhai  Tamboli Vs. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and others [(1991) 3 SCC  442]. Before we look at the views expressed by the High Court on this  question, it would be pertinent to note the ratios of the two authorities  cited before us. In Sunil Kumar and another Vs. Ram Prakash and  others [supra], this court held as follows: - "In a Hindu family, the Karta or Manager  occupies a unique position. It is not as if anybody  could become Manager of a joint Hindu family.  As a general rule, the father of a family, if alive,  and in his absence the senior member of the  family, is alone entitled to manage the joint  family property."

From a reading of the aforesaid observation of this court in Sunil  Kumar and another Vs. Ram Prakash and others [supra], we are  unable to accept that a younger brother of a joint hindu family would  not at all be entitled to manage the joint family property as the Karta  of the family. This decision only lays down a general rule that the  father of a family, if alive, and in his absence the senior member of  the family would be entitled to manage the joint family property.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

Apart from that, this decision was rendered on the question whether a  suit for permanent injunction, filed by co-parcerners for restraining  the Karta of a joint hindu family from alienating the joint family  property in pursuance of a sale agreement with a third party, was  maintainable or not. While considering that aspect of the matter, this  court considered as to when could the alienation of joint family  property by the Karta be permitted. Accordingly, it is difficult for us  to agree with Mr. Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for the  appellant, that the decision in Sunil Kumar and another Vs. Ram  Prakash and others [supra] would be applicable in the present case  which, in our view, does not at all hold that when the elder member of  a joint hindu family is alive, the younger member would not at all be  entitled to act as a manager or Karta of the joint family property.     In Tribhovandas’s case [supra], this court held as follows: "The managership of the joint family property  goes to a person by birth and is regulated by  seniority and the karta or the manager occupies a  position superior to that of the other members. A  junior member cannot, therefore, deal with the  joint family property as manager so long as the  karta is available except where the karta  relinquishes his right expressly or by necessary  implication or in the absence of the manager in  exceptional and extraordinary circumstances such  as distress or calamity affecting the whole family  and for supporting the family or in the absence of  the father whose whereabouts were not known or  who was away in remote place due to compelling  circumstances and that his return within the  reasonable time was unlikely or not  anticipated."(Emphasis supplied)  From a careful reading of the observation of this court in  Tribhovandas’s case [supra], it would be evident that a younger  member of the joint hindu family can deal with the joint family  property as manager in the following circumstances: -  (i)     if the senior member or the Karta is not available; (ii)    where the Karta relinquishes his right expressly or by  necessary implication; (iii)   in the absence of the manager in exceptional and extra  ordinary circumstances such as distress or calamity  affecting the whole family and for supporting the  family; (iv)    in the absence of the father: - (a)     whose whereabouts were not known or (b)     who was away in a remote place due to compelling  circumstances and his return within a reasonable  time was unlikely or not anticipated. Therefore, in Tribhovandas’s case [supra], it has been made clear that  under the aforesaid circumstances, a junior member of the joint hindu  family can deal with the joint family property as manager or act as the  Karta of the same.  7.      From the above observations of this court in the aforesaid two  decisions, we can come to this conclusion that it is usually the Father  of the family, if he is alive, and in his absence the senior member of  the family, who is entitled to manage the joint family property. In  order to satisfy ourselves whether the conditions enumerated in  Tribhovandas’s case [supra] have been satisfied in the present case,  we may note the findings arrived at by the High Court, which are as  follows: - (i)     Jasraj Singh, in his cross examination before the trial court had  explained that his eldest brother Dhuman Raj Singh (supposed to be  the Karta of the HUF) has been living in United Kingdom for a long  time. Therefore, the trial court had rightly presumed that Dhuman Raj  Singh was not in a position to discharge his duties as Karta of the  HUF, due to his absence from the country.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

(ii)     The respondent produced the Xerox copy of the power of  attorney given by Dhuman Raj Singh to Jasraj Singh.  (iii)   The trial court relied upon the law discussed in the books  namely, "Principles of Hindu Law" by Mulla and Mulla and "Shri  S.V. Gupta on Hindu Law", wherein it has been observed that  ordinarily, the right to act as the Karta of HUF is vested in the senior- most male member but in his absence, the junior members can also act  as Karta.(Emphasis supplied) (iv)    There was no protest by any member of the joint hindu family  to the filing of the suit by Jasraj Singh claiming himself to be the  Karta of the HUF. There was also no whisper or protest by Dhuman  Raj Singh against the acting of Jasraj Singh as the Karta of the HUF.  It may also be noted that the High Court relied on the decision of this  court in Narendrakumar J. Modi Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax,  Gujarat II, Ahmedabad [(AIR) 1976 SC 1953], wherein it was held  that so long as the members of a family remain undivided, the senior  member of the family is entitled to manage the family  properties\005\005\005and is presumed to be manager until contrary is  shown, but the senior member may give up his right of management,  and a junior member may be appointed manager. Another decision in  Mohinder Prasad Jain Vs. Manohar Lal Jain [2006 II AD (SC)  520], was also relied upon by the High Court wherein it has been held  at paragraph 10 as follows: "10. A suit filed by a co-owner, thus, is  maintainable in law. It is not necessary for the co- owner to show before initiating the eviction  proceeding before the Rent Controller that he had  taken option or consent of the other co-owners.  However, in the event, a co-owner objects thereto,  the same may be a relevant fact. In the instant  case, nothing has been brought on record to show  that the co-owners of the respondent had objected  to eviction proceedings initiated by the respondent  herein."

Having relied on the aforesaid decisions of this Court and a catena of  other decisions and the findings arrived at by it, as noted hereinabove,  the High Court rejected the argument of the appellant that Jasraj Singh  could not have acted as the Karta of the family as his elder brother,  namely, Dhuman Raj Singh, being the senior most member of the  HUF, was alive. In view of our discussions made herein earlier and  considering the principles laid down in Tribhovandas’s case [supra]  and Sunil Kumar’s case [supra], we neither find any infirmity nor do  we find any reason to differ with the findings arrived at by the High  Court in the impugned judgment.  It is true that in view of the  decisions of this court in Sunil Kumar’s case [supra] and  Tribhovandas’s case [supra], it is only in exceptional circumstances,  as noted herein earlier, that a junior member can act as the Karta of  the family. But we venture to mention here that Dhuman Raj Singh,  the senior member of the HUF, admittedly, has been staying  permanently in the United Kingdom for a long time. In  Tribhovandas’s case [supra] itself, it was held that if the Karta of the  HUF was away in a remote place, (in this case in a foreign country)  and his return within a reasonable time was unlikely, a junior member  could act as the Karta of the family. In the present case, the elder  brother Dhuman Raj Singh, who is permanently staying in United  Kingdom was/is not in a position to handle the joint family property  for which reason he has himself executed a power of attorney in  favour of Jasraj Singh. Furthermore, there has been no protest, either  by Dhuman Raj Singh or by any member of the HUF to the filing of  the suit by Jasraj Singh. That apart, in our view, it would not be open  to the tenant to raise the question of maintainability of the suit at the  instance of Jasraj Singh as we find from the record that Jasraj Singh  has all along been realizing the rent from the tenant and for this  reason, the tenant is now estopped from raising any such question. In

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

view of the discussions made herein above, we are, therefore, of the  view that the High Court was fully justified in holding that the suit  was maintainable at the instance of Jasraj Singh, claiming himself to  be the Karta of the HUF.  8.      This takes us to the next issue namely, whether the High Court  was right in concluding that the first appellate court had duly dealt  with all the issues involved and re-appreciated the evidence as  provided under O.41 R.31 of the CPC. The learned senior counsel for  the appellant Mr. Gupta sought to argue that the High Court had erred  in holding that the first appellate court had acted in due compliance  with O.41 of the CPC. It may be noted that the High Court, while  concluding as aforesaid, came to the following findings: - 1)      The first appellate court has passed a speaking order and it is  apparent that it has applied its mind. 2)      The First appellate court had to deal with the arguments which  were advanced before it. It had rightly given the short shrift to all  those arguments which did not inject some coherence. 3)      The learned counsel for the appellant had failed to point out the  issues regarding which the First Appellate court had not given its own  conclusion. 4)      The learned counsel for the appellant had also failed to show as  to how the authority cited viz., Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam  Tiwari (dead) by LRs. [AIR 2001 SC 965] was applicable to the facts  of the case.  9.      In our view, it is difficult for us to set aside the findings of the  High Court on the question whether the first appellate court, while  deciding the questions of fact and law, had complied with the  requirements under O.41 of the CPC. We are in agreement with the  findings of the High Court as on a perusal of the judgment of the first  appellate court, it does not appear to us that the findings arrived at by  the first appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court on  any issue were either very cryptic or based on non-consideration of  the arguments advanced by the parties before it. In support of this  contention, before the High Court, the appellant had relied on a  decision of this court in the case of Santosh Hazari [supra], but in this  appeal, the learned senior counsel for the appellant Mr. Gupta has  strongly relied on a decision of this court in the case of Madhukar  &  Ors. Vs. Sangram & Ors. [(2001) 4 SCC 756] and contended that  since the judgment of the first appellate court was cryptic in nature  and the first appellate court had not dealt with the issues involved in  the appeal, the same was liable to be set aside and the matter was  liable to be sent back to the first appellate court for rehearing. We are  unable to accept this contention of the learned senior counsel for the  appellant. Before we consider the findings of the first appellate court  as well as the High Court on this issue, we must keep on record that in  Madhukar & Ors. Vs. Sangram & Ors. [supra], this court had to  reverse the findings of the High Court because the High Court erred in  allowing the plaintiff/respondents first appeal without even  considering the grounds on which the trial court had dismissed the suit  and without discussing the evidence on record. On the same lines, the  decision of this court in Santosh Hazari’s case [supra] was based. In  our view, the aforesaid two decisions of this court are distinguishable  on facts with the present case. A perusal of the judgment of the first  appellate court after remand would clearly indicate that the same was  neither cryptic nor based on non-consideration of the issues involved  in the appeal. Apart from that, it has to be kept in mind that the  decisions of this court in Madhukar & Ors. Vs. Sangram & Ors.  [supra] and Santosh Hazari’s case [supra], were considering the  reversal of the findings of fact of the trial court. In the present case,  the first appellate court had affirmed the findings of the trial court,  which were based on total consideration of the material evidence \026  documentary and oral on record. It is well settled that in the case of  reversal, the first appellate court ought to give some reason for  reversing the findings of the trial court whereas in the case of  affirmation, the first appellate court accepts the reasons and findings

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

of the trial court. In any view of the matter, from a perusal of the  judgment of the first appellate court, it is clear that it reflects  conscious application of mind and has recorded the findings supported  by reason on all the issues arising along with the contentions put  forward by the parties. In Santosh Hazari’s case [supra], this court  observed: - "The task of an appellate court affirming the findings  of the trial court is an easier one. The appellate court  agreeing with the view of the trial court need not  restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the  reasons given by the trial court; expression of general  agreement with the reasons given by the court,  decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily  suffice." (Emphasis supplied). Again, in Madhukar & Ors. Vs. Sangram & Ors. [supra], this court  had to set aside the judgment of the High Court because the first  appellate court was singularly silent as to any discussion, either of the  documentary or the oral evidence. In addition, this court in that  decision was of the view that the findings of the first appellate court  were so cryptic that none of the relevant aspects were noticed. In this  background, this court at paragraph 8 observed as follows: - "Our careful perusal of the judgment in the first  appeal shows that it hopelessly falls short of  considerations which are expected from the court of  first appeal. We, accordingly set aside the impugned  judgment and decree of the High Court and remand  the first appeal to the High Court for its fresh  disposal in accordance with law."

In view of our discussions made hereinabove, we are, therefore,  unable to agree with the learned senior counsel for the appellant Mr.  Gupta that the High Court was not justified in holding that the  findings of the first appellate court were in compliance with O.41 of  the CPC. That apart, the learned senior counsel for the appellant Mr.  Gupta could not satisfy us or even point out the specific issues which,  in his opinion, had been left to be addressed by the first appellate  court. In view of the discussions made herein above, we are, therefore,  of the view that no ground was made out by the appellant to set aside  the judgment of the High Court on the question whether the judgment  of the first appellate court was liable to be set aside for non- compliance with the mandatory provisions of O.41 of the CPC. 10.     Let us now deal with Issue Nos. 3 and 4. Since both these issues  are interlinked, we shall deal with these two issues together. Let us  first consider whether the respondent landlord could issue a notice  under Section 6A of the Act for increase of rent when the petition for  eviction of the appellant was pending before the Additional Rent  Controller and when there had been an order to the tenant for deposit  of rent on a month to month basis under Section 15 of the Act. In our  view, the first appellate court as well as the High Court were fully  justified in holding that it was open to a landlord to increase the rent  of the suit premises by 10% after giving a notice under section 6A of  the Act. In this connection, it would be appropriate to reproduce  Section 6A of the Act which talks about revision of rent and Section 8  of the Act which contemplates notice of increase of rent. Section 6A  runs as under: - "6A. Revision of rent - Notwithstanding anything  contained in this Act, the standard rent, or, where no  standard rent is fixed under the provisions of this Act  in respect of any premises, the rent agreed upon  between the landlord and the tenant, may be  increased by ten per cent every three years".   

From a bare perusal of this provision under Section 6A of the Act, it is  evident that by this statutory provision, the standard rent and in cases

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

where no standard rent is fixed under the Act in respect of any  premises, the rent agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant,  may be increased by 10% every three years. It is, therefore, open to  the landlord under Section 6A of the Act to increase the rent agreed  upon between him and the tenant by 10 % every three years,  irrespective of the fact that an eviction proceeding is pending and an  order under Section 15 of the Act has been passed by the Additional  Rent Controller except that when a land lord wishes to so increase the  rent of any premises, a notice of increase of rent, as provided under  Section 8 of the Act, has to be served on the tenant thereby intimating  the tenant his intention to make the increase. Section 8 of the Act runs  as under: - "Notice of increase of rent \026 (1) Where a landlord  wishes to increase the rent of any premises, he shall  give the tenant notice of his intention to make the  increase and in so far as such increase is lawful under  this Act, it shall be due and recoverable only in respect  of the period of the tenancy after the expiry of thirty  days from the date on which the notice is given.

(2) Every notice under sub-section (1) shall be in  writing signed by or on behalf of the landlord and given  in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of  Property Act, 1982 (4 of 1882)."

Therefore, if the landlord wishes to increase the rent of any premises  at any time, only a notice expressing his intention to make such  increase is required to be given to the tenant and Section 6A of the  Act, as noted herein earlier, clearly permits the landlord to increase  the rent by 10% every three years. In this view of the matter, after the  completion of three years, it was open to the landlord at any point  even during the pendency of an eviction petition to increase the rent of  the suit premises after giving the prescribed notice to the tenant. 11.     At this stage, we may also consider Section 3(c) of the Act,  which bars the application of the Act to the premises whose monthly  rent exceeds Rs. 3500/-. Section 3(c) of the Act runs as under:- "Act not to apply to certain premises \026 Nothing in  this Act shall apply \026  (a)     \005\005\005\005\005\005.. (b)     \005\005\005\005\005\005.. (c)     to any premises, whether residential or not,  whose monthly rent exceeds three thousand and five  hundred rupees;"

The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was amended by Act No. 52 of  1988, which came into effect from 1st of December, 1988. By this  amendment of the 1958 Act on 1st of December, 1988, Section 3(c)  with other amendments was brought into force. Section 3(c) of the  amended act provides that the provisions of the Act will not apply to  any premises whose monthly rent exceeds Rs. 3500/- from the date of  coming into operation of this act. In D.C. Bhatia and others Vs.  Union of India and another [(1995) 1SCC 104], while considering  the parent act and the amending act, this court held that the objects of  the amending act are quite different from the objects of the parent act.  It observed that one of the objects of the amending act was to  rationalize the rent control law by bringing about a balance between  the interest of landlords and tenants. It was also observed that the  object was not merely to protect the weaker section of the community.  The Rent Act had brought to a halt house-building activity for letting  out. This court also made an observation that many people with  accommodation to spare did not let out the accommodation for the  fear of losing the accommodation. As a result of all these, there was  acute shortage of accommodation which caused hardship to the rich  and the poor alike and that in the background of this experience, the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

amending act of 1988 was passed. In paragraph 28 of the aforesaid  decision in D.C. Bhatia’s case [supra], this court observed as follows:  - "In order to strike a balance between the interests  of the landlords and also the tenants and for giving  a boost to house-building activity, the legislature  in its wisdom has decided to restrict the protection  of the Rent Act only to those premises for which  rent is payable up to the sum of Rs 3500 per month  and has decided not to extend this statutory  protection to the premises constructed on or after  the date of coming into operation of the Amending  Act for a period of ten years. This is a matter of  legislative policy. The legislature could have  repealed the Rent Act altogether. It can also repeal  it step by step. It has decided to confine the  statutory protection to the existing tenancies whose  monthly rent did not exceed Rs 3500."

Considering the aforesaid reasons which led to the amending act of  1988, it is clear that the legislature intended to strike a balance by  allowing the landlords to evict a tenant, who could pay more than Rs.  3500/- per month, from the tenanted premises.  12.     In the present case, after serving a notice under Section 6A read  with Section 8 of the Act, the protection of the tenant under the Act  automatically ceased to exist as the rent of the tenanted premises  exceeded Rs. 3500/- and the bar of Section 3(c) came into play. At the  risk of repetition, since, in the present case, the increase of rent by  10% on the rent agreed upon between the appellant and the  respondent brought the suit premises out of the purview of the Act in  view of Section 3(c) of the Act, it was not necessary to take leave of  the rent controller and the suit, as noted herein above, could be filed  by the landlord under the general law. The landlord was only required  to serve a notice on the tenant expressing his intention to make such  increase. When the eviction petition was pending before the  Additional Rent Controller and the order passed by him under Section  15 of the Act directing the appellant to deposit rent at the rate of Rs.  3500/- was also subsisting, the notice dated 9th of January, 1992 was  sent by the respondent to the appellant intimating him that he wished  to increase the rent by 10 percent. Subsequent to this notice, another  notice dated 31st of March, 1992 was sent by the respondent  intimating the appellant that by virtue of the notice dated 9th of  January, 1992 and in view of Section 6A of the Act, the rent stood  enhanced by 10 percent i.e. from Rs. 3500/- to Rs. 3850/-. It is an  admitted position that the tenancy of the appellant was terminated by  a further notice dated 16/17th of July, 1992. Subsequent to this, the  eviction petition No. 432 of 1984 was withdrawn by the respondent on  20th of August, 1992 and the suit for eviction, out of which the present  appeal has arisen, was filed on 6th of February, 1993. That being the  factual position, it cannot at all be said that the suit could not be filed  without the leave of the Additional Rent Controller when, admittedly,  at the time of filing of the said suit, the eviction petition before the  Additional Rent Controller had already been withdrawn nor can it be  said that the notice of increase of rent and termination of tenancy  could not be given simultaneously, when, in fact, the notice dated  16/17th of July, 1992 was also a notice to quit and the notice intending  increase of rent in terms of Section 6A of the Act was earlier in date  than the notice dated 16/17th of July, 1992. In any view of the matter,  it is well settled that filing of an eviction suit under the general law  itself is a notice to quit on the tenant. Therefore, we have no hesitation  to hold that no notice to quit was necessary under Section 106 of the  Transfer of Property Act in order to enable the respondent to get a  decree of eviction against the appellant. This view has also been  expressed in the decision of this court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar Vs.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

Yesodai Ammal [AIR (1979) SC 1745]. 13.     Before parting with this judgment, we may deal with a decision  of this court in the case of Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. Vs.  Amrit Lal & Co. and another [(2001) 8 SCC 397] on which the  learned senior counsel for the appellant Mr. Gupta placed strong  reliance. Relying on this decision, Mr. Gupta sought to argue that the  amendment of the Act being not retrospective in operation, in view of  Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, it would not affect the pending  eviction proceeding, which would continue as if the act had not been  amended and therefore, the suit filed by the respondent for eviction  under the general law without taking leave from the Additional Rent  Controller could not be said to be maintainable. In our view, the  decision of this court in Ambalal Sarabhai’s case [supra] does not  support the appellant but it supports the respondent. In that decision,  this court held that the vested right of the landlord under the general  law continues so long it is not abridged by the protective legislation,  namely, the Rent Act, but the moment this protection is withdrawn,  the vested right of the landlord reappears which can be enforced by  him. Such being the position, we are, therefore, of the view that since  the eviction petition filed by the respondent before the Additional  Rent Controller was withdrawn and the tenancy was terminated by a  fresh notice to quit and in view of the increase of rent wished by the  landlord in compliance with Section 6A read with Section 8 of the  Act, there cannot be any difficulty to hold that the suit in fact was  maintainable under the general law. That being the position, the  decision of this court in Ambalal Sarabhai’s case [supra] can not at  all be applicable in favour of the appellant and which, in view of our  discussions made hereinabove, can only be applicable in favour of the  respondent. 14.     For the reasons aforesaid, none of the grounds urged by the  learned senior counsel for the appellant Mr. Gupta can be accepted by  us to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court.  Accordingly, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. However,  considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we grant time to  the appellant to vacate the premises in question by 29th of February,  2008 provided the appellant files an usual undertaking in this regard  in this court within a fortnight from this date. In default, it will be  open to the respondent to proceed to execute the decree for eviction of  the appellant from the suit premises in accordance with law. There  will be no order as to costs.