24 April 1997
Supreme Court
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M/S MODERN TAILORING HALL Vs SHRI H.S. VENKUSA & ORS.


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PETITIONER: M/S MODERN TAILORING HALL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI H.S. VENKUSA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       24/04/1997

BENCH: M.M. PUNCHHI, K. VENKATASWAMI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:            With C.A. Nos. 12711/96,12712-12713/96                          O R D E R      Leave was  granted in  these  appeals  limited  to  the question whether  after demolition and reconstruction of the building, the appellants-tenants have a right of re-entry.      The Karnataka  Rent Control Act, 1986 in its Section 21 (1) (h)  confers on the landlord the right to claim eviction of a  building bona fide required for his own occupation and Section   21(1)(j) confers on him the right to seek eviction to have  the  building  demolished  and  reconstructed,  but subject to  the right  of re-entry  of the tenant. These two rights are encircled with corresponding obligations inasmuch as under  the former  provision the  landlord is required to enter the  premises  himself  within  the  statutory  period failing which the tenant has a right of re-entry, and in the latter provision,  the  landlord  is  required  to  give  an undertaking so  as to  ensure observance of the terms of re- entry on  reconstruction of  the building. The present cases are such  in which  the landlord  has sought eviction of the tenants under Section 21(1)(h) of the Act on the ground that he bona  fide requires  the premises  for his  own  use  and occupation but  after  demolition  and  reconstruction.  The point arising  for consideration  is whether  the landlord’s claim was  rightly based  under Section  21(1)(h) or  was it founded under Section 21(1)(j)?      The consistent  view of  the Karnataka  High Court in a series of  decisions starting  from the  case titled as Smt. Rohinibai vs.  Vishnumurty -1980  ILR Karnataka Series Vol.1 page. 340  (D.B.) is  that the two provisions, i.e., Section 21(1)(h) and  Section 21  (1)(j) are  mutually exclusive and that demolition  and reconstruction  of a  premises  by  the landlord for  his own  use and  occupation, after getting an order of  eviction, clearly falls under Clause(h) of Section 21(1) and  not under Clause (j). It has been viewed that the plea of  the landlord for bona fide requirement, for his own use and  occupation of the  premised under Section 21(1)(h), would include  the occupation  of the premises after  making any alteration or a new construction on securing an order of eviction. This  extended meaning  was given by the Karnataka high Court  on the  basis of a decision reported in Ramnikal

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Pitambardas Mehta  Vs. Indradaman  Amratlal Sheth-  1964 98) SCR Page.1,  a decision  by a  three member  Bench  of  this Court. Identical  provisions of  the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House  Rates Control  Act, 1947 were examined and it was held  that the  demolition of  the existing building and subsequent erection of a new building were only intermediate steps in order to make the building fit of occupation by the landlord. A nitch was thus carved that till the new building was altered  or reconstructed  to the  satisfaction  of  the landlord, his  obligation   to enter the premises within the statutory provided  period got  extended. It  was also  held that   the    provisions   relating    to   demolition   and reconstruction saddled with the obligation to provide to the tenant re-entry  could not  possibly apply to the case where the  landlord   reasonably  and  bona  fidely  requires  the premises for  his own  occupation even  if he had to priorly demolish the  premises and  erect a  new building on it. And further it  was viewed that qualitatively the eviction under the provision,  such as  provided under Section 21 (1)(j) of the Act  presently in  hand, would  apply to cases where the landlord  does   not  require   the  premises  for  his  own occupation, but  requires it  for erecting a new building to be let  out to  the tenants.  Thus, it  is obvious  that the Karnataka High  Court has maintained the distinction between the  two   provisions  sharply   and  has  never  let  these provisions overlap with each other.      There is  a lone voice however made by a learned single judge of  the High  Court in  ILR 1990  Karnataka 4060 -P.K. Upadhyaya Vs. A. Venkatesh to rule that if there be with the Court an  occasion to  choose between Clauses (h) and (j) in directing eviction  of a  tenant, it  will have  to lean  in favour of  clause (j)   rather  than ordering eviction under Clause (h)  of Section  21 (10  of the  Act. This  has  been pressed into  service to  opt for  eviction under Section 21 (1)(j). this attempt of the learned Single judge to demolish the exclusivity  of the two sub-clauses (j) & (h) of Section 21 (1),  well drawn  by the Division Bench in Smt. Rohinibai Vs. Vishnumurthy  - 1980 ILR Karnataka Series Vol.1 page 340 is uncalled  for .  The ground  of eviction given in the two provisions being  mutually exclusive  have flowing therefrom separate individual  rights and  obligations and they cannot be permitted  to overlap  so as  to confer  on the Court the discretion of  employing one  provision over  the other . An application of the landlord, if not falling under section 21 (1) (h), would on its own, merit dismissal. The court cannot treat it in its discretion as one under Section 21(1)(j) and order and  unwanted eviction.  The distinction qualitatively has to be maintained. We therefore decline to take a view to the contrary,  even if it be possible, than the one taken by the High  Court based as it is on the decision of this court in Ramnikal Pitambardas Mehta Vs. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth- 1964 (8) SCR page 1.      As  a   result,  these  appeals  fail  and  are  hereby dismissed. In  passing however  it need  be added that Civil Appeal  Nos.  12712-12713/96  would  have  otherwise  to  be dismissed because sub-letting was another ground of eviction as ordered  by the  High Court  qua which leave has not been granted and that matter had been put to rest. No costs.