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PETITIONER: M/s.  KESORAM COTTON MILLS LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: GANGADHAR AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/04/1963

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1964 AIR  708            1964 SCR  (2) 809  CITATOR INFO :  R          1964 SC 719  (8)  R          1969 SC 983  (9,10)  D          1972 SC1579  (3)

ACT: Industrial  Dispute-Go slow and strike-Agreement  Suspension of  Workmen  pending inquiry-No  inquiry  held-Reference  to adjudication-If  workmen  entitled to wages  for  period  of suspension-Inquiry-Natural  Justice-No  examination-in-chief of  witnesses-Previous Statement read Copy of statement  not given to workmen-Propriety of procedure.

HEADNOTE: The appellant suspended 1600 workmen as they retorted to  go slow and illegal strikes.  On December 23, 1957, an 810 agreement  was arrived at between the workers Union and  the management  under which the workmen resumed work.  Clause  7 of  the agreement provided that the suspended workmen  shall not  be  entitled  to  any wages  or  compensation  for  the suspension period.  Clause 9 provided that 29 of the workmen shall  remain  suspended pending  inquiry  and  disciplinary action  by the management.  The management did not hold  any inquiry and had the matter referred for adjudication.   With respect to another 5 workmen, the management held an inquiry on various charges and ’dismissed them.  In the inquiry, the management  did  not examine their witnesses but  had  their previous  statements read out, and without giving copies  of those  statements  to  the workmen.  asked  them  to  cross. examine the witnesses.  The dispute arising out of the  dis- missal of these 5 workmen was also referred to adjudication. With  respect to the 29 workmen the Tribunal  permitted  the dismissal  of 9 and ordered reinstatement of  the  remaining and awarded 12 months’ wages to the dismissed workmen and 15 months’  wages  to  the reinstated workmen  for  the  period during which they remained suspended.  With respect to the 5 workmen dismissed the Tribunal held that the inquiry was not held  in accordance with the principles of  natural  justice but that the evidence produced before the Tribunal,justified the dismissal of 4 of the workmen.  The appellant  contended that  in  view  of cl. 7 of the agreement  none  of  the  29 workmen  were entitled to any compensation or wages for  the

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period  of suspension and that the inquiry with  respect  to the  5 workmen was in accordance with principles of  natural justice.  The workmen contended that all the 29 workmen were entitled to full wages for the period of suspension. Held  that cl. 7 of the agreement referred to the period  of suspension  up to the date of the agreement and not  to  the suspension  thereafter.   Ordinarily,  the  law  is  that  a workman  may be suspended pending inquiry  and  disciplinary action;  and if after the inquiry he is dismissed he is  not entitled  to any wages for the suspension period, but if  he is  reinstated lie is entitled to full wages for the  period of  suspension.   Clause (9)  envisaged  suspension  pending inquiry  and  also envisaged the  legal  consequences.   The Tribunal was accordingly justified in awarding wages for the suspension period subsequent to the date of the agreement. The Straw Board Mfg.  Co. v. Govind, [1962] Supp. 3 S. C. R. 6I8 referred to. Held,  further  that  all  the  29  suspended  workmen  were entitled to full wages from the date of the agreement up  to the  811 date  of the award.  There was no provision in the  standing orders.,  nor was there any term of service, which  entitled the  management  to  suspend a workman  without  payment  of wages.   In these circumstances there was  no  justification for  depriving  the workmen who had been ordered to  be  re- instated  and  to whom the Tribunal had  awarded  15  months wages for any period of their suspension.  The 9 workmen who had been allowed to be dismissed were also entitled to  full wages for the entire period of suspension.  Under cl. (9) of the agreement they were to remain suspended pending  inquiry and disciplinary action, but the management held no  inquiry and took no disciplinary action, but applied for the dispute to be referred to adjudication.  As the management wanted to dismiss  these  workmen  without  holding  an  inquiry,  the workmen were entitled to their full wages up to the date  of the enforcement of the award. The Management of Hotel Imperial New Delhi v. Hotel Workers’ Union,  [1960]  1  S. C. R. 476 and M/s.   Sasa  Musa  Sugar Works,  (P) Ltd. v. Shobrati Khan, [1959] Supp. 2 S.  C.  R. 836, releid on. Held  further,  that the inquiry with respect  to  the  five workmen  violated principles of natural justice.  The  rules of natural justice do not change from tribunal to  tribunal; but since their purpose is to safeguard the position of  the person  against whom an inquiry is being conducted so as  to enable  him to meet the charges against him, the  nature  of the inquiry and the status of the person charged will have a bearing  on what should be the minimum requirements  of  the rules  of  natural  justice.  In a domestic  inquiry  in  an industrial matter the proper course for the management is to examine the witnesses from beginning to end in the  presence of the workman at the inquiry itself.  In exceptional cases, a  witness  may be asked merely to  confirm  his  previously recorded  statement and then tendered for  cross-examination by  the  workman, but in such cases  the  previous  prepared statement of the witness should be given to the workman well in  advance  before  the inquiry begins at  least  two  days before. The  Union  of India v. T. R. Verma, [1958] S.  C.  R.  499, State of Mysore v. S. S. Makapur, [1963] 2 S. C. R. 943, and New  Prakash  Transport  Co. v. New  Suwarna  Transport  Co. [1957] S. C. R. 98, referred to.

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos.  425  and 426 of 1962. 812 M.   C.  Setalvad and B. P. Maheshwari, for  the  appellants (in C. A. No. 425 of 1962) and the respondents (in C. A. No. 426 of 1962). Y.   Kumar,  for the respondents (in C. A. No. 425 of  1962) and the appellants (in C.A. No. 426 of 1962). 1963.  April 4. The judgment of-the Court was delivered by WANCHOO  J.-These are two appeals by special  leave  against the same award of the First Industrial Tribunal; West Bengal and  will be dealt with together.  Appeal No. 425 is by  the employers  and  Appeal  No.  426 is  by  the  workmen.   The employers  will be referred to as the  appellant  throughout this  judgment while the workmen will be referred to as  the respondents.  There was a dispute between the appellant  and the  respondents  with respect to two  matters,  which  were referred to the tribunal for adjudication by the  Government of West Bengal in the following terms:-               (1)   To  what  relief the  suspended  workmen               whose  names  are mentioned in  list  ’A’  are               entitled ?               (2)   Whether the termination of employment of               the workmen whose names are mentioned in  list               ’B’  was  justified  ? Are  they  entitled  to               reinstatement and/or compensation ? List ’A’ consisted of 29 workmen while list ’B’ consisted of 12 workmen. The  genesis of the dispute as to the suspended workmen  was this according to the case of the  813 appellant.   The  workmen of the weaving department  of  the appellant commenced slow down from October 28, 1957 in spite of the warning given by the appellant.  On November 3, 1957, doffers  of  carding refused to work on new  machines.   The workmen  of  loose godown and folding section  started  slow down   from   October  27,  1957  and   November   4,   1957 respectively.   On  November 23, 1957, the  workmen  of  the spinning  department adopted slow down tactics and  indulged in  other  subversive activities and left  their  respective machines  in  groups  rendering the  work  in  backward  and forward processes idle.  As a result of this conduct of  the workmen for a period of about four weeks, the appellant  had to  lay-off a large number of workmen without  compensation. Then  on  December  3, 1957, the workmen of  dye  house  and printing  department went on an illegal stay-in-strike.   In the  first week of December, 1957, the workmen of blow  room and  carding went on strike.  On December 9, the strike  was commenced in the engineering department, cotton godown, bale godown,   canteen,  high  speed  winding  and   old   stores department.   In  the  circumstances the  appellant  had  to suspend  1600  workmen on charges of slow down  and  various other charges.  Thereafter negotiations were started between the union of the workmen and the management and an agreement was arrived at on December 23, 1957.  The, interpretation of some  of  the terms of the agreements is in dispute  and  we shall  refer to them in due course.  Suffice it to say  here that  by  this  agreement  the  workmen  resumed  work   and undertook not to take recourse to go-slow activities  either individually or jointly and not to take recourse to  illegal methods  and means for the achievement of their  demands  or for getting their grievances redressed.  It was also  agreed that  maintenance of discipline was of paramount  importance

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and  the  workmen as also the union at all times  would  co- operate   with   the  management   in   taking   appropriate disciplinary 814 action against the workmen for the maintenance of discipline in the factory.  The agreement however provided that  thirty workmen named in annexure ’A’ thereof would remain suspended pending  inquiry and disciplinary action by  the  appellant. The  first  term  of reference  with  respect  to  suspended workmen  is  about  the thirty workmen who  were  to  remain suspended  under the terms of the agreement of December  23, 1957. The  twelve workmen with which the second term of  reference is  concerned,  were claimed by the appellant to  have  been guilty  of  various acts of misconduct for which  they  were liable  to dismissal under the standing orders.   They  were duly chargesheeted and inquiries were held against them  and thereafter  they were dismissed according to the  provisions of  law.  As however the dismissals had taken  place  during the  pendency  of  a dispute  before  the  first  industrial tribunal  in which the appellant was a  party,  applications were  made  under s. 33 (2) (b) of the  Industrial  Disputes Act,  1947  (14 of 1947), (hereinafter ’referred to  as  the Act)  for approval of the action taken by the  appellant  in regard  to  these twelve workmen.  It seems,  however,  that before these applications could be disposed of, the  dispute before  the  tribunal was decided, with the result  that  no orders  were passed by the tribunals on these  applications. The appellant, however, claimed that the dismissal of  these workmen   was   justified   and  therefore   no   case   for reinstatement  or  compensation arose.  This  claim  of  the appellant  was disputed by the respondents and therefore  we find  this  dispute being referred for adjudication  in  the second ’term of reference. We  shall first deal with the matter relating to  suspension of  the  twenty-nine  workmen in list ’A’ to  the  order  of reference.  It may be mentioned that though in annexure  ’A’ to the agreement there were  815 thirty workmen, the reference was made only with respect  to twenty-nine, as it is said that one of the workmen out of 30 had died by the time the reference came to be made.  Further out of the 29 workmen with which the first term of reference was  concerned, the respondents gave up the case of five  of the workmen.  The tribunal therefore dealt with the case  of the  remaining  24.  These 24 workmen were  divided  by  the tribunal into five groups.  The first group consisted of two workmen,  the second group of five workmen, the third  group of 13 workmen, the fourth group of two workmen and the fifth group of two workmen.  Learned counsel for the appellant has not pressed the appeal with respect to six workmen in groups I, IV and V, and we need not therefore consider the order of the tribunal with respect to these workmen, who are  Govindo (No. 1), Bholanath (No. 8), Khageswar (No. 7), Ramjatan (No. 27),  Rampujan (No. 26) and Khetrabasi (No. 28) of list  ’A’ attached to the order of reference. As  to the five workmen in group II, namely, Gangadhar  (No. 2).   Ramchandra (go. 3), Babaji Nayak (No. 4), Pahraj  (No. 5) and Shankdardas (No. 6) of list ’A’ attached to the order of  reference,  the  tribunal ordered that  they  should  be reinstated in their jobs with effect from the date the award came into force and should be paid compensation amounting to fifteen  months’  wages in all for the period  during  which they remained suspended.  The appellant has challenged  this order of the tribunal.

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As  to  group  III, the tribunal decided that  nine  of  the thirteen  workmen should be dismissed.  As to the  remaining four  the tribunal held that they should be  reinstated-  It may be mentioned that the reason why the tribunal  proceeded to  consider whether any of the workmen in list ,A’  to  the order of reference should be dismissed was on account of the appellant’s  filing an application under s. 33 (1)  (b)  of, the Act 816 before  the  tribunal for permission to dismiss  the  twenty nine workmen.  The order of the tribunal with respect to the reinstatement  of four workmen, namely, Gulzarali (No.  18), Farid (No. 16), Din Mohd. (No. 17) and Mohd.  Islam (No. 24) of  list  ’A’ attached to the order of  reference  is  being challenged by the appellant on the ground that there was  no reason  for the tribunal to treat these four workmen out  of this  group  of 13 differently from the other  nine  as  the evidence  was  the same in all these  cases.   Finally,  the tribunal also ordered with respect to all the 24 workmen  on an  interpretation  of the agreement of December  23,  1957, that they should be paid 12 months’ wages for the period  of their  suspension irrespective of whether it was  permitting them to be dismissed or not.  This order of the tribunal  is also being attacked by the appellant. We  shall first take the case of the five workmen  in  group II.  The contention of the appellant in that behalf is  two- fold.   In  the first place it is urged that  these  workmen ’were  charged  with  adopting go-slow  tactics  by  causing spindle   stoppage   unnecessarily  and  there   was   clear documentary   evidence  to  support  this  charge  and   the tribunal’s  decision  that  there was no  proof  of  go-slow tactics  in the circumstances was perverse.  In  the  second place, it is urged that all these five workmen were  charged with other misconduct also and the tribunal did not consider the  evidence  with respect to other misconduct at  all  and gave  no  finding  thereon and so the  case  of  these  five workmen at any rate should be. remanded to the tribunal  for considering the evidence on the other charges against them. Now  the appellant relied on an extract from two  registers, Exs.   AA  and  AA-1, which had  been  produced  before  the tribunal in this connection and this extract was set out  in the  special  leave  petition.   The  respondents,  however, contended that, what was  817 set out in the special leave petition was not an extract  at all  from Exs.  AA and AA-1.  On the other hand it was  said to be a spurious document prepared to mislead this Court  at the time of the admission of the appeal and so it was  urged that  the leave should be revoked.  This extract related  to four  workmen, namely, Paharaj, Shankdardas,  Gangadhar  and Babaji,  and  was  with respect  to  spindle  stoppage  from November 10 to 23, 1957.  In view of the charge made by  the respondents,  the original registers were sent for and  have been examined by us and we have come to the conclusion  that the  extract given in the special leave petition was  not  a true copy of Exs.  AA and AA-1 as it should have been, if it was merely an extract from those registers.  The figures  of spindle  stoppage given in the extract certainly tally  with the  figures in the two registers but the registers  do  not show  the  names of the persons who were  manning  the  four machines,  the spindle stoppage of which was given  in  this extract.   It  is however urged that the names of  the  four workmen were given in the extract though they were not to be found in the registers because these workmen actually manned the  machines  on  the dates mentioned in  the  extract  and

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reference  was  made to some evidence  in  that  connection. Even  assuming that these workmen manned these  machines  we find  another  serious misrepresentation  in  this  extract. Paharaj was charge-sheeted on November 17 and was  suspended forthwith.   Therefore  he  could  not  have  worked   after November  17,  but  this extract shows as  if  he  continued working  even  after November 17 upto November  23.   It  is remarkable  that  serious spindle stoppage occurred  on  the machine  which Paharaj was said to be manning  mainly  after November 17 when it must have been manned by somebody  else. Similarly  Shankdardas was chargesheeted on November 17  and suspended  forthwith and could not have  worked  thereafter. But in his case also the extract shows as if he continued to 818 work thereafter from November 18 to 23, and the more serious spindle  stoppage  is during this period when  he  obviously could  not  have manned this machine.  Babaji   was  charge- sheeted  on November 18 and suspended forthwith.   He  could not  have therefore worked on the machine on which his  name is  shown in the extract between November 19 and 23 and  the more  serious  spindle stoppage occurred after  November  18 when  somebody  else must have been  manning  this  machine. Gangadhar was charge-sheeted on November 22 and was  suspen- ded forthwith.  In his case also the extract shows as if  he had worked on November 23.  We strongly deprecate the manner in which the extract was used in the special leave  petition to  convey a wrong impression to this Court.  But we do  not think  that  we should revoke the special leave  granted  in this case on this ground alone.  However our examination  of the  extract which we have set out above clearly shows  that the  contention  of  the appellant  that  the  tribunal  had patently misunderstood Exs.  AA and AA-1 cannot be made out. It  seems to us that the reasons given by the  tribunal  for holding that go-slow by these five workmen had not been pro- ved  cannot  be  said to be inadequate for  the  purpose  of coming to the conclusion which it did.  We may only note one reason  which is given by the tribunal and which shows  that everything  was  not all right in the appellant  company  in this  matter.  Though the charge-sheets to these workmen  of the  spinning department were given on November 17,  IS  and 22,  it is remarkable that in the written-statement  of  the appellant before the tribunal the case made out was that the workmen of the spinning department adopted slow down tactics and  indulged in other subversive activities  from  November 23, 1957.  This seems to be surprising statement to make  in the face of the charges given to these five workmen and  can only  .show that the appellant did not really know what  the correct facts were.  It is further remarkable that  819 in  the application under s. 33 (1) (b) which was made  four months after the written-statement of the appellant had been filed  the same thing was repeated and it was said that  the workers  of the spinning department adopted go-slow  tactics on November 23 and indulged in other subversive  activities. It is true that in the evidence the appellant tried to prove that  slow down tactics had started earlier ; but if in  the circumstances  the tribunal refused to believe the  evidence it cannot be said that it went wrong.  The contention of the appellant therefore that the view taken by the tribunal  was perverse  and clearly against the two registers to which  we have referred above must fail. This brings us to the other contention of the appellant with respect  to this group of workmen, namely that the  tribunal did not consider the evidence with respect to other charges. It  is true that in the last paragraph of the award  dealing

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with  these  five  workmen,  the  tribunal  said  that   the appellant  had failed to prove that these five  workmen  had adopted  go-slow tactics and did not say anything about  the other  charges.  But a perusal of the entire  discussion  by the  tribunal  with respect to this group of  workmen  shows that  it considered the oral evidence of all  the  witnesses with  respect to other charges and held that their  evidence was not worthy of acceptance, though it did not say so in so many words that that evidence was insufficient to prove  the other  charges also.  On the whole however a reading of  the discussion  of  the tribunal with respect to this  group  of workmen  convinces us that the tribunal had  considered  the entire evidence including the evidence with respect to other charges  and  did  not  consider  that  evidence  worthy  of acceptance.   The  mistake that the tribunal made  was  that when  it  recorded  its conclusion in  the  final  paragraph dealing  with this group of workmen it confined itself  only to say that go-slow tactics had not been proved and did  not say 820 anything  about  other charges.  Even so we are  of  opinion that  the consideration of the entire award of the  tribunal with  respect to this group of workmen leaves no doubt  that the  evidence on the other charges was also  considered  and was  found  unworthy  of acceptance.  We may  add  that  the reason  why the tribunal seems to have confined itself  only to  go-slow in the final paragraph is that everybody  before the tribunal was concentrating on go-slow and did not  worry to see what the other charges were.  This will be clear when we  consider  the case of some other workmen  in  group  III which  will  show that though there was  no  charge  against those  workmen of go-slow, the evidence was given about  go- slow and the tribunal also came to the conclusion that those workmen  were guilty_ of go-slow.  It seems  therefore  that nobody  worried about any other charges before the  tribunal and  that  is how the tribunal seems to  have  confined  its conclusion only to the charge of go-slow, even where no such chargesheet  was  given  to  the  workmen.   On  the  whole, however,  we  do  not think that any case is  made  out  for remand for consideration of other charges against these five workmen,  for the tribunal seems to have considered all  the evidence and did not think it worthy of acceptance.  In  the circumstances the appeal with respect to these five  workmen in group II must fail. Then we come to the four workmen in group III whose names we have  already  mentioned.  These workmen were  charged  with having  incited  on and from various dates in  October  1957 their  co-workers  to slow down work.  The  entire  evidence against these workmen was considered by the tribunal and  it did  not place any reliance on it for one main  reason.   In the  case of Gulzarali the tribunal found that there was  no written  report against him as was the case with respect  to others,  and  in the case of the other  three  the  tribunal found  that the written report which had been produced  very late  821 before it did not bear the endorsement of the weaving master as it should have done, as in the case of other such reports made by the Assistant weaving master.  In the  circumstances when  the  evidence was considered by the tribunal  and  for reasons  given  by  it no reliance was placed  upon  it,  we cannot  say  that  it  went wrong in  not  relying  on  that evidence.  The appeal of the appellant with respect to these four workmen of group III must also fail. We  now  come  to the general attack on  the  order  of  the

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tribunal  awarding 12 months wages to all the  24  suspended workmen  whose  cases  were  processed  before  it  by   the respondents.   We have in this connection to  consider  four clauses of the agreement dated December 23, 1957, which  are as below :-               I.    (b)-It  is  agreed between  the  parties               that  the charge-sheets against  such  workmen               who  are  allowed to resume duty in  terms  of               para   (1)  herein,  however,  shall  not   be               withdrawn.It   is  further  agreed  that   the               suspension   of   workmen  whose   names   are               contained  in  the annexure  A  herein,  shall               continue   and  their  respective   order   of               suspension  shall  remain  operative   pending               enquiry as laid down hereinafter.               7.    The  suspended  workmen  shall  not   be               entitled to any wages or compensation for  the               suspension  period.   The  workmen  shall  not               raise  any  dispute  or make  any  claim  with               regard  to  the suspension period  or  lay-off               period in any shape or form.               8.    Without    prejudice   to   the    other               provisions   of  this  agreement   or   claims               relating to the suspension order served on the               workmen               822               respectively  and  the lay-off  order  by  the               company  and/or all claims or issues  for  the               period   connected   with  slowing   down   of               production and disciplinary    action    taken               thereon by the company are     hereby  finally               settled  and  all workmen  are bound  by  this               agreement  and no worker shall be entitled  to               make any demand or claim in this behalf.               9.    The workers in annexure ’A’ shall remain               suspended  pending  enquiry  and  disciplinary               action by the management.  The management will               try  to reach an amicable settlement with  the               Union  regarding disciplinary action taken  or               may be taken by them against the said workmen.               If  the parties fail to reach settlement,  the               matter  will be referred to the  tribunal  for               settlement of the dispute in this behalf. The tribunal has held that cl. (7) which lays down that  the suspended  workmen  shall not be entitled to  any  wages  or compensation  for  the suspension period does not  apply  to workmen who remained suspended under cl. (9), and the reason given  by  the tribunal for this view is that cl.  (7)  only applied to those workmen who were allowed to resume duty  in the  first  clause  of  the agreement.   This  view  of  the tribunal  has  been challenged by the appellant and   it  is contended  that the seventh clause applies even  to  workmen who  remained suspended under cl. (9) and therefore in  view of   cl.  (7)  such  workmen  were  not  entitled   to   any compensation  whatsoever  for  the entire  period  of  their suspension  whether before December 23, 1957 or  thereafter. We  agree with the contention of the appellant that cl.  (7) applies  to all suspended workmen whether they went back  to work according  823 to  the first clause of the agreement or remained  suspended according to cl. (1) (b) set out above.  But as we read this agreement we are of opinion that cl. (7) read along with cl. (8) refers only to suspension upto the date of the agreement and not to suspension thereafter.  Clause (7) says that  the

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suspended  workmen shall not raise any dispute or ,make  any claim with regard to the suspension period or lay off period in  any shape or form.  This provision could only  refer  to suspension  or  lay-off  in the past; it could  not  be  the intention of the agreement, for example, that if any lay-off took  place  in future cl (7) would apply  to  it.   Further though  under  cl. (9) suspension of 30  workmen  continued, that suspension was pending enquiry and disciplinary action. We  cannot  read cl.(7)and cl. (9) together for  the  future also   unless  there  are  clear  terms  to   that   effect. Ordinarily,  the  law  is that a workman  may  be  suspended pending  enquiry  and  disciplinary action.   If  after  the enquiry  the misconduct is proved the workman  is  dismissed and is not entitled to any wages for the suspension  period; but  if  the inquiry results’ in the  reinstatement  of  the workman  he  is entitled to full wages  for  the  suspension period  also along with reinstatement, unless  the  employer instead  of  dismissing the employee can give him  a  lesser punishment  by way of withholding of part of the  wages  for the  suspension  period.  In The Straw Board  Mfg.   Co.  v. Govind  (1),  this Court was considering what  would  happen where  approval  was granted or withheld on  an  application under s. 33. (2) (b) of the Act, and it was pointed out that "’if  the tribunal does not approve of the action  taken  by the  employer, the result would be that the action taken  by him  would  fall and thereupon the workman would  be  deemed never to have been dismissed or discharged and would  remain in  the service of the employer." It follows therefore  that if a workman is fully exonerated after the inquiry, he would remain in the service of the employer and (1)  [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 618. 824 would be entitled to his full wages during the period of his suspension   also.    Therefore  when  cl.   (9)   envisages suspension  pending inquiry and disciplinary action it  also envisaged  the  consequence,  namely, that  if  the  inquiry results  in dismissal, ’the workmen would get no  wages  for the  suspension period while if the inquiry results  in  the reinstatement  of the workman he would be entitled  to  full wages  for the suspension period, if he is fully  exonerated or  to such less wages as the employer may give in case  the exoneration  is not complete and some punishment  less  than dismissal can be inflicted.  We see nothing in el. (7) which clearly  takes  away  this legal  consequence  following  an inquiry and disciplinary action, and it seems to us that cl. (7)  must be confined to the period of suspension  upto  the date  of  agreement and there is nothing in it  which  would induce us to hold that it must apply to the future also.  So far  as  the future is concerned it is cl.  (9)  which  must wholly   apply  and  that  clause  envisaged   inquiry   and disciplinary  action and the consequence  thereof  depending upon  the  inquiry going one way or the other must  also  be envisaged  by it in the absence of any provision  about  the future  in  this agreement.  If the intention was  that  the workmen  who remained suspended under cl. (9) would  get  no wages  for  the future, even if they were  fully  exonerated after  an inquiry under that clause we should have  found  a specific provision that to effect in cl. (9) itself.  We are therefore of opinion that cl. (7) refers to the period up to the  date  of the agreement including the  period  of  grace given  to  the  workmen in cl. (1) in order  to  join  their duties  and not to the future.  In this view of  the  matter the  tribunal was not unjustified in granting wages for  the suspension period after the date of this agreement to  those whom it reinstated.  The contention of the appellant in this

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behalf must fail with respect to those reinstated.  We shall consider the case of nine workmen permitted to be  dismissed when considering the appeal of the workmen,  825 Coming  now  to the second term of reference, we  find  that inquiries  were  held in the case of the five  workmen  with whom  we are concerned.  The respondents  however  contended that   the  inquiries  were  not  in  accordance  with   the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the witnesses were not  examined-in-chief  before the  inquiry  officer.   What actually  happened  at  the  inquiries  was  that  when  the witnesses   were   produced,  previously   prepared   signed statements of the witnesses were read over to them and  they were asked whether the statements were correct, and they had signed  them.  Statements were also read over and  explained to  the workmen charged and they were then asked  to  cross- examine the witnesses.  No copies of statements of witnesses were supplied to the workmen at any time.  The tribunal  has held that this procedure followed by the inquiry officer was open to objection and was against the principles of  natural justice and that the witnesses should have been examined-in- chief  in  the  presence of the  workmen  against  whom  the inquiries were going on.  The requirements of principles  of natural justice were laid down by this Court in The Union of India V. T.    R. Verma (1), where it was observed:-               "Rules of natural justice require that a party               should  have the opportunity of  adducing  all               relevant evidence on which he relies, that the               evidence  of the opponent should be  taken  in               his presence, and that he should be given  the               opportunity  of cross-examining the  witnesses               examined by that party, and that no  materials               should be relied upon against him without  his               being given an opportunity of explaining them.               If  these rules are satisfied, the enquiry  is               not  open  to attack on the  ground  that  the               procedure  laid down in the Evidence  Act  was               not strictly followed." This matter was further considered in the State of Mysore v. S. S. Makapur (2), where the (1) [1958] S.C.R. 499. (2) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 943. 826 following observations were made:-               "When  the  evidence  is  oral,  normally  the               examination   of  the  witness  will  in   its               entirety, take place before the party charged,               who  will  have  full  opportunity  of  cross-               examining him.  The position is the same  when               a  witness  is  called,  the  statement  given               previously by him behind the back of the party               is  put  to him, and admitted in  evidence,  a               copy thereof is given to the party, and he  is               given an opportunity to cross-examine him.  To               require in that case that the contents of  the               previous  statement should be repeated by  the               witness   word  by  word,  and   sentence   by               sentence, is to insist on bare technicalities,               and  rules of natural justice are matters  not               of form but of substance.  In our opinion they               arc  sufficiently complied with when  previous               statements given by witnesses are read over to               them,   marked  on  their  admission,   copies               thereof given to the person charged, and he  s               given an opportunity to cross-examine them.

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It is urged on behalf-of the appellant that rules of natural justice  are the same whether they apply to  inquries  under Art. 311 or to domestic inquiries by managements relating to misconduct  by  workmen.  It may be accepted that  rules  of natural  justice  do not change from tribunal  to  tribunal. Even  so  the  purpose of rules of  natural  justice  is  to safeguard the position of the person against whom an inquiry is  being  conducted so that he is able to meet  the  charge laid  against  him properly.  Therefore the  nature  of  the inquiry  and  the  status of the  person  against  whom  the inquiry is being held will have some bearing on what  should be the minimum requirements of the rules of natural.justice. Where, for example, lawyers are permitted before a  tribunal holding an inquiry and the party against whom the inquiry is being  827 held  is represented by a lawyer it may be possible  to  say that  a  mere  reading of the material to  be  used  in  the inquiry  may  sometimes  be  sufficient:  (see  New  Prakash Transport Co. v. New Suwarna Transport Co. (1), but where in a  domestic inquiry in an industrial matter lawyers are  not permitted, something more than a mere reading of  statements to  be used will have to be required in order  to  safeguard the interest of the industrial worker.  Further we can  take judicial  notice  of the fact that many  of  our  industrial workers    are   illiterate   and   sometimes    even    the representatives of labour union may not be present to defend them.  In such a case to read over a prepared statement in a few minutes and then ask the workmen to cross-examine  would make a mockery of the opportunity that the rules of  natural justice  require  that  the workmen should  have  to  defend themselves.   It  seems  to us therefore that  when  one  is dealing  with domestic inquiries in industrial matters,  the proper course for the management is to examine the witnesses from the beginning to the end in the presence of the workman at  the enquiry itself.  Oral examination always takes  much longer  than a mere reading of a prepared statement  of  the same length and brings home the evidence more clearly to the person  against whom the inquiry is being  held.   Generally speaking  therefore we should expect a domestic  inquiry  by the  management to be of this kind.  Even so,  we  recognise the  force of the argument on behalf of the  appellant  that the  main principles of natural justice cannot  change  from tribunal  to  tribunal and therefore it may be  possible  to have another method of conducting a domestic inquiry (though we  again  repeat that this should not be the rule  but  the exception)   and  that  is  in  the  manner  laid  down   in Shibavasappa’s  case (2).  The minimum that we  shall expect where witnesses arc not examined from the very beginning  at the  enquiry in the presence of the person charged  is  that the person charged should be given a copy of the (1) [1957] S.C.R. 98. (2) (1963) 2 S.C.R. 943. 828 statements made by the witnesses which are to be used at the inquiry  well in advance before the inquiry begins and  when we say that the copy of the statements should be given  well in advance we mean that it should be given at least two days before the inquiry is to begin.  If this is not done and yet the  witnesses  are  not  examined-in-chief  fully  at   the inquiry.,  we  do  not  think  that  it  can  be  said  that principles of natural justice which provide that the  person charged  should  have an adequate opportunity  of  defending himself are complied with in the case of a domestic  inquiry in  an industrial matter.  In the present case all that  had

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happened was that the prepared statements were read over  to the  workmen charged and they were asked then and  there  to cross-examine the witnesses.  They were naturally unable  to do  so and in the circumstances we agree with the  tribunal- though for different reasons-that the enquiry did not comply with  the principles of natural justice.  The order  of  the tribunal therefore holding that the inquiries were  vitiated by the disregard of rules of natural justice is correct.  We may  add  however  that inspite of  the  above  finding  the tribunal  permitted  termination of the service of  four  of these  five workmen and reinstated only one.  We shall  deal with this aspect of the matter further when considering  the appeal of the workmen. Turning  now to the appeal by the workmen  respondents,  the first contention raised on their behalf is that the tribunal went  completely wrong in permitting the dismissal  of  nine workmen in list ’A’ to the order of reference, namely, Hanif (No.  10), Narayan (No. 11), Khalil (No. 12),  Abdul  Subhan (No.  13),  Bhagwan  Singh (No. 15),  Ram  Ekbal  (No.  19), Mangroo  (No. 20), Satish (No. 21), and Raja Ram  (No.  22). The contention in this behalf is that these nine workmen  in group  III were charged with inciting other workers to  slow down work and that was the only charge given to them ; there was  829 no charge of go-slow by these nine workmen themselves.   But the  tribunal allowed evidence to be led to the effect  that these   nine  workmen  were  actually  guilty   of   go-slow themselves  and give a finding to that effect and  therefore permitted  them  to be dismissed.  It was  also  urged  that there was no finding by the tribunal and no evidence to  the effect that these workmen had incited other workmen to  slow down  work  and therefore there was no proof of  the  charge given  to  these workmen.  Consequently, they could  not  be dismissed  on  a charge which was never  made  against  them completely  ignoring  the  charge which  was  in  fact  made against  them  and  which  had not  been  proved.   We  have therefore  to see in the case of each workman  whether  this contention of the respondents is correct. Hanif  is  the  first workman in this  group  of  nine.   It appears  from  the discussion in the award with  respect  to Hanif that though in the finding part there is a  suggestion as if this workman was guilty of go-slow himself, it appears that the tribunal knew that the charge against Hanif was for inciting  co-workers to slow down work.  There was  evidence before the tribunal to the effect that Hanif roamed about in the  department  and incited workers to slow down  work  and that  evidence  was  considered by the  tribunal.   It  also appears  that  the tribunal accepted that evidence  and  the final  conclusion  at which the tribunal  arrived  was  that Hanif  was  rightly chargesheeted by the appellant  and  the appellant  should  be  permitted to  dismiss  him.   In  the circumstances  it cannot be said so far as this  workman  is concerned  that there was no evidence to support the  charge actually framed against him.  It would also be wrong to  say that  the  tribunal did not find that  the  charge  actually framed  against  him  had  been proved,  though  it  may  be admitted that there is an undercurrent in the discussion  as if  Hanif  was  guilty of go-slow  himself.   Even  so  the- tribunal appears to 830 have  found  him guilty of inciting other workers  and  this would clearly be misconduct under standing order No. 22 (k), for   which   a  workman  Could  be   dismissed.    In   the circumstances we arc of opinion that there is no reason  for

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our interference with the order of the tribunal in the  case of Hanif. The  next  workman  is Narayan.  He was  also  charged  with having incited other workers to slow down work.  In his case also the tribunal apparently came to the conclusion that  he took part in deliberate slow-down, but during the discussion in  the  award, the tribunal started by saying that  he  was charged  with inciting other workers to slow down  work  and referred to the evidence which showed that Narayan had  gone round  in the department and asked the workmen to  work  two looms  instead  of four and to give  low  production.   This evidence was apparently accepted by the tribunal, though  at the end of the discussion the tribunal did say that  Narayan took part in deliberate ’go-slow tactics.  Though  therefore the conclusion of the tribunal with respect to Narayan seems to suggest as if he was dismissed for taking part in go-slow himself,  the  discussion in the award with respect  to  him shows that the tribunal was apparently satisfied that he had also   incited   other  workers  to  slow  down.    In   the circumstances we do not think that a case has been made  out for interference with the order of the tribunal in the  case of Narayan. Then  we  come to the case of Khalil.  He was  also  charged with having incited other workers to slow down.  In his case also there was evidence that he had incited other workers to slow  down  which was apparently accepted by  the  tribunal. Though  therefore  the  discussion in  the  award  was  with respect  to incitement by this workman, at the  end  however the  tribunal came to the conclusion that the appellant  had succeeded in proving that Khalil was  831 indulging in go-slow tactics, causing fall in production and therefore the tribunal permitted the dismissal of Khalil for the misconduct of slowing-down as shown in the charge-sheet. It  seems that tribunal has not expressed its conclusion  in this  and other cases in proper words and has perhaps  taken the  incitement  of  other  workmen to  slow  down  work  as amounting  to  the  misconduct of  go-slow  by  the  workman himself.  But the entire discussion in the award shows  that the  tribunal had accepted the evidence to the  effect  that Khalil  was inciting his co-workers to slow down.   In  this view of the matter we arc of opinion that there is no reason to  interfere with the order passed by the  tribunal  simply because  its  conclusion was not  expressed  in  appropriate words. Next we come to the case of Abdul Subhan.  In his case  also the charge was for inciting other workmen to slow-down work. The  evidence was that he incited other workers to work  two looms  ,instead  of  four.   This  evidence  was  apparently accepted  by  the tribunal but in the end it said  that  the appellant  had  succeeded in proving that Abdul  Subhan  had indulged  in  go-slow tactics and  therefore  permitted  his dismissal.  Here again it seems to us that the conclusion of the  tribunal  has been expressed  in  inappropriate  words, though  the  real finding is that Abdul Subhan  had  incited other  workers and thus brought about go-slow.  In his  case also  therefore  we  see no reason  to  interfere  with  the finding of the tribunal. Next  we  come  to  Bbagwan  Singh.   He  was  charged  with incitement  of other workers to slow down work and  evidence was  led before the tribunal that Bhagwan Singh  went  round instigating  the  weavers not to work more than  two  looms, though  they  were  expected to work on  four  looms.   This evidence was apparently accepted by the tribunal, though  it expressed its conclusion by saying that Bhagwan

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832 Singh  had  committed the misconduct of  deliberate  go-slow tacticts.  Here again, we are of opinion that the conclusion of  the tribunal has been expressed in inappropriate  words, though in fact it did find that Bhagwan Singh was guilty  of inciting  other workers to slow down.  We therefore  see  no reason  to  interfere with the order of  the  tribunal  with respect to Bhagwan Singh. Next  we come to Ram Ekbal.  His case is exactly similar  to that  of Bhagwan Singh and the evidence is also exactly  the same.   In the circumstances we see no reason  to  interfere with the order of the tribunal in his case either. Next  we  come to Mangroo.  The charge against  him  was  of incitement of other workers to slow down work.  In his  case also the evidence was that he went round in the weaving-shed asking the weavers to work two looms instead of four  looms. This  evidence  was  apparently accepted  by  the  tribunal, though  it expressed its conclusion inappropriately  to  the effect that Mangroo had adopted go-slow tactics as shown  in the charge-sheet and therefore his dismissal was  permitted. We  are  of opinion that the conclusion of the  tribunal  in this case also was expressed inappropriately but in fact the finding  was that Mangroo had incited other workers  to  go- slow.  As we have already said, the tribunal seems to  think that this incitement of other workers to go-slow amounts  to adoption of deliberate go-slow tactics by the person who  is guilty of incitement and that is why the tribunal  expressed its   final   conclusion   in  words   which   we   consider inappropriate.  But in substance the finding is that Mangroo was  guilty  of  inciting  other  workers  to  go-slow.   We therefore see no reason to interfere with the finding of the tribunal with respect to Mangroo. Next  we come to Satish.  He was also charged with  inciting other workmen to go-slow.  There was  833 evidence  before  the  tribunal that  Satish  incited  other weavers  to slow down work and this evidence was  apparently accepted  by  the tribunal.  In his case also  the  tribunal expressed  its conclusion in inappropriate words  by  saying that it held that Satish had indulged in go-slow tactics  as charged  in  the chargesheet.  It  therefore  permitted  his dismissal.    We   are  however  of  opinion   that   on   a consideration  of the discussion of the matter in the  award the  substance of the finding is that Satish was  guilty  of inciting  other  workers.  In the circumstances  we  see  no reason to interfere with the finding of the tribunal. Lastly we come to Raja Ram.  His case is exactly similar  to that of Satish and the evidence was also to the same  effect viz., that they were going round together and inciting other workers  to slow down work.  In the circumstances we see  no reason to interfere with the order of the tribunal. The next contention on behalf of the respondents is that the tribunal  should have allowed full wages to the  workmen  in list "A’ in whose case it had ordered reinstatement, and not merely  15  months’ wages as it actually did.   It  is  well settled  that "under the ordinary law of master and  servant the  power to suspend the servant without pay could  not  be implied as a term in an ordinary contract of service between the  master  and the servant but must arise either  from  an express term in the contract itself or a statutory provision governing  such  contract:  (see  The  management  of  Hotel Imperial  New  Delhi  v.  Hotel  Workers’  Union  (1).    No provision  in  the standing orders has been brought  to  our notice which entities the appellant in this case to  suspend the  workman without payment of wages.  But, as held in  The

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Hotel Imperial’s case (1), where under s. 33 of the Act  the right of the employer to dismiss an employee except with the permission  of the industrial tribunal, was taken  away,  it would be (1)  [1960] 1 S.C.R. 476. 834 open to the employer to suspend the workman pending  inquiry and permission of the tribunal.  In such circumstances ’such a  term in the contract of employment would be  implied  and the  result  would  be  that if  the  tribunal  granted  the permission, the suspended Contract would come to an end  and there  would  be no further obligation on the  part  of  the employer to pay any wages after the date of suspension.   If on  the other hand, the permission was refused, the  workmen would  be  entitled  to a] I their wages from  the  date  of suspension.  It follows therefore that in the case of  those workmen who have been ordered to be reinstated there can  be no justification for depriving them of their wages from  the date  of the suspension which in the case of the workmen  in list  ’A’  to  the reference, in view of  the  agreement  of December  23,  1957,  must start  from  December  24,  1957. Therefore,  so  far  as  these 15 workmen,  out  of  the  29 workmen, of list ’A’ are concerned, who have been ordered to be reinstated we see no reason for depriving them from their full  wages  for the entire period from December  24,  1957. The  appeal of the respondents therefore with  reference  to these  fifteen workmen in list ’A’ must be allowed  and  the order  of the tribunal is hereby varied to the  effect  that they will be paid full wages from December 24, 1957. As  to  the five workmen in list ’B’ to the  reference,  one workman,   namely,  Hiralal  Bhomick,  was  ordered  to   be reinstated  by the tribunal and he was allowed  compensation equivalent to 15 months’ wages.  His case in our opinion  is on  a par with the case of the fifteen workmen in  list  ’A’ which  we  have considered above and he  will  therefore  be entitled  to his full wages from the date of his  suspension and not only 15 months’ wages as ordered by the tribunal. Then we come to the case of nine workmen from list "A’ whose cases we have already considered  835 and  who were permitted to be dismissed.  Further there  are four  workmen of list ’B’ namely., Misra (No.  1),  Abdullah (No. 2), Narayan Tewari (No. 5) and Din Mohd. (No. 6), whose services were allowed to be terminated with effect from  the date  of  the  enforcement of the  award.   The  first  nine workmen  were allowed 12 months’ wages while the other  four workmen were paid wages for a period of one month along with compensation  equivalent  to 15 days’ average pay  for  each completed  year of service or any part thereof in excess  of six  months.  It is contended on behalf of  the  respondents that these workmen should have been allowed full wages  upto the  date  the  award became enforceable,  even  though  the tribunal had eventually permitted their dismissal or allowed their services to be terminated. I  So  far as the nine workmen in list  ’A’  are  concerned, their  case in our opinion is fully covered by the  decision of  this Court in Messrs Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P)  Ltd.  v. Shobrati  Khan  (1).   Clause (9)  of  the  agreement  which permitted  the  continuance  of  the  suspension  of   these workmen,  also  provided that they  shall  remain  suspended pending  inquiry and disciplinary action by the  management. The  clause went on to say that the management would try  to reach  an  amicable  settlement  with  the  union  regarding disciplinary  action taken or to be taken by it against  the workmen   and  that  if  the  parties  failed  to  reach   a

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settlement,  the matter would be referred for  adjudication. The  contention  on behalf of the respondents is  that  this clause  clearly  contemplated  inquiry  by  the   management followed by disciplinary action and as the appellant held no inquiry whatsoever and straightaway applied when the dispute was  referred  for adjudication, for permission  to  dismiss these workmen they would be entitled to full wages till  the date of the enforcement of the award.  On the other hand  it is contended on behalf of the appellant that though cl.  (9) envisaged inquiry and (1)  [1959] Supp 2 S.C.R. 836. 836 disciplinary  proceedings against the suspended  workmen  it also  provided  that the management would try  to  reach  an amicable  settlement  with the union,  failing  which  there would  be a reference to adjudication.  It is said  that  in view  of this the appellant held no inquiry.   Particularly, the factory manager stated that he had discussions with  the secretary of the union over the matter of these workmen  and no  settlement  could be reached.  He also stated  that  the management wanted to hold inquiries but the Secretary of the union  stated  that  no useful purpose would  be  served  by holding  inquiries because before final action was taken  by the management, it had to consult the union.  This statement was  made  by the factory manager who appeared as  the  last witness  in the case.  The secretary of the  union  appeared long before as the first witness in the case and he was  not questioned on this matter at all.  No such case was made out even in the application for permission to dismiss which  was filed  on,’ June 29, 1959, to the effect that the  inquiries were  not held because the secretary of the union  suggested that  it  would  be  useless to do  so;  nor  was  any  such allegation  made in the written-statement of the  appellant. In the circumstances it would be difficult to hold that  the reason why no inquiry was held was that the respondents  did not  want the inquiry.  In the circumstances therefore  this is a case where the management wanted to dismiss the workmen without having held an inquiry and the decision in Sasa Musa case  (1), would be fully applicable to these  nine  workmen who  have been permitted to be dismissed and they  would  be entitled to full wages from December 23, 1957 till the  date the   tribunal’s   award   permitting   dismissal    becomes enforceable. Lastly  we  come  to  the case of  the  four  workmen  whose services  have been allowed to be terminated.   Nothing  was urged before us with respect to the (1)  (1959) Supp. 2 S.C.R, 836.  837 order  permitting termination of service.  Nor do  we  think that the order of the tribunal in this behalf is wrong.   In their  case  the  tribunal  has said  that  if  the  inquiry proceedings had not been defective, these four persons would be  liable to dismissal as ordered by the  appellant. It  is only because there was defect in the inquiry proceedings  as stated above that it was held   that   the   dismissal   was unjustified.   The tribunal therefore went on to permit  the termination  of service of these four workmen under  one  of the  standing  orders and finally ordered payment  of  wages for,  a  period of one month alongwith compensation  at  the rate  of 15 days average wages for every completed  year  of service  or any part thereof in excess of six  months.   The circumstances  of the case are not exactly similar to  those in  the Sasa Musa case (1), and therefore the  principle  of that case would not necessarily apply.  In the circumstances we  do not think that we should interfere with the order  of

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the tribunal. In the result, the award of the tribunal is affirmed in  the light  of  and  subject  to  the  above  modifications;  and consequently  the appeal by the management is dismissed  and by  the  workmen allowed only with respect to the  grant  of wages  in the manner indicated above.  In the  circumstances parties will bear their own costs in both appeals. C.   A. 425 of 1962 dismissed. C. A. 426 of 1962 allowed in part. (1) [1959] Supp 2 S.C.R. 836. 838