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PETITIONER: M/S.  JEEWANLAL (1929) LTD., CALCUTTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ITS WORKMEN

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/03/1961

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N.

CITATION:  1961 AIR 1567            1962 SCR  (1) 717  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1981 SC 852  (12)  R          1992 SC 780  (10)

ACT: Industrial      Dispute-Gratuity,-’Continuous      service’- Interpretation  of-Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947  (14  of 1947).

HEADNOTE: One  Bbanu  Bala  had joined the appellant’s  service  as  a workman in 1929 and resigned in 1957.  During this period of his service he had remained absent from duty without permis- sion or leave for nearly 8 months between February, 1945, to 718 October, 1945.  Under an Award made between the company  and its workmen a scheme was framed wherein the concerned clause was  that  "on  voluntary retirement or  resignation  of  an employee  after 15 years continuous service gratuity at  the same rate as above." Dispute  arose  with  regard to  the  question  of  granting gratuity  to Bhanu Bala who claimed the benefit of the  said clause  and the company denied the claim on the ground  that the said employee had not been in continuous service for the requisite  period because there was a break in  his  service and  that  affected the continuity of his  employment  which made his claim incompetent. The  question  was  as to the  interpretation  of  the  term "continuous service" contained in the Award of 1951. Held, that in different context the same word can often have different  meanings and the expression "continuous  service" would  always  be a question of fact to be  decided  on  the circumstances  of  each  case whether or  not  a  particular employee  can claim continuity of service for the  requisite period. Where  the expression "continuous service"  was  statutorily defined  then  the definition would prevail;  and  where  an award itself gave a definition of the expression that  would bind  the  parties in dealing with claims arising  from  the award  but  where the award did not explain  the  expression "continuous service" and statutory definitions contained  in other  Acts  were  of no material  assistance  it  would  be necessary  to examine the question on principle  and  decide

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what the expression should mean in any given award. "Continuous  service",  in  the context  of  the  scheme  of gratuity,  postulates  the continuation of  relationship  of master and servant between the employer and employees  which could  come  to an end either by act of  parties,  i.e.,  by resignation  or termination of service, or by the  operation of  law; but the continuity of service would not come to  an end merely because an employee was absent without  obtaining leave; though. there would be cases where long  unauthorised absence  may reasonably give rise to an inference that  such service was intended to be abandoned by the employee. For the purpose of gratuity mere participation in an illegal strike  could not be said to cause breach in the  continuity of   service  though  it  may  he  a  good  cause  for   its termination,   provided  the  relevant  provisions  in   the Standing Orders in that behalf were complied with. Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Workers of the  Bucking- ham and Carnatic Co. Ltd., [1953] S.C.R. 219, distinguished. Budge Budge Municipality v. P. R. Mukherjee, [1953] 1 L.L.J. 195, referred to.                             719

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 264 of 1960. Appeal  by  special leave from the Award dated  October  12, 1959,  of the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay in Reference  (IT) No. 81 of 1959. S.   T.  Desai,  Sukumar  Ghose and B.  N.  Ghose,  for  the appellant. C. L. Dhudia and K. L. Hathi, for the respondents. 1961.  April 3. The Judgment of the Court was, delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-This appeal by special leave is  directed against  the  award passed by the industrial tribunal  in  a matter  which  was  referred to it under s.  36A(2)  of  the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for interpretation of certain terms  of the award made by the said tribunal on  April  28, 1951,  in  Reference  No. 168 of 1950.  It  appears  that  a dispute  had  arisen between the appellant  M/s.   Jeewanlal (1929)  Ltd.  and its workmen in regard to  certain  demands made by the respondents against the appellant in 1950.   The said  dispute was referred for adjudication as a  result  of which an award was passed which, inter alia, provided for  a gratuity  scheme.  Some provisions of this award  have  been referred for interpretation in the present reference. On August 31, 1957, resignation submitted by the appellant’s employee Bhanu Bala was accepted by the appellant.  The said employee  had  joined the appellant’s service  in  1929  but there  was  a  break in the continuity of  his  service  for nearly  81 months because he had remained absent  from  duty without permission or leave from.  February 14, 1945 to  the end  of October, 1945.  According to the appellant the  said employee  was not entitled to any gratuity under the  scheme framed by the award.  Even so the appellant offered him  Rs. 1,165  and odd on compassionate grounds.  The  employee  was not willing to accept that amount because he claimed that he was  entitled to Rs. 2,282.50 nP. by way of  gratuity.   The demand  thus made by the employee led to an industrial  dis- pute which was taken by the employee before the 720 First  Labour Court at Bombay under s. 33C of the Act.   The Labour Court entertained the application, decided the  point in  dispute  in  favour of the  employee  and  directed  the appellant  to  pay him Rs. 1,781-80 nP.  as  gratuity.   The

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appellant then moved the Bombay High Court for a writ  under Arts.  226 and 227  on the ground that the Labour Court  had no jurisdiction to entertain the application made before  it by  the  employee.  This writ petition was allowed  and  the order  passed  by the Labour Court was quashed.  It  was  at this  stage  that  the Government  of  Bombay  referred  the question of interpretation of the term "continuous  service" contained in the award of 1951 to the Industrial Court under s. 36A(1) of the Act.  That is how the Industrial Court  was possessed  of  the  matter.   It has  held  that  the  words "continuous  service"  I  as used by the  tribunal  when  it framed  the  award in question mean service  not  broken  or interrupted by the termination of the contract of employment by  either the employer or the employee or by  operation  of law.  It is this interpretation the correctness of which  is challenged by the appellant in its present appeal. The relevant part of the gratuity scheme which was framed by the tribunal in the earlier reference reads thus:               (i)   On the death of an employee while in the               service  of  the  company or  on  an  employee               becoming  physically or mentally  disabled  to               continue  further  in service  half  a  months               wages  for each year of service subject  to  a               maximum of ten months’ wages to be paid to him               or   to his heirs, executors,  assigns or               nominees as the case may be.               (ii)  On the termination of his service by the               company after five years’ continuous  service-               Gratuity at the same rate as above.               (iii)On voluntary retirement or resignation of               an   employee  after  15   years’   continuous               service-Gratuity at the same rate as above. As we have already seen the employee Bhanu Bala resigned and his  resignation was accepted in August, 1957.   He  claimed the benefit of el. (iii) whereas the 721 appellant  contended  that the said employee  had  not  been employed  in  continuous service for  the  requisite  period because  there was a break in his service  between  February 14,  1945, to -the end of October, 1945, and  that  affected the  continuity  of  his employment  which  made  his  claim incompetent  under  el.  (iii).  This  contention  has  been rejected by the tribunal. Mr.  S.  T. Desai contends that in  interpreting  the  words "continuous  service"  in cl. (iii) we  should  compare  the provisions  of s. 49B(l) along with the explanation  in  the Indian Factories Act, 1934 (XXV of 1934) as well as s. 79(1) along with explanation (1) in the Indian Factories Act, 1948 (63  of 1948) prior to its amendment in 1954; and he  argues that unauthorised absence from work should normally cause  a break in service so that if an employee, after  uNauthorised absence   from  work,  is  allowed  to  resume  after   such unauthorised  absence  he should not be  entitled  to  claim continuous service in view of the break in his service.   In support  of  this argument reliance has been placed  on  the decision  of this Court in Buckingham and Carnatic Co.  Ltd. v. Workers of the Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. (1).   In that  case  this Court has held that the continuity  of  the service of the workers was interrupted by the illegal strike and  so  they were not entitled to claim holidays  with  pay under  s.  49B(1) of the Indian Factories  Act.   It  would, however,  be noticed that the said decision turned upon  the definition of the word "strike" in S. 2(q) of the Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947, read with the relevant provision of  s. 49-B of the Indian Factories Act, 1934; and there can be  no

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doubt  that  in a different context the same words  can  and often  have different meanings.  As this Court has  observed in  Budge Budge Municipality v. P. It.  Mukherjee (2),  "the same words may mean one thing in one context and another  in different context.  This is the reason why decisions on  the meaning of particular words or collection of words found  in other statutes are scarcely of (1) [1953] S.C.R. 219.     (2) [1953] 1 L. L. J. 195, 198. 91 722 much  value when we have to deal with a specific statute  of our  OWn; they may be helpful but cannot be taken as  guides or  precedents".  Therefore, the meaning attributed  to  the words  "continuous service" in the context of the  Factories Act may not have a material bearing in deciding the point in the present appeal. The same comment falls to be made in regard to the  argument based  on  the  definition  of  the  expression  "continuous service"  contained in s. 2(eee) of the Industrial  Disputes Act,  1947.   The  said section  provides  that  "continuous service"  means uninterrupted service and  includes  service which  may be interrupted merely on account’ of sickness  or authorised  leave  or an accident or a strike which  is  not illegal,  or a lockout or a cessation of work which  is  not due  to  any  fault  on  the  part  of  the  workmen.   This definition  is  undoubtedly  relevant in  dealing  with  the question   of  continuous  service  by  reference   to   the provisions  of  Industrial Disputes’ Act but  its  operation cannot   be  automatically  extended  in  dealing  with   an interpretation of the words "continuous service" in an award made  in an industrial dispute unless the context  in  which the expression is used in the award justifies it.  In  other words,   the   expression  "continuous   service"   may   be statutorily  defined  in  which  case  the  definition  will prevail.. An award using the said expression may itself give a  definition of that expression and that will bind  parties in  dealing  with  claims arising from  the  award.   Where, however, the award does not explain the said expression  and statutory  definitions  contained in other Acts  are  of  no material  assistance  it would be necessary to  examine  the question on principle and decide what the expression  should mean  in  any given award’; and that is precisely  what  the tribunal had to do in the present case. "Continuous  service"  in  the  context  of  the  scheme  of gratuity  framed  by the tribunal in the  earlier  reference postulates the continuance of the relationship of master and servant  between  the employer and his  employees.   If  the servant  resigns his employment service automatically  comes to  an end.  If the employer terminates the service, of  his employee that                             723 again  brings the continuity of service to an end.   If  the service of an employee is brought to an end by the operation of  any  law  that  again  is  another  instance  where  the continuance  is disrupted; but it is difficult to hold  that merely because an employee is absent without obtaining leave that  itself  would bring to an end the  continuity  of  his service.   Similarly,  participation in  an  illegal  strike which  may  incur  the punishment of dismissal  may  not  by itself  bring to an end the relationship of master and  ser- vant.  It may be a good cause for the termination of service provided  of course the relevant provisions in the  standing orders   in  that  behalf  are  complied  with;   but   mere participation  in an illegal strike cannot be said to  cause breach  in continuity for the purposes of gratuity.  On  the

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other hand, if an employee continues to be absent from  duty without  obtaining leave and in an unauthorised  manner  for such a long period of time that an inference may  reasonably be drawn from such absence that by his absence he has  aban- doned  service,  then  such long  unauthorised  absence  may legitimately  be held to cause a break in the continuity  of service.   It would thus always be a question of fact to  be decided  on the circumstances of each case whether or not  a particular employee can claim continuity of service for  the requisite  period  or not.  In our opinion,  therefore,  the view taken by the tribunal is substantially right though  we would  like to make it clear that in addition to  the  cases where according to the tribunal continuity of service  would come to an end there would be the class of cases where  long unauthorised   absence  may  reasonably  give  rise  to   an inference  that such service is intended to be abandoned  by the  employee.  With this modification we confirm the  award and  dismiss  the  appeal.  There would be no  order  as  to costs. Appeal dismissed. 724