REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4344 OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.2689 of 2009)

M/s Jeevan Diesels & Electricals Ltd. ..Appellant(s)

Versus  

M/s Jasbir Singh Chadha (Huf) & Anr. ..Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal is  directed against  the judgment  and  

order dated 28.11.2008 passed by the High Court of  

Delhi in Regular First Appeal No.465 of 2008. In the  

impugned judgment upon admission the High Court came  

to a finding that a case of ejectment was made out  

against the appellant on the basis of admission of  

the case of the plaintiff-landlord in the written  

statement filed by appellant. In passing the said  1

judgment the High Court affirmed the judgment and  

decree  of  dispossession  passed  by  the  Additional  

District  Judge,  Delhi  on  23.09.2008  against  the  

appellant.  

3. The  material  facts  of  the  case  are  that  the  

respondents-plaintiffs,  claiming  to  be  the  

landlords/owners  of  the  premises  bearing  Flat  

No.205,  (2nd Floor),  Arunachal  Building,  19,  

Barakhambha Road, New Delhi-110001 having area of  

581 sq. ft., (super area) (hereinafter, ‘the suit  

premises’) filed a suit against the appellant for  

recovery of possession and mesne profit. The case of  

the  plaintiff-landlord in  the plaint  is that  the  

appellant was inducted as a tenant vide lease deed  

dated 07.07.2003 at a monthly rent of Rs.23,200/-  

for  a  period  of  three  years  with  effect  from  

07.07.2003. According to the respondents-plaintiffs  

the said lease dated 07.07.2003 was initially for a  

period of three years and which was to be renewed  

for  a  further  period  of  three  years  as  per  the  

mutual consent of both the parties with 20% increase  

in the monthly rent. The main case of the plaintiff-

landlord is that the said lease deed had expired by  

efflux of time and notice to that effect was sent to  

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appellant  which was  enclosed with  the plaint.  In  

paragraph 6 of the plaint further averment is that  

the appellant, despite determination of its tenancy  

of the suit property, has failed to vacate the suit  

property, and handover the possession thereof to the  

respondents-plaintiffs.

4. The stand of the respondents-plaintiffs before the  

Civil Court and also the High Court and before this  

Court  also  was  that  the  case  of  termination  of  

tenancy has been admitted by the appellant in its  

written statement.

5. In order to appreciate this controversy it will be  

proper  to  set  out  the  relevant  averments  in  the  

plaint and written statement of the parties.

6. Paragraphs  5  and  6  of  the  plaint  on  which  the  

respondents-plaintiffs rely are as follows:-

“5. That the tenancy has expired by efflux of  time  but  for  the  precautionary  measure,  the  Plaintiffs  vide  notice  dated  July  15,  2006  terminated the tenancy of the Defendant, which  was  sent  via  Regd.  Ad.  &  UPC.  The  aforesaid  notice dated July 15, 2006 was duly served upon  the  defendant.  The  copy  of  said  notice  is  annexed  herewith  as  Annexure  A-3.  The  registration  receipt,  UPC  and  acknowledgement  

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card are annexed herewith as Annexure A-4 to A-6  respectively.

6. That  the  defendant,  despite,  the  determination of its tenancy of the said suit  property has failed to vacate the suit property  and  handover  the  possession  thereof  to  the  Plaintiffs”.

7.   In the written statement, which was filed by the  

appellant, paragraphs 5 and 6 of the plaint have  

been dealt with in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the written  

statement respectively. Those two paragraphs are set  

out below:-   

“5. That the contents of para 5 of the plaint  are a matter of record. It is submitted that  tenancy has neither expired by efflux of time  nor it has been terminated.

6. That in reply to the contents of para 6 of  the plaint, it is submitted that defendant is in  possession of the premises. There has been no  determination of tenancy.

8. It  is  clear  from  a  perusal  of  the  aforesaid  

averments  in  the  written  statement  that  the  

appellant has disputed (a) the fact of expiry of  

tenancy by efflux of time; (b) the appellant has  

also disputed that there has been a determination of  

tenancy. So far as receipt of notice referred to in  

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paragraph 5 of the plaint is concerned, there has  

been no denial by the appellant.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant also argued before  

us that the lease deed cannot be terminated in view  

of certain clauses contained in the lease. The said  

argument was opposed by the learned counsel for the  

respondents-plaintiffs.  But  in  the  facts  of  this  

case and in view of the nature of the judgment we  

propose to pass we need not decide those contentions  

at all.

10. It may be noted herein that to the written statement  

filed by the appellant, the respondents-plaintiffs  

did  not  file  any  rejoinder.   They  filed  an  

application under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of  

Civil Procedure for passing a judgment on admission.  

In  the  said  petition  in  paragraph  4,  the  

respondents-plaintiffs also averred as follows:-

“4. That  in  view  of  the  admission  (i)  On  existence of relationship of landlord and tenant  and there after (ii) service of the termination  notice, the only question left for adjudication  for the purpose of possession is “whether the  termination  of  the  tenancy  has  been  validly  terminated?”

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11. To that application the appellant had given a reply.  

In paragraph 2 of the reply it was again denied by  

the appellant that there was any admission by them  

about termination or determination of tenancy. In  

the said reply it has been stated that in the suit  

issues are still to be framed and the case be tried  

in accordance with the Civil Procedure Code as there  

is  no  admission  by  the  appellant  and  the  

respondents-plaintiffs have to prove its case with  

legally  admissible  evidence.    

As such prayer was made to dismiss the application  

of the respondents-plaintiffs under Order 12 Rule 6.  

12. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondents-plaintiffs  

relied on a judgment of this Court in Karam Kapahi &  Others vs. M/s. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust &  Another reported in 2010 (3) SCALE 569 and contended  that in view of the principles laid down in that  

case, this Court may affirm the judgment of the High  

Court in the instant case.  This Court is unable to  

accept  the  aforesaid  contention.  In  Karam  Kapahi  (supra)  a  Bench  of  this  Court  analyzed  the  

principles of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code and held  

that  in  the  facts  of  that  case  there  was  clear  

admission  on  the  part  of  the  lessee  about  non-

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payment of lease rent.  The said admission was made  

by the lessee in several proceedings apart from its  

pleading  in  the  suit.   In  view  of  such  clear  

admission, the Court applied the principles of Order  

12 Rule 6 in the case of Karam Kapahi (supra).  The  principles of law laid down in Karam Kapahi (supra)  can be followed in this case only if there is a  

clear and unequivocal admission of the case of the  

plaintiff by the appellant.   

13. Whether  or  not  there  is  a  clear,  unambiguous  

admission by one party of the case of the other  

party  is  essentially  a  question  of  fact  and  the  

decision of this question depends on the facts of  

the case.  This question, namely, whether there is a  

clear  admission  or  not  cannot  be  decided  on  the  

basis  of  a  judicial  precedent.   Therefore,  even  

though the principles in Karam Kapahi (supra) may be  unexceptionable  they  cannot  be  applied  in  the  

instant  case  in  view  of  totally  different  fact  

situation.    

14. In Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. Vs. United Bank of  India and others reported in (2000) 7 SCC 120 the  provision  of  Order  12  Rule  6  came  up  for  

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consideration  before this  Court. This  Court on  a  

detailed consideration of the provisions of Order 12  

Rule 6 made it clear “wherever there is a clear  

admission  of  facts  in  the  face  of  which  it  is  

impossible for the party making such admission to  

succeed” the principle will apply. In the instant  

case  it  cannot  be  said  that  there  is  a  clear  

admission of the case of the respondents-plaintiffs  

about termination of tenancy by the appellant in its  

written statement or in its reply to the petition of  

the respondents-plaintiffs under Order 12 Rule 6.  

15. It may be noted here that in this case parties have  

confined their case of admission to their pleading  

only.  The  learned  counsel  for  the  respondents-

plaintiffs fairly stated before this Court that he  

is  not invoking  the case  of admission  ‘otherwise  

than  on  pleading’.  That  being  the  position  this  

Court finds that in the pleadings of the appellant  

there  is  no  clear  admission  of  the  case  of  

respondents-plaintiffs.   

16. In this connection reference may be made to an old  

decision of the Court of Appeal between Gilbert vs.  Smith reported in 1875-76 (2) Chancery Division 686.  

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Dealing with the principles of Order XL, Rule 11,  

which was a similar provision in English Law, Lord  

Justice James held, “if there was anything  clearly  

admitted upon which something ought to be done, the  

plaintiff might come to the Court at once to have  

that  thing  done,  without  any  further  delay  or  

expense”  (see  page  687).   Lord  Justice  Mellish  

expressing  the  same  opinion  made  the  position  

further clear by saying, “it must, however, be such  

an  admission  of  facts  as  would  shew  that  the  

plaintiff  is clearly  entitled to  the order  asked  

for”.  The learned Judge made it further clear by  

holding, “the rule was not meant to apply when there  

is any serious question of law to be argued.  But if  

there is an admission on the pleading which clearly  

entitles  the  plaintiff  to  an  order,  then  the  

intention was that he should not have to wait but  

might at once obtain any order” (see page 689).

17. In another old decision of the Court of Appeal in  

the  case  of  Hughes vs.  London,  Edinburgh,  and  Glasgow Assurance Company (Limited) reported in The  Times  Law  Reports  1891-92  Volume  8  at  page  81,  

similar principles were laid down by Lord Justice  

Lopes, wherein His Lordship held “judgment ought not  

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to be signed upon admissions in a pleading or an  

affidavit,  unless  the  admissions  were  clear  and  

unequivocal”.   Both  Lord  Justice  Esher  and  Lord  

Justice  Fry  concurred  with  the  opinion  of  Lord  

Justice Lopes.   

18. In yet another decision of the Court of Appeal in  

Landergan vs.  Feast reported  in  The  Law  Times  Reports 1886-87 Volume 85 at page 42, in an appeal  

from  Chancery  Division,  Lord  Justice  Lindley  and  

Lord Justice Lopes held that party is not entitled  

to apply under the aforesaid rule unless there is a  

clear  admission  that  the  money  is  due  and  

recoverable in the action in which the admission is  

made.

19. The decision in  Landergan  (supra) was followed by  the  Division  Bench  of  Calcutta  High  Court  in  

Koramall Ramballav vs. Mongilal Dalimchand reported  in 23 Calcutta Weekly Notes (1918-19) 1017. Chief  

Justice Sanderson, speaking for the Bench, accepted  

the formulation of Lord Justice Lopes and held that  

admission  in  Order  12,  Rule  6  must  be  a  “clear  

admission”.   

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20. In the case of J.C. Galstaun vs. E.D. Sassoon & Co.,  Ltd., reported in 27 Calcutta Weekly Notes (1922-23)  783, a Bench of Calcutta High Court presided over by  

Hon’ble Justice Sir Asutosh Mookerjee sitting with  

Justice Rankin while construing the provisions of  

Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code followed the aforesaid  

decision in Hughes (supra) and also the view of Lord  Justice  Lopes in  Landergan  (supra) and  held that  these  provisions  are  attracted  “where  the  other  

party  has  made  a  plain  admission  entitling  the  

former to succeed.  This rule applies where there is  

a clear admission of the facts on the face of which  

it  is  impossible  for  the  party  making  it  to  

succeed”.   In  saying  so  His  Lordship  quoted  the  

observation of Justice Sargent in  Ellis vs.  Allen  [(1914) 1 Ch. D. 904] {See page 787}.

21. Similar  view has  been expressed  by Chief  Justice  

Broadway in the case of  Abdul Rahman and brothers  vs.  Parbati Devi reported in AIR 1933 Lahore 403.  The learned Chief Justice held that before a Court  

can act under order 12, Rule 6, the admission must  

be clear and unambiguous.    

22. For the reasons discussed above and in view of the  

facts  of  this  case  this  Court  cannot  uphold  the  11

judgment  of  the  High  Court  as  well  as  of  the  

Additional District Judge. Both the judgments of the  

High Court and of the Additional District Judge are  

set aside.  

23. The  matter  is  remanded  to  the  trial  Court  for  

expeditious  disposal  of  the  suit  as  early  as  

possible, preferably within a period of six months  

from  the  date  of  service  of  this  order  on  the  

learned  trial  Court.  It  is  made  clear  that  this  

Court has not made any observation on the merits of  

the case.   

24. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to  

costs.        

.....................J. (G.S. SINGHVI)

.....................J. (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi May 7, 2010

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