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PETITIONER: M/S.  HAJI ESMAIL NOOR MOHAMMAD & CO.  AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE COMPETENT OFFICER, LUCKNOW & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/03/1967

BENCH: RAO, K. SUBBA (CJ) BENCH: RAO, K. SUBBA (CJ) SHAH, J.C. SHELAT, J.M. BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA MITTER, G.K.

CITATION:  1967 AIR 1244            1967 SCR  (3) 134  CITATOR INFO :  F          1983 SC 259  (19)

ACT: U.P.  Administration  of Evacuee Property  Ordinance,  1949. Administration  of Evacuee Property Act (Central)  1950  and Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act (Central) 1951--Partner of firm   declared   ’evacuee’   under   U.P.   Ordinance-Fresh declaration  under  s.  7 of  1950  Act  whether  necessary- Proceedings  under  1951 Act before Appellate  Authority  at Delhi-Appellate Authority appointed by U.P. State but office situated   at   Delhi-Allahabad  High  Court   whether   has jurisdiction under Art. 226 over Appellate Authority. Constitution  of  India,  Part  III-Fundamental  Rights   of partners  of  firm whether affected by one of  the  partners being declared evacuee and his property being taken over  by Custodian.

HEADNOTE: A partnership firm carrying on business in Calcutta had also a  branch in Kanpur.  In 1948, ’A’ one of its partners  went away to Pakistan.  Under the United Provinces Administration of  Evacuee  Property Ordinance 1949  all  evacuee  property situated in the United Provinces, vested in the Custodian of Evacuee Property.  In September 1949 the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee  Property,  Kanpur, took possession  of  the  Kanpur property of the firm.  The firm raised objections under s. 8 of  the aforesaid Ordinance.  On October 18, 1949 a  Central Ordinance  namely  the Administration  of  Evacuee  Property Ordinance  1949 came into force; it was succeeded  on  April 17,  1950,  by the Administration of Evacuee  Property  Act, 1950.  Under the provisions of the Central Ordinance as also the Act any property which had vested in the Custodian under the  Provincial Ordinance would be deemed to continue  being so vested.  On May 31, 1950 The Deputy Custodian of  Evacuee Property  (Judicial) Allahabad Circle, Kanpur, dealing  with the  aforesaid objections raised by the firm held ’A’ to  be an evacuee and his share in the firm to be evacuee property. No appeal was filed against this order. on December 13, 1952 the  Competent Officer, Kanpur -sent separate notices  under

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s. 6 of the Evacuee Interest Separation Act, 1951 to each of the  partners  of the firm calling upon them to  file  their claim  for  the purpose of determining the interest  of  the evacuee in the partnership business.  The firm filed a claim under  s.  7  of  the  Act  and  raised  various  objections contending  that  ’A’ was not -a member of  the  firm.   The competent  officer rejected all the objections.  The  firm’s appeal  to the Appellate Officer failed; whereupon it  filed petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution before the High Court.   The petitions were dismissed by a single Judge  who took  the view that the order of the Competent  Officer  had merged  in that of the Appellate Authority whose office  was situated in Delhi beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court.  Special appeals before the Division Bench  were also dismissed.  The firm and its partners appealed to  this Court.  They also filed a petition under Art. 32.  The Court ’had to consider (i) Whether a fresh notice and  declaration under s, 7 of the Central Ordinance of 1949 or of tile  Cen- tral Act of 1950 was necessary, (ii) Whether any fundamental right of 135 the  partners of the firm had been. affected,  (ii)  Whether the  Appellate Authority was subject to the jurisdiction  of the High Court of Allahabad. HELD  :  From the Facts ’it was clear that ’A’, in  view  of disturbed conditions, went away to Pakistan in the year 1948 and therefore he was an ’evacuee’ within the meaning of U.P. Ordinance 1 of 1949.  His property i.e. his interest in  the partnership business immediately vested under the  Ordinance in  the Custodian.  This automatic vesting was continued  by Central  Ordinance 27 of 1949 and Central Act 31 of 1950  by the  deeming  provisions contained  therein.   Therefore  no question  of issuing further notice or making a  declaration that the said interest was evacuee property under s. 7(1) of the  Ordinance arose.  Section 7 only applied to  properties other  than  those which have vested  automatically  in  the Custodian.  Such a vesting cannot be reopened under the Cen- tral Ordinance or the Central Act for it has already  vested thereunder by a fiction. [142 E-G] (ii) It  followed that the partners had no interest  in  the share of ’A’ in the firm which had vested in the  Custodian. They  had  also  acquiesced  in  the  order  of  the  Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property (Judicial) (Allahabad) holding ’A"s property to be evacuee property.  It was no longer open to  them to question that finding.  The partners had  there- fore  no fundamental right in regard to the interest of  ’A’ in the partnership.  L143 B] (iii)     The  Appellate Authority, though  for  convenience having  its  head  office in New Delhi,  was  factually  and legally   functioning  under  the  State  Act   within   the territorial jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court.   Such an  appellate  authority is located within  the  territorial limits of the High Court for the purpose of disposing of the appeals under the Act. [146 B-C] Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao  [1953] S.C.R.  1144,  Lt.  Col.  Khajoor Singh v. Union  of  India, [1961]  2  S.C.R.  828,  A. Thangal  Kunju  Musaliar  v.  M. Venkitachalam  Potti,  [1955] 2 S.C.R. 1196,  Collector-  of Customs  v.  East India Commercial Company,[1963]  2  S.C.R. 563,  Shriram v. Tire State of Boimbay A.I.R. 1962 S.C.  670 and  The  State of Uttar Pradesh v.  Mohammad  Nooh,  [1958] S.C.R. 595, distinguished.

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JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL/CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 14 of 1963. Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for  the enforcement of fundamental rights.              AND Civil Appeals Nos. 1566 and 1567 of 1966. Appeals  by special leave from the judgment and order  dated January  11,  1963 of the Allahabad High  Court  in  Special Appeals Nos. 26 and 27 of )963 respectively. S.   T.  Desai, E. C. Agarwala, Bhawanilal, Champat Rai  and P.   C.  Agrawala,  for the petitioners (in W.P. No.  14  of 1965). S.   P.  Sinha, E. C. Agarwala, Bhawanilal, Champat Rai  and P. C. Agrawala, for the appellants (in both the appeals). 136 136 N. S. Bindra and S. P. Nayyar, for the respondents (in W.P. No. 14 of 1963 and C.As. Nos. 1566 and 1567 of 1966). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Subbarao,  C.J.  The writ petition and the two  appeals  are connected and they arise out of a dispute under the  Evacuee interest (Separation) Act, 1951, (Act No. 64 of 1951) in re- gard to a partnership firm carrying on business in the  name and  style of Messrs.  Hajee Esmail Noor Mohammad & Co.  its principal place of business is Calcutta and it has  branches at  Kanpur  and  Bombay.  In 1947  a  partnership  deed  was executed  in  respect  of the  said  business.   Though  the business continued to be carried on under the said name from time   to  time,  having  regard  to  the  exigencies.   new partnership  deeds  were executed. In the year  1948,  Abdul Latif Hajee Esmail, one of the partners of the firm, went to Pakistan.   On May 1, 1949, it appears that the  said  Abdul Latif Hajee Esmail sent from Pakistan a letter addressed  to the partnership firm at Calcutta indicating his intention to retire  from the partnership.  On June 24, 1949, The  United Provinces Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949 (U.P. Ordinance No. 1 of 1949) came into force.  Under  that Ordinance  all  evacuee  property  situated  in  the  United Provinces  vested  in  the Custodian.  On  August  8,  1949, another  deed  of  partnership  was  executed  between   the partners  excluding  therefrom the said  Abdul  Latif  Hajee Esmail and the document was registered on October 24,  1949. On  September  7,  1949, the  Deputy  Custodian  of  Evacuee Property,  Kanpur, informed the firm that possession of  the Kanpur property of the firm would be taken within 24  hours. Pursuant to the notice, possession of the firm at Kanpur was taken  by the Deputy Custodian.  On September 24, 1949,  the firm  filed  a claim under s. 8 of the U.P. Ordinance  1  of 1949  to the effect that the said property was  not  evacuee property.   On  October  18,  1949,  The  Administration  of Evacuee  Property  Ordinance  No. 27  of  1949,  hereinafter called   the   ’Central   Ordinance’,   came   into   force. Thereafter, on April 17, 1950, The Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (Act 31 of 1950) came into force.  On May 31,   1950   the  Deputy  Custodian  of   Evacuee   Property (Judicial),  Allahabad  Circle,  Kanpur,  in  the  objection petition  filed  by the firm found that  Abdul  Latif  Hajee Esmail was an evacuee, that the notice issued by him to  the firm  was  invalid, as it was not given  to  the  individual partners  thereof,  that the said Abdul Latif  Hajee  Esmail would  be deemed to be continuing as a partner, that he  was an evacuee and that, therefore, his share in the partnership vested in the Custodian.  In the result he declared that the share  of  Abdul Latif Hajee Esmail in the firm,  which  was

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annas  5 out of annas 19 and pies 3, was  evacuee  property. He released the other shares from attachment.  No  137 appeal was filed against that order.  On December 13,  1952, the  Competent Officer, Kanpur, sent separate notices  under s. 6 of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951 (Central Act 64 of 1951 ) to each of the partners of the firm calling upon them to file their claim for the purpose of determining the interest of the evacuee in the partnership business.  In March  1953,  the firm filed a petition under s.  7  of  the Central  Act 64 of 1951 claiming 14 annas and 3  pies  share out of the total share of 19 annas and 3 pies of the  Kanpur branch of the partnership firm.  On December 31, 1953, Abdul Latif  Hajee Esmail died.  On September 12, 1959,  the  firm raised  various objections, including one  of  jurisdiction, the  main objection being that Abdul Latif Hajee Esmail  was not  a partner of the present firm.  The Cornpetent  Officer rejected  all  the objections and held, by his  order  dated November  10,  1950, that the firm was  accountable  to  the Custodian  in respect of the assets and profits of the  firm so far as it related to the Kanpur Branch of the firm,  from February  10,  1949 upto the date of the  order.   The  firm preferred  an  appeal against that order  to  the  Appellate Officer  appointed under Central Act 64 of 1951.   On  April 25,  1960,  the  Appellate  Officer  dismissed  the  appeal. Thereafter,  on July 25, 1960, the firm filed a petition  in the   High  Court  of  Allahabad  under  Art.  226  of   the Constitution against respondents 1 and 2 for quashing  their orders  and  for  issuing an appropriate  writ  or  suitable directions  against all or any of the respondents.  On  Sep- tember  25,  1961, the firm and its partners  filed  another petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the said High Court  for  similar  reliefs.  The  second  petition  became necessary  because certain technical objections were  raised in regard to the first petition.  On November 29, 1962, Oak, J.,  of  the said High Court dismissed both  the  petitions. The   learned  Judge  held  that  the  High  Court  had   no jurisdiction to quash the order of the Competent Officer for taking  accounts  inasmuch as his order had  merged  in  the order  of the Appellate Authority whose office was  situated in  Delhi  beyond the territorial jurisdiction of  the  said High  Court.  Special Appeals preferred to a Division  Bench of  the  High  Court were also  dismissed.   Hence  the  two appeals.  The firm and its partners also filed a petition in this  Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for  the  same reliefs. We  shall first take the petition filed in this Court  under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Mr. S. T. Desai, learned counsel for the petitioners, raised before  us  the  following points : (1)  Abdul  Latif  Hajee Esmail  was not an evacuee and, therefore, his property  was not evacuee property within the meaning of cls. (c) and  (d) of s. 2 of the U.P. Ordinance No. 1 of 1949 and,  therefore, the  orders  of the Competent Officer or  of  the  Appellate Officer were without L4 Sup.  Cl/67-10 138 jurisdiction.  (2)  The decision given by the  two  officers were  also without jurisdiction as no notice was issued  and as  no  declaration  was ’Made under s.  7  of  the  Central Ordinance  No. 27 of 1949 or of the Central Act 31 of  1950. (3)  The said officers also had no jurisdiction to pass  any order  relating  to the share of Abdul  Latif  Hajee  Esmail confined  only to the Kanpur branch of the firm. (4) In  any case,  the said Officers committed an error in holding  that

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Abdul  Latif  Hajee  Esmail had a subsisting  share  in  the partnership even after February 10, 1949 and August 8, 1949, i.e., after the dates of reconstitution of the partnership. Mr. N. S. Bindra, learned counsel for the respondents, apart from contesting the correctness of the points raised by  the petitioners’  counsel,  argued that the petitioners  had  no fundamental right to maintain the petition.  His  contention was  that  the interest of Abdul Latif Hajee Esmail  in  the partnership had automatically vested in the Custodian  under the provisions of the U.P. Ordinance No. 1 of 1949, that the petitioners  had  no interest in the said share  and,  that, therefore,  no fundamental right of theirs was  affected  by the  order  of  the Competent Officer or  of  the  Appellate Officer made in the appeal against the said ,order. To  appreciate the contentions it is necessary  to  consider the provisions of the relevant Ordinance and the Acts.              U.P. Ordinance No. 1. of 1949        Section  2. (c) "evacuee" means any person,               (i)   who, on account of the setting up of the               Dominions of India and Pakistan or on  account               of  civil  disturbances or the  fear  of  such               disturbances,  leaves or has on or  after  the               1st  day of March, 1947 left any place in  the               United  Provinces  for any place  outside  the               territories now forming part of India, or               (ii)  who is resident in any place now forming               part of Pakistan and is for that reason unable               to  occupy, supervise or manage in person  his               property  in  the United  Provinces  or  whose               property  in  the Province has  ceased  to  be               occupied, supervised or managed by any person,               or is being occupied, supervised or managed by               an unauthorised person, or......               (d)   "evacuee property" means any property in               which   an   evacuee   has   any   right    or               interest ......                139               (e)   "property" includes any property,  right               or interest, but does not include a mere right               to sue or a cash deposit in a bank-.               Section  5. Vesting of evacuee property in the               Custodian.               (1)   Subject   to  the  provisions  of   this               Ordinance,  all evacuee property  situated  in               the   United  Provinces  shall  vest  in   the               Custodian.               Section  6. Notification of evacuee property.               (1)   The  Custodian  may from time  to  time,               notify by publication in the official  Gazette               or in such other manner as may be  prescribed,               evacuee  properties which have vested  in  him               under this Ordinance.               (2)   Where  after the vesting of any  evacuee               property  in  the Custodian any person  is  in               possession  of any such property, he shall  be               deemed  to  be  holding it on  behalf  of  the               Custodian  and  shall on  being  so  required,               surrender possession thereof to the  Custodian               or any person appointed by him in this behalf. Under this Ordinance ’property of an evacuee’ as defined  in s.  2(c)  automatically vests in the Custodian under  s.  5. Thereafter  any  person in possession of the  said  property holds  it  only  on behalf of the Custodian,  who  can  take necessary steps to take possession from him. The Administration of Evacuee Property (Chief Commissioners’

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Provinces) Ordinance, No. 12 of 1949. This  Ordinance was extended to the United Provinces by  the Administration  of  Evacuee Property  (Chief  Commissioners’ Provinces)  Amendment  Ordinance, No. 20 of 1949.   It  came into force on August 23, 1949. Section  5.  Vesting of evacuee property in the Custodian.-               (1)   Subject   to  the  provisions  of   this               Ordinance, all evacuee properties situate in a               Province  shall vest in the Custodian of  that               Province.               (2)   Where     immediately     before     the               commencement  of  this Ordinance  any  evacuee               property  in  a  Province had  vested  in  any               person  exercising the powers of  a  Custodian               under  any corresponding law in force in  that               Province immediately before such commencement,               that   evacuee   property   shall,   on    the               commencement  of this Ordinance, be deemed  to               have vested in the Custodian appointed for the               Province under this Ordinance.               140 Section 7 and 8 of this Ordinance correspond to ss. 7 and  8 Of  the  U.P. Ordinance No. 1 of 1949;  the  former  confers power  on  the Custodian to take possession of  any  evacuee property vested in him and the latter provides for filing of claims  by  interested persons.  Under  this  Ordinance  the evacuee  property automatically vested in the Custodian  was deemed  to  have vested in the Custodian  for  the  Province concerned.        Central Ordinance No. 27 of 1949. This  Ordinance came into force on October 18,  1949.Section 55.               (1)   The  Administration of Evacuee  Property               Ordinance, 1949 (XII of 1949), as in force  in               the  Chief  Commissioners’ Provinces  and  the               Province of Madras and the United Provinces is               hereby repealed.               (2)............................               (3)   Notwithstanding   the  repeal  by   this               Ordinance  of  the Administration  of  Evacuee               Property   Ordinance,   1949,   or   of    any               corresponding law, anything done or any action               taken  in the exercise of any power  conferred               by  that Ordinance or law shall be  deemed  to               have been done or taken in the exercise of the               powers  conferred by this Ordinance,  and  any               penalty incurred or proceeding commenced under               that Ordinance or law shall be deemed to be  a               penalty incurred or proceeding commenced under               this  Ordinance as if this Ordinance  were  in               force on the day on which such thing was done,               action  taken, penalty incurred or  proceeding               commenced.               Section   8.               (1)..............................               (2)   Where     immediately     before     the               commencement  of  this Ordinance  any  evacuee               property  in  a  Province had  vested  in  any               person  exercising the powers of  a  Custodian               under  any  law repealed hereby,  the  evacuee               property  shall, on the commencement  of  this               Ordinance,  be  deemed to have vested  in  the               Custodian  appointed  or deemed to  have  been               appointed   for   the  Province   under   this               Ordinance, and shall continue to so vest.   It

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             is  clear  from the said provisions  that  the               Administration of Evacuee Property (Chief Com-               missioners’  Provinces) Ordinance, No.  12  of               1949,  was  repealed  and under  s.  8(2)  the               evacuee  property automatically  vested  under               U.P. Ordinance No. 1 of                141               1949 and thereafter deemed to have been vested               in  the Custodian under the Administration  of               Evacuee    Property   (Chief    Commissioners’               Provinces)  Ordinance,  No.  12  of  1949,  as               amended  by  the  Administration  of   Evacuee               Property   (Chief  Commissioners’   Provinces)               Amendment Ordinance, 1949, Ordinance No. 20 of               1949,  was deemed to have been vested  in  the               Custodian  appointed  under  this   Ordinance.               Under the saving clause things done or  action               taken under the previous Ordinance was  deemed               to   have  been  taken  or  done  under   this               Ordinance.                             Central Act 31 of 1950               Section 58.               (1)   The  Administration of Evacuee  Property               Ordinance, 1949........ are hereby repealed.               (2)........................................               (3)   The   repeal   by  this   Act   of   the               Administration of Evacuee Property  Ordinance,               1949......           shall  not   affect   the               previous  operation of that  Ordinance,  Regu-               lation  or  corresponding  law,  and   subject               thereto, anything done or any action taken  in               the  exercise  of any power  conferred  by  or               under    that   Ordinance,    Regulation    or               corresponding  law,  shall be deemed  to  have               been  done  or taken in the  exercise  of  the               powers  conferred by or under this Act  as  if               this  Act  were in force on the day  on  which               such thing was done or action was taken. Section  8(2)  of  this Act corresponds to s.  8(2)  of  the Central  Ordinance  No. 27 of 1949.  This  Act  repeals  the Ordinance and practically enacts its provisions.  Under this Act  also the automatic vesting of the evacuee  property  in the Custodian under the U.P. Ordinance No. 1 of 1949  deemed to  have  continued to vest under  the  Custodian  appointed under the Central Ordinance No. 27 of 1949 is continued,  by fiction,  under  this Act.  The High Court of  Allahabad  in Azimunnissa’s(1)  case held that there was no valid  vesting under  Ordinance XII of 1949 or even under Ordinance  XX  of 1949   for  lack  of  legislative  competence   and,   that, therefore, the deeming, clause in Ordinance XXVII of 1949 or Act  XXXI  of  1950 would not continue  the  vesting.   This defect was cured by Act 1 of 1960 retrospectively validating the vesting under the earlier laws.  This aspect of the case was  considered by this Court in Azimunnissa v.  The  Deputy Custodian, Evacuee (1)  A.1.R. 1951 All 561. 142 Properties, District Deoria(1).  Therein Kapur, J., speaking the Court, observed :               "The   effect  of  s.  8(2-A)  is  that   what               purported  to  have vested under s. 8  (2)  of               Ordinance  XXVII  of 1949 and which is  to  be               deemed  to  be vested under s. 8  of  the  Act               which repealed that Ordinance, notwithstanding               any invalidity in the original vesting or  any

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             decree  or order of the Court shall be  deemed               to  be evacuee property validly vested in  the               Custodian and any order made by the  Custodian               in relation to the property shall be deemed to               be valid.  Thus retrospective effect is  given               to the Act to validate (1) what purports to be               vested; (2) removes all defects or  invalidity               in  the vesting or fictional vesting under  s.               8(2) of Ordinance XXVII of 1949 or s. 8(2)  of               Ordinance XXVII of 1949 or s. 8(2) of the               Act  which repealed the Ordinance;  (3)  makes               the  decrees and judgments to the contrary  of               any  court  in  regard  to  the  vesting   in-               effective;  (4)  makes  the  property  evacuee               property  by  its  deeming  effect;  and   (5)               validates  all orders passed by the  Custodian               in regard to the property." In  the instant case, from the narration of the facts it  is clear  that  Abdul  Latif  Hajee  Esmail,  in  view  of  the disturbed conditions, went away to Pakistan in the year 1948 and, therefore, he was an evacuee within the meaning of  the U.P. Ordinance 1 of 1949.  His property, i.e., his  interest in the partnership business, automatically vested under  the Ordinance in the Custodian.  The Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property, Kanpur, issued notice to the firm on September  7, 1949,  informing  the firm that the Kanpur property  of  the firm would be taken possession.  The said vesting was deemed to  have taken place under the Central Ordinance 27 of  1949 and the Central Act 31 of 1950.  Subsequent proceedings were taken under the provisions of the said Central Ordinance and Act.  As stated above, the automatic vesting of Abdul  Latif Hajee  Esmail’s share in the firm was continued  by  Central Ordinance  27  of  1949 and Central Act 31 of  1950  by  the deeming   provisions  contained  therein.    Therefore,   no question  of issuing further notice or making a  declaration that the said interest was evacuee property under s. 7(1) of the Ordinance arises.  Section 7 only applies to  properties other than those which have been vested automatically in the Custodian.   Such  a vesting cannot be  reopened  under  the Central  Ordinance  or the Central Act, for it  has  already vested  thereunder by a fiction.  It follows that the  peti- tioners  have no interest in the share of Abdul Latif  Hajee Esmail in the firm which had vested in the Custodian. (1)  [1961]  2 S. C. R. 91, 104.  143 That apart, after the Central Act 31 of 1950 came into force on April 17, 1950, the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee  Property (Judicial), Allahabad, made an order on the objections filed by the firm.  Therein he held that the share of Abdul  Latif Hajee Esmail in the firm, i.e., 5 annas out of 19 annas  and 3 pies, vested in the Custodian and on that finding declared it  to  be evacuee property.  That order had  become  final. The firm did not take any further proceedings under the  Act to  set aside that order which bad become final.  It  is  no longer open to it to question this finding.  It follows that the  petitioners have no fundamental right in regard to  the interest of Abdul Latif Hajee Esmail in the partnership. But this will not dispose of the petition.  The petition  is not  solely based upon the fundamental right in  respect  of the   interest  of  Abdul  Latif  Hajee  Esmail,   for   the allegations  made in the petition and the reliefs asked  for disclose that the petitioners’ case is that the  fundamental right  of  the  firm and its partners is  infringed  by  the impugned  orders  in the manner mentioned in  the  petition. But the reliefs asked for are similar to those asked for  in

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the  appeals.  As we are remanding the appeals to  the  High Court for decision on merits, the other questions raised  in the writ petition can more conveniently be disposed of  only after the High Court gives its findings on the other  points raised  in the appeals.  If the appeals succeed in the  High Court,  this writ petition will become unnecessary; if  they fail,  the  findings  therein will be binding  in  the  writ petition.   In  that  event, if appeals are  filed  in  this Court,  the questions will be finally decided  therein.   In these  circumstances  we dismiss the writ  petition  without prejudice to the petitioners’ personal rights which we  will presently  consider  in  the appeals.  This  order  will  be subject  to  the  final orders that may  be  passed  in  the petitions by the High Court pursuant to the order of  remand that  we are making in the appeals.  There will be no  order as to costs. Now  coming  to the appeals, the High  Court,  as  indicated earlier, dismissed the writ petitions on the ground that  it hid  no jurisdiction to issue a writ against  the  Appellate Officer  in whose order the order of the  Competent  Officer had  merged, as he held his office outside  the  territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Uttar Pradesh. To  appreciate this argument it is necessary to  state  some relevant  facts.  The Competent Officer of Kanpur  who  made the order dated November 10, 1959, has his office at  Kanpur in  Uttar Pradesh.  The Appellate Officer, who by his  order dated April 25, 1960, dismissed the appeal against the order of  the  Competent Officer, has his office  located  at  New Delhi.  In the memo- 144 randum  of  appeal  filed  by  the  appellants  before   the Appellate  Officer the location of his office was  described thus .               "In the Court of the Appellate Officer.  Under               the  Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act,  1951.               Ministry  of  Rehabilitation.   Government  of               India, Dilaram Place, Mussoorie."               In  the  order of the Appellate  Officer,  the               said Officer is described thus :               "Shri  Parshottam Swarup,  Appellate  Officer,               India." It also shows that the appeal was heard and the judgment was delivered  at Allahabad.  In the counter-affidavit filed  in the  writ petition on behalf of the Appellate Officer it  is stated  in  paras  4(a)  and 4(b) that  the  office  of  the Appellate Officer is situated at New Delhi and the record of the  Appellate  Court is kept at Delhi.   In  the  rejoinder affidavit  filed  by the appellants it is averred  that  the Appellate  Officer to whom the appeal was presented had  his head-office at Mussoorie, that he was appointed by the State Government  and  that he gave his decision at  Allahabad  on April 25, 1960.  From the aforesaid affidavits the following facts emerge : The Competent Officer’s office is at  Lucknow and  he made his order at Lucknow.  The  Appellate  Officer, who  was  appointed by the State Government,  had  his  main office  at Mussoorie in Uttar Pradesh, heard the  appeal  at Allahabad and dismissed it there.  Later on, his main office was shifted to Delhi.  Section 2(a) of the Evacuee  Interest (Separation)  Act,  1951  (Act  No.  64  of  1951)   defines "appellate officer" thus :               "  a   appellate"  officer  means  an  officer               appointed as such               by the State Government under section 13." Under  s. 13 of the said Act, the State Government with  the approval  of the Central Government may, by notification  in

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the Official Gazette, appoint as many appellate officers  as may be necessary for the purpose of hearing appeals  against the  orders  of  the competent  officers  and  an  appellate officer  shall  have jurisdiction over such  local  area  or areas as may be specified in the notification.  Sections  14 to  18  provide for filing of appeals and  also  define  the powers of the competent appellate officers in the matter  of disposing of those appeals.  The Appellate Officer therefore derives  his  jurisdiction  under a  State  statute,  he  is appointed  by the State Government, though  in  consultation with The Central Government, and exercises his  jurisdiction within the territorial limits of the High Court.  It appears that the same officer is also appointed by other States  and that  for convenience his office is now situated  at  Delhi, though he disposes of appeals pertaining to each State  only in that State.  145 On  these facts the question arises whether the  High  Court of,Allahabad has jurisdiction to issue a writ under Art. 226 of  the Constitution against the Appellate Officer.  It  has now   been  well  settled  that  under  Art.  226   of   the Constitution,  before it was amended, the High Court had  no jurisdiction to issue a writ thereunder against a person  or authority  unless  the person or authority  resided  or  was located   within   the  territorial  jurisdiction   of   the appropriate High Court : See Election Commission,, India  v. Saka  Veniata Subba Rao(1) and Lt.  Col.  Khajoor  Singh  v. The  Union of India(2).  In the context of  jurisdiction  of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari against  orders made  by  .  a hierarchy of tribunals  or  authorities,  two situations arise namely, (1) where the order of an appellate authority  or  tribunal,  having  its  office  outside   the territorial  jurisdiction of the High Court, is  a  nullity, and  (ii) where the order of the original  authority  within the  territorial jurisdiction of the High Court merges  with that  of  the appellate authority  outside  its  territorial jurisdiction, in the former case the appropriate High  Court can issue a writ against the order of the original authority and  in the latter it cannot see, A. Thangal Kunju  Musaliar v.  V. Venkitachalam Pott(3); Collector of Customs  v.  East India Commercial Company (4) and Shriram Jhunjhunwala v. The State  of Bombay(,).  This Court has also held that  in  all cases  after  the appellate authority has  disposed  of  the appeal.  the  operative  order was of  the  final  authority whether it has reversed, modified or confirmed the  original orders  : see Collector of Customs v. East India  Commercial Company(4).  Though Das, C.J., in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh(6), was not able to equate the orders  made in  departmental enquiries with decrees in civil  courts  in the  context  of  the  doctrine of  merger,  this  Court  in Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co., Ltd.  (4  )  distinguished  that  case  with  the  following observations at p. 573               "That   case  was  not  concerned   with   the               territorial  jurisdiction  of the  High  Court               where  the original authority is  within  such               territorial  jurisdiction while the  appellate               authority   is  not  and  must  therefore   be               confined  to the special facts with  which  it               was dealing." In  that case the Court held that, as the Central  Board  of Revenue  which had confirmed the order of the  Collector  of Customs had its office in New Delhi, the Calcutta High Court could not issue a writ against it.  But in none of the cases the  Court  considered  a  situation  similar  to  that  now

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presented  to us.  They dealt with the case of an  appellate authority  or  tribunal  which bad  been  appointed  by  the Central Government and was disposing of only (1) [1953] S.C.R. 1144.  (2) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 828. (3) [1955] 2S.C.R. 1196. (4) [1963] 2 S .C.R. 563. (5) A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 670. (6) (1958] S.C.R. 595, 610. 146 statutory  appeals or other proceedings in a  place  outside the  territorial jurisdiction of the concerned  High  Court, though in one of the cases, i.e., Election Commission, India v.  Saka  Venkata Subba Rao(1), the  Central  Authority  for convenience heard the parties and made the order within  the territorial  jurisdiction of the High Court.  In  all  these cases  the appellate authority, both factually and  legally; had  its  residence  or  location  outside  the  territorial jurisdiction  of the High Court.  But in the  present  case, the  appellate authority, though for convenience  is  having its  head  office  in New Delhi, is  factually  and  legally functioning  under  the  State Act  within  the  territorial jurisdiction  of  the  High Court.  To  hold  that  such  an authority  which  is appointed by the State  Government  and holds office, entertains and disposes of appeals within  the State  is outside the jurisdiction of the High Court  is  to carry  technicality beyond reasonable limits.  One can  hold reasonably  that  such  an appellate  authority  is  located within  the  territorial limits of the High  Court  for  the purpose of disposing of the appeals under the Act.  This  is a  converse case where legally and factually  the  appellate authority is located in the State though for convenience  it also  holds  office  in New Delhi,  as  presumbly  the  same officer has been appointed appellate officer by other States under  different  Acts.  We, therefore, hold that  the  High Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ in appropriate  cases against such an authority under Art. 226. In the result, the order of the High Court is set aside  and the  appeals are remanded to it for disposal  in  accordance with law.  Costs will abide the result. G.C.                                    Appeal remanded (1) [1953] 3 S.C.R. 1144. 147