24 October 2008
Supreme Court
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M/S. EVEREST HOLDING LTD. Vs SHYAM KUMAR SHRIVASTAVA .

Bench: MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA
Case number: ARBIT.CASE(C) No.-000013-000013 / 2007
Diary number: 31784 / 2006
Advocates: Vs KHAITAN & CO.


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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

ARBITRATION PETITON NO. 13 OF 2007

M/s. Everest Holding Ltd.                                                   …. Petitioner

Versus

Shyam Kumar Shrivastava & Ors.                                          …. Respondents

O R D E R

Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.

1. This Order would dispose of the petition filed by the petitioner praying

for  appointment  of  an  arbitrator  under  Section  11(6)  and  (9)  of  the

Arbitration  and Conciliation  Act,  1996 (hereinafter  referred to  as  ‘the

Act’)  in  terms of  the  Arbitration  Agreement entered into between the

parties.   

2. The  petitioner  is  a  foreign  company  incorporated  under  the  laws  of

China having its office at Hong Kong whereas the respondent no. 1 is a

citizen of India and Chairman of respondent no. 2 - Shrivastava Group of

Companies.  Respondent Nos. 3 to 5 are the companies of Shrivastava

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Group and respondent  nos.  6 and 7 are  partnership  firms carrying  on

business under the name of Shrivastava Group.  The respondent no. 8,

also arrayed as party to the petition, is a company formed under the Joint

Venture  Agreement  (for  short  ‘JVA’)  between  the  petitioner  and

respondent  no.  1.  The  said  company was  incorporated  and  registered

under  the  provisions  of  the  Indian  Companies  Act,  1956.  However,

during the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings the name of respondent

no. 8 was deleted from the array of parties.  

3. On 08.09.2003, an agreement of cooperation was entered into between

the petitioner on one hand and respondent no. 1 on the other hand for the

purpose of providing cooperation and also for exports of iron ore from

mines  belonging  to  Shrivastava  Group.   Pursuant  to  the  above

agreement,  a JVA was executed on 25.09.2003 between the petitioner

and respondent no. 1 for the purpose of mining, processing and export of

iron ore.  On 26.03.2004 another JVA was executed between the parties,

particularly, to iron out certain controversies in respect of the JVA dated

25.09.2003.  Article 14.3 of the said JVA, which is an arbitration clause,

reads as follows:

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“If  the  parties  fail  to  resolve  the  matter  through  mutual agreement,  the  dispute  shall  be  referred  to  an  Arbitrator appointed  by mutual  agreement  of  the  two parties.   Such Arbitrator shall be a retired High Court or Supreme Court Judge; such arbitration proceedings shall be completed and Award  be  given  within  three  months  of  the  Arbitrator’s appointment; the cost of such arbitration would be shared equally  by  the  two  parties.   The  arbitration  proceedings shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or any subsequent enactment or amendment thereto.  The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the parties.”

4. The  stand  of  the  petitioner  in  the  petition  is  that  the  whole  idea  of

signing  the  JVA and  constituting  a  company  under  the  JVA was  to

promote the business of the petitioner in trading the iron ore in foreign

countries  and  to  secure  a  firm supply base  for  international  trade  for

mining,  processing  and  export  of  iron  ore.   Consequent  thereto  on

execution  of  the  aforesaid  agreement  a  company under  the  name and

style  of  Everest  Mining  &  Mineral  Pvt.  Ltd.  was  incorporated  on

02.06.2004.  The petitioner has stated in the petition that Focus Trading

Company Ltd., a sister concern of the petitioner company advanced an

amount of  US $ 450,000 on behalf of the petitioner to respondent no. 3

company  towards  capital  investment  on  18.02.2004.   Thereafter  on

29.07.2004,  it  is  stated  that  another  sister  concern  of  the  petitioner,

namely,  AMJ  Marketing  paid  to  respondent  no.  3  on  behalf  of  the

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petitioner, further amounts of Rs. 51,00,000/-, Rs. 50,00,000/- and   Rs.

24,00,000/- totaling to Rs. 1,25,00,000/- towards interest free deposit for

the benefit of the newly incorporated company, namely, Everest Mining

& Mineral Pvt. Ltd. – respondent no. 8.  

It is also the stand of the petitioner that on 20.09.2004 the petitioner

was shocked and surprised to receive unwarranted notice for cancellation of

JVA from respondent no. 3 on the ground of reduction of FOBT price which

according to respondent no. 3 had brought about an alarming situation for

the JVA.  In the said notice, the petitioner was further informed that Reserve

Bank of India had hesitated to consider reduction of aforesaid price and that

the  Reserve  Bank  of  India  would  never  approve  JVA between  both  the

companies.   The  aforesaid  notice  was  received  and  rightly  replied  on

06.10.2004, wherein it was pointed out to respondent no. 3 that reduction of

price of the consignment had not only caused loss to respondent no. 3 but

also to M/s.  Focus Trading Company Ltd.  It  was further  pointed out  to

respondent no. 3 that future of the JVA should not be jeopardized only on

account of the said event, particularly, when both the parties had invested

enormous time and energy in establishing the Joint Venture.  By the said

reply  the  respondent  no.  3  was  requested  to  withdraw  the  letter  of

cancellation.   

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On  04.11.2004,  the  sister  concern  of  the  petitioner,  namely,

M/s. Focus Trading Company Ltd. and its director Mr. J.M. Sahai received a

legal notice from the advocate of respondent no. 2 demanding an amount of

rupees US $ 5,03,319 with 14% interest towards the reduction of price in

the shipment supplied through the vessel named M.V. LUO – QUING.  The

petitioner pointed out in the reply to the aforesaid notice that the petitioner

is willing to cooperate and resolve the issues provided the said issues are

within the JVA.  However,  the  said  issues  could not  be resolved as  the

respondents  were  not  willing  to  resolve  the  same.   Consequently  on

15.12.2004 the petitioner sent a request to the respondent no. 1 to refund the

amount of security deposit  of US $ 725,000, US $ 11,000 paid as equity

contribution  and  Rs.  25,00,000/-  paid  towards  working  expenses  of

respondent no. 8 with interest @ 18% per annum within one week from the

date of receipt of the aforesaid notice.  A lawyers’ notice in respect of the

same was also sent on 14.05.2005.   

As no amount  was  refunded,  the petitioner  invoked the arbitration

clause  as  contained  in  the  JVA  and  a  notice  to  that  effect  was  issued

requesting for appointment of an arbitrator under letter dated 16.09.2006.

In the said letter, the petitioner proposed the name of Justice J.C. Gupta,

retired Judge of Allahabad High Court to be the Presiding Arbitrator and

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respondent no. 1 was requested to concur with the said name proposed by

the petitioner.  The respondent no. 1, however, through his lawyer’s reply

dated 12.10.2006 categorically refuted the claim of the petitioner and also

refused to refer the matter to arbitration on the ground that the JVA between

the petitioner and the respondent no. 1 is not in existence as the same had

been  terminated  by respondent  no.  2.   It  was  stated  that  in  view of  the

aforesaid position there could be no invocation of clause 14.3 of the JVA.  

5.  In view of the aforesaid position and the stand of the parties, the present

petition was filed by the petitioner with a prayer for appointment of an

arbitrator and for referring all the disputes between the parties arising out

of JVA to the said arbitrator for adjudication and decision.   

6. Notice was issued and on receipt  the  respondents  entered appearance.

However, during the pendency of the petition, the respondent no. 8 could

not be served as the address of respondent no. 8 - the JVA Company,

mentioned  in  the  petition  was  not  correct  and  therefore  the  name of

respondent no. 8 stood deleted from the array of parties by the order of

this Court dated 28.02.2008.  All the other respondents are represented in

the petition through their counsel.  

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7. I heard the counsel appearing for the parties who drew my attention to

various documents on record.  According to the petitioner a Long Term

Agreement of Co-operation dated 08.09.2003 was executed between the

parties, pursuant to which a JVA was entered into and a Joint Venture

Company was also incorporated in India.  My attention was drawn to the

said JVA containing an arbitration clause, in terms of which, any dispute

or difference that arises between the parties is required to be adjudicated

and decided through the process of arbitration.  It was submitted by the

counsel  for the petitioner  that  since in  the  present  case  disputes  have

arisen between the parties in connection with the matters pertaining to

the JVA, therefore, all the said disputes are required to be referred for

adjudication to the arbitration by appointing an arbitrator.   

8. Upon careful perusal of the petition filed under Section 11(6) and (9) of

the Act and upon hearing the counsel appearing for the parties it could

be deduced that the petitioner is mainly confining its claim for refund of

the money paid/deposited pursuant to and in execution of JVA and also

amount paid towards working expenses of respondent no. 8 with interest

@ 18% per annum.  In the petition details of the amount as paid by the

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petitioner towards JVA are also furnished, wherein it is stated that M/s.

Focus Trading Company Ltd., a sister concern of the petitioner company

even prior to the singing of JVA on 18.02.2004 advanced an amount of

US $ 450,000 to respondent no. 3 company i.e. the Deccan Minerals Pvt.

Ltd. towards capital investment.  The receipt of the aforesaid amount is

in fact recorded in the JVA itself, under Article 4, clause 4.2.(b)(i).  It is,

therefore, contended that the said payment made, also forms part of the

dispute pertaining to the JVA.  The petitioner has also pleaded that on

29.07.2004  another  sister  concern  of  the  petitioner,  namely,  AMJ

Marketing paid to the respondent no. 3 on account of interest fee deposit

an amount  of  1,25,00,000/-  by making payment in installments  in the

following manner, vide cheque No. 004442 dated 27.7.2004 an amount

of Rs. 50,00,000/-, cheque No. 004443 dated 29.7.2004 an amount of Rs.

51,00,000 and cheque No.  048815 dated  16.9.2004 an amount  of  Rs.

24,00,000/-.   

9. The  aforesaid  claims  of  the  petitioner  are,  however,  refuted  by  the

respondents  contending  inter  alia  that  some  of  the  aforesaid  claims

which  are  mentioned  in  the  petition  and  also  in  the  correspondences

between the parties do not arise out of the JVA and they are relatable to

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other agreements and concern dealings between the sister concerns of the

petitioner  and  sister  concerns  of  the  respondents,  and  therefore,  they

cannot be said to be a part of the disputes arising out of the JVA between

the parties.   It  was  submitted  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  that  there

could neither be bifurcation of parties nor of matter and such bifurcation

is  not  permissible  under the  existing law, and therefore,  the  aforesaid

petition cannot be entertained.  It was also submitted by the counsel for

the respondent that the said JVA although came into existence and in

pursuance of the said agreement a company, respondent no. 8, came into

existence but there was no transaction at all of the company and the said

JVA  was  cancelled  and  terminated  w.e.f.  20.9.2004,  and  therefore,

neither  the agreement  was in existence nor the arbitration  clause,  and

therefore,  invocation  of  clause  14.3  of  the  said  agreement  by  the

petitioner is wrong and without jurisdiction.  

10.The aforesaid submissions of the parties have been noticed by me and I

have  carefully  perused  the  various  documents  which  are  placed  on

record.  The JVA, which is the subject matter of the disputes between the

parties was dated 26.03.2004 and the same was entered into and between

M/s.  Everest  Holding  Ltd.  and  Shri  Shyam Kumar  Shrivastava  along

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with the Mining Companies  as  indicated  in  Article  1 constituting  the

Shrivastava  Group.   In  the  said  JVA “Mining  Companies”  which  are

referred  to  in  the  agreement,  are  the  following  companies

owned/controlled by Shrivastava Group:  (a) M/s.  The Deccan Minerals

Private Limited;  (b) M/s. New India Mining Corporation Pvt. Ltd. (c)

Minerals and Metals; (d) M/s. Raw and Finished Product; and (e) M/s.

The  Champion  India  Industries  Pvt.  Ltd.   By  the  aforesaid  JVA the

parties  have  expressed  their  intention  to  form  and  register  a  Joint

Venture Company with equal equity participation at the earliest possible

date for the purposes of carrying on the business as mentioned in the said

agreement.   The  incorporation  of  the  company  was  in  the  name  of

“Everest  Mining  &  Mineral  Pvt.  Ltd.”  which  was  incorporated  with

initial  authorized capital of Rs. 50,00,000/-.  Both the parties, namely,

Shrivastava Group and M/s.  Everest  Holding Ltd. agreed to capitalize

the Joint Venture Company up to Rs. 10,00,000/- and that each party was

required to subscribe to 50,000 equity shares of Rs. 10/- each.  In the

said clause, namely, clause 3.3, the parties also agreed that the aforesaid

shares  could  be  subscribed  by  either  of  the  parties  itself  or  by  its

affiliates and that the shareholding of the affiliates should be included in

the shareholding of the party and each party should ensure that each such

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affiliates would be bound by and comply with the terms and conditions

of the agreement.  Therefore, in the said JVA not only the parties are

recognized but their affiliates are also recognized as it is intended that

the affiliates also could make the subscription on behalf of the parties.   

11.The said JVA, which is an admitted document on behalf of the parties

also stipulates  that  an amount of Rs.  US $ 450,000 had already been

deposited by M/s. Everest Holding Ltd. with Shrivastava Group, paid by

Telegraphic Transfer to Deccan Minerals Pvt. Ltd., which is one of the

mining companies  owned and controlled by respondent  no.  1 and the

receipt of the said amount is also acknowledged by respondent no. 1.

12.There is another clause in the Agreement, namely, 14.2 which stipulates

that  the  parties  agreed  that  they  would  use  all  reasonable  efforts  to

resolve the dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this

agreement, other than a dispute, the resolution of which is specifically

provided for in that Agreement.  I have already extracted clause 14.3 of

the  JVA,  which  stipulates  that  if  there  is  any  dispute  or  difference

between the parties and they fail to resolve the matter through mutual

agreement,  the  dispute  shall  be  referred  to  an  arbitrator  appointed  by

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mutual agreement of the two parties.  It is also stated that the venue for

arbitration will be New Delhi and the language used shall be English,

which is clause 14.4 of the JVA.   

13.When a petition is filed under Section 11 of the Act, particularly, under

sub-sections (6) and (8), certain preliminary matters are required to be

determined by the Chief Justice or his designate.  In  SBP & CP  .    v.

Patel Engineering Ltd. and Another reported in (2005) 8 SCC 618, per

majority (6:1) it was held that the powers to be exercised by the Chief

Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India under Section 11

(6) of the Act are not an administrative power and it is judicial power.  It

was  also  held  in  the  said  decision  that  while  exercising  power  of

performing the duty under Section 11(6) of the Act, the Chief Justice has

to  consider  whether  the  conditions  laid  down  by  the  section  for  the

exercise of that power or the  performance of that duty, exists or not and

consequent thereto a Chief Justice or the person or institution designated

by him, is bound to decide whether he has jurisdiction to entertain the

request,  in  the  sense,  whether  the  parties  making  the  motion  has

approached  the  right  High  Court,  whether  there  is  a  valid  arbitration

agreement in terms of Section 7 of the Act and whether the person before

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him with the request is a party to the arbitration agreement or whether

there was no dispute subsisting which was capable of being arbitrated

upon.  It was also held in the said decision that the Chief Justice can also

decide the question whether the claim was a dead one; or a long barred

claim that  was sought  to  be resurrected  and  whether  the  parties  have

concluded the transaction by recording satisfaction of their mutual rights

and  obligations  or  by  receiving  the  final  payment  without  objection.

This Court,  however, issued a caution that at that  stage it  may not be

possible to decide whether a live claim made is one which comes within

the purview of the arbitration clause and that it would be appropriate to

leave  that  question  to  be  decided  by the  Arbitral  Tribunal  on  taking

evidence, along with the merits of the claims involved in the arbitration.

The decision further laid down that on coming to a conclusion on these

aspects,  the  Chief  Justice  or  his  designate  has to  enquire whether  the

conditions for exercise of his power under Section 11(6) of the Act have

been  fulfilled;  and  if  an  arbitrator  is  to  be  appointed,  who  is  the  fit

person, in terms of the provision.  

 

14.Therefore, the present enquiry, which is entrusted to me in the present

case, under the provisions of Section 11 (6) of the Act would revolve

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around  the  aforesaid  aspects  which  are  dealt  with  in  the  aforesaid

decision.  There is no dispute raised by the respondents that this Court

has no jurisdiction to decide the issues raised in the petition.  There is

also a valid arbitration agreement.  Clause 14.3 of the JVA requires that

if  there  is  any  dispute  between  the  parties  in  respect  of  the  matters

relating  the  JVA,  the  same  is  required  to  be  adjudicated  upon  and

decided  through  the  process  of  arbitration  and  the  decision  of  the

arbitrator  shall  be  final  and  binding  upon  the  parties.   The  aforesaid

clause is neither disputed nor questioned before me.  

15.The dispute is in relation to the amount which is stated to be paid by the

petitioner  or  its  sister  concerns.   It  is  contended  on  behalf  of  the

respondents  that  the  said  issues  cannot  be  a  part  of  the  Arbitration

Agreement and the same are not subject matter of disputes arising out of

the  JVA.   According  to  the  respondents,  the  said  disputes  relate  to

transactions not between the parties to the agreement but between other

parties,  namely, sister  concerns of the petitioner  and respondents,  and

therefore,  they  cannot  form  part  of  the  dispute  arising  out  of  or  in

relation to the JVA.  In support of the said contention the counsel for the

respondents relied upon the decision of this Court in Sukanya Holdings

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(P) Ltd. v.  Jayesh H. Pandya and Another reported in (2003) 5 SCC

531.  In the said decision it was held that when the subject matter of the

suit includes subject matter of the arbitration agreement as well as other

disputes, there is no requirement under the Act that even such matter is

required  to  be  referred  to  arbitration.   There  is  also  no  provision  for

splitting the causes of action or parties and referring the subject matter of

the suit to the arbitrators.  The learned counsel appearing for the party,

particularly, relied upon paragraph 16 of the judgment which reads as

under:

“The next question which requires consideration is – even if there  is  no  provision  for  partly  referring  the  dispute  to arbitration, whether such a course is possible under Section 8 of the Act.  In our view, it would be difficult to give an interpretation  to  Section 8 under which bifurcation  of  the cause of action, that is to say, the subject-matter of the suit or in some cases bifurcation of the suit between parties who are  parties  to  the  arbitration  agreement  and  others  is possible.   This  would  be  laying  down  a  totally  new procedure not contemplated under the Act.  If bifurcation of the subject-matter of a suit was contemplated, the legislature would  have  used  appropriate  language  to  permit  such  a course.  Since there is no such indication in the language, it follows that  bifurcation  of the  subject-matter  of an action before a judicial authority is not allowed”.

In paragraph 17 of the said judgment it was held as follows:

“Secondly, such bifurcation of suit in two parts, one to be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal and the other to be decided

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by the civil  court  would inevitably delay the proceedings. The  whole  purpose  of  speedy  disposal  of  dispute  and decreasing the cost of litigation would be frustrated by such procedure.  It would also increase the cost of litigation and harassment  to  the  parties  and  on  occasions  there  is possibility  of  conflicting  judgments  and  orders  by  two different forums”.

It was also contended that return of the amount paid by the petitioner

as equity contribution towards constitution of the JVC is a matter relating to

winding  up  of  the  company,  and  therefore,  the  arbitrator  will  have  no

jurisdiction to order winding up of a company since such power is conferred

on and vested on a court as envisaged under the Companies Act, 1956.   

16.The  decision  of  this  Court  in  Sukanya  Holdings  (P)  Ltd.  (supra),

however, came to be distinguished in a subsequent decision of this Court

in  Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v.  Verma Transport Co.,  reported in

(2006)  7  SCC 275.   In  order  to  pinpoint  the  distinction  drawn,  it  is

necessary to extract paragraphs 23, 45 and 47 of the Judgment, which are

as under:

“23…..Once  the  conditions  precedent  contained  in  the said proceedings are satisfied, the judicial authority is statutorily mandated to refer the matter to arbitration.  What is necessary to be looked into therefore, inter alia, would be as to whether

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the subject-matter of the dispute is covered by the arbitration agreement or not.

            

45. Reliance  placed  by  the  learned  counsel  on  Sukanya Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya is misplaced.  Therein, not  only a suit  for  dissolution  of  the  firm was filed,  but  a different cause of action had arisen in relation whereto apart from the parties to the arbitration agreement, other parties had also been impleaded. In the aforementioned fact situation, this Court held: (SCC p. 535, para 13)

“13. Secondly, there is no provision in the Act that when  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit  includes subject-matter of the arbitration agreement as well as  other  disputes,  the  matter  is  required  to  be referred to arbitration. There is also no provision for splitting the cause or parties and referring the subject-matter of the suit to the arbitrators.”

47. Such a question does not arise herein as the parties herein are  parties  to  the arbitration  agreement and the  question  in regard  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  arbitrator,  if  any,  can  be determined by the arbitrator himself in terms of Section 16 of the 1996 Act”.

17.In  the  light  of  the  aforesaid  factual  and  legal  position,  I  am of  the

considered opinion that  there is a valid arbitration agreement between

the parties  as contained in the JVA, which the parties  are required to

adhere to and are bound by the same.  In other words, if there is any

dispute between the parties to the agreement arising out of or in relation

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to the subject matter of the said JVA, all such disputes and differences

have  to  be  adjudicated  upon  and  decided  through  the  process  of

arbitration by appointing a mutually agreed arbitrator.  Pursuant to the

aforesaid JVA dated 26.03.2004 Everest Mining & Mineral Pvt. Ltd. was

incorporated and various amounts were also deposited by the petitioner

through sister concerns for the incorporation and functioning of the said

company.  The said company could not function due to disputes which

arose between the parties.  Such disputes which relate to the working of

JVA and various deposits made and which arose out of and in relation to

the  said  JVA are  required  to  be  considered  and  decided  through  the

process  of  arbitration  as  envisaged  under  clause  14.3  of  the  JVA.

Though the JVA may have been terminated and cancelled as stated but it

was a valid JVA containing a valid arbitration agreement for settlement

of disputes arising out of or in relation to the subject matter of the JVA.

The argument of the respondent that the disputes cannot be referred to

the  arbitration  as  the  agreement  is  not  in  existence  as  of  today  is

therefore devoid of merit.   

18. It is true that the arbitrator would have no power to order for winding up

of the company as such power is conferred on and vested with a court as

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envisaged under the Companies Act in view of the decision of this Court

in Haryana Telecom Ltd. v. Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. [(1999) 5

SCC 688].  But in terms of the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator can

always  find  out  and  adjudicate  as  to  whether  or  not  a  Company  is

functional and if it was not functional in that event he could always find

out the nature and status of its assets and can also issue direction and

pass orders regarding dues and liabilities and also for taking recourse to

appropriate remedy.  

  

19.All such disputes whether relating to payment towards security deposit,

deposited  by  the  petitioner  or  on  its  behalf  and  also  relating  to

contribution made towards equity contribution or working expenses, if

any, to be returned or not and if so, what amount should be returned are

to be decided and adjudicated upon through the process of arbitration as

agreed upon by the  parties  in  the  JVA.  Contributions  made towards

execution  of  the  JVA  and  for  the  functioning  of  the  Joint  Venture

Company by party or on its behalf by its affiliates whether would and

should be treated as contributions made by the party in specific term and

clause  in  the  JVA  are  also  matters  to  be  adjudicated  upon  by  the

arbitrator.  It is to be noted at this stage that in the JVA it was agreed to

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by the parties  hereto that  the  equity shares  of  the  Company could  be

subscribed  by  either  of  the  parties  or  by  its  affiliates  and  that

shareholding of its  affiliates  should be considered as shareholdings  of

the party to the extent it  is recognized.  The affiliates were also made

bound by the terms and conditions of the agreement.   Therefore, in my

considered opinion, the disputes which arise out of JVA, if referred to an

arbitrator would not in any manner amount to bifurcation of the causes of

action or bifurcation of parties.   

20.There  could  be  other  disputes  between  the  sister  concerns  of  the

appellant  and  the  respondent  arising  out  of  separate  and  independent

agreements.  Such disputes would have to be decided and adjudicated

upon in accordance with law.  But all such disputes which are identified

and mentioned hereinbefore and which arise  out  of  and in  relation  to

JVA have to be and must be decided by appointing an arbitrator in terms

of the arbitration agreement.   

21.During the course of the arguments the parties have agreed that in case

the Court decides to refer the disputes to the arbitrator in that event the

same may be referred to Justice V.N. Khare, retired Chief Justice of this

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Court for adjudication and decision.  The parties mutually agreed for him

as  the  arbitrator  for  deciding  these  issues.   Consequent  to  the  said

agreement,  I  appoint  Justice  V.N. Khare,  retired  Chief  Justice  of  this

Court as the sole arbitrator with a request to him to decide the disputes

between the parties arising out of the JVA as expeditiously as possible.

It shall be open for the learned Arbitrator to fix his remuneration after

discussing with the parties.   

22.Accordingly, the petition is disposed of. It goes without saying that the

observations made herein are only for the purpose of deciding the issue

as to  whether  or not  the disputes  should be referred to  the arbitrator.

Necessarily any observation made herein would not be construed as any

views or opinion expressed on the merit of the claims.    

  

……………………………J. (Dr. Mukundakam Sharma)

New Delhi October 24, 2008

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