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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1389 of 2007

PETITIONER: M/S DURGA HOTEL COMPLEX

RESPONDENT: RESERVE BANK OF INDIA & ORS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/03/2007

BENCH: H.K. SEMA & P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 10075-10076 of 2005)

P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.

               Leave granted. 1.              The appellant, a partnership firm, sought a loan  from the third respondent \026 Bank for putting up a hotel.  In  April 1997, a loan of Rs. 15 lakhs was sanctioned by the  Bank.  The Bank disbursed a sum of Rs. 11,58,750/-.  The  appellant sought an additional advance.  The proposal in that  behalf was not accepted by the Bank.  The Bank recalled the  loan after crediting Rs. 3,41,250/- out of the original loan  sanctioned.   

2.              The appellant made a complaint before the Banking  Ombudsman for the State of Bihar at Patna under clause 16 of  the Banking Ombudsman Scheme, 1995.  Clause 16 enabled  any person, who had a grievance against the Bank, to make a  complaint in writing to the Banking Ombudsman.  The  complaint had to be in writing and it had to be accompanied  by supporting documents, if any, relied on by the  complainant.  It had also to set out the nature and extent of  the loss caused to the complainant and the relief sought from  the Banking Ombudsman and a statement about the  compliance of the conditions referred to in that clause.   The  appellant made the complaint about what it called the  unauthorised or fraudulent withdrawal from the account of  the appellant and the non credit of proceeds to the account of  the appellant.  It was contended that the crediting of Rs.  3,41,250/- or withdrawal thereof from the account of the  appellant was unauthorised, and that the appellant had  suffered considerable loss because of the delay on the part of  the respondent \026 Bank in advancing the loan and in not  permitting the higher credit facility recommended in the  Technical Cell Report binding on the Bank.  By way of relief it  was claimed that the Bank should further credit the remaining  sanctioned loan to the account of the appellant.  The total  interest for the period should be exempted and there should  be a direction to pay towards loss of the appellant a sum of Rs.  16.9 lakhs.  The respondent \026 Bank opposed the complaint.   The respondent \026 Bank questioned the jurisdiction of the  Banking Ombudsman to entertain such a complaint.  It  contended that the jurisdiction of the Banking Ombudsman  was confined to certain matters specified in that behalf and  the claims of the appellant were not within the purview of the  Banking Ombudsman.  

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3.              On 1.11.2000, the respondent \026 Bank approached  the Debts Recovery Tribunal constituted under the Recovery of  Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for  short, "the Recovery of Debts Act") for recovery of amounts  alleged to be due from the appellant.  The complaint of the  Bank was numbered as O.A. No. 157 of 2000 and was being  dealt with by the Tribunal.   4.              Before the Banking Ombudsman, the Bank, inter  alia, contended that the complaint of the appellant before him  had ceased to be maintainable in view of the pendency of the  proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and that, even  otherwise, the claims raised by the appellant did not come  within the purview of the Banking Ombudsman under the  Banking Ombudsman Scheme, 1995.  It was contended that  the jurisdiction of the Banking Ombudsman was a limited one  and the claims of the appellant were not those that could be  entertained by him.  The Banking Ombudsman brushed aside  these contentions.  He found that his jurisdiction was invoked  by the appellant before the respondent \026 Bank approached the  Debts Recovery Tribunal with its claim and hence he was not  precluded from adjudicating on the complaint of the appellant  before him.  He also brushed aside the objection of the  respondent regarding his jurisdiction to entertain the  complaint made by the appellant.  The Banking Ombudsman  is seen to have made some suggestions or recommendations to  settle the dispute between the parties.  They were not  acceptable to the Bank.  The Banking Ombudsman thereupon  proceeded to pass an award directing disbursal of the sum of  Rs. 3,41,250/- to the complainant and directing the Bank to  make further advances in terms of the recommendations of  the concerned Cell of the State Bank of India maintaining  financing ratio of 75:25 between the Bank and the  complainant.  The Banking Ombudsman further directed that  the period of repayment should be fixed as seven years  exclusive of one year of moratorium and in view of non- disbursement of the loan, the period of moratorium had to be  enhanced according to the Rules and the interest be charged  strictly in accordance with the guidelines of the Reserve Bank  of India.  This award was passed on 30.3.2002.   

5.              The respondent \026 Bank sought the permission of the  Reserve Bank of India to challenge the award passed by the  Banking Ombudsman in a court of law.  Meanwhile, the  appellant found that the respondent \026 Bank was not  complying with the directions in the award of the Banking  Ombudsman.  The appellant therefore filed C.W.J.C. No.  10756 of 2002 before the High Court of Patna under Article  226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issue of a writ  of mandamus directing the respondent \026 Bank to implement  the award of the Banking Ombudsman.  The respondent \026  Bank, in its turn, filed C.W.J.C. 1882 of 2003 challenging the  award of the Banking Ombudsman essentially on the ground  that it was one without jurisdiction, both on the basis that the  matter was pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal when  he rendered his award and on the further ground that the  subject matter of adjudication by him in the present case was  beyond his ken under the Banking Ombudsman Scheme,  1995.  The learned single judge of the High Court upheld the  contentions of the respondent \026 Bank and held that on the  claim being filed by the respondent \026 Bank before the Debts  Recovery Tribunal as O.A. No. 157 of 2000, the jurisdiction of  the Banking Ombudsman to deal with the complaint of the  appellant had come to an end and on the further ground that  the Banking Ombudsman had exceeded his jurisdiction in  rendering the award since the disputes raised were beyond his

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purview.  As a consequence, the learned single judge allowed  the Writ Petition filed by the respondent \026 Bank and quashed  the award passed by the Banking Ombudsman leaving the  appellant to raise all his claims before the Debts Recovery  Tribunal, by way of a counter-claim.  Resultantly, the High  Court also dismissed the Writ Petition of the appellant seeking  enforcement of the award of the Banking Ombudsman.  Being  aggrieved by the decision of the learned single judge, the  appellant filed two Letters Patent Appeals in the High Court as  L.P.A. Nos. 309 and 313 of 2004.  The Division Bench of the  High Court agreed with the conclusions of the learned single  judge and dismissed the appeals filed by the appellant.   Feeling aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed these Petitions  for Special Leave to Appeal before this Court.  On 10.5.2005,  this Court while not entertaining the Petition of the appellant  on the merits of its claim, issued notice confined to the  questions of law arising in the case, clarifying at the same time  that the proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal could  proceed.  Thus, what is involved in this appeal is only the  question of the jurisdiction of the Banking Ombudsman and  not the merits of the claims of the appellant in the case on  hand.  Learned counsel also argued the appeal before us  consistent with the notice issued by this Court earlier.  

6.              Therefore, the two questions that arise are, whether  the subsequent filing of the claim by the Bank before the  Debts Recovery Tribunal would oust the jurisdiction of the  Banking Ombudsman in a complaint earlier instituted before  him and whether the claims put forward before the Banking  Ombudsman in its complaint by the appellant fell within the  jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under the Scheme and  consequently whether the directions issued by him were  within his province under the Scheme.  

7.              Before we proceed to deal with the arguments, we  will notice the relevant provisions.  Under Section 35A of the  Banking Regulation Act, 1949, the Reserve Bank of India has  the power to issue directions to banking companies generally  or to any banking company in particular, as it deems fit, and  the banking companies shall be bound to comply with such  directions.  The Reserve Bank of India could, on its own  motion or on representation made to it also modify or cancel  any direction it had earlier issued.  In consonance with this  power, on 14.6.1995, the Reserve Bank of India notified the  Banking Ombudsman Scheme, 1995.  We think it profitable to  extract the relevant Notification herein: "                       NOTIFICATION                 Ref. RCPC No. 1070/BOS-94-95             

14th June, 1995

In exercise of the powers conferred by Section  35A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 (10 of  1949), Reserve Bank being satisfied that it is  necessary in public interest and in the interest  of banking policy to provide for a system of  Banking Ombudsman for redressal of  grievances against deficiency in banking  services, concerning loans and advances and  other specified matters hereby directs that all  commercial banks should comply with the  Banking Ombudsman Scheme, 1995 annexed  hereto. Sd/- (R.V. Gupta)

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 Deputy Governor"

By a notification dated 15.6.1995, the Scheme was also  extended to Scheduled Primary Cooperative Banks.  Admittedly, the Scheme so notified, was in force at the  relevant time.  As per clause 2, the object of the Scheme was  to enable resolution of complaints relating to provision of  banking services and to facilitate the satisfaction, or  settlement of such complaints.  Under clause 4 of Chapter II,  the Reserve Bank of India could appoint a Banking  Ombudsman to carry out the functions entrusted to him by or  under the Scheme.  The Banking Ombudsman was to hold  office during the pleasure of the Governor of the Reserve Bank  of India.  Chapter III dealt with the jurisdiction, powers and  duties of the Banking Ombudsman.  Clause 12 provided that  the Banking Ombudsman had the power and duty to receive  complaints relating to the provision of banking services and to  consider such complaints and facilitate their satisfaction, or  settlement by agreement, by making a recommendation, or  Award in accordance with the Scheme.  Clause 13 specified  that as regards banking services, the authority of the Banking  Ombudsman would include all complaints concerning  deficiency in service such as, non-payment/inordinate delay in  the payment or collection of cheques, drafts/bills etc. The  other deficiencies that could be looked into on a complaint are  enumerated in clauses (ii) to (ix) to sub-clause (a) of Clause 13.   We are not concerned with them in the present case.  Since we  are concerned with a complaint regarding loan and advances,  we may extract the Clause with particular reference to clause  13(b), which has relevance thereto: "13. SPECIFIC AMBIT OF AUTHORITY                  As regards banking services, the Banking  Ombudsman’s authority will include:-  (a)     \005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005\005 (b)     Complaints concerning loans and  advances only insofar as they relate  to:- i)      non-observance of Reserve  Bank Directives on interest  rates,

ii)     delays in sanction/non- observance of prescribed time  schedule for disposal of loan  applications, and                

iii)    non-observance of any other  directions or instructions of  the Reserve Bank, as may be  specified for this purpose, from  time to time."

Under clause 14, the Banking Ombudsman had general  superintendence and control over his office and he had power  to incur expenditure on behalf of his office.  Chapter IV dealt  with the procedure for redressal of grievance.  Clause 16  provided for making a complaint. Since what is involved is an  interpretation of the scope of the power of the Ombudsman on  a complaint, we think it proper to extract Clause 16  hereunder:                 "16.    COMPLAINT  (1)     Any person who has a grievance  against a bank, may himself or  through an authorised  representative make a complaint in

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writing to the Banking Ombudsman  within whose jurisdiction the  branch or office of the bank  complained against is located.  

(2)     The complaint shall be in writing  duly signed by the complainant or  his authorised representative and  shall state clearly the name and  address of the complainant, the  name and address of the branch or  officer of the bank against which the  complaint is made, the facts giving  rise to the complaint supported by  documents, if any, relied on by the  complainant, the nature and extent  of the loss caused to the  complainant and the relief sought  from the Banking Ombudsman and  a statement about the compliance of  the conditions referred to in sub- clause (3) of this clause.  

(3)     No complaint to the Banking  Ombudsman shall lie unless,-

(a)     The complainant had before  making a complaint to the  Banking Ombudsman made a  written representation to the  bank named in the complaint  and either the bank had  rejected the complaint or the  complainant had not received  any reply within a period of  two months after the bank  concerned received his  representation or the  complainant is not satisfied  with the reply given to him by  the bank;

(b)     The complaint is made not  later than one year after the  bank had rejected the  representation or sent its final  reply on the representation of  the complainant;

(c)     The complaint is not in respect  of the same subject matter  which was settled through the  office of the Banking  Ombudsman in any previous  proceedings whether received  from the same complainant or  any one or more of the parties  concerned with the subject  matter;

(d)     The complaint is not the same  subject matter, for which any  proceedings before any Court,  Tribunal or Arbitrator or any  other forum is pending or a

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decree or Award or order of  dismissal has already been  passed by any such Court,  Tribunal, Arbitrator or forum;

(e)     The complaint is not frivolous  or vexatious in nature."

8.              As regards the first aspect as to whether the  Banking Ombudsman had lost his jurisdiction in view of the  approach made by the respondent \026 Bank to the Debts  Recovery Tribunal, what is relevant is clause 16(3)(d) quoted  above and as regards the question whether the Banking  Ombudsman had jurisdiction to entertain the claims made by  the appellant, what is involved is the understanding of the  scope of clause 13(b), quoted above.  

9.              It is clear that when the appellant invoked the  jurisdiction of the Banking Ombudsman, the respondent \026  Bank had not approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal with  its application for recovery of the amounts due under the loan  transaction.  Therefore, this was a case where on the day the  complaint was filed, no proceeding before any Tribunal on the  subject matter was pending or in which a final order had been  passed or decision rendered.  At the stage of initiation, there  was no impediment in the way of the Ombudsman in  entertaining the complaint or in proceeding with it.  The  impediment, if any, was caused by the Bank’s subsequent  filing of O.A. No. 157 of 2000 before the Debts Recovery  Tribunal.  The High Court has taken the view that since by the  time the Ombudsman rendered his award, the Bank had  already approached the Debts Recovery Tribunal with its claim  under the Recovery of Debts Act, the Banking Ombudsman  did not have jurisdiction to render the award, or has lost his  jurisdiction to render the award.  Clause 16 of the Scheme in  sub-clause (1) speaks of a person making a complaint in  writing to the Banking Ombudsman.  Clause (3)  read in  conjunction with sub-clause (d) indicates that no complaint to  the Banking Ombudsman shall lie if on the subject matter  that is put forward before the Ombudsman, there is a  proceeding pending before a Court, Arbitrator, Tribunal or  forum or a decree or final adjudication had earlier been made  by any one of them.  This would suggest that the bar is  attracted only when on the date of the filing of the complaint  before the Ombudsman, a claim on the subject matter is  pending before, say, the Debts Recovery Tribunal.  Here  admittedly, on the day the jurisdiction of the Banking  Ombudsman was invoked, no such claim was pending before  any Court, Arbitrator, the Debts Recovery Tribunal or any  other forum.  To that extent, prima facie, there is merit in the  contention that Clause 16(3) may not be attracted to the case  on hand.   

10.             Clause 16(3) of the Scheme says, "No complaint to  the Banking Ombudsman shall lie".  According to Black’s Law  Dictionary "lie" means, "to have foundation in the law; to be  legally supportable, sustainable or proper".  In the context of  the power conferred on the Ombudsman by the Scheme read  in the light of Section 35A of the Banking Regulation Act, it  would be appropriate to understand the expression as having  a foundation in law in the sense that the claim must have a  foundation in law.  A Banking Ombudsman, though might  have initially jurisdiction to entertain a complaint on the basis  that it has a legal foundation, here in terms of the Scheme, he  may be divested of that jurisdiction or the foundation in law

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might be lost on either of the parties approaching the Court,  the Arbitrator or the Debts Recovery Tribunal in respect of the  same subject matter.  Dealing with the expression ’entertain’  this Court held in LAKSHMI RATTAN ENGINEERING  WORKS LTD. VS. ASSTT. COMMR. SALES TAXN KANPUR &  ANR. [(1968) 1 S.C.R. 505] that it means to deal with or admit  to consideration.  The Court approved the views expressed by  some of the High Courts that the word ’entertain’ meant not  ’receive’ or ’accept’ but ’proceed to consider on merits’ or  adjudicate upon.  The Court also accepted the Dictionary  meaning of the word as ’admit to consider’.  This was also the  view that was  subsequently taken by this Court  in  Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd. Vs. Punnu Sahu (Dead)  Through Legal Representatives [(1971) 3 S.C.C. 124].  It was  held therein that the expression "entertain" in Order XXI Rule  90 of the Code meant, to ’adjudicate upon’ or to ’proceed to  consider on merits’ and not ’initiation of proceeding’ alone.   Drawing an analogy, it is possible to say that the complaint  must continue to have a foundation in law at the time the  Ombudsman takes up the claim for his consideration and  renders his decision or award.  The foundation would be lost  when a Court, Arbitrator, Tribunal or any other competent  forum is moved on the same subject matter.  When the subject  matter of the complaint is taken to any other competent  forum, the complaint loses its foundation in law.  In other  words, the subject matter of the complaint should not be  pending in any other Tribunal, or Court or before an Arbitrator  not merely when it is filed but also when it is taken up for  consideration and disposal.  

11.             There is a more fundamental aspect.  The  Ombudsman, at best, is an Authority or Tribunal of limited  jurisdiction constituted under the Scheme.  It is a jurisdiction  conferred by the Scheme.  The exercise of jurisdiction or power  by the Ombudsman would depend on his having jurisdiction  not only to entertain a claim but also to bring it to an end.   The continued exercise of power by him would depend on his  continuing to have jurisdiction.  Once he is deprived of his  jurisdiction or gets deprived of his jurisdiction over the subject  matter, he could no more proceed with a complaint which was  earlier filed.  In other words, to render an Award valid in terms  of the Scheme, the Ombudsman must continue to retain  jurisdiction over the subject matter of the concerned  complaint.  A complaint goes out of his purview when the  subject matter of it is taken to a Court, Arbitrator, Tribunal or  forum.  The relief that can be granted by the Ombudsman are  limited and confined to the matters coming within clause 13 of  the Scheme.  The intention behind incorporating clause  16(3)(d) appears to be to ensure that the relief an Ombudsman  may give, may not conflict with a more comprehensive  adjudication by a Court, Arbitrator, Tribunal or forum  with  wider powers.  When there is conferment of a power on an  authority or Tribunal with limited jurisdiction, that conferred  power must continue to exist, when the decision is rendered  by that authority or Tribunal.  Once the conferred authority or  power is taken away or impeded, the Authority or Tribunal can  no more exercise it.  This will be the position when one of the  parties in a complaint before the Ombudsman takes the  subject matter to a Court, Arbitrator, Tribunal or forum.  In  other words, when ultimately he is about to pronounce his  Award, the Ombudsman finds that the subject matter of the  dispute has been taken to the Debts Recovery Tribunal or a  Civil Court or an Arbitrator or to any other competent forum,  he gets divested of his jurisdiction, on a harmonious reading of  clause 16(1) with clause 16(3)(d) of the Scheme.  It is not, as if,

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a bar of jurisdiction can occur only at the stage of initially  entertaining a claim.  It could also occur at a subsequent stage  either in view of the jurisdiction being taken away or in view of  any other impediment created by the very Legislation, Rule or  Scheme that conferred the initial jurisdiction.  Thus, having  lost his jurisdiction over the complaint in view of clause  16(3)(d) of the Scheme, the Ombudsman will have to decline  jurisdiction to pass any order or award on the complaint.   This, we think would be the proper way of understanding the  bar created by clause 16(3)(d) of the Scheme.   12.             Conceptually, an Ombudsman is only a non- adversarial adjudicator of disputes.   An Ombudsman by  definition is only an official appointed to receive, investigate,  and report on private citizen’s complaints about the  government; a similar appointee in a non-governmental  organisation (such as a company or university).  (See Black’s  Law Dictionary).  He serves as an alternative to the adversary  system for resolving disputes, especially between citizens and  government agencies.  He is an independent and non-partisan  officer who deals with specific complaints from the public  against the administrative injustice and mal-administration.  (See 4 American Jurisprudence 2d).  Therefore, by its very  nature, an Ombudsman is an alternative to an adversary  system for resolution of disputes.  When the subject matter of  a complaint before the Ombudsman under the Scheme is  taken to a Court, Tribunal, Arbitrator or other competent  forum, the subject matter is takwn away from the purview of  the Ombudsman to an adjudicatory forum under an  adversarial system.  It is therefore logical to understand clause  16 of the Scheme with particular reference to sub-clause 3(d)  thereof, that on one of the parties approaching an adjudicatory  forum on an adversarial system, the non-adversarial  adjudicator, the Ombudsman must lose his power or authority  to bring about a resolution of the complaint by way of a non  adversarial adjudication.  An Ombudsman is not defined in  the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 or in the Banking  Ombudsman Scheme 1995 constituting him as adversarial  adjudicator.  Clause 12 of the Scheme constitutes him a  facilitator to bring about a satisfaction of the complaint, in one  of the modes referred to therein.  An adversarial adjudication  necessarily stands on a higher plane than a settlement of a  complaint at the instance of an Ombudsman.  When such a  forum for adversarial adjudication of disputes takes seisin of  the subject matter of a complaint, it will be logical to  postulate, on an interpretation of clause 16 of the Scheme,  that the Ombudsman loses his jurisdiction over the subject  matter of the complaint and consequently the complaint itself.

13.             Thus we are of the view that the High Court was  justified in interfering with the Award of the Banking  Ombudsman on the ground that he could not have passed the  Award in view of the divestiture of his jurisdiction.   

14.             After all, a complainant before the Ombudsman like  the appellant will not be prejudiced by this interpretation.  It  has now been clarified in United Bank of India, Calcutta Vs.  Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. & ors. [(2000) Supp 3  S.C.R 153]  that the expression ’counter-claim’ in sub-Sections (8) to (11)  of Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts Act will take in even a  claim for damages based on the same transaction and would  include even an independent claim the respondent before the  Debts Recovery Tribunal may have against the claimant \026  Financial Institution.  It has thus been held that a counter- claim in a wide sense will lie before the Debts Recovery  Tribunal and the respondent will be entitled to raise a

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comprehensive counter-claim. This ratio has also been  accepted subsequently in State Bank of India Vs. Ranjan  Chemicals Ltd. & Anr. [(2007) 1 S.C.C. 97].  It is therefore  obvious that the appellant can make all his claims before the  Debts Recovery Tribunal while defending the claim of the  Bank, including the ones he has put forward before the  Banking Ombudsman.

15.             Then the question is whether the subject matter of  the complaint came within the purview of the Banking  Ombudsman.  Clause 13(b) of the Scheme indicates the  jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.  Clause (b) provides that he  could entertain complaints concerning loans and advances  only insofar as they relate to non-observance of the directives  of the Reserve Bank of India on interest rates, delays in  sanction/non-observance of prescribed time schedule for  disposal of loan applications and non-observance of any other  directions or instructions of the Reserve Bank of India, as may  be specified for the purpose of the Scheme from time to time.   It is seen, as found by the High Court, that there was no claim  that the respondent \026 Bank was guilty of non-observance of  any directive of the Reserve Bank of India on interest rates.   There is also no case that any other direction or instruction of  the Reserve Bank of India made for the purpose of the Scheme  had not been observed by the respondent \026 Bank.  At best, the  appellant can claim that it was complaining of delay in  sanction/non-observance of prescribed time schedule for  disposal of its loan application for additional finance. Even  here, the case of the respondent \026 Bank is that there was no  time schedule prescribed for enhancing the limit of the loan or  for granting additional loan to a hotel industry like the one for  which the appellant was claiming a loan from the Bank and  hence there was no question of any of the complaints of the  appellant coming within the purview of the Banking  Ombudsman.  A reading of the Award of the Banking  Ombudsman shows that the directions issued by him  regarding the advancing of the balance amount of  Rs.3,41,250/- out of the original loan of Rs. 15 lakhs  sanctioned, his direction to the Bank to make available  additional finances merely on the basis of the recommendation  of the Committee in that behalf and his directing the  maintaining the financing ratio of 75:25 and his fixing a  repayment schedule as seven years exclusive of one year of  moratorium and the enhancement of the period of moratorium  consequent on non-disbursement of the loan amount by the  respondent \026 Bank, are all outside Clause 13(b) of the Scheme  and consequently outside the jurisdiction of the Banking  Ombudsman.   The Banking Ombudsman has no authority to  compel the Bank to make further advances which as a  prudent banker it might not find feasible.  Nor can the  Banking Ombudsman interfere with the agreement regarding  the repayment schedule fixed by the parties or the financing  ratio that may be maintained between the Bank and the  borrower.  Nor can the Ombudsman direct the increase of the  period of moratorium or fix a schedule of repayment of the  loan.  As we have indicated, there is no case that any of the  directives of the Reserve Bank of India in respect of any of  these matters had been violated by the respondent \026 Bank.   The High Court, in our view, was correct in finding that the  Banking Ombudsman had exceeded his jurisdiction in passing  the Award that he has passed.  None of the directions come  within the purview of Clause 13(b) of the Scheme.  The  jurisdiction of the Banking Ombudsman under the Scheme is  cribbed, confined and cabined by clause 13 of the Scheme.   Therefore, in any event, the directions issued by the Banking

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Ombudsman are outside his jurisdiction.  In this context, we  do not think it necessary to consider whether there can be a  specific performance of an agreement to lend or the issuance  of a direction to lend more money than the Bank was willing to  lend considering the creditworthiness of the borrower and his  prior conduct in respect of the repayment of the loan which  the Bank had already granted.  

16.             We thus find that the High Court was justified in  interfering with the award of the Banking Ombudsman.  We  therefore answer both the questions raised on behalf of the  appellant against the appellant and in favour of the  respondent \026 Bank.  The questions of law thus stand  answered.   

17.             We dismiss the appeal.