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PETITIONER: M/s.  BURRAKUR COAL CO., LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (And connected petition)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/02/1961

BENCH: MUDHOLKAR, J.R. BENCH: MUDHOLKAR, J.R. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) DAS, S.K. SARKAR, A.K. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1961 AIR  954            1962 SCR  (1)  44  CITATOR INFO :  R          1965 SC 632  (11)  RF         1969 SC 125  (8)  RF         1973 SC1461  (90)

ACT: Coal  Mines-Law  Providing for respecting for coal  and  ac- quisition-Validity-"Unworked land", meaning of-"To undertake any operation in the land", meaning of-Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition  and Development) Act, 1957.(20 of  1957),  ss. 4,5,6,7  8, 13, 14-Constitution of India,  Arts.  31A(1)(e), 31(2).

HEADNOTE: The  Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and  Development)  Act, 1957,  was  enacted,  as  indicated  in  the  preamble,  for providing for the acquisition by the State of unworked  land containing or likely to contain coal deposits, and under  S. 4(1)  of  the Act,-the Central Government was  empowered  to issue  a  notification with reference to  its  intention  to prospect for coal from land in any locality.  By s. 5(b) any mining  lease granted to a person and in respect of which  a notification had been issued shall cease to have effect, and under  s. 7 the Central Government was entitled  to  acquire the mining rights within a period of two or three years from the date of the notification.  On July 29, 1960, the Central Government published a notification under s, 4(1) of the Act in respect of an area included in the colliery in which  the petitioners  had acquired mining rights.  Between  the  year 1932 and the month of May, 1960, the colliery was not worked because it was uneconomical to work it, but the  petitioners made  an application on December 3, 1959, to the Coal  Board for  permission to reopen the Colliery and though  no  reply was  received  from  the Board,  the  petitioners  commenced drilling operations in May, 1960, but discontinued them from August   12,  1960,  in  view  of  the  notification.    The petitioners  challenged the validity of the notification  on the  ground that the preamble of the Act and ss. 4, 5, 6,  7 and  8  show that the Act was applicable  only  to  unworked mines which must mean virgin lands,, and not to those  which

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were being worked at the time of notification or which  were worked in the past, whereas the petitioners’ coal field  had been  worked and the working had ceased for some  time  only due  to  the  unremunerative market for  the  produce.   The petitioners  also contended that the Act  contravened  Arts. 19(1)(g)  and  31(2)  of the Constitution of  India  on  the grounds (1) that the effect of a notification under the  Act was to prevent an owner or lessee of a mine from working for two  or  three  years,  which was too  long  a  period  and, therefore, the restrictions could not be regarded as 45 reasonable,  (2) that the Act did not contain any  provision for  compensation  for the deprivation of  the  petitioners’ right to carry on their business for two or three years, and (3) that s. 13 of the Act, though it dealt with the  payment of  compensation,  did  not  provide  for  compensation  for mineral rights. Held:     (1) that the expression "unworked land"  occurring in  the preamble of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition  and Development)  Act,  1957,  means land-which  was  not  being worked at the time of the notification issued under the  Act and includes dormant mines. Where the object or meaning of a enactment is not clear, the preamble may be resorted to to explain it. In  re the Kerala Educatiion Bill, 1957, [1959] S.C.R.  995. referred. (2)  that the Act is applicable not only to virgin lands but also  to  dormant collieries or  unworked  lands,  including mines  which were worked in the past but  mining  operations therein are not being carried on at present. (3)  that the expression "to undertake any operation in  the land" in S. 5(b) of the Act refers to the undertaking of  an operation  on  land not for the first time only but  at  the resumption  of  an  operation which had  been  abandoned  or discontinued.  The resumption of the working of a mine after a casual closure or a closure in the ordinary course of  the working  of a mine would not fall within the bar created  by s. 5(b). (4)  that  the restrictions imposed upon an owner or  lessee of a mine by which he is prevented from working his mine for a certain period of time under ss.4 and 5 of the Act are not unreasonable  and  that  the Act does  not  contravene  Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. (5)  that such restrictions amount to a modification of  his rights   within  the  meaning  of  Art.  31A(1)(e)  of   the Constitution;  and that the validity Of ss. 4 and 5  Of  the Act  cannot be challenged on the ground that  they  infringe Art. 31(2) in view of the provisions of Art. 31A(1)(e). Thakur  Raghbir.   Singh v. Court of  Wards,  Ajmer,  [1953] S.C.R. 1049, explained. Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, [1959] Supp.  1 S. C. R. 489, Atma Ram v. The State of Punjab, [1959]  Supp. r  S.C.R. 748 and In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912, [1951]  S.C.R. 793, relied on. (6)  that  the Act cannot be challenged on the  ground  that ss.  5(a) and 13 do not provide for payment of  compensation for  mineral  rights,  because ss. 13 and 14  lay  down  the principles  on which compensation is to be  determined,  and under Art- 31(2) such a law cannot be called in question  on the ground of the inadequacy of the compensation provided. 46

JUDGMENT:

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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petitions Nos. 241 and 242 of 1960. Petitions  under  Art. 32 of the Constitution of  India  for enforcement of Fundamental Rights. P.   B. DaS, K. Choudhoury, Balbhadra Prasad Singh and I. N. Shroff, for the petitioners. M.   C.  Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, B. Sen and  R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents. 1961.  February 10.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MUDHOLKAR,  J.-The petitioner in W. P. 241 of 1960,  Messrs. Burrakur Coal Co., Ltd., and the petitioner in W. P. 242  of 1960,  Messrs.   East India Coal Co., Ltd.,  claim  to  have acquired  mining rights in two blocks in Mouza Sudamdih  and Mouza Sutikdih respectively situated in Dhanbad district  in the  State  of  Bihar.   On  July  28,  1960,  the   Central Government published a notification bearing no.  S. 0.  1927 under  s.  4  of the Coal  Bearing  Areas  (Acquisition  and Development)  Act,  1957  (no.  20  of  1957),  stating  its intention to prospect for coal in an area approximately five sq.  miles  which includes Sudamdih  colliery  aud  Sutikdih colliery.   The petitioners have stated in their  respective petitions that in consequence of the issue of the  aforesaid notification they are precluded from carrying on any  mining operations in the respective collieries and that the Central Government is entitled to acquire mining rights in the  area covered  by  the notification within a period of  two  years from the date of notification or within such further  period not exceeding one year as the Central Government may specify by  notification in the Official Gazette.   The  petitioners have come up to this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution contending  that the aforesaid notification is  ultra  vires and   illegal   inasmuch  as  it  interfere,%   with   their fundamental right to own property and to carry on  business. Assuming  that an incorporated company is a citizen  we  may point out that the East India Coal Co., Ltd. is incorporated in the United Kingdom while the Burrakur Coal Co., Ltd. is 47 incorporated  in India.  Therefore, in so far as the  rights conferred by Art. 19 are concerned it may only be the latter which is entitled to the protection of the Constitution  but not  the  former company.  Both  the  petitioners,  however, contend  that  the  right conferred by  Art.  31(2)  of  the Constitution is also infringed by the aforesaid notification and if their contention is correct they will be entitled  to protection  in respect of that right inasmuch as it  is  not limited to the citizens of India as is the case with  regard to  the  rights enumerated in Art. 19.  Both  the  petitions were  argued  together though the arguments  were  addressed mainly with reference to the case of Burrakur Coal Co., Ltd. and,  therefore,  it is that case with which  we  will  deal fully.   After  dealing  with the  arguments  advanced  with reference  to that case we will deal briefly with the  other case. The  challenge  to the notification rests  on  two  grounds, firstly  that  the notification is ultra vire8 the  Act  and secondly   that   the  Act  is  itself   ultra   vires   the Constitution. The petitioner’s learned counsel Mr. P. R. Das contends that the Act applies to "unworked" coal mines which according  to him,  mean  virgin lands-and not to those  which  are  being worked  at  present or which were worked in  the  past.   In support  of  this  contention he strongly  relies  upon  the preamble to the Act.The preamble runs thus:               "An Act to establish in the economic  interest               of India greater public control over the  coal

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             mining   industry  and  its   development   by               providing for the acquisition by the State  of               unworked land containing or likely to contain,               coal  deposits  or of rights in or  over  such               land, for the extinguishment, or  modification               of  such  rights  accruing by  virtue  of  any               agreement,  lease, licence or  otherwise.  and               for matters connected therewith." His  argument  proceeds to the length of  saying  that  even abandoned  mines are not touched by the Act.   According  to him,  however,  the Sudamdih colliery was not  an  abandoned mine  nor could it be regarded as abandoned because,  though it was not actually worked 48 between  the  year  1932 and the month  of  May.  1960.  the petitioner  had  purchased  it  for  a  large  consideration amounting  to  over  Rs. 1,46,000  and  thereafter  it  paid annually the minimum rent and royalty which totals upto over Rs. 1,23,000 from May 1, 1939, to June 30, 1960.   According to  the petitioner the mine was not actually  worked  during this  period  because  in the petitioner’s  opinion  it  was uneconomical  to  work it. The petitioner in fact  made’  an application  on  December  3, 1959, to  the  Coal  Board  as required  by the provisions of the Coal Mines  (Conservation and  Safety)  Act,  1952 (XII of 1952),  for  permission  to reopen  the colliery but it did not receive any  reply  from the Coal Board.  Even so, the petitioner commenced  drilling operations in the beginning of May, 1960 and carried them on till  August 12, 1960, during which a depth of 235  ft.  was reached  at  one point.  The  petitioner,  however,  stopped these  operations  consequent upon the  publication  of  the impugned notification in the Gazette of August 6, 1960.   We are mentioning. these facts because on their basis a further argument  is raised by Mr. Das to the effect that  prior  to the  issue of the notification the mine was  being  actually worked.  Before, however, we deal with that argument we must consider  the  main contention of Mr. Das which  is  to  the effect that the Act applies only to virgin land. Mr.  Das contended that the preamble to an Act is a  key  to understanding  the provisions of the Act and referred us  in this connection to the advisory opinion of this Court in  re the Kerala Education Bill, 1957 In that case Das, C. J., who delivered the opinion of the Court has observed:               "The  long title of the said Bill (The  Kerala               Education  Bill, 1957) describes it as A  Bill               to  provide  for the better  organisation  and               development of educational institutions in the               State’.   Its preamble recites thus:  ’Whereas               it  is  deemed necessary to  provide  for  the               better   organisation   and   development   of               educational institutions in the State  provid-               ing  a  varied and  comprehensive  educational               service               (1)   [1959] S.C.R. 995, 1022.               49               throughout  the State’.  We  must,  therefore,               approach  the  substantive provisions  of  the               said  Bill  in  the light of  the  policy  and               purpose  deducible  from  the  terms  of   the               aforesaid  long title and the preamble and  so               construe the clauses of the said Bill as  will               subserve the said policy and purpose". While.  holding  that  it  is permissible  to  look  at  the preamble for understanding the import of the various clauses contained  in  the Bill this Court has not  said  that  full

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effect should not be given to the express provisions of  the Bill  even though they appear to go beyond the terms of  the preamble.    It  is  one  of  the  cardinal  principles   of construction that where the language of an Act is clear, the preamble  must be disregarded.  Though, where the object  or meaning  of an enactment is not clear, the preamble  may  be resorted to explain it.  Again, where very general  language is used in an enactment which, it is clear must be  intended to  have a limited application, the preamble may be used  to indicate  to  what  particular instances  the  enactment  is intended to apply (1).. We cannot, therefore, start with the preamble for construing the provisions of an Act, though  we would  be  justified  in resorting to it, nay,  we  will  be required  to  do so, if we find that the  language  used  by Parliament is ambiguous or is too general though in point of fact  Parliament  intended  that it should  have  a  limited application. Mr.  Das then contended that the various provisions  of  the Act  clearly show that Parliament intended the Act to  apply only  to  virgin  land.  In support of  this  contention  he referred to the provisions of as. 4,5,6, 7 and 8 of the Act. He  pointed  out  that whenever it appears  to  the  Central Government  that coal is likely to be obtained from land  in any  locality it is empowered by sub-a. (1) of s. 4 to  give notice  of  its  intention to  prospect  for  coal  therein. According to him, where a mine has been worked at some time- in the past all the necessary information would be available in the working plan of the mine, and, by way of illustration pointed out that the fullest information (1)  Craies-Interprotation  of Statutes, 5th Edn., pp.  188, 189. 50 was  available  in  the working plan,  Annexure  B1  of  the Sudamdih  colliery.   He  further  pointed  out  that   this information was in fact in the possession of the  Government as  would appear from Annexure B which was appended  to  the notification  of July 20, 1960.  We may point out that  this annexure sets out that this is a statement of percentage  of worked and unworked areas in different coal mines and. after setting  out the various seams which have been  proved,  the percentages of worked and unworked areas have been specified therein.   Prospecting,  according  to  Mr.  Das,  would  be necessary  only  if  nothing  is known  about  an  area  and therefore there can possibly be no need for prospecting when a mine has been worked.  Admittedly, sub-s. (1) of a. 4 does not specifically say that it applies to unworked land.   All the  same, according to Mr. Das, it must be so construed  as to apply to unworked land only; for, there would be no  need for  the  Government to undertake prospecting  for  coal  in worked land on which there is a colliery. We  cannot accept the argument of Mr. Das.  The bulk of  the coal in a mine is underground and even though the  existence of some seems may have been proved in particular areas it is impossible to say that the information obtained when it  was prospected  once  or  when it was being worked,  as  to  the quality and quantity of coal or the dimensions of the  seams is  complete.  The seams are not necessarily horizontal  and more  often  are inclined and sometimes even  folded.   Then again  there  may  be faulting in the strata of  coal  as  a result of which an impression may be created that a seam has disappeared at a particular place though further borings  or drilling  may  show  that even. beyond  that  point  but  at greater depths the same seam reappears.  So where a mine was worked  in  the  past but  mining  operations  therein  were stopped either because the coal therein was thought to  have

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been  exhausted  or because it was not thought to  be  of  a sufficiently good quality such as to make the working of the mine  economic,  further  prospecting may  well  reveal  the existence  of additional coal bearing strata or of a  better type of coal than that found 51 earlier.   On the plain language of sub-a. (1) of s.  4  the Central   Government   has  been  empowered   to   issue   a notification with reference to its intention of  prospecting any  land in a locality and not only such land as is  virgin in the sense in which Mr. Das uses that expression. Then  Mr. Das referred sub-s. (3) of a. 4 and said that  the whole  of  the country has been subjected  to  a  geological survey of a very detailed kind and all known coal fields are mentioned  in one report or the other of the  department  of Geological  Survey  of India.  Collieries  which  have  been worked at some time in the past must have been mentioned  in one  of  these reports and., therefore, it would  be  wholly unnecessary   for  the  legislature  to  confer   upon   the Government the power as is done by cl. (a) of sub-s. (3)  of s.  4 to enter upon and survey any land in the  locality  in which  such colliery is situate.  The very fact  that  power has  been given to the Central Government to enter upon  and survey  land for’ the purpose of ascertaining whether  there is  any coal in that land shows that the legislature had  in mind  only  that land which has not been mentioned  as  coal bearing  in any of the reports of the Geological  Survey  of India.   Here  again  we may point out that  the  object  of survey of land is to enable the Government to satisfy itself not merely about the fact that any coal exists in that  land but also about the quality and quantity of coal therein  and whether  it would be an economical proposition to  work  the mines already existing on that land. Indeed  a  perusal of the provisions of sub-a. (4) of  s.  4 would show that the Act is not restricted to unworked  lands only  but applies equally to those lands on which there  are existing  mines but those mines are not being worked.   That sub.section reads as follows:               "In issuing a notification under this  section               the Central Government shall exclude therefrom               that portion of any land in which coal  mining               operations  are actually being carried  on  in               conformity   with   the  provisions   of   any               enactment, rule or order for the time being in               force  or  any premises on which  any  process               ancillary to the getting, dressing or               52               preparation  for  sale of coal obtained  as  a               result of such operations is being carried  on               are situate". Under  this provision the Central Government is required  to exclude  that  portion  of any land  in  which  coal  mining operations  are  being carried on "in  conformity  with  any enactment,  rule  or order".  This would indicate  that  the language  of sub-s. (1) of s. 4 was understood  as  applying also  to  that  land in which coal  mining  operations  were actually being carried on.  Unless we hold so, the whole  of sub-s. (4) would be rendered otiose.  Mr. Das, however, says that sub-s. (4) enacts a "rule of exclusion" and that it had been  enacted by way of abundant caution.  We cannot  accede to this argument for the simple reason that if the  language of  sub-s.  (1) of s. 4 is capable of being  interpreted  as applying  to  any land in which coal mining  operations  are actually  being  carried on, then there is all  the  greater reason  why that provision should be held also to  apply  to

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land in which coal mining operations were carried on in  the past,  though they are not being carried on at present.   If Parliament was cautious enough to exclude land in which coal mining  operations are actually being carried on why did  it stop there and not exercise the same caution with respect to land in which coal mining operations were once being carried on  but have now ceased?  For, on the plain meaning  of  the word  "unworked" such lands would more readily  fall  within the  terms  of sub-s. (1) of s. 4 than land  in  which  coal mining operations were actually being carried on, that is to say, "worked lands". Then Mr. Das referred to cl.-(b) of s. 5 which runs thus:               "any  mining lease in so far as it  authorises               the lessee or any person claiming through  him               to undertake any operation in the laid,  shall               cease  to  have  effect for  so  long  as  the               notification  under  that sub. section  is  in               force". He  contended  that  what this provision  prohibits  is  the undertaking of any operation in the land and not carrying on of an operation.  Undertaking of an operation, according  to himself ’relates to the- initial 53 working  of the mine and riot to the resumption of  work  on the  mine after work thereon had stopped nor to carrying  on work  on a mine the working of which had not  been  stopped. As a consequence of the issue of a notification under sub-s. (1) or s. 4 what the lessee of a mining lease is  prohibited from doing is undertaking any operation on land-on which  no operations were being carried on.  But he is not  prohibited from continuing to carry on operations which he was carrying on  at  the date of the notification.  We  cannot,  however, accede  to  the  contention that the  resumption  of  mining operations on a land is outside the bar created by this pro- vision.  The words used in the section are "to undertake any operations  in  the land" which, according  to  the  Concise Oxford  Dictionary  mean "to enter upon  (work,  enterprise, responsibility)".  The meaning of the provision,  therefore, is  that  what  the  lessee  is  prohibited  from  doing  is something   which   he   was   not   doing   at   the   date of the notification though he was authorised to do it  under his  lease.  Thus if a colliery was not functioning  at  the date of the notification then by virtue of the provisions of a.  5(b) he would not be permitted to work it.   Undoubtedly the  provision has to be interpreted reasonably and it  does not  mean  that if the notification came into force  on  the Monday  and the mine was not worked on Sunday because  of  a holiday, the lessee was prohibited by the notification  from working  it.   The resumption of working of a mine  after  a casual  closure  or  a closure in  the  ordinary  course  of working  a mine would not fall within the bar created by  s. 5(b).   In this connection we may refer to r. 7 of the  Coal Mines  Regulations of 1957, which provides that when  it  is intended  to  reopen a mine after abandonment for  a  period exceeding  60  days  not less than  30  days  notice  before resumption  of  mining operations must be given  to  certain authorities.   The Coal Mines Regulations of 1957 have  been framed under s. 57 of the Mines Act of 1952, s. 16 of  which provides  for  the giving of notice before  commencement  of mining  operations.  It is in the light of these  provisions that we must interpret the provisions of s. 5(b) of the Act. So what must be said to have 54 been prohibited would be the undertaking of an operation  on land not for the first time only but also the resumption  of

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an operation which had been abandoned or discontinued. Mr.  Das  then  contended  that  a  mining  area  is  always extensive and it is not possible to work on every bit of  it simultaneously and, therefore, if work is carried on at  one point in a colliery the whole colliery must be deemed to  be working,  that  is to say, coal mining  operations  must  be deemed to have been carried on over the entire area on which the  colliery is situate.  In support of his  contention  he relied  upon the decision of the Privy Council  in  Nageswar Bux Roy v. Bengal Coal Co., Ltd. (1), and upon a passage  in Halsbury’s  Laws  of England(2).  Both the decision  of  the Privy  Council as well as the passage in Halsbury deal  with the  question of possession and state the law to be  that  a person can be said to be in possession of minerals contained in  a  well-defined  mining  area  even  though  his  actual physical possession is confined to a small portion, that is, to the mine which is being actually worked.  The decision of the Privy Council as well as the passage in Halsbury are nus not  in  point.   Further  it is difficult  to  see  how  an exemption  under  s. 4(4) is admissible in the case  of  the Sudamdih  colliery or Sutkidih colliery unless it  is  shown that  they  were actually being worked at the  date  of  the notification  in  conformity  with the  provisions  of  "any enactment,  rule or order for the time being in force".   It is an admitted fact that though a notice was given under  s. 16  of  the Mines Act, 1952, by the Sutkidih  Colliery,  the petitioners  in W.P. 242 of 1960, it aid not actually  start working  the colliery in view of the impugned  notification. As we have al. ready pointed out the Burrakur Coal Co., Ltd. did  commence  working the Sudamdih Colliery in  May,  1960, even  though  it  had not obtained  the  permission  of  the appropriate authorities. We  must,  therefore, examine here the argument of  Mr.  Das that every colliery must be held to be exempted under sub-s. (4) of S. 4. We have already referred (1) (1930) L.R. 58 I-A. 29.  (2)..3rd Edn., Vol. 26, p. 630. 55 to s. 16 of the Mines Act, 1952, and regulation 7 of  Mining Regulations,  1957.  In addition, there is Regulation  3  of 1957  which requires that the notice contemplated by  s.  16 should be submitted in Form I.. No doubt the petitioner  had given notice as required by these provisions.  No doubt also that it was necessary for the authorities concerned to  take appropriate  action on the notice.  But it is  difficult  to say  that the inaction of the authorities can be availed  of by  the petitioner.  We must give effect to the  plain  lan- guage  of sub-s. (4) of s. 4. That provision in clear  terms makes  an  exclusion or exemption only with regard  to  that portion  of  the land in which coal  mining  operations  are actually being carried on in conformity with the  provisions of  any  enactment, rule or order.  Therefore, it  is  clear that  Parliament was exempting only such collieries as  were being worked in consonance ’with the provisions of law.  Mr. Das’s  argument, however, is that the Act prescribes  penal- ties  for the breach of its provisions and of those  of  the regulations and so the petitioner could well be visited with an  appropriate penalty but that its right to run  the  mine could  not be affected.  We are not here concerned with  the question  whether  the failure of the petitioner  to  comply with  the  requirements  of the Coal Mines  Act  or  of  the Regulations of 1957 precludes the petitioner under that  Act or   under  those  regulations  from  carrying   on   mining operations.  We are concerned here only with one point,  and that  is  whether the petitioner could be said in  point  of

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fact  to have been carrying on mining operations in  accord- ance with law.  That the petitioner was not doing so is  not even denied by Mr. Das and in the circumstances it is  clear that the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of sub-s. (4)  of  s. 4. We should have dealt with this  part  of  Mr. Das’s argument elsewhere but in order to avoid repetition we have thought it convenient to deal with it here. Adverting  to  s.  6(1)  of  the.   Act  which  deals   with compensation for any necessary damage done under s. 4 of the Act,  learned  counsel  contended  that  Parliament  plainly intended the Act to apply to virgin land. 56 If  the section was intended to apply to worked mines  there would have been provision, according to learned counsel, for payment of compensation to the owner or lessee of the  mine, for being deprived of his right to work the mine  consequent upon  the-. issue of the notification.  It is sufficient  to point  out that s. 4 does not contemplate entering upon  any land  which is actually being worked and there will thus  be no  deprivation in fact of the owner’s or lessee’s right  of working the mine.  The Act applies only to "unworked lands". This expression would include not only virgin lands but also lands  on  which  mines  may have  been  opened  and  worked sometime  in the past but working on those mines was  either discontinued or abandoned.  Of course, it is possible to say that  the action of the Government would interfere with  the potential right of the owner or the lessee to work the mines and this would interfere with his right to hold property and carry on his business.  When we deal with the other part  of Mr. Das’s argument we shall deal with this question. It was next contended that s. 7 which deals with the power of the Central Government to acquire land or rights in or over land notified under s. 4 also indicates the  limited operation of the Act.  Sub-section (1) of s. 7 runs thus:               "If  the Central Government is satisfied  that               coal is obtainable in the whole or any part of                             the  land  notified under  sub-section  (1)  o f               section  4,  it may, within a  period  of  two               years  from the date of the said  notification               or  within such further period  not  exceeding               one  year  in  the aggregate  as  the  Central               Government  may  specify in  this  behalf,  by               notification  in  the official  Gazette,  give               notice  of its intention to acquire the  whole               or any part of the land or of any rights in or               over such land, as the case may be". The argument was that in respect of mines which have already been  worked  at  some time in the  past  all  the  relevant material  would  be at the disposal of the  Government  even previous  to the issuing of a notification under sub-s.  (1) of S. 4 and, therefore, there 57 could  be  no necessity for the Government to enter  on  and prospect   the  land  for  being  satisfied  that  coal   is obtainable therefrom.  Therefore, the argument proceeds, the provision  could  not have been intended to  apply  to  land other than virgin land.  This is really a repetition of  the argument  which was addressed to us in connection with  sub. (1)  of s. 4 and what we have said with regard to that  sub- section would equally apply here. Sub-section  (1) of s. 7 provides for a period of two  years within  which a notice of acquisition could be given by  the Central  Government.  It is argued that this period  is  too

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long  for keeping out an owner or lessee of land, the  mines on  which  had been worked in the past and  that  Parliament could  not  have  intended  this  effect.   Therefore,   the argument  proceeds,  this  provision  also  points  to   the conclusion  that the word "land" wherever it occurs  in  the Act  should be read as virgin land.  Prospecting  operations are  necessarily  prolonged  because  what  lies  under  the surface  of  land  cannot be easily  ascertained  except  by undertaking  drilling or other appropriate operations  at  a number   of  places.   Such  operations  are  bound  to   be prolonged.   Parliament apparently thought that it would  be reasonable to allow a period of two years to the  Government for carrying on the necessary operations and for, making  up its  mind.  The mere length of the period so allowed to  the Government cannot be regarded as indicative of the intention of  Parliament  to  give to the  word  ’land’  the  -meaning ’virgin land’. Reliance was placed on the explanation to sub-a. (1)   of s.. 8. That sub-section and the explanation are as follows:               "Any person interested in any land in  respect               of  which a notification under section  7  has               been  issued may, within ’ thirty days of  the               issue  of  the  notification,  object  to  the               acquisition  of the whole or any part  of  the               land or of any rights in or over such land.               Explanation.-It  shall  not  be  an  objection               within  the  meaning of this section  for  any               person to say               58               that  he himself desires to  undertake  mining               operations  in the land for the production  of               coal  and that such operations should  not  be               undertaken by the Central Government or by any               other person". It was argued that in the explanation the words used are "to undertake  mining  operations" and not "to carry  on  mining operations"  and therefore the Act could not be intended  to apply  to worked mines.  Here again the argument is  similar to that advanced on the basis of cl. (b) of s. 5 and what we have said regarding it would equally apply here. Adverting to s. 13 of the Act which deals with  compensation for  prospecting licences ceasing to have effect and  rights under mining leases being acquired, it was contended that as there  is  no provision for compensation in respect  of  the minerals  lying underground, Parliament could not be  deemed to have enacted this law for the purpose of acquiring  mines which have been worked in the past.  According to Mr. Das if we  have  understood him right, when a person  has  acquired land either as an owner or as a lessee carrying with it  the rights  to  win minerals and has opened in that  land  mines which he worked for sometime, there takes place a  severance between  the right to the surface and right to the  minerals and that consequently such person will thereafter be holding the minerals as separate tenement, that is, something  apart from  the land demised and this separate tenement cannot  be acquired under the terms of the present Act or, if it can be so  acquired,  it has to be  specifically  compensated  for. Reference  to  the  several provisions of  the  Act  and  in particular to those of s. 13 indicates, according to learned counsel,  the limited scope of the Act.  It is difficult  to appreciate  the contention that merely because the owner  or the  lessee  of  a land had opened mines  on  that  land,  a severance   is   effected  between  the  surface   and   the underground  minerals.   It  may be  that  a  trespasser  by adverse  possession  for the statutory  period  can  acquire

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rights to underground minerals.  It may also be that if that happens  the  surface rights would become severed  from  the mineral rights as a result of which the 59 minerals underground would form a separate tenement.  It is, however,  difficult  to see how the owner or the  lessee  of land  who  has  right  to win minerals  can  effect  such  a severance  between the mineral rights and surface rights  by opening  and  operating the mines of that land.   For,  even while  he is carrying on mining operations he  continues  to enjoy the surface rights also.  We cannot, therefore, accept the  contention that there was any severance of the  mineral rights and surface rights in either of these two cases. It  is no doubt true that s. 13 does not make  any  specific provision  for compensation in respect of minerals,  but  on the other hand it provides in the explanation to el. (a)  of sub-s.  (5)  that the value of minerals lying  in  the  land shall   not  be  taken  into  consideration   in   assessing compensation.   Whether  the  absence  of  a  provision  for compensation’ would make the Act ultra vire8 in so far as it contemplates   acquisition  of  land  will   be   considered presently.  We may, however, point out that the Act does not make  provision for compensation for minerals in respect  of even  virgin land and the argument of Mr. Das would  equally apply  to such land.  Therefore, no point can be  made  from the  absence  of a provision for compensation  for  minerals that  the Act was applicable only to virgin lands.  For  all these reasons it is clear that the notification is not ultra vires the Act because, in our view the Act applies not  only to  virgin lands but also to dormant collieries or  unworked lands. To sum up, in our view, the preamble of this Act need not be resolved to for construing its provisions and in  particular for understanding the meaning of the word "land" used in the Act;  that even if the preamble is taken into  consideration the  expression  "unworked land" occurring in  the  preamble should  be given its ordinary meaning, that is to say,  land which  was not being worked at the time of the  notification issued  under  the Act, which would include  dormant  mines; that  the provisions of the Act and in particular  those  of sub-s. (4) of s. 4 and s. 5(b) clearly militate against  the contention that the Act was intended to apply only to virgin lands, to the exclusion of land on 60 which  there  are dormant mines, and that the absence  of  a provision in s. 13 of the Act providing for compensation for mineral rights cannot by itself justify the conclusion  that the Act was intended to apply to virgin land only. Now  we  come  to the second part of the  argument.   It  is contended that ss. 4, 5 and 6 invade the fundamental  rights of  the petitioner under Art. 19(1)(g) of  the  Constitution because under s. 5, a mining lease ceases to have effect for two  years and possibly for three years.  Mr.  Das  concedes that reasonable restrictions can be placed by the State upon the  rights enumerated in this article in the  interests  of the general public but he contends that the period of two to three  years  is too long and, therefore,  the  restrictions cannot be regarded as reasonable.  We have already indicated that prospecting operations, in their very nature, must take a long time to complete and presumably Parliament had  fixed this  period after bearing in mind this factor and  also  on the  basis  of  expert  advice.  Of  course,  there  are  no pleadings to that effect in the affidavit of the State.  But in  our  opinion  the  petitioner  cannot  be  permitted  to complain  of  the absence of pleadings because  it  has  not

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itself stated in the petition what would be reasonable  time for  conducting prospecting operations.  We are,  therefore, unable to accede to the argument. The next attack, and that is a more formidable one, is based upon the ground that the Act does not contain any  provision for  compensation  for the deprivation  of  the  petitioners right  to carry on its business for two to three  years  and that   consequently  one  of  its  fundamental   rights   is infringed.  It is no doubt true that in a. 13(4) which deals with the question of compensation there is no provision  for payment of compensation for the deprivation of the right  of a  mine  owner or a lessee to carry on his  business  for  a period  of  two or three years, but  the  petitioner  cannot complain  about it.  In Art. 31A, cl. (1), sub-el.  (e),  of the  Constitution,  which was inserted by  the  Constitution First   Amendment   Act,   1951,   it   is   provided   that "notwithstanding anything contained in Art. 13, no 61 law  providing  for...............  the  extinguishment   or modification  of  any  rights  accruing  by  virtue  of  any agreement,  lease  or licence for the purpose  of  searching for,  or  winning,  any  mineral  or  mineral  oil,  or  the premature termination or cancellation of any such agreement, lease or licence, shall be deemed to be void on :the  ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges  any of the rights conferred by Art. 14, Art. 19 or Art 31." Then follows  a  proviso with which we are  not  concerned.   The effect of a notification under s. 4(1) of the Act read  with s.  5(b)  is to prevent an owner or lessee of  a  mine  from working  his mine far a certain period of time.  His  rights are  thus  modified by the notification.  According  to  Mr. Das,  however, the effect of the notification is to  suspend the  rights  of  a mine-owner or lessee of the  mine  for  a certain period and that such suspension is not modification. In  this  connection  he relied  upon  the  observations  of Mahajan,  J., (as he then was), in Thakur Raghbir  Singh  v. Court  of  Wards,  Ajmer (1).  That was  a  case  where,  in connection  with  a notification issued under the  Court  of Wards  Act,  the  learned  Judge  observed  that  the   word "modification"  used  in  the  aforesaid  provision  of  the Constitution  does not include suspension of a  right.   The observations  made  in that case fell for  consideration  by this  Court  in  Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v.  The  State  of Bombay (2) and Atma Ram v. The State of Punjab and Ors. (3). Explaining them this Court observed in the latter case:               "Those  observations must be strictly  limited               to the facts of the case, and cannot  possibly               be  extended to the provisions of Acts  wholly               dissimilar  to those of the Ajmer Tenancy  and               Land Records Act, XLII of 1950, which was  the               subject-matter  of the challenge in  the  case               then before this Court.  This Court held, on a               construction  of  the provision of  that  Act,               that   they  only  suspended  the   right   of               management   but   did  not  amount   to   any               extinguishment   or   modification   of    any               proprietary rights               (1) [1953] S.C.R. 1049,1053.               (2) [1959] Supp.  S.C.R. 489, 519               (3) [1959] SUPP.  S.C.R. 748, 767.               62               in an estate.  The provisions of the Act  then               under   consideration  of  this  Court,   have               absolutely no resemblance to those of the  Act               now  before us, and it is impossible to put  a

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             similar  interpretation on  these  provisions.               In the recent decision of this Court (not  yet               reported) this Court had been invited to apply                             the  observations  of this  Court  referred  t o               above,  to the provisions of the  Bombay  Act.               It  was  pointed out in that case  that  those               observations of Mahajan, J., (as he then was),               must  be read as limited to an Act which  only               brings  about  a suspension of  the  right  of               management  of  an estate, and  could  not  be               extended  to  the provisions of an  Act  which               either extinguishes or modifies certain rights               of  a  proprietor in an estate  or  a  portion               thereof". This  Court  did  not intend to lay down as  law  in  Thakur Raghbir  Singh  v.  Court  of Wards,  Ajmer  (1)  that  Art. 1A(i)(e) is inapplicable to a case where the property rights of a person are kept in abeyance for a certain period.   The meaning  of the word "modify" fell to be considered,  in  re The  Delhi Laws Act, 1912 As pointed out in the -opinion  of Kania,  C. J., the word "modify" means, according to  Oxford Dictionary,  to  limit, restrain, to assuage, to  make  less severe, rigorous, or decisive; to tone down".  It also means "to  make  partial  changes in;  to  alter  without  radical transformation".   In Rowland Burrows"’Words  and  Phrases’, the  word  "modify" has, however, been  defined  as  meaning "vary, extend or enlarge, limit or restrict".  According  to the   learned   Chief  Justice  "It  has  been   held   that modification implies an alteration. it may narrow or enlarge the provisions of the former Act". Bearing   in  mind  the  principle  that  a   constitutional enactment  must be construed liberally we would be right  in according the dictionary meaning to the word " modification" occurring  in  the aforesaid provision.  Mr.  Das,  however, contends  that for a thing to amount to a modification of  a right  it  must  be of a permanent character and  not  of  a temporary duration.  We see no ground whatsoever for holding that for a (1) [1953] S.C.R. 1049,1053. (2) [1951] S.C.R. 793-4. 63 thing  to  be  a  modification it must  be  of  a  permanent duration.  A right may well be modified for all time or  for a  limited  duration and in either case the  right  must  be regarded as having been modified.  For these reasons we hold that  the  provisions  of Art. 31A, cl.  (1)(e),  debar  the petitioners from challenging the validity of ss. 4 and 5  of the  Act on the ground that they infringe the provisions  of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. What  remains  to be considered is  whether  the  provisions permitting   acquisition  of  land  are  ultra   vires   the Constitution   because  they  offend  Art.  31(2)   of   the Constitution.  According to the learned Attorney-General the petitioners have no present grievance on that score  because the  notification  in question empowers the  State  only  to prospect  for  coal  in the petitioner’s  land  and  not  to acquire  it.  We cannot accept this contention.   The  whole object of Parliament in enacting the law was to empower  the State to acquire coal bearing lands.  Prospecting on a piece of  land  for coal is merely a stage  preceding  the  actual acquisition  of that land.  If, therefore, those  provisions of the law which deal with the question ’of acquisition  are unconstitutional   the   whole   Act   will   be    rendered unconstitutional.

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Article 31(2) of the Constitution, as amended by the  Fourth Amendment Act, 1955, runs thus:               "No property shall be compulsorily acquired or               requisitioned  save for a public  purpose  and               save by authority of a law which provides  for               compensation  for the property so acquired  or               requisitioned  and either fixes the amount  of               the  compensation or specifies the  principles               on  which,  and  the  manner  in  which,   the               compensation  is to be determined  and  given;               and no such law shall be called in question in               any court on the ground that the  compensation               provided by that law is not adequate". Mr.  Das pointed out that s. 13 of the Act, though it  deals with  the  payment  of compensation, does  not  contain  any provision  for payment of compensation for  mineral  rights. Not  only  that,  but the explanation to cl.  (a)  of  s.  5 clearly lays down that in computing the 64 compensation for the land the value of minerals will not  be taken  into  account.   The acquisition  of  mineral  rights would,  therefore, according to him, be impermissible  under Art.  31(2)  without payment of compensation.   The  learned Attorney-General quite rightly pointed out that s. 13  deals with  the  whole subject of payment of compensation  to  the owner  or lessee of the mine for his entire interest in  the land  including the rights to minerals and even though  that section  specifically  says that the value of  the  minerals cannot  be taken into account in determining the  amount  of compensation,  the concluding words of Art.  31(2)  preclude the  petitioners from challenging the law.  Mr. Das  pointed out that the only ground on which the Central Government  in their  affidavit have tried to sustain the validity  of  the provisions relating to the acquisition of land under the Act is that a challenge to the validity of the law is barred  by the provisions of Art. 3lA(1)(e) and that it is not now open to  the  Central  Government  to say that  the  law  can  be sustained   on  another  ground.   We  cannot  accept   this contention.  Where the validity of a law made by a competent legislature  is challenged in a Court of law that  Court  is bound to presume in favour of its validity.  Further,  while considering  the  validity  of the law the  court  will  not consider itself restricted to the pleadings of the State and would be free to satisfy itself whether under any  provision of  the Constitution the law can be sustained.  There is  no doubt  that the entire Act cannot be sustained by  resorting only to Art. 31A(1)(e) or to Art. 31(2A) of the Constitution because  these provisions do not deal with the  question  of acquisition and the Attorney-General fairly admitted that it could not be so sustained.  The opening words of sub-s.  (2) of s. 13 read thus:               "Where  the  rights under a mining  lease  are               acquired  under this-Act, there shall be  paid               to  the  person interested  compensation,  the               amount of which shall be a sum made up of  the                             following items, namely............ Then follow the items which have to be added up  Undoubtedly they are items of expenditure and 65 interest  on such expenditure.  Sub-section (3)  deals  with the procedure to be adopted where the rights acquired  under s.  9 relate only to part of the land covered by the  mining lease.   Sub-section (4) deals with the compensation  to  be paid  where the mining lease ceases to have effect  for  any period  under cl. (b) of s. 5. Subsection (5)  provides  for

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payment of compensation for any land acquired under s. 9 and lays  down  the principles to be followed in  computing  the compensation.  Sub-section (6) provides for payment of  com- pensation for damage done to the surface of any land or  any works  thereon  and  in respect  whereof  no  provision  for compensation is made elsewhere in the Act.  Sub-section  (7) deals with the question of compensation for maps, charts and other  documents.   Section  14 of the Act  deals  with  the method  of determining the compensation.  It will  be  clear from these provisions that the Act specifies the  principles on which and the manner in which the compensation should  be determined and given.  This is all that is required of a law relating to the acquisition of property by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution.  Where provisions of this kind exist in a  law that  Article  lays down that such law cannot be  called  in question  in any court on the ground that  the  compensation provided by that law is not adequate.  Here compensation  is specifically  provided for the land which is to be  acquired under the Act.  The land includes all that lies beneath  the surface  or, as Mr. Das put it, all that is "locked up "  in the  land.  Parliament has laid down in sub-B. (5) of s.  13 how  the  value  of  this land is  to  be  calculated.   The contention  that  the  provisions  made  by  Parliament  for computing  the  amount of compensation for the land  do  not take  into account the value of the minerals is in effect  a challenge to the adequacy of the compensation payable  under the Act.  The concluding words of Art. 31(2) preclude such a challenge being made. But  Mr.  Das  contended  that  the  minerals  are  separate tenement and have to be separately compensated for.  We have already  dealt  with  the contention of  Mr.  Das  that  the minerals underlying the surface are a separate tenement  and we need not repeat here all 66 that  we  have  said before.  In our  opinion  the  minerals cannot be regarded as a separate tenement except perhaps  in a case of a trespass and, therefore, there is no question of the  law  providing for a separate  compensation  for  them. Apart from that if minerals have become a separate  tenement then  the  present Act may not apply to such a  tenement  at all.   As we have pointed out the coal contained in the  two collieries  in  question  is  not  held  by  the  respective petitioners as a tenement separate from the surface.  In the circumstances  the challenge to the validity of the  Act  on the  ground that it offends Art. 31(4) of  the  Constitution fails, and we dismiss the petition with costs. We must say a few words about W. P. 242 of 1960.  Out of 737 bighas of land held by the petitioner in that writ petition, we  are  informed  that 321 bighas have  been  worked.   The working,of  this  mine was closed in the year  1928  on  the ground  that the mine was flooded.  An application Was  made by  the petitioner for reopening the mine on June  5,  1957. Repeated  reminders were sent subsequently but there was  no reply  to  any  of  them either.   In  its  application  the petitioner, it may be stated, did not apply for opening  new mines.  Since the necessary permission was not received,  it did not commence any operations.  We are informed that  over a million tons of coal was extracted by the petitioner  from its colliery in the past.  Even so, we do not think that any different  considerations  could apply to  the  petitioner’s case from those which apply to the case of the Burrakar Coal Co. The petitioner’s colliery was also dormant for too  long a period and was thus an "unworked mine".  The impugned  Act and the notification made thereunder both apply to it in the same way as they apply to the Sudamdih colliery belonging to

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Burrakur  Coal, Co., Ltd.  The writ petition thus fails  and is dismissed with costs. Cost  of  the  hearing  be paid half and  half  by  the  two petitioners.   There  will be only one hearing  fee,  to  be divided equally between the two petitioners. Petitions dismissed. 67