http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 2  

PETITIONER: M/S.  BHAGWAN DASS RAMA SHANKER (DEAD) THROUGH L.RS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       25/02/2000

BENCH: U.C.Banerjee, S.S.M.Quadri

JUDGMENT:

D E R       The  plaintiff in O.S.  No.  4 of 1960 on the file  of the  Civil Judge, Ballia, is the appellant herein.  It  laid the  suit  for recovery of damages for non-delivery  of  the goods  entrusted  to the Railways.  The plaintiff  consigned the  goods at the Tata Freight Railway Station for  delivery at  Ballia  on  29th  September, 1958 vide  RR  No.   026790 Invoice  No.502.   As  the goods were not delivered  to  the plaintiff,  it  filed the suit for recovery of damages  etc. of  Rs.15,477/-.  The trial court decreed the suit in a  sum of  Rs.13,347/-.   The  respondents carried  the  matter  in appeal.  The first appellate court confirmed the findings of the  trial court so far as damages were concerned but  found that the suit was barred by limitation in view of Article 31 of  the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (Article 11 of 1963 Act) and accordingly dismissed the suit.  The plaintiff filed the second  appeal in the High Court of Allahabad, aggrieved  by the  judgment of the first appellate court dated 20th March, 1972.   The High Court agreed with the first appellate court and  dismissed the second appeal of the plaintiff.  That  is how  the plaintiff is before us in this appeal.  Mr.   Manoj Swarup, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that the statement  of  P.W.1,  ought  not to  have  been  taken  for reckoning the period of limitation and the date on which the goods  ought  to be delivered to the appellant and that  the High  Court  ought  to  have taken  into  consideration  the special  circumstances that the goods had arrived at  Ballia but  on verification the goods were not found to be the same as  were  consigned  by the appellant.   To  appreciate  the contention  of the learned counsel, it would be necessary to refer to Article 31 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which reads as  follows:  Description of Suit Period of Limitation  Time for which period begins to run

     Against  a  carrier for compensation for  non-delivery of,  or delay in delivering, goods.  One year when the goods ought to be delivered.

     From  a  perusal  of column 3 of the  extract  of  the Schedule  to the Limitation Act, it is clear that in a  suit against  a  carrier for compensation for non-delivery of  or delay  in delivering goods, the period of limitation is  one year  and  time  from which the period begins  to  run,  the starting point of limitation, is when the goods ought to be delivered.  The period of limitation under the 1908 Act was one  year which is enhanced to three years in Article 11  of the  Limitation  Act  of  1963.  The  period  of  limitation

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 2  

prescribed  in  Article 31 of 1908 Act alone will  apply  in this  case.   The limitation starts from the time when  the goods ought to be delivered.  The time of delivery of goods to the consignee has to be ascertained from the terms of the contract  between  the consignor/consignee and the  carrier. In  the  absence  of any contract, express or  implied,  the normal  time of delivery of goods will have to be determined having  regard  to  nature of carrier,  distance  and  other relevant  factors  on  the facts of each case.   The  phrase when   the   goods  ought  to   be  delivered   fell   for consideration of this Court in Boota Mal vs.  Union of India [AIR  1962 SC 1716].  It was laid down that it  contemplated that  the time would begin to run after reasonable time  had elapsed  on  the expiry of which the delivery ought to  have been  made.   It  was observed:  The word when  the  goods ought  to  be delivered can only mean the  reasonable  time taken (in the absence of any term in the contract from which the  time  can  be  inferred expressly or  implied)  in  the carriage  of  the  goods from the place of despatch  to  the place of destination.

     It is pointed out that this should depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and that the carrier may have to  show eventually what is the reasonable time for carriage of  goods.  In this case, though there is no evidence by the carrier-respondent  on the question of reasonable time which would  be necessary to carry the goods from the Tata Freight Railway  Station, place of consignment, to Ballia, the place of destination.  However, the plaintiff- appellant placed on record  evidence of P.W.1 which suggests that it would  take 10  to 15 days.  Taking that period as the reasonable  time, the  first  appellate court and the second  appellate  court have  worked out the period of limitation and found that the suit  was filed beyond the period one year.  In view of  the fact  that  there is no other evidence before the  court  to dislodge  the  statement  of P.W.1, in our view,  the  first appellate  court  and the High Court have not committed  any error of law warranting interference by this Court.  We find no  merit in this appeal.  It is accordingly dismissed,  but in  the  circumstances  of the case we make no order  as  to costs.