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CASE NO.: Special Leave Petition (crl.) 3229  of  2000

PETITIONER: M.RAMALINGA THEVAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       19/04/2000

BENCH: K.T. THOMAS  & M.B. Shah

JUDGMENT:

Thomas J.

Leave granted. L...I...T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T.......T..J

   A Land Acquisition Collector passed award only after the expiry  of  two  years from the date of publication  of  the declaration  under  Section 6 of the Land  Acquisition  Act, 1894  (for short the "Act’).  The owner of the land wanted a declaration  that proceedings for acquisition covered by the said  publication  stood  lapsed on the expiry of  the  said period of two years.  But a Division Bench of the High Court of  Madras which the owner of the land approached for such a relief,  repelled his contentions.  The High Court took into account  the  time  during   which  proceedings  for  taking possession  of the land were stayed by an order passed in  a writ  petition.  When that period was excluded from the time fixed for passing the award the Division Bench held that the award  was  passed within the permitted range of time.   The owner  of  the  land challenges the said  judgment  in  this appeal.

   After  hearing learned counsel for the appellant we  did not  find  the necessity to issue notice to  the  respondent State  as the appeal can be disposed of without resorting to such a course.

   A  notification  under  Section  4(1)  of  the  Act  was published  in  the gazette on 27.2.1991.  That  notification was  challenged by the appellant in writ petition No.9715 of 1991  which  he filed before the High Court of Allahabad  on 16.7.1991.   On the same day an order was passed by the High Court  staying  dispossession  of  the  appellant  from  the property  involved.   Despite the pendency of the said  writ petition  the Government published declaration under Section 6 of the Act on 10.4.1992.  But the award was passed only on 16.9.1994.   Thus,  there  is no doubt that  the  award  was passed  only after the expiry of two years from the date  of declaration.

   Learned  counsel for the appellant submitted that  since

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there  was  no stay for passing an award the period  of  two years  should  have  been counted from 10.4.1992  which  had expired  on 9.4.1994 and by such expiry the proceedings  had become  lapsed.   Section  11A and the  Explanation  thereto (omitting  the  proviso which is not material in this  case) are extracted below:

   "11A.   Period  within which an award shall be made.   - (1)  The  Collector  shall make an award  under  section  11 within  a  period  of  two  years   from  the  date  of  the publication  of  the  declaration and if no  award  is  made within   that  period,  the   entire  proceedings  for   the acquisition of the land shall lapse.

   Explanation.-  In  computing  the period  of  two  years referred  to  in  this section the period during  which  any action  or  proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the  said declaration  is  stayed  by  an order of a  Court  shall  be excluded]."

   As  per the Explanation the period of exclusion from the time  is the period during which "any action or proceedings" to  be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed. We  have  no  doubt  that one of  the  actions  contemplated pursuant  to  the  declaration is taking possession  of  the land,  though  such  action is a post-award step  in  normal circumstances  and in emergent circumstances it can as  well be  a pre-award step.  Nonetheless, taking possession is one of  the  actions  to  be adopted as  a  follow-  up  measure pursuant  to  the declaration envisaged in Section 6 of  the Act.   The  consequence  mentioned  in   Section  11A  is  a self-operating  statutory  process  and, therefore,  it  can operate  only when the conditions specified therein  conjoin together.   The consequence would step in only when there is fusion  of all the conditions stipulated therein.  If  there is  any  stay  regarding  any of the  actions  to  be  taken pursuant  to  the declaration then the consequence of  lapse would  not  happen.  A three judge bench of this  court  had considered  the  scope of the Explanation to Section 11A  of the  Act  in  Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya vs.   State  of Gujarat[1991 (4) SCC 531]:

   "The  said  Explanation is in the widest possible  terms and,  in  our opinion, there is no warrant for limiting  the action  or  proceedings  referred to in the  Explanation  to actions  or  proceedings preceding the making of  the  award under  Section  11 of the said Act.  In the first place,  as held  by the learned Single Judge himself where the case  is covered by Section 17, the possession can be taken before an award  is  made  and  we see no  reason  why  the  aforesaid expression  in  the Explanation should be given a  different meaning  depending  upon  whether  the case  is  covered  by Section  17 or otherwise.  On the other hand, it appears  to us that the Explanation is intended to confer a benefit on a landholder  whose  land  is acquired after  the  declaration under Section 6 is made in cases covered by the Explanation. The  benefit is that the award must be made within a  period of  two  years  of  the   declaration,  failing  which   the acquisition  proceedings  would  lapse and  the  land  would revert  to  the landholder.  In order to get the benefit  of the  said provision what is required, is that the landholder who  seeks the benefit must not have obtained any order from a court restraining any action or proceeding in pursuance of the  declaration under Section 6 of the said Act so that the Explanation  covers only the cases of those landholders  who

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do  not  obtain any order from a court which would delay  or prevent  the making of the award or taking possession of the land acquired."

   In  Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan vs.  State of Karnataka [1994  (4) SCC 145] the question considered was the scope of Explanation  1 to the proviso of Section 6 of the Act  which also  contained  a similar restriction that  no  declaration under  the  section shall be made after the expiry of  three years from the date of publication of the notification under Section  4.   The said Explanation states that in  computing the aforesaid period of three years "the period during which any  action  or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of  the notification  issued  under  Section 4 (1) is stayed  by  an order  of  a court shall be excluded." As there was  only  a stay of dispossession from the land concerned the High Court did  not permit that period of stay to be excluded from  the three  years’ period.  But this Court reversed the said view of the High Court and stated thus:

   "Though  there is no specific direction prohibiting  the publication  of  the declaration under Section 6, no  useful purpose   would  be  served  by  publishing   Section   6(1) declaration  pending adjudication of the legality of Section 4(1),  notification.  If any action is taken to preempt  the proceedings, it would be stigmatised either as ‘undue haste’ or  action  to  ‘overreach the  Court’s  judicial  process.’ Therefore,   the   period   during   which  the   order   of dispossession  granted by the High Court operated, should be excluded in computation of the period of three years covered by  clause (1) of the first proviso to the Land  Acquisition Act.   When it is so computed, the declaration published  on the  second  occasion  is   perfectly  valid.   Under  these circumstances, we do not find any justification to quash the notification  published under Section 6, dated May 17, 1984. The review petitions are accordingly dismissed.  No costs."

   Both  the  above decisions were later followed  by  this Court  in  Government of Tamil Nadu vs.  Vasantha Bai  {1995 Supple.  (2) SCC 423}.

   Thus,  the  position is now well settled that even  when dispossession alone is stayed by the Court the period during which  such stay operates would stand excluded from the time fixed  for  passing  the award, the expiry  of  which  would render  the acquisition proceedings lapsed.  In the light of the  said interpretation it is now idle to contend that  the Government is debarred from proceeding with the acquisition. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.