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PETITIONER: M. RAMAKRISHNAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MADRAS

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/08/1979

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) GUPTA, A.C.

CITATION:  1979 AIR 1905            1980 SCR  (1) 396  1979 SCC  (4) 209

ACT:      Tamilnadu Land  Reforms (Fixation  of Ceilings on Land) Act 1961-Ss.  3 (42),  5 (4)(a)-Scope  of-"Stridhana  land"- Whether includes land inherited by female or acquired by her as bequest after the date of commencement of the Act.

HEADNOTE:      The Tamilnadu  Land Reforms  (Fixation  of  Ceiling  on Land) Act, 1961 by S. 3 (42) defined "stridhana land" as any land held  on the date of the commencement of the Act (April 6, 1960)  by any  female member of a family in her own name, and S.  5 (4)(a)  of the Act enabled such a female member to hold, in  addition to the extent of land which the family is entitled to  hold, stridhana  land not exceeding 10 standard acres.      The mother  of the  appellant  had  bequeathed  to  the appellant and his wife certain agricultural lands by a will. The appellant  being married on June 29, 1960 and his mother having died  on April  20, 1962 i.e. after the Act came into force, the  Authorised Officer  passed orders  treating  the lands bequeathed  in favour  of the appellant’s wife as part of the  holdings of  the family  consisting of the appellant and his  wife, and determined the extent of the surplus land to be surrendered.      The appellant’s contention in his appeal under S. 78 of the Act  before the  Land Tribunal,  that the land which was bequeathed in  favour of  his wife  by his  mother under the will was  stridhana land,  was accepted  by it  and the Land Tribunal allowed  the wife  of the  appellant to  retain the land as  stridhana land  under S.  5 (4)(a)  of the  Act and remitted back  the case to the Authorised Officer for making a fresh determination of the surplus extent of the land.      The respondent’s  revision petition  under S. 83 of the Act was  allowed, the  High Court holding that the land held by the  wife was  not ’stridhana land’ as defined under S. 3 (42) of  the Act,  and could  not be  treated as  such while determining the surplus land.      On the  question  whether  the  land  in  question  was ’stridhana land’ and could be treated as such under S. 5 (4) of the Act while determining the surplus land. ^      HELD: (1) The High Court was right in holding that S. 5

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(4) of  the Act  was not applicable to the land in question. [403 F]      (2) The  expression "stridhana  land" used  in S. 5 (4) (a) has  been given a restricted meaning by S. 3 (42) of the Act which  defines it  as any  land held  on the date of the commencement of  the Act by any female member of a family in her own name. [401C] 397      In the  instant case on the date of the commencement of the Act i.e. April 6, 1960 the wife was not the owner of the land in question. She acquired title to it on April 20, 1962 on the  death of  the testatrix  her mother.  The  appellant cannot therefore claim any benefit under S. 5 (4) (a) of the Act. [401C]      (3) S.  21 of  the Act under which the land in question becomes  liable  to  be  included  in  the  holding  of  the appellant for  purposes of determination of the surplus land does not make any difference between stridhana property of a female  acquired  after  the  commencement  of  the  Act  by inheritance  or  bequest  from  any  person  and  any  other property held by her family. [401D]      (4) A  reading of  the  definition  of  the  expression "stridhana land"  in S. 3 (42) of the Act and the provisions of S.  5(4) of  the Act, indicate that the State Legislature intended to  extend the  concession available under S. 5 (4) of the  Act only to the land held by a female on the date of the commencement  of the Act and not to land acquired by her thereafter. [401E]      (5) The object of the legislation is the acquisition of agricultural  land   in  excess  of  the  ceiling  area  and distribution of  the same  amongst the  landless  among  the rural population. If the construction urged by the appellant is placed  on S.  21 of  the Act,  the very  object  of  the statute would  be  defeated.  There  is  also  no  room  for construing S.  5 (4)  (a) of  the Act as being applicable to agricultural land  acquired  by  a  female  even  after  the commencement of this Act. [401G, F]      (6) If  the Legislature intended that lands acquired by way of  inheritance or  bequest by  a female on or after the commencement of  the  Act  should  also  be  dealt  with  in accordance  with   S.  5(4),   it  would  have  defined  the expression "stridhana  land" without  the words "on the date of the commencement of this Act." [401H]      (7) The  Act is  applicable to Hindus as well as others governed by  other personal  laws. This  indicates that  the expression ’stridhana’  is not  used in the Act in the sense in which it is used in Hindu law. [402A]      Valliammal v.  The Authorised  Officer,  Land  Reforms, Coimbatore A.I.R. 1973 Mad 321, over-ruled.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1592 of 1969.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated 12th  March, 1969  of the  Madras High  Court in Civil Rev. Petition No. 1791/67.      K. Jayaram and K. Ramkumar for the Appellant.      A. V. Rangam for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      VENKATARAMIAH, J.-This appeal by special leave is filed against the  order dated  March 12,  1969  passed  in  Civil Revision Petition  No. 1791  of 1967 on the file of the High Court of Madras.

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398      On the  date of the commencement of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling of Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to  as ’the Act’) i.e. April 6, 1960, the appellant owned approximately  47 acres  of agricultural lands. He was required to  file a  statement under  section 8  of the  Act within 90  days from  the date specified in the Notification issued by  the Government  in that  behalf in respect of all lands held or deemed to have been held by him furnishing the particulars mentioned  in that  provision to  the Authorised Officer within  whose jurisdiction his holding or major part thereof was  situated. Accordingly,  he filed his return. In the course of the enquiry, the Authorised Officer found that under a  will made  by Sivagami  Achi,  the  mother  of  the appellant, who  died on April 20, 1962, the appellant became entitled to  4.99 standard  acres and  his wife,  Devika got 8.81 standard  acres of  agricultural land.  The  Authorised Officer after  ascertaining the  true extents of the several bits of  agricultural land held by the appellant on April 6, 1960, exempted  2.21 acres  of land  under section 73 of the Act and  determined the  extent of surplus land which had to be surrendered  by the  appellant under  the Act  at  12.803 standard acres  on the  basis that  the  appellant’s  family which included  his wife was holding 44-46 acres as also the land which  the appellant and his wife got under the will of Sivagami Achi.  On the  above basis,  he directed  the final statement to  be published  under section  12  of  the  Act. Aggrieved by  the  order  of  the  Authorised  Officer,  the appellant filed  an appeal before the Land Tribunal i.e. the Subordinate Judge  of Thanjavur  under section 78 of the Act contending inter alia that the extent of 8.81 standard acres which had  been bequeathed  in favour of his wife, Devika by his mother  Sivagami Achi  under the  will referred to above was stridhana  land and  had to be dealt with accordingly as required by  section 5  (4) (a)  of  the  Act.  The  learned Subordinate Judge  accepted the  case of  the appellant that the extent  of 8.81 standard acres acquired by Devika on the death of  Sivagami Achi  should be allowed to be retained by her in addition to 30 standard acres. The case was, however, remitted back  to the  Authorised Officer for making a fresh determination of  the surplus  extent of  land in accordance with the  order passed  in appeal.  The State  of Tamil Nadu filed a revision petition under section 83 of the Act before the High  Court against  the appellate order. The High Court allowed the  revision petition  holding that  the extent  of 8.81 standard  acres acquired  by Devika  was not ’stridhana land’ as  defined under  section 3 (42) of the Act and could not be  treated as  such while determining the surplus land. The High Court further held that the land acquired by Devika was governed by section 21(1) read with section 10(2) (b) of the Act. This appeal is filed against the said order. 399      In order  to appreciate  the submissions made on behalf of the  parties before  us, it is necessary to refer briefly to some  of the provisions of the Act. The Act was passed to provide for  the fixation  of ceiling  on agricultural  land holdings and  for certain  other matters connected therewith in the  State of  Tamil Nadu.  Having regard  to the limited extent of  the  area  of  agricultural  land  available  for cultivation in  that  State,  the  great  disparity  in  the ownership of  agricultural land leading to the concentration of such  land in  the hands of certain persons, the need for reduction of such disparity in the ownership of agricultural land in that State and the necessity for fixing a ceiling on the Agricultural  land holdings,  provisions were enacted in

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the Act  fixing a  ceiling on the agricultural land holdings and providing for acquisition of agricultural land in excess of the  ceiling area  and distribution  of such land amongst the landless and other persons among the rural population.      Section 3(11)  of the  Act defined the expression "date of the  commencement of  this Act"  as the date on which the Tamil Nadu  Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Bill, 1960 was  published in  the Fort St. George Gazette, namely, the 6th day of April, 1960.      Section  3(34)   of  the  Act  defined  the  expression "person" as  including any  trust,  company,  family,  firm, society or  association of individuals, whether incorporated or not.      Under section 3(14) of the Act, ’family’ in relation to a person  meant the  person, the wife or husband as the case may be,  of such  person and  his  or  her  minor  sons  and unmarried daughters and minor grandsons and unmarried grand- daughters in  the male  line, whose  father and  mother were dead.      Section 3(7)  of the  Act defined "ceiling area" as the extent of  land which  a person  was entitled  to hold under section 5.      Section 3(42)  of the  Act defined  "stridhana land" as any land  held on the date of the commencement of the Act by any female member of a female in her own name.      During the  period in  question, the  relevant part  of section 5 of the Act read as follows:-           "5. (1)(a)  Subject to  the provisions  of Chapter      VIII, the ceiling area in the case of every person and,      subject to  the provisions  of sub-sections (4) and (5)      and of  Chapter VIII  the ceiling  area in  the case of      every family  consisting of not more than five members,      shall be 30 standard acres........ 400           (4)(a) Subject  to the  provisions of  sub-section      (5), where the stridhana land held by any female member      of a  family together  with the  other land held by all      the members of that family, is in excess of 30 standard      acres,  the   female  member  concerned  may  hold,  in      addition to  the extent  of land  which the  family  is      entitled to  hold under sub-section (1), stridhana land      not exceeding 10 standard acres........." Section 7 of the Act read as follows:-           "7. On  and from  the date  of the commencement of      this Act, no person shall, except as otherwise provided      in this  Act, but  subject to the provisions of Chapter      VIII, be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling      area:           Provided that  in calculating  the total extent of      land held  by any  person, any  extent in excess of the      ceiling area and not exceeding half an acre in the case      of wet land and one acre in the case of dry land shall,      irrespective  of   the  assessment  of  such  land,  be      excluded."           Section 21 of the Act read as follows:-           "21. Ceiling on future acquisition by inheritance,      bequest or by sale in execution of decrees, etc.-           (1) If,  on or  after the date of the commencement      of this Act-           (a) any  person acquires by inheritance or bequest      from  any  person;  .......................  any  land,      which, together  with the land, if any, already held by      him, exceeds in the aggregate the ceiling area, then he      shall, within  ninety days  from the  notified date  or      from the  date of such acquisition, whichever is later,

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    furnish  to   the  authorised   Officer  within   whose      jurisdiction his  holding or  the major part thereof is      situated,   a    return   containing    the   following      particulars, namely .................."      The lands  which were  bequeathed by Sivagami Achi, the mother of the appellant under a will were held by her on the date of  the commencement of the Act i.e. April 6, 1960. The appellant married  Devika on  June 29,  1960. Sivagami  Achi died on  April 20,  1962 and on her death, the appellant and Devika became  entitled to  the  land  bequeathed  in  their favour by  her. The  draft statement relating to the holding of the  appellant was  published on  May, 30,  1965 and  the Authorised Officer  passed  his  order  on  March  14,  1966 treating the  lands bequeathed by Sivagami Achi in favour of the appellant and his 401 wife as  part of the holding of the family consisting of the appellant and his wife. The case of the appellant before the Authorised Officer, the Subordinate Judge and the High Court was that  in view  of section  5 (4)  (a) of  the  Act,  the ceiling area  should have  been fixed  in  his  case  at  30 standard acres  plus the extent of land bequeathed in favour of his  wife i.e.  8.81 standard  acres. In this Court also, the very  same contention  is urged. We are of the view that there is no substance in this contention.      The expression  "stridhana land"  used in  section 5(4) (a) has  been given a restricted meaning by section 3(42) of the Act which defines it as any land held on the date of the commencement of  the Act by any female member of a family in her own  name. Admittedly on the date of the commencement of the Act  i.e. April 6, 1960, Devika was not the owner of the land in question. She acquired title to it only on April 20, 1962 on  the death  of the  testatrix. The appellant cannot, therefore, claim  any benefit  under section 5(4) (a) of the Act. Section  21 of the Act under which the land in question becomes  liable  to  be  included  in  the  holding  of  the appellant for  purposes of determination of the surplus land does not make any difference between stridhana property of a female  acquired  after  the  commencement  of  the  Act  by inheritance  or  bequest  from  any  person  and  any  other property  held   by  her  family.  From  a  reading  of  the definition of  the expression  "stridhana land"  in  section 3(42) of  the Act  and the provisions of section 5(4) of the Act, we  are of  opinion that the State Legislature intended to extend the concession available under section 5(4) of the Act only  to the  stridhana property held by a female on the date of  the commencement  of the  Act and  not to  property acquired by her thereafter.      It was urged by Mr. K. Jayaram, learned counsel for the appellant  that   the  Act  was  an  expropriatory  one  and therefore, we  should construe  section 5 (4) (a) of the Act as being  applicable to  agricultural  land  acquired  by  a female even  after the  commencement of  the Act.  We do not think that  there  is  any  room  for  construing  the  said provision in  that way.  The object  of the  legislation  as mentioned earlier was to acquire agricultural land in excess of  the  ceiling  area  from  the  holders  thereof  and  to distribute the  same amongst  the landless  among the  rural population. If  the construction  urged by  the appellant is placed on  section 21  of the  Act, the  very object  of the statute  would   be  defeated.  If  really  the  Legislature intended that  lands  acquired  by  way  of  inheritance  or bequest by  a female on or after the commencement of the Act should also  be dealt  with in accordance with section 5(4), it  would  have  defined  the  expression  "stridhana  land"

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without the  words "on  the date of the commencement of this Act." It has also to be 402 borne in mind that the expression ’stridhana’ is not used in the Act  in the  sense in which it is used in Hindu Law. The Act is  applicable to  Hindus as  well as others governed by other  personal   laws.  It  is,  therefore,  reasonable  to construe the  expression ’stridhana  land’ as referring only to the land held by a female on the date of the commencement of the  Act and not to lands inherited by her or acquired by her as a bequest at any subsequent point of time.      The learned  counsel for  the appellant  relied on  the decision of  the High  Court of  Madras in Valliammal v. The Authorised Officer,  Land Reforms,  Coimbatore  in  which  a contention similar  to the  one urged before us on behalf of the appellant  in this  case had been accepted. The facts of that case were more or less similar to the facts in the case before us.  The petitioner  in that case was the wife of one Palanisami Gounder  who was  in possession  of an  extent of 44.061 standard  acres, after  excluding the exempted lands, on  the  commencement  of  the  Act.  She  inherited  11.075 standard acres on the death of her son on March 25, 1962. In the return  filed by  him, the  husband  of  the  petitioner claimed that  he was entitled to retain 30 standard acres as holding of  the family  and that his wife, the petitioner in that case,  was  entitled  to  hold  10  standard  acres  as stridhana property.  The Land Tribunal, Coimbatore held that since the  Act defined  "stridhana land" as meaning any land held on  the date  of the  commencement of  the Act  by  any female member  of the  family in  her own name and since the petitioner therein  had inherited  the land  on the death of her son  only on  March 25,  1962  i.e.  subsequent  to  the commencement of  the Act, she was not entitled to retain any land as stridhana property in addition to the extent of land which the  family  could  retain  under  section  5(1).  The petitioner questioned  the correctness  of the  order of the Tribunal before  the High  Court of Madras in C.R.P. No. 916 of 1971.  That petition  was dismissed by Ganesan, J. on the ground that  in view  of the definition of stridhana land in section 3  (42) of  the Act,  the petitioner therein was not entitled to hold 10 standard acres as stridhana property, in addition to  the 30  standard acres  allowed to  the  family consisting of herself and her husband. Thereafter a petition was filed before the High Court by the petitioner therein to review the  order passed  by Ganesan, J. The review petition came up  for  decision  before  another  learned  Judge  who allowed the  same by his order dated November 2, 1972. It is on the decision rendered on the review petition the reliance is placed by the appellant before us. In paragraph 6 of that decision, it is observed as follows:- 403           "The learned  Judge, who  heard the civil revision      petition, mainly relied on the definition of ’stridhana      property’ for holding that no woman is entitled to hold      any stridhana  property if  the same  was  acquired  or      inherited subsequent to the commencement of the Act. Of      course, section 3(42) defines stridhana land as meaning      any land held on the date of commencement of the Act by      any female member of a family in her own name. But that      meaning is  to be adopted ’unless the context otherwise      requires’. It has been repeatedly held that the word in      the section  will have to be interpreted and understood      in the  context in  which it is used in the section and      the definition  given for  that word  in the definition      section  of   the  Act  could  not  always  govern  the

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    interpretation without reference to the context. In the      context of  sections 5,  7 and 21 and with reference to      the scope  and object of the Act, I am of opinion, that      the  properties   inherited  by  females  as  stridhana      property subsequent  to the commencement of the Act are      also entitled  to the  benefit of  sub-section  (4)  of      section 5 of the Act."      It is  true that the above passage supports the case of the appellant  but we are of the view that in the context of section 21  of the Act it is not necessary to give a meaning to the  expression ’stridhana  land’ different  from what is stated in  section 3(42) of the Act. For the reasons already stated by  us we  hold that  the aforesaid decision does not lay down  the law  correctly. It is also to be observed that the earlier  decision of  the High  Court of Madras which is now under appeal does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judge who decided the above case.      We, therefore,  hold that  the High  Court was right in this case  in holding  that section 5 (4) of the Act was not applicable to the land in question.      It was  lastly urged  by Mr. K. Jayaram that in view of certain subsequent  amendments made to the Act, the case has to be examined afresh by us in the light of the amended law. We do not think that it is advisable to do so at this stage. It is open to the appellant if he is so advised to resort to appropriate proceedings  in order  to claim the benefit that he may be entitled to under the amended law. Liberty is also reserved to  the State Government to take whatever action it may take under the subsequent amendments to the Act.      In the  result, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. N.V.K.    Appeal dismissed. 404