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PETITIONER: M.   PADMANABHA SETTY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: K.   P. PAPIAH SETTY

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/03/1966

BENCH:

ACT: Mysore  House  Rent  and Accommodation Control  Act  (30  of 1951), s. 8(3)(a)(ii)-"Entitled to possession", meaning of.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  and  the  respondent  were  the  tenant  and landlord  respectively, of the non-residential  premises  in dispute.  The respondent’s application under s.  8(3)(a)(ii) of  the  Mysore House Rent and  Accommodation  Control  Act, 1951,  for eviction of the appellant on the ground that  the respondent required the premises for the purpose of shifting his business which he was carrying on in a rented  building, was  ordered, but the order was set aside by  the  appellate court.   The High Court in revision set aside the  appellate order and restored the order of eviction. In  appeal to this Court, it was contended that : (i)  since the  respondent was, within the meaning of  s.  8(3)(a)(ii), "entitled  to possession" of the building in his  occupation he  had  no right to ask for the appellant’s  eviction;  and (ii)  the High Court should not have interfered in  revision under s. 17 of the Act. HELD  (i) The High Court was right in ordering the  eviction of the appellant from the premises. The  respondent,  who was in occupation of a building  as  a tenant,  and  over  which  he  had  no  absolute  right   of possession but only a right to remainin  possession  till one of the conditions in s. 8(2) is satisfied. could notbe said to be "entitled to possession" of that building.  Those words aremore  akin  to the right of  possession  which  an owner has in respect ofa  building owned and  occupied  by him. [873 F-G] (ii)In  not  following the decision of the  High  Court  in Narayanappa  v.  Narasimhiah,  [1962] Mys.   L.J.  760,  the appellate court acted with material irregularity and so  the High Court could set aside the appellate order in  revision. [874 B] Thanappa  Chetty v. Govindaswami Naicker, A.I.R.  1952  Mad. 553 overruled.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 756 of 1965. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated April  9,  1965 of the Mysore High Court in  Civil  Revision Petition No. 1044 of 1962. S.   K. Venkatarangaiengar G. L. Sanghi, J.   B.  Dadachanji O.   C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant. Mirle N. Lakshminaraynappa O. P. Malhotra, S. S. Khanduja

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Ganpat Rai, for the respondent. 869 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri,  J. This appeal by special leave is directed  against the  judgment of the High Court of Mysore in Civil  Revision Petition  No. 1044 of 1962, filed under s. 17 of the  Mysore House  Rent and Accommodation Control Act, 1951 (Mysore  Act 30  of 1951)hereinafter referred to as the  Act-whereby  the High Court set aside the order passed by the III  Additional District Judge, Bangalore.  The III Additional Judge had set aside  the order of’ the First Munsiff, Bangalore,  who  had directed  the  eviction of the tenant from the  premises  in dispute. The  appellant  before  us,  Padmanabha  Setty,  hereinafter referred  to  as  the  tenant, was  the  tenant  of  a  non- residential  premises  No. 281,  Old  Tharagupet,  Bangalore City.  ]’be  tenant  had installed  some  machinery  in  the premises.   The  respondent,  K. P.  Papiah  Setty,  is  the landlord.  He had purchased the premises for his own use and occupation, namely, for the purpose of shifting his business which hewas  carrying  on  in a  rented  building  to  the premises in dispute. The  landlord tiled an  application under s.8(3)(a)(ii) of theAct  for the eviction  of  the tenant  on  the  ground that he  required  the  premises  in dispute for his own use and occupation.  It is not necessary to  give  the other allegations made in the  application  as both  the First Munsiff, Bangalore, and the  III  Additional District  Judge,  Bangalore, have found  that  the  landlord required  the premises for his bonafide use and  occupation, namely,  for shifting his business from the rented  premises to  the  premises in dispute.  The III  Additional  District Judge, however, held that under s. 8(3)(a)(ii) the  landlord was  not entitled to possession of the premises  in  dispute unless  and  until he was prepared to vacate  the  shops  in which  he  was  trading at the time.  This  finding  of  the learned Additional Judge was contrary to the decision of the Mysore  High Court in S. G. Narayanappa and Bros. v.  A.  N. Narasimhiah(1).  The landlord then filed a revision petition under  s. 17 of the Act, and the High Court,  following  the decision   in  S.  G.  Naravanappa  and  Bros.  v.   A.   N. Narasimhiah(1)  set  aside  the  order  of  the   Additional District  Judge.  The tenant having obtained special  leave, the matter is now before us. Two  points are raised before us: (1) that the  construction put upon s. 8(3)(a) (ii) of the Act by the Mysore High Court is  erroneous  and  the  construction  put  upon  a  similar provision by the Madras High Court in V. Thanappa Chetty  v. Arcot  Govindaswami Naicker(2) is correct; and (2) that  the High  Court was not right in setting aside the order of  the Additional District Judge in a revision under s.  1 7 of the Act. (1)  [1962] Mys.  L. J. 76). (2) A.I.R, 1952 Mad. 553. 870 The  Act was passed to regulate the letting  of  residential and non-residential houses and to control the rents of  such houses  and  to  prevent unreasonable  eviction  of  tenants therefrom  in  the State of Mysore.  The  word  "tenant"  is defined as follows in sub-s. (9)   of S. 2 of the Act:               "  ’tenant’  means any person by  whom  or  on               whose account rent is payable for a house  and               includes  the surviving spouse or any  son  or               daughter  of  a deceased tenant who  had  been               living  with  the  tenant in the  house  as  a               member of the tenant’s family up to the  death

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             of  the  tenant  and a  person  continuing  in               possession   after  the  termination  of   the               tenancy in his favour, but does not include  a               person placed in occupation of a house by  its               tenant  or a person to whom the collection  of               rents  or fees in a public market,  cart-stand               or  slaughter-house or of rents for shops  has               been   farmed  out  or  leased  by   a   local               authority." There  is no doubt that the definition of the word  "tenant" is wider than the ordinary meaning of the word and  includes a person ,continuing in possession after the termination  of the  tenancy  in  his  favour.  Section  4  deals  with  the determination of fair rent and s. 5 with lawful increase  of or  addition  to  or  reduction in  fair  rent.   Section  6 prohibits  the landlord from claiming or receiving  anything in excess of fair rent or agreed rent.  Section 7 deals with issue  of receipts for rent.  Sections 7A and 7-B deal  with the  right  of tenant to deposit rent in certain  cases  and time  for  deposit  and savings.   Section  7-C  deals  with eviction  of  tenant  in  occupation of  a  house  under  an allotment  order.  Section 8 deals with eviction of  tenants and provides that ,a tenant shall not be evicted whether  in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of s.7-C or of this section.  Sub-section (2) provides  the  circumstances in which a  landlord  would  be entitled  to seek eviction of a tenant in  possession.   For instance,  a landlord is entitled to evict a tenant  if  the tenant  has  not  tendered or paid the rent due  by  him  in respect  of  the  premises  within the  time  fixed  in  the agreement of tenancy with the landlord on in the absence  of any  such  agreement,  by the last day  of  the  month  next following  that  for which the rent is payable;  if  he  has transferred  his right under the lease or sublet the  entire premises  or any portion thereof; or used the  premises  for the  purpose other than that for which they were leased;  or if the tenant has committed such acts of waste as are likely to  impair materially the value or utility of the house;  or if the tenant has without the landlord’s consent in  writing erected on the house or any portion thereof any permanent  ’ structure; or if the tenant or any person residing with  the tenant  has been guilty of such acts and conduct as  amounts to  nuisance or annoyance to the adjoining  or  neighbouring occupiers 871 or has been using the house or allowing the house to be used for  immoral  or  illegal purposes; or  that  the  house  is reasonably  and  bona  fide required  by  the  landlord  for carrying  out  repairs  or reconstruction  which  cannot  be carried  out  without the house being vacated; or  that  the house  has  not been used without reasonable cause  for  the purpose  for  which it was let for a  continuous  period  of three months immediately preceding the date of  application; or  that the tenant, after the commencement of the Act,  has built,  acquired  vacant possession of or  been  allotted  a suitable house. We have set out these conditions in detail because it  would be relevant to consider whether in view of these  conditions a  tenant can be said to have a right to possession  of  the premises  of which he is a tenant.  Then we come  to  sub-s. (3) (a) which reads as follows:               "(3)(a)   A  landlord  may,  subject  to   the               provisions  of clause (d) apply to  the  court               for  an order directing the tenant to put  the               landlord in possession of the house-

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             (i)in case it is a residential building, if               the   landlord   requires  it  for   his   own               occupation  or for the occupation of a  member               of his family and if he or such member, as the               case  may be, is not occupying  a  residential               building  of  his  own in the  city,  town  or               village concerned;               (ii)in   case   it  is   a   non-residential               building,  if the landlord requires it  for  a               business which he or a member of his family is               carrying  on  and if for the purposes  of  the               said  business is not in occupation of a  non-               residential  building which is owned by or  to               the  possession of which the landlord or  such               member,  as  the  case  may  be,  is  entitled               whether under this Act or otherwise." It is not necessary to set out the Explanation or the  first proviso but the second proviso is relevant and runs thus:               "Provided  further that where a  landlord  has               obtained possession of a house for his own use               or occupation or for the use or occupation  of               a  member of his family under this  clause  he               shall  not  be entitled to apply  again  under               this clause-               (ii)for    possession   of   another    non-               residential  building of his own, for  himself               or for the same member of his family, in  case               he has obtained possession of a nonresidential               building." The  Madras High Court held in V. Thannappa Chetty v.  Arcot Govindaswami Naicker (1) that the tenant under the Madras (1)  A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 553 at p. 554-555. 872 Buildings  (Lease  and Rent Control) Act (Madras Act  15  of 1946)  had  a right to possession unless and  until  he  was evicted  under  the  provisions  of  the  Madras  Act,  and, therefore, the landlord would not be entitled to  possession of  a  non-residential building if he was in  possession  of another non-residential building as a tenant, for in such  a case  he would be entitled to possession of those  premises. The  reasoning  of Subba Rao, J., then a Judge of  the  High Court of Madras, was as follows:               "It   will,  therefore,  be  seen   that   the               relationship  between the landlord and  tenant               even  in  cases  in  which  such  relationship               terminated   under  the  provisions   of   the                             Transfer of Property Act, continues su bject  to               the provisions of the Act.  The rights of  the               tenants  as well as the landlord are  defined.               The  tenant  tinder  the Act has  a  right  to               possession  unless  and until  he  is  evicted               under  the provisions of the Act.   Under  the               provisions of the Act, a landlord will not  be               entitled   to  the  possession  of  his   non-               residential buildings, if he obtains an  order               for eviction against another tenant in respect               of another non-residential building, or if  he               is  in possession of  another  non-residential               building as a tenant; for in either case he is               entitled to possession of that premises.   The               words  used  in  the section,  viz.,  "to  the               possession  of which he is entitled" are  wide               and  I  do not see any reason why  the  latter               category  should be excluded from the  express

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             words  used  which in their  ordinary  meaning               take in that class."               "It  was argued that a statutory  immunity  is               different from a right to possession.  But  in               my   view   a  statutory   immunity   is   not               inconsistent with a right to possession.   The               statutory  immunity itself creates a right  in               him  to  continue  in possession  till  he  is               evicted under the provisions of the Act."               The  Mysore  High Court  dissented  from  this               decision  of  the Madras High Court,  and  the               reasoning  of  Ahmed Ali Khan, J.,  in  S.  G.               Narayanappa and Bros. v. A. N.  Narasimhiah(1)               is as under:               "After   a   careful  consideration   of   the               arguments  advanced  before me, I  am  of  the               opinion  that the provision of the Act on  the               strength  of  which a tenant  may  resist  the               landlord’s  claim  to  evict  him  cannot   be               described  as a right to possession, but  only               as  a  statutory immunity  from  eviction,  as               observed by the Federal Court in the case  Kai               Khushrao  v. Bai Jerbai (2).  It appears  that               his Lordship in the Madras case  distinguished               the said observations in the said case of  the               Federa  Court  by  stating  that  a  statutory               immunity is not inconsistent with the right to               posses-               (1)[1962]  Mys.L.J.76               (2) A. I. R. 1949 F. C. 124 (128).                873               sion and that such immunity may itself  create               a right.  The right to immunity from  eviction               involves  a negative element in it.  In  other               words it restricts the right of possession  of               the  landlord.  Hence, it cannot be  construed               to  have  an  effect of creating  a  right  of               possession to a tenant.  Though the  statutory               immunity  from eviction may not be  consistent               with the right to possession, the fact remains               in  view of the inherent element  involved  in                             both   the  rights,  that  the  immuni ty   from               eviction  cannot  be equated to the  right  to               possession.  Therefore, with great respect,  I               am  of the view that we will not be  justified               in adopting the strict view while interpreting               the  words which occur in s. 8(3)  (a)(ii)  of               the   Mysore  House  Rent  and   Accommodation               Control  Act,  as taken in the  Madras  ruling               cited above." In  our opinion, with great respect to Subba Rao, J.,  Ahmed Ali  Khan, J., arrived at the correct conclusion.  A  tenant who  can  be evicted under the conditions prescribed  in  s. 8(2) of the Act cannot be said, in our view, to be  entitled to  the possession of the premises of which he is a  tenant. No  doubt  he  cannot be evicted till one  or  more  of  the conditions  prescribed by the section are fulfilled, but  it is  difficult  to equate his right to stay in  the  premises till  he is evicted to an entitlement of the  possession  of the  premises.  Section 8(3)(a)(ii) deals with two types  of cases;  first where the landlord is in occupation of a  non- residential building which is owned by him, and secondly,  a non-residential building of which he is in occupation not as a  landlord  but  otherwise.  The object of the  Act  is  to

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prevent  unreasonable evictions of tenants.  Can it be  said that  the Legislature is considering it to  be  unreasonable for  a landlord to shift to his own premises while he is  in occupation  of  tenanted premises over which he has  not  an absolute  right of possession but only a right to remain  in possession  till  one  of  the  conditions  in  s.  8(2)  is satisfied,  and  over one of which he has no  control.   For instance, the landlord may require the premises for  repairs or  reconstruction or the neighbours may complain  that  the tenant  is guilty of nuisance or annoyance, or the  landlord may  think that the tenant has committed some acts of  waste as  are likely to impair materially the value or utility  of the  house.   If any of these conditions is  proved,  he  is liable to be evicted.  In our view, in the context the words "entitled  to possession" have a more positive  content  and are more akin to the right of possession which an owner  has in respect of the building owned and occupied by him. In  conclusion  we are of the view that the High  Court  was right in holding that the Additional District Judge erred in not following the decision of the Mysore High Court in S. G. Narayanappa and Bros. v. A. N. Narasimhiah.(1) (1) (1962) Mys.  L.J. 760. M12Sup.C.I.166-10 874 There is no force in the second point raised by the  learned counsel of the tenant.  It is true that the jurisdiction  of a  High Court under provisions similar to S. 1 7 of the  Act is limited, but we cannot say that the High Court was  wrong in  holding  that the Additional District Judge  acted  with material  irregularity in not following the decision of  the Mysore High Court when that decision had been rendered in  a case  arising from an earlier order of the  same  Additional District  Judge.   It  may be that  this  decision  was  not pointed out to the Additional District Judge but we  cannot, in  exercise  of  our jurisdiction under  Art.  136  of  the Constitution,  say that the High Court should not  have  set aside  the  order of the Additional District Judge  on  this ground. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with  costs. The tenant is granted two months’ time from today to  vacate and  deliver  possession of the premises in dispute  to  the landlord. Appeal dismissed. 875