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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  2138 of 2007

PETITIONER: M.P.Ram Mohan Raja

RESPONDENT: State of Tamil Nadu & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/04/2007

BENCH: A.K.MATHUR & TARUN CHATTERJEE

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  [Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.12751 of 2006]

A.K. MATHUR, J.

               Leave granted.                 This appeal is directed against the order passed by the  Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated 13.7.2006  whereby  the Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed the writ petition  filed by the appellant- M.P.Ram Mohan Raja and disposed of the writ  appeal filed by S.Ramilarasi in view of the affidavit filed by the State  Government. Hence, aggrieved against the order passed by the  Division Bench dismissing the writ petition the  present appeal has  been filed by the appellant.

               Brief facts giving rise to this appeal are the appellant- writ  petitioner (hereinafter to be referred to as the writ petitioner) applied  to the State Government  in the Industries Department on 2.2.1996  under Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules,  1959 (hereinafter to be referred to as ’the Rules’) for grant of quarry  lease for quarrying jelly and rough stone for a period of 20 years from  the poramboke lands over an extent of 3.64 hectares in survey  No.782/2 and over an extent of 2.36 hectares in survey No. 777/4A of  Ayyamkollankondam village,  Rajapalayam Taluk, Kamarajar District.  Rule 39 of the Rules conferred power on the State Government  to  grant or renew  quarry lease or permission in special cases.  The  validity of the said rule was affirmed by this Court  in Premium  Granites  & Anr.v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. [ (1994) 2 SC 691].  This Court held  the rule as valid but the action of the State  Government can always be subject to challenge. The writ petitioner  approached the High Court of Madras by filing writ Petition No.6931  of 1996 making a grievance that his application under Rule 39  of the  Rules was not disposed and as such he prayed for a direction to the  State Government  to dispose of his application made under Rule 39  of the Rules.  By order dated 14.6.1996 the High Court disposed of  the writ petition by directing the State Government to consider the  application of the writ petitioner and dispose of the same within a  period of four weeks from the date of receipt of  copy of the order and  also directed the State Government   to maintain status quo in the  meantime. However, on 27.6.1996 within a period of four weeks Rule  39 was repealed by the State Government. Consequently, the  application of the writ petitioner  came to be rejected by order dated  8.10.1996. Subsequently, the District Collector put certain lands for  auction in 2003. One of the two lands for which the writ petitioner had  applied for grant of lease, was also put to auction. After seven years,   the writ petitioner filed the present writ petition being W.P.No.13791  of 2003 seeking a writ of certiorari  to quash the order dated  8.10.1996  and to direct the first respondent to consider the

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application of the writ petitioner   dated 2.2.1996 for  grant of lease for  quarrying jelly and rough stone under Rule 39 of the Rules as it stood  at the relevant time.

               The writ petition was admitted on 29.4.2003. By an  interim order dated 27.2.2004  learned Single Judge permitted the  writ petitioner to carry on quarrying operation of jelly and rough stone  in the said land. The said order was challenged by the State  Government in Writ Appeal No.1750 of 2004. Thereafter, learned  Single Judge passed some clarificatory order against which an  appeal was preferred by the State Government but the same was  also dismissed.  The interim order dated 27.2.2004  passed by  learned Single Judge was challenged by a private party namely,  S.Tamilarasi in Writ Appeal No.453 of 2006 alleging that taking  advantage of the order of  learned Single Judge  the writ petitioner   has unauthorisedly encroached  upon the lease-hold land granted in  his favour  and started quarrying operation in the  said land. Hence,  both these matters were clubbed together by consent of parties  and  were disposed of by the High Court by the common impugned order.   It may be relevant to mention here that earlier Rule 8-C of the  Rules was introduced in 1977 by which grant of lease for quarrying  black granite  in favour of private persons was prohibited. It was  clearly stipulated that lease could only be granted in favour of  Corporations wholly owned by the State Government. The validity of  Rule 8-C was challenged before the Madras High Court and  ultimately, the matter reached before this Court and in State of Tamil  Nadu v. Hind Stone [AIR 1981 SC 711]  this Court allowed the State  appeal and upheld the validity of Rule 8-C.  However, this Court  observed that some of the applications which were pending before   introduction of this prohibition, may be dealt with in accordance with  the Rules but at the same time it is clarified that no one has vested  right for grant of lease in mining. Thereafter, Rule  39 was introduced  on 8.3.1993 and that rule provided power to the State Government for  relaxation. In the interest of mineral development and in public  interest  the Government may  for the reasons to be recorded, grant   or renew a lease or permission to quarry  any mineral. The validity of  Rule 39 was also challenged but it was upheld by this Court in  Premium Granites & Anr.  (supra).  

               A number of applications were filed under Rule 39 of the  Rules before the State Government for grant of lease. Government  granted lease in some cases relaxing the power of prohibition but  some applications were rejected. Hence, a batch of writ petitions was  filed before the Madras High Court. The High Court allowed certain  number of writ petitions by order dated 17.3.1995 and issued  directions that all pending applications should be disposed of as far  as possible within a period of twelve weeks from the date of the  order. The High Court further laid down that all future applications  should be disposed of as far as possible within a period of twelve  weeks from the date of receipt of such applications.  This order of the  High Court passed on 17.3.1995 was not challenged further and it  attained finality.  

       The writ petitioner made an application under Rule 39 of the  Rules but his application was not disposed of within twelve weeks.  Hence, he filed the writ petition &  the High Court passed an order on  2.5.1996 directing the State Government  to expedite the disposal of  the application of the writ petitioner and to dispose the same within  four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of the order.   Meanwhile, on 27.6.1996 within four weeks  Rule 39 was repealed.   The State Government  passed an order on 8.10.1996 rejecting the  application of the writ petitioner and the writ petitioner was asked to  participate  in the tender cum auction to be conducted by the  Collector for granting of quarry lease for the area applied by him.    The writ petitioner did not pursue the matter after the Government

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passed the order dated 8.10.1996 in pursuance of the direction given  by the High Court and the Collector while rejecting the application of  the writ petitioner held that since rule 39 has already been repealed,  therefore,  the writ petitioner cannot be granted any lease in view of  the changed circumstances.  The writ petitioner did not challenge   this order till 2003 and suddenly woke up to file writ petition  on  27.4.2003 being writ petition No.13791 of 2003 before the High Court.    The High Court passed an interim order on 29.4.2003 permitting the  writ petitioner to continue with quarrying operation on payment of  lease amount quoted by the neighbouring quarry owners.  Though  the Government preferred an appeal against the said order, it was  rejected.  But the private respondent who was affected by the interim  order filed a writ appeal against the said order alleging that the writ  petitioner under the garb of interim order was interfering with the  quarry allotted to him. As such the writ petition filed by the writ  petitioner and the writ appeal were clubbed together.

               We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The first  and foremost question before us  as was before the High Court , was  of delay. The Government on 8.10.1996  passed the order in  pursuance to the direction given by the High Court rejecting his  application, same was challenged after inordinate delay i.e. on  27.4.2003 by  the present writ petition, therefore, the writ petition was  hopelessly belated. The High Court affirmed the objection of the  respondents and in our opinion, rightly so.  When the application of  the writ petitioner under Rule 39 was  rejected on 8.10.1996 by the  State Government in pursuance to the direction given by the High  Court, the writ petitioner waited up to 27.4.2003 and filed a  hopelessly belated writ petition. But strangely enough, the said writ  petition was entertained and an interim order was passed  and it was  not interfered  despite the State Government raising an objection. It   was only when the third party who felt aggrieved by the said interim  order because the writ petitioner  on account of this interim order  started interfering with his area, that the matter was entertained by  the  High Court and it was clubbed up together.  We are satisfied that   there was no justification for the writ petitioner to have waited for a  long time. Once  the order was passed on 8.10.1996, then there was  no need for the writ petitioner to have waited for such a long time. We  are in full agreement with the view taken by the High Court.   However,  the High Court despite the fact that the writ petition was  belated and suffered from laches entered into  the controversy on the  merits also and took the view that when Rule 39 was deleted within  four weeks  of the direction to the State Government to dispose of the  application of the writ petitioner, there was no option with the  Collector  but to reject the application as the rule which was in force  was repealed, therefore, the basis on which the order was passed  was knocked out.  Therefore, the High Court declined to grant any  relief to the writ petitioner and dismissed the writ petition on merit  also.                 Learned counsel for the appellant  submitted that the writ  petition should not be dismissed on the ground of delay. In support  thereof, learned counsel invited our attention to a decision of this  Court in P.C.Sethi & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. ( AIR 1975 SC  2164).  In that case it was held that because the Government has  held out hopes, therefore, the petition was not liable to be dismissed  on the ground of delay.  In the case of K.Thimmappa & Ors. v.  Chairman, Central Board of Directors, State Bank of India & Anr..  [(2001) 2 SCC 259],  their Lordships held that a petition cannot be  rejected solely on the ground of laches if it violates  Article 14 of the  Constitution and when there is no infraction of Article 14, the question  of delay in filing the petition cannot be ignored.  In the case of  Hindustan Petroleum  Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Dolly Das [(1999) 4  SCC 450] it was held that delay itself cannot defeat the claim of the  petitioner for relief unless  the position of the respondent has been  irretrievably altered or he has been put to undue hardship.  In the

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case of M/s. Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District  Board, Bhojpur & Ors. etc. [(1992) 2 SCC 598] their Lordships found  that dismissal of the writ petition in limine was not proper. Since the  demand of cess was made illegally  in 1967 and the suit was  dismissed in 1971,  their Lordships found that it was involving matter  of serious consequence to the party, therefore delay was not  considered fatal in that case.          As against this,  learned counsel for the respondents invited our  attention to a decision in  State of Orissa v. Lochan Nayak (dead) by  LRs. [(2003) 10 SCC 678]. In this case, the question of allotment of  land was involved and  the Commissioner rejected the allotment  made in 1984 against which repondent filed writ petition in the High  Court in 1992. The High Court remanded the matter back to the  Revenue Officer for consideration of the matter afresh.  Meanwhile,  the allotment was further cancelled in 1992. This Court held that due  to in ordinate delay in filing the writ petition, the High Court ought not   to have entertained  the writ petition and  accordingly, set aside the  order of the High Court.  

               So far as the question of delay is concerned,  no hard and  first rule can be laid down and it will depend on the facts of each  case. In the present case, the facts stare at the face of it  that on  8.10.1996 an order was passed by the Collector in pursuance to the  order passed by the High Court,  rejecting the application of the writ  petitioner for consideration of the grant of mining lease. The writ  petitioner sat tight over the matter and did not challenge the same up  to 2003. This on the face of it appears to be very serious.  A person  who can sit tight for such a long time for no justifiable reason, cannot  be given any benefit.

               Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that when  the High Court passed the order on 14.6.1996,  at that time  Rule 39  was in existence. Therefore,  the case of the writ petitioner should  have been decided by the High Court as if the Rule had not been  deleted or repealed. In support thereof,  learned counsel for the  appellant has invited our attention to the following decisions of this  Court.         i)      1993 Supp (1) SCC 96(II)                 In the matter of : Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal.

       ii)     AIR 1994 SC 1 State of Haryana & Ors. v. The Karnal Co-op.Farmers’  Society Limited etc.  

iii)    AIR 2003 SC 833         Beg Raj Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors.          In the  matter of Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, their Lordships  held that Legislature can change the law in general by changing the  basis on which a decision given by court but it cannot affect setting  aside the decision inter parties itself.  Similarly, in the case of State of  Haryana & Ors.  it was held that decree of civil court and judicial  order holding that certain lands and immovable properties fell outside  "shamilat deh" regulated by principal Act, subsequent amendment   directing  Assistant Collector to decide the claim by ignoring them  was held to be unconstitutional as  it encroaches upon judicial power.   In the case of Beg Raj Singh,  the petitioner was granted mining  lease for 3 to 5 years  but the petitioner was erroneously granted   lease for one year.   It was held that a right accrued to the petitioner  to continue for a minimum period of three years  in terms of the policy  decision and it was held that it cannot be curtailed because  of lapse  of time in litigation  and on the ground that higher revenue  would be  earned by the Government by auctioning  the mining rights.   Therefore the Court directed that the petitioner would be entitled to

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continue for a period of three years.                  Now, coming to the merits of the writ petition we find that  the rule was already repealed on  27.6.1996 and the ground reality  had also changed.  So far as  grant of  mining  and mineral  lease is  concerned,  no person has a  vested right in it. There is no quarrel on  the legal proposition that if certain rights have been decided on the  basis of the law which was obtaining  at that time,  that will not  nullify  the judicial decision  unless the bases are taken out.  In the present  case, the rule under which the writ petitioner sought direction for  consideration of his application has already been repealed within the  time frame directed by the High Court. Therefore  the basis on which   the order was passed has been totally knocked out.  Rule 39 on the  basis of which direction was given was not in existence. Therefore, it  could not have been possible for the authorities to have acceded to  the request of the  writ petitioner. More so, no one has a vested right  in mineral  lease. In this connection it will be more useful to refer to a  decision of this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. M/s. Hind Stone &  Ors. [ (1981) 2 SCC 205]. Their Lordships in the aforesaid case  observed as follows:

               "  The submission was that it was not open  to the government to keep applications for the  grant of leases and applications for renewal  pending for a long time and then to reject them on  the basis of Rule 8-C notwithstanding the fact that  the applications had been made long prior to the  date on which Rule  8-C came into force.  While it  is true that such applications should be dealt with  within a reasonable time, it cannot on that account  be said that the right to have an application  disposed of in a reasonable time clothes an  applicant for a lease with a right to have the  application disposed of on the basis of the rules in  force at the time of the making of the application.  No one has a vested right to the grant or renewal  of a lease and none can claim a vested right to  have an application for the grant or renewal of a  lease dealt with in a particular  way, by applying   particular provisions. In the absence of any vested  rights in anyone, an application for a lease has  necessarily to be dealt with according to the rules  in force on the date of the disposal of the  application despite the fact that  there is a long  delay  since  the making of the application. We are,  therefore, unable to accept the submission of the  learned counsel that applications for the grant of  renewal of leases made long prior to the date of  G.O.Ms. No.1312 should be dealt with as if Rule 8- C did not exist."

Similarly in the case of P.T.R.Exports (Madras) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of  India [ (1996) 5 SCC 268] their Lordships reiterated the same  position.  

               As a result of our above discussion,  we find no merit in  this appeal and the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.