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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  6675 of 1999

PETITIONER: M.P. Gopalakrishnan Nair & Anr.

RESPONDENT: State of Kerala & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/04/2005

BENCH: H.K. Sema & S.B. Sinha

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT

W I T H

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6674 OF 1999

S.B. SINHA, J :

BACKGROUND FACT:

       Sri Krishna Temple situated at Guruvayoor is one of the most famous  temples in the world.  The history and legends of the temple are intimately  linked with great saints like Villwamangalam Swamiyar, Melpathur, the  author of Narayaneeyam, Poonthanam and Kururamma.  The temple attracts  millions of devotees from all over the world.  Zamorin Raja and the  Karanavan of the Mallissery Illom were the hereditary trustees of the temple.   Disputes and differences arose between the Zamorin Raja and the Karanavan  of the Illom mainly about Orrayma rights which were ultimately determined  by a judgment of the Madras High Court in A.S. No. 35/1887 on 1-11-1880.   

       After the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act,  1926 came into force, a scheme for administration of the Temple and its  properties was framed in terms whereof the Zamorin Raja was entrusted  with the management of the Temple under the supervision of the officers of  the Board.  The Karanavan of the Mallissery Illom thereupon filed O.S. No.  1 of 1929 before the District Court of South-Malabar.   

       The worshippers of the Temple also filed O.S. No. 2 of 1929 in the  same court praying for framing up of a proper scheme which would give  appropriate representation to the non-hereditary trustees from among the  devotees.  The District Court by a judgment and decree dated 25-10-1929  upheld the claim of the Karanavan of the Mallissery Illom to be made a joint  trustee along with Zamorin Raja as a result whereof the scheme was  amended.  The Zamorin Raja preferred an appeal thereagainst before the  High Court of Madras which were marked as A.S. No. 211 and 212 of 1930.   The High Court of Madras disposed of the appeals by a common judgment  dated 21-11-1930 confirming the decision of the District Court rejecting the  prayer for appointment of non-hereditary trustees.  Some modifications in  the said scheme were made later on.

       The Guruvayoor Devaswom Act, 1971, Act 6 of 1971 was framed  after the Government established a Commission to enquire into the cause of  the fire, which destroyed the temple in 1970.  The validity of the Act was  challenged before the Kerala High Court by the hereditary trustees in O.P.  No. 812 of 1971, claiming infringement of their fundamental rights under  Articles 19, 25 and 26 of Constitution of India.  A Full Bench of the Kerala  High Court dismissed the said writ petition.  The Act was thereafter  amended by Act 12 of 1972, which again came to be challenged in O.P. No.

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314 of 1973 in a writ petition filed on behalf of the denomination of the  temple.  A Bench of Five Judges of the Kerala High Court struck down the  said Amending Act in Krishnan Vs. Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing  Committee [since reported in 1979 KLT 350].  The Governor of Kerala  promulgated an ordinance known as Guruvayur Devaswom Ordinance, No.  25 of 1977.   

       The Legislature of the State of Kerala thereafter enacted Guruvayoor  Devaswom Act, 1978 (the 1978 Act) with a view to make provision for the  proper administration of the Guruvayoor Devaswom.  The 1978 Act was  enacted having regard to the decision of the 5-Judge Bench of Kerala High  Court in Krishnan (supra).

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HIGH COURT:

       The First Appellant herein is President, Kerala Kshethra Samrakshina  Samithi and the Second Appellant herein is the General Secretary, Vishwa  Hindu Parishad, Kerala State.  They filed a writ petition before the High  Court praying for the following reliefs:

"i) declare that the Hindus in the Council of  Ministers of the Leftist Democratic Front,  respondents 4 to 14 herein, have no manner of  authority to nominate Members to the Guruvayoor  Devaswom Managing Committee in the light of  the pronouncement of this Honourable Court in  1985 KLT 629 and other ruling of the Kerala High  Court and that any move initiated by them to so  nominate and constitute the Managing Committee  will be illegal and unconstitutional and violative of  the petitioners Fundamental Rights under Articles  14, 21, 25 & 26 of the Constitution of India;

ii)     issue a writ of mandamus or any other  appropriate writ, order or direction directing  respondents 4 to 14 to refrain from nominating any  members to the Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing  Committee in pursuance of the provisions of  Section 4 of the Guruvayoor Devaswom Act 1978;

iii)    issue an interim order of stay of all steps  initiated by respondents 1 & 4 to 14 to nominate  any member/ members to the Guruvayoor  Devaswom Managing Committee pending disposal  of the above original petition before this  Honourable Court;"

       A Division Bench of the said Court having regard to the importance of  the question involved in the writ petition by an order dated 9th July, 1999  referred the matter to a larger bench.  By reason of the impugned judgment,  a 5-Judge Bench of the Kerala High Court dismissed the said writ petition.   The Appellants herein are, thus, before us.

SUBMISSIONS:

       Mr. M.K.S. Menon, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the  Appellants would contend that the expression ’Hindu’ having not been  defined either in the 1978 Act or Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious  Institutions Act must be construed in the light of the series of decisions  rendered by the Kerala High Court, as a person who believes in god and  temple worship and professes Hindu faith.  A person belonging to the  denomination in relation to a temple, according to Appellants, must not only  be  entitled to attend at the performance of the worship or service but also  must be in the habit of attending such performance.  As the Hindu members

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of the then Council of Ministers (Respondent Nos. 4 to 14) did not satisfy  such requirements having regard to their political affiliation as they owe  their allegiance to the leftist (Marxist) ideology and as they were against  such religious practice; any nomination made by them as members of the  Committee is ultra vires Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India.   Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on Krishnan (supra), K.  Krishnankutty & Others Vs. State of Kerala [1985 KLT 289], Narayanan  Namboodiri & Others Vs. State of Kerala [1985 KLT 629] and  Muraleedharan Nair Vs. State of Kerala [1990 (1) KLT 874].

       Mr. T.L.V. Iyer, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the  Respondents, on the other hand, would support the impugned judgment of  the High Court contending that the management of a temple or religious  endowment is a secular aspect which can always be subject matter of control  by a State.  Reliance in this behalf has been placed on A.S. Narayana  Deekshitulu Vs. State of A.P. and Others [(1996) 9 SCC 548] and Sri Adi  Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi and Others Vs. State of  U.P. and Others [(1997) 4 SCC 606].

       Mr. Iyer would urge that the worshippers never enjoyed any right in  the denomination to have a person in the Management Committee and in any  event, the Appellants herein have failed to establish that there had been a  religious practice which had been existing as on the date of coming into  force of the Constitution, the writ petition was not maintainable.

       Mr. Iyer submitted that the expression "Hindu" having not been  defined in the 1978 Act, the High Court rightly did not extend the meaning  thereof to a person having a faith in the temple worship and other rituals  connected therewith.  It was pointed out that keeping in view the decision of  the Kerala High Court in Krishnan (supra), the power of nomination is  vested in a smaller body and not in the Government.  It is the smaller body  of Hindus amongst the members of the Council of Ministers who would  nominate persons who must fulfill the qualifications laid down in Sub- sections (2) and (4) of Section 4 of the 1978 Act.

QUESTIONS BEFORE THE HIGH COURT:

       The High Court framed the following questions for its determination:

(1) Whether the Hindu Ministers in the Council of Ministers should have  faith in God and Temple worship while nominating the members to the  Managing Committee of the Guruvayoor Devaswom under Section 4 of the  Guruvayoor Devaswom Act? and

(2) Whether Hindu Ministers who are not believers in God and Temple  Worship can, by reason of their not having faith in Hindu God and Temple  worship, are disqualified from nominating the members of the Managing  Committee of the Guruvayoor Devaswom, who should have faith in God  and Temple worship, and must also make and subscribe an oath affirming  their faith in God and Hindu Religion and believe in Temple worship.

JUDGMENT OF THE HIGH COURT

(a)    The High Court noticed that in Krishnan (supra), the 5-Judge Bench  upheld the validity of the 1978 Act holding that the Committee did not  represent the denomination.   

(b)     Article 25 merely secures to every citizen, subject to public order,  morality and health, a freedom specified therein but the State has the  requisite power to make laws regulating economic, financial, political or  other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice.   

(c)     Furthermore, the State has reserved unto itself the power to make laws  providing for social reform and social welfare even though they might  interfere with religious practices.  

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(d)     The Bench in Krishnan (supra) merely directed for consideration of  the Government whether the nomination could be given to a statutory body  other than the State Government with sufficient guidelines furnished to it for  ensuring that such nominations would be effected in such a way so as to  make the committee a truly representative of the denomination consisting of  the worshipping public.   

(e)     Section 4(1) of the 1978 Act was declared invalid as by reason thereof  the State had been conferred with a naked and arbitrary power without any  safeguard being provided for ensuring that the Committee will be a body  representing the denomination.   

(f)     The observations made by a 3-Judge Bench in Narayanan Namboodiri  (supra) to the effect that the requirements of Article 26 (d) would be satisfied  only if those in charge of Devaswom represent denomination are not in  consonance with the observations and findings of Krishnan (supra).   

(g)     What is necessary is that the Managing Committee should be the  representative of the religious denomination and it is not necessary that the  persons nominating should form part of it.   

(h)     The Bench in Narayanan Namboodiri (supra) having been called upon  to determine the lis as to whether Section 4 was ultra vires Article 14 of the  Constitution was not correct in making the observations that the requirement  of Article 26 would be satisfied only if the Hindu Ministers among the  Council of Ministers should also have belief in God and temple worship and,  thus, it was not correctly decided.

(i)    The management and administration of a temple being a secular  matter, the State can control and administer the management thereof.

(j)    The concession made by the Additional Advocate General and the  Special Counsel appearing for the Devaswom to the effect that the persons  nominating the members to the Managing Committee should also belong to  the denomination as a result whereof Section 4(1) of the Act was not struck  down by the Kerala High Court.  It was held, that such a concession was not  binding upon the State.   

(k)     Having regard to the concept of secularism and tolerance as reflected  in our constitutional scheme as would appear from Clause (3) of Article 164  of the Constitution of India, Section 4(1) cannot be read in the manner as  was submitted by the Appellants in view of the fact that the administration  of the property of a religious institution is not a matter of religion.   

(l)     The Appellants herein have failed to establish that there had been a  religious practice which was subsisting on the date of the coming into force  of the Constitution of India to the effect that the denomination of the temple  worshipers had a right to be in the Management Committee and members of  the Management Committee were to be elected or nominated by an electoral  college consisting of members of such denomination.   

(m)     The 1978 Act is not violative of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution  of India.

(n)     It was observed:

"39. Before parting with this case, we want to  make it clear that it is a very important function or  duty that is assigned to the nominating persons,  namely, the duty of constituting a Committee for  the efficient management and administration of  Guruvayur Temple.  It is true that the Act  prescribed that persons who are elected as  members of the Managing Committee should be

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persons who have faith in Temple Worship and  they have also to give a declaration to that effect.   But, every man who believes in God and Temple  worship may not be a good or efficient  administrator or may not be aware of the  formalities of temple management.  It is our  earnest hope and desire that the persons nominated  by the Hindu Ministers should be of high integrity  and honesty and should discharge the functions of  management and administer with care, sincerity  and in the interests of the religious denomination  and in public interest.  With a view to avoid  politics among the members of the Committee, it is  desirable that no politician from any party should  be nominated to the Committee."  

STATUTORY PROVISIONS:

       Section 2(c) of the 1978 Act defines "committee" to mean the  Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee constituted under Section 3  thereof.  ’Devaswom’ has been defined in Section 2(e) to mean the Temple  and includes its properties and endowments and the subordinate temples  attached to it.  The expression "person having interest in the Temple" has  been defined to mean a person who is entitled to attend at, or is in the habit  of attending, the performance of worship or service in the temple or who is  entitled to partake, or is in the habit of partaking, in the benefit of the  distribution of gifts thereat.

       By reason of Section 3 of the 1978 Act, the administrative control and  management of the Devaswom is vested in a committee constituted in the  manner provided for under Section 4 thereof.  The said committee is a body  corporate and has perpetual succession having a common seal and shall by  the said name sue and be sued through the Administrator.  In terms of  Section 4 of the 1978 Act, the Management Committee is to consist of nine  members as provided for in Clauses (a) to (e) of Sub-section (1) thereof.   Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the 1978 Act provides for disqualification for  being nominated under clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 4 if:

"(i) he believes in the practice of untouchability or  does not profess the Hindu Religion or believe in  temple worship; or (ii) he is an employee under the Government or the  Devaswom; or (iii) he is below thirty years of age; or (iv) he is engaged in any subsisting contract with  the Devaswom; or  (v) he is subject to any of the disqualifications  mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section  (3) of section 5."

       Sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the 1978 Act provides for election of  one of its members by the members of the Committee as its Chairman at its  first meeting.  Sub-section (4) of Section 4 enjoins every member of the  Committee to make and subscribe an oath in the presence of the  Commissioner in the following form, that is to say \026  

"I, A B, do swear in the name of God that I profess  the Hindu Religion and believe in temple worship  and that I do not believe in the practice of  untouchability."

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE APPELLANTS:

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       Before adverting to the questions raised at the Bar, we must place on  record that the Appellants herein did not question the constitutionality of  Section 4 of the 1978 Act.  The provisions of the Act merely were required  to be read in the light of the different judgments rendered by the Kerala High  Court.  While it may be true that in certain cases a statute in the nature of the  1978 Act may have to be read in the light of the provisions contained in  Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India, but the same would not mean  while doing so the Court shall extend the protection granted thereby.   Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India read, thus:

"25. FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND FREE  PROFESSION, PRACTICE AND  PROPAGATION OF RELIGION.  (1) Subject to public order, morality and health and  to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are  equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the  right freely to profess, practise and propagate  religion.  (2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation  of any existing law or prevent the State from  making any law-  (a) regulating or restricting any economic,  financial, political or other secular activity which  may be associated with religious practice;  (b) providing for social welfare and reform or the  throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a  public character to all classes and sections of  Hindus.  Explanation I  The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be  deemed to be included in the profession of the  Sikh religion.  Explanation II  In sub-clause (b) of clause (2), the reference to  Hindus shall be construed as including a reference  to persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist  religion, and the reference to Hindu religious  institutions shall be construed accordingly.  26. FREEDOM TO MANAGE RELIGIOUS  AFFAIRS  Subject to public order, morality and health, every  religious denomination or any section thereof shall  have the right-  (a) to establish and maintain institutions for  religious and charitable purposes;  (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;  (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable  property; and  (d) to administer such property in accordance with  law."

       Article 25 guarantees that every person in India shall have the  freedom of conscience and shall have the right to profess, practice and  propagate religion subject to the restrictions imposed by the State on the  following grounds, viz.: (i)     Public order, morality and health; (ii)    other provisions of the Constitution; (iii)   regulation of non-religious activity associated with religious practice; (iv)    social welfare and reform; and (v)     throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to  all classes of Hindus.

SECULARISM:

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       India is a secular country.  Secularism has been inserted in the  Preamble by reason of the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act, 1976.  The  object of inserting the said word was to spell out expressly the high ideas of  secularism and the integrity of the nation on the ground that these  institutions are subjected to considerable stresses and strains and vested  interests have been trying to promote their selfish ends to the great detriment  of the public good.  

       A 9-Judge Bench of this Court in S.R. Bommai Vs. Union of India  [(1994) 3 SCC 1] observed:

"197. Rise of fundamentalism and  communalisation of politics are anti-secularism.  They encourage separatist and divisive forces and  become breeding grounds for national  disintegration and fail the parliamentary  democratic system and the Constitution. Judicial  process must promote citizens’ active participation  in electoral process uninfluenced by any corrupt  practice to exercise their free and fair franchise.  Correct interpretation in proper perspective would  be in the defence of the democracy and to maintain  the democratic process on an even keel even in the  face of possible friction, it is but the duty of the  court to interpret the Constitution to bring the  political parties within the purview of  constitutional parameters for accountability and to  abide by the Constitution, the laws for their strict  adherence.

       It is now well-settled: (i)     The Constitution prohibits the establishment of a theocratic State. (ii)    The Constitution is not only prohibited to establish any religion of its  own but is also prohibited to identify itself with or favouring any  particular religion. (iii)   The secularism under the Indian Constitution does not mean  constitution of an atheist society but it merely means equal status of  all religions without any preference in favour of or discrimination  against any one of them.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:

       The management or administration of a temple partakes to a secular  character as opposed to the religious aspect of the matter.  The 1978 Act  segregates the religious matters with secular matters.  So far as, religious  matters are concerned, the same have entirely been left in the hands of the  ’Thanthri’.  He is the alter ego  of the deity.  He gives mool mantra to the  priests.  He holds a special status.  He prescribes the rituals.  He is the only  person who can touch the deity and enter the sanctum sanctorum.  He is the  final authority in religious matters wherefor a legal fiction has been created  in Section 35 of the Act in terms whereof the Committee or the  Commissioner or the Government is expressly prohibited from interfering  with the religious or spiritual matters pertaining to Devaswom.  His decision  on all religious, spiritual, ritual or ceremonial matters pertaining to  Devaswom is final unless the same violates any provision contained in any  law for the time being in force.  The impugned provisions of the Act must be  construed having regard to the said factor in mind.  By reason of Section  4(1) of the 1978 Act, the Committee will consist of nine members.  The  nomination of one person from the Council of Ministers as a representative  of the employees of the Devaswom and five persons, one of whom shall be a  member of a Scheduled Caste, are required to be nominated by the Hindus  among the Council of Ministers from amongst the persons having interest in  the temple.  The area within which such nomination can be made by the  Hindus amongst the Council of Minister is, thus, limited.

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HINDU-CONCEPT OF

       The word ’Hindu’ is not defined.  A Hindu admittedly may or may not  be a person professing Hindu religion or a believer in temple worship.  A  Hindu has a right to choose his own method of worship.  He may or may not  visit a temple.  He may have a political compulsion not to openly proclaim  that he believes in temple worship but if the submission of the Appellants is  accepted in a given situation, the 1978 Act itself would be rendered  unworkable.  Idol worships, rituals and ceremonials may not be practised by  a person although he may profess Hindu religion.   

A 5-Judge Bench of the Kerala High Court in Krishnan (supra) in  paragraph 40 of its judgment noticed:

"\005It is well known that there are sections of  Hindus whose schools of thought and philosophy  do not consider idol worship, rituals and  ceremonials as necessary or even conducive to the  spiritual progress of man.  There are also political  creeds or social theories which openly condemn  such forms of worship as being based on mere  superstition and ignorance.  Many persons, who  are born Hindus and who may be said to profess  Hinduism solely because they have not openly  renounced the Hindu faith by any recognized  process, may ardently believe in such political or  social ideologies which do not view temple  worship with favour."

       The legislature has not chosen to qualify the word "Hindu" in any  manner.  The meaning of word is plain and who is a Hindu is well known.   The legislature was well aware that "Hindu" is a comprehensive expression  (as the religion itself is) giving the widest freedom to people of all hues  opinion, philosophies and beliefs to come within its fold.  [See Shastri  Yagnapurushdasji and others Vs. Muldas Bhundardas Vaishya and another,  AIR 1966 SC 1119 and Dayal Singh and Others Vs. Union of India and  Others, (2003) 2 SCC 593, para 37]

       The legislature was also well aware of the conglomeration/ diversity  of thought that prevailed in the Hindu religion but it did not choose to limit  ’Hindus’ to the category propounded by the appellants \026 namely those who  believe in temple worship.  There is no absurdity or ambiguity which  compels a departure from the plain language and to read section 4 as  meaning something more than what is expressed, and, thus there is no reason  to construe the expression ’Hindu’ in the manner sought to be done by the  Appellants. To debar all ’Hindu’ Ministers of leftist Government, from  nominating members to the Managing Committee of the Guruvayoor  Devaswom will lead to stalemate in the Management of the Devaswom.

DETERMINATION:

       The Bench in Krishnan (supra) upheld the right of the Executive  Government to oversee control and management of a temple, but merely  made the following observations:

"\005We may, however, observe that in the light of  the recent amendment of the preamble to the  Constitution emphasizing the secular character of  the State it is desirable that the legislature should  consider whether the power to nominate the  members of the Committee should not be  conferred on an independent statutory body other  than the State Government with sufficient  guidelines furnished to it for ensuring that the  nominations will be effected in such a way as to be

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truly representative of the denomination consisting  of the worshipping public."

       The only ground, which weighed with the Bench declaring Section  4(1) of the 1978 as unconstitutional, is confirmation of naked and arbitrary  power upon the Government without any safeguard being provided for  ensuring that the Committee would be a body representing the  denomination.  The 1978 Act was, as noticed hereinbefore, enacted to  overcome the same.  The composition of the body which would have the  power of nomination in terms of Sections 4(1)(d) and 4(1)(e) would consist  of the Hindu Ministers professing Hindu religion only.  While making such  nominations, they are statutorily bound to nominate such persons who would  fulfill the criteria laid down therein.  Section 4, therefore, lays down  guidelines for ensuring that the Committee would be a body representing the  denomination.  

       From its provisions it is clear that the Act has ensured that only  persons who believe in temple worship are to be in the management of the  temple.  The Act has further ensured that none except the Thanthri gets any  voice in the spiritual administration of the temple and that his voice alone  will prevail in such matters.  The practice of religion by the denomination  including customs, practices and rituals is, therefore, preserved in its entirety  and there is no tampering therewith in any manner whatsoever.

       It is not clear how vesting of such a right on the Hindus in the Council  of Ministers can effect their denominational rights when the members of the  Managing Committee, the Commissioner and the Administrator have all got  to be believers in temple worship.  To insist on such a qualification in the  electorate will be as bad saying that when the law relating to a temple is  under consideration in the legislature, only Hindu legislators can vote and  they must further be qualified as believers in temple worship.

       It is expected that the action of such a body would be bona fide and  reasonable.  Once a committee is constituted which would be representing  the denomination, in our opinion, it would be not be correct to contend that  even the authority empowered to nominate must also be representative of the  denomination.

       Indisputably the State has the requisite jurisdiction to oversee the  administration of a temple subject to Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution  of India.  The grievance as regard the violation of the constitutional right as  enshrined under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India must be  considered having regard to the object and purport of the Act.  For fulfilling  the said requirements, the denomination must have been enjoying the right  to manage the properties endowed in favour of the institutions.  If the right  to administer the properties never vested in the denomination, the protection  under Article 26 of the Constitution of India is not available.

       Assuming such a denomination exist, the question which is required  to be posed is, what is the right that is sought to be protected.  The right  sought to be preserved is that under clauses (d) and (e) of Section 4(1).  It  does not depend upon the persons who nominates the members of the  Managing Committee.  The crux of the matter is who are the persons who  are qualified to be in the Managing Committee.  To fulfill the said object,  the statute has taken particular care to see that only those who believe in  temple worship among the Hindus can be nominated under clauses (d) and  (e) of Section 4.

       The High Court in its impugned judgment has arrived at a finding as  regard categorical existence of a subsisting religious practice that as on the  date of coming into force of the Constitution of India it has not been  established that the denomination of temple worshippers had any right to be  on the management committee or the members of such a committee were  being elected / nominated by an electoral college consisting exclusively of  members of such denomination.  Nothing has been pointed out before us to

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show that such a finding is contrary to the materials on records.   

       The freedom guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution is not an  unconditional one.  A distinction exists between the matters of religion, on  the one hand, and holding and management of properties by religious  institutions, on the other.  What is necessary to be considered for  determining the issue is as to whether by reason of the impugned Act the  administration of the institution had been taken from the hands of the  religious denomination and vested in another body.  If the answer to the said  question is rendered in the negative, attack to the constitutionality of the Act  would not survive.

       Furthermore, it is permissible for a legislature to take over the  management of the temple from the control of a person and vest the same in  a Committee of which he would remain the Chairman.  [See Raja Bira  Kishore Deb, hereditary Superintendent, Jagannath Temple, P.O. and  District Puri Vs. The State of Orissa, AIR 1964 SC 1501]

       It is also now trite that although State cannot interfere with the  freedom  of a person to profess, practise and propagate his religion, the  secular matters connected therewith can be the subject matter of control by  the State.  The management of the temple primarily is a secular act.  The  temple authority controls the activities of various servants of the temple.  It  manages several institutions including educational institutions pertaining to  it.  The disciplinary power over the servants of the temple, including the  priest may vest in a committee.    The payment of remuneration to the  temple servants was also not a religious act but was of purely secular in  nature.  [See Shri Jagannath Temple Puri Management Committee  represented through its Administrator and Another Vs. Chintamani Khuntia  and Others, (1997) 8 SCC 422, Pannalal Bansilal Pitti and Others Vs. State  of A.P. and Another, (1996) 2 SCC 498 and Bhuri Nath and Others Vs. State  of J&K and Others, (1997) 2 SCC 745].

       State of Rajasthan and Others Vs. Shri Sajjanlal Panjawat and Others  [(1974) 1 SCC 500] relied upon by Mr. Menon was also a case where the  statute enabled the Government to appoint a committee of management.   The provision was upheld.  When the Government in terms of a statute is  entitled to appoint a management committee for the temple, without  violating the constitutional provisions, the more remote aspect of the mode  of nomination of the members of the Managing Committee cannot be said to  constitute violation of any constitutional mandate.

       Yet again in Sri Adi Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple,  Varanasi (supra), this Court held:

"31\005 It is a well-settled law that administration,  management and governance of the religious  institution or endowment are secular activities and  the State could regulate them by appropriate  legislation\005"

       (See also N. Adithayan Vs. Travancore Devaswom Board and Others,  (2002) 8 SCC 106, para 6)

       Recently in Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and  Another Vs. C.K. Rajan and Others [(2003) 7 SCC 546], a bench of this  Court of which one of us (S.B. Sinha, J.) was a member observed:

"60. It is possible to contend that the Hindus in  general and the devotees visiting the temple in  particular are interested in proper management of  the temple at the hands of the statutory

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functionaries. That may be so but the Act is a self- contained code. Duties and functions are  prescribed in the Act and the Rules framed  thereunder. Forums have been created thereunder  for ventilation of the grievances of the affected  persons. Ordinarily, therefore, such forums should  be moved at the first instance. The State should be  asked to look into the grievances of the aggrieved  devotees, both as parens patriae as also in  discharge of its statutory duties."

The decision of the Kerala High Court in Krishnan (supra) did not lay  down any proposition of law that the person authorized to nominate the  persons of the Managing Committee should also form part of the  denomination.  With respect, the Full Bench in Narayanan Namboodiri  (supra) misread and misinterpreted Krishnan (supra).  Even assuming that  the decision in Narayanan Namboodiri (supra) is correct (which it is not) it is  not proper or correct to brand all Ministers of leftist Government as persons  not believing in temple worship.  There is no presumption that a Communist  or Socialist (who may normally form part of a leftist Council of Ministers)  are ipso facto non believers in god or in temple worship.  Such a sweeping  allegation or premise on which the prayer is based need not be correct.  It  depends on each individual approach.  The observations in a judgment  should not be, it is trite, read as a ratio.  A decision, as is well-known, is an  authority of what it decides and not what can logically be deduced  therefrom. [See Kalyan Chandra Sarkar Vs. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav  & Anr. \026 para 42 -  (2005) 1 SCALE 385 and Haryana State Coop. Land  Dev. Bank Vs. Neelam, JT 2005 (2) SC 600]

       So far as the decision of Narayanan Namboodiri (supra) is concerned,  we are of the opinion that the High Court in its impugned judgment has  rightly held the same to be not applicable to the fact of the present case.

       In Muraleedharan Nair (supra), whereuon Mr. Menon has placed  strong reliance, the Bench was concerned with the interpretation of Sections  4 and 6 of the Hindu Religious Institutions Act, 1950.  In that case for the  purpose of contesting election, the candidate in the nomination paper itself  was required to comply with Rule 3(b) mentioned in the Scheduled II which  reads, thus:

"3(b) The person nominated shall affix his  signature to the nomination paper before it is  delivered to the Chairman, stating that he believes  in God and professes the Hindu Religion and  believes in temple worship and that he is willing to  serve as a member of the Board, if elected."

       The Court rightly proceeded on the basis that the function of the court  is to apply the law as it stands.  It is whilst analyzing the provisions of the  Act and the Rules, the Bench referred to the dictionary meaning of temple  and observed:

"So only persons who have faith in God or in  temple worship, will be taken in by the word  "Hindu", occurring in Act XV of 1950.  It is  implicit that only such of those who have faith in  God and in temple worship, will be aware of its  efficacy, necessity and importance and can be  entrusted with the administration, supervision and  control of the Devaswoms and other Hindu  Religious Endowments.  However wide the  meaning of the word ’Hindu’ may be under the  general law, under Act XV of 1950, only those

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Hindus who believe in God and in temple worship,  will fulfill the requirement of the word ’Hindu’  occurring in the Act.  Our conclusion aforesaid  necessarily flows from the title and preamble of  the Act as also the definition contained in S.2(b) of  the Act\005"

       The High Court for the aforementioned purpose considered the history  of the provisions as was understood at the relevant time.  It noticed the Full  Bench decision of Krishnan (supra) and while doing so fell into an error as  was done in Krishnankutty (supra) that therein a proposition of law has been  laid down in the fact that the person who professes Hindu religion but not a  believer in temple worship and may even be opposed to the practice of idol  worship cannot be considered a representative of the public having believed  in God and temple worship.   

       This decision cannot, thus, be said to be an authority for the  proposition that the "electoral college" should also be believers in temple  worship.   

       The crucial question may now be addressed whether the vesting of  power in the "Hindus" in the Council of Ministers to nominate the members  of the Managing Committee could be held to violate Articles 25 and 26.  The  temple is visited by millions every year.  Apart from proper management of  the funds flowing from these devotees, the Devaswom also owns other  properties, runs a college, a guest house, choultries etc., all of which require  efficient and prompt management.  This is quiet apart from the spiritual  management dealing with religious side which is under the sole control  management and guidance of the Thanthri.  It is the secular aspect of the  management that is vested in the Management Committee.

       We have noticed hereinbefore that it is one thing to say that prejudice  may be caused if the management of temple is entrusted to a person who has  no faith in temple worship but it is another thing to say that such persons are  nominated by those who may not have any such faith but those nominated  would not only be believers in God but also in temple worship.  The function  of a statutory and constitutional authority while exercising its power of  nomination cannot be equated with the power of management of a temple,  particularly, in relation to the religious aspects involved therein.   

       One further question which may arise is as to whether Articles 25 or  26 can be invoked on the facts of the present case.  There is no case for the  Appellant that Section 4 insofar as it provides for the constitution of the  Managing Committee is violative of any rights.  If this be the position, the  claim that the right of nomination has not been vested in a proper body is  beside the point.  The right to manage the Devaswom was at the inception of  the Constitution vested in the two hereditary trustees, viz., the Zamorain  Raja of Calicut and the Karnavam (Manager) of the Malliseery Illom (A  Namboodri Family).  The denomination of devotees at large had no say in  the administration, except to watch the counting of the contents, the  Bhandarams of the hundies of sealed locks where the devotees deposit their  offerings to prevent any defalcation or pilferage.  [See Krishnan (supra),  para 3] The denomination of devotees had no say or right in the  administration \026 secular or religious \026 of the temple.  Article 26 does not  create any rights in any denomination which it never had.  It only safeguards  and guarantees existing rights, which such a denomination had.  [See Sri Adi  Visheshwara of Kashi Vishwanath Temple, Varanasi (supra)]   Since the  denomination had no right prior to January 26, 1950, they cannot claim any  such rights after the enactment of the impugned Act.  If it had no such right  even in the matter of management of the temple, it is all most so in the  matter of the constitution of the "electorate".

       The said decision, therefore, also has no application to the fact of the  present case.

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       The submission of the learned counsel to the effect that in Narayanan  Namboodiri (supra) Section 4(1) was read down on the basis of the  concession made by the Additional Advocate General and Special Counsel  appearing for the Devaswom, in our opinion, with respect, have rightly been  held to be not binding on the State by the High Court.

       In Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company Vs. M/s. Bharat Coking  Coal Limited and Another [(1983) 1 SCC 147 : AIR 1983 SC 239], this  Court held: "25\005 No Act of Parliament may be struck down  because of the understanding or misunderstanding  of parliamentary intention by the executive  Government or because their (the Government’s)  spokesmen do not bring out relevant circumstances  but indulge in empty and self-defeating affidavits.  They do not and they cannot bind Parliament.  Validity of legislation is not to be judged merely  by affidavits filed on behalf of the State, but by all  the relevant circumstances which the court may  ultimately find and more especially by what may  be gathered from what the legislature has itself  said."

       In P. Nallammal and Another Vs. State represented by Inspector of  Police [(1999) 6 SCC 559 : JT 1999 (5) SC 410], this Court observed:

"7\005 The volte-face of the Union of India cannot  be frowned at, for, it is open to the State or Union  of India or even a private party to retrace or even  resile from a concession once made in the court on  a legal proposition. Firstly, because the party  concerned, on a reconsideration of the proposition  could comprehend a different construction as more  appropriate. Secondly, the construction of statutory  provision cannot rest entirely on the stand adopted  by any party in the lis. Thirdly, the parties must be  left free to aid the court in reaching the correct  construction to be placed on a statutory provision.  They cannot be nailed to a position on the legal  interpretation which they adopted at a particular  point of time because saner thoughts can throw  more light on the same subject at a later stage."

       The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, did not commit any error  whatsoever in allowing the State to file a supplementary affidavit resiling  from such concession made in the earlier case as had been noticed in  paragraph 5 of the impugned judgment.

       A wrong concession of law cannot bind the parties, particularly when  the constitutionality of a statue is in question.

       The contention by the Appellant that the "electorate" should be  representative of the denomination of believers in temple worship (assuming  such a denomination exists) also cannot be accepted, who will determine the  electorate from amongst the millions of devotees of Lord Krishna visiting  the temple?  It will be impossible and impracticable to select such a College  of "electors" from among them.  The whole exercise will be arbitrary and  time consuming and will be open to further challenge.  The present mode  has the advantage of being precise as the same has the advantage that only  believers in temple worship are put incharge of the administration.

       A statute, it is trite, should not be interpreted in such a manner as

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would lead to absurdity. [See Nandkishore Ganesh Joshi Vs. Commissioner,  Municipal Corporation of Kalyan & Dombivali and Ors, JT 2004 (9) SC 242  and Ranjitsingh Brahmajeetsingh Sharma Vs. State of Maharashtra and Anr.,  JT 2005 (4) SC 123]

       It is necessary to bear in mind the principle ’ut res magis valeat quam  pereat’ in terms whereof a statute must be read in such a manner which  would make it workable. [See Balram Kumawat Vs. Union of India, (2003)  7 SCC 628, Nandkishore Ganesh Joshi (supra), para 19 and Pratap Singh Vs.  State of Jharkhand and Anr., JT 2005 (2) SC 271, para 82].

       For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any infirmity in the  impugned judgment which is hereby affirmed.  These Appeals are  dismissed.  No costs.