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PETITIONER: M.M. CHAWLA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: J.S. SETHI

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/09/1969

BENCH:

ACT: Delhi  Rent  Control Act 1958--Suit for ejectment  for  non- payment  of  rent for three  consecutive  months--Tenant  in written  statement claiming fixation of standard  rent--Such claim  made  after period of limitation laid dawn in  s.  12 cannot  be entertained--Ss. 4, 5, 6 or 15(3) do not  support claim--Benefit  under s. 14(2) for a second time  barred  by proviso to sub-section.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant was the tenant since before 1958  of  certain premises  in Delhi belonging to the respondent.  The  latter filed a proceeding for electing the appellant under s. 14(1) of  the  Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, on the plea  of  non- payment of rent for seven months.  Persuant to the direction of the Rent Controller the appellant paid the arrears  under s. 141.2)    of the Act and the proceeding was disposed  of. The appellant again committed default in payment of rent for three  consecutive months and the respondent again  filed  a fresh  proceeding for his ejectment under s. 14(1).  In  his written statement the appellant asked the Rent Controller to fix  the standard rent of the premises and further  to  give him again the benefit of 14(2). The Rent Controller rejected these  pleas  and passed an order’  in  ejectment.   Appeals before the Rent Control Tribunal and the  High Court failed. In appeal by special leave before this Court the   appellant contended that the order of the Rent Controller was  illegal because   he failed to fix the standard rent as  claimed  by the  appellant.   He  also  contended  that  the  limitation period prescribed in s. 12 of the Act for an application for fixation  of  standard rent did not apply  where  the  claim made  as  a  defence   in a  suit  for  ejectment  under  s. 14(/)(c),  and  that  in any event he was  entitled  to  the benefit of s. 14(2). HELD: (i) The appellant’s plea that the Rent Controller  was to  fix the standard rent when the appellant asked  for  its fixation in  his written statement must be rejected.  (a) The prohibition in ss 4 and 5 of the Act operates  only after  the   standard  rent has been fixed and  not  before. Until the Rent Controller has fixed the standard rent  under s.   9.  the  contract  between  the  landlord  and   tenant determines  the liability.  Section 6 cannot be  interpreted to mean that standard rent can be regarded as fixed without- an order the Controller. [400 F-H] (b)  When  s.  15(3) refers to a ease in which  there  is  a "dispute  as  to amount payable by the tenant"  the  dispute referred to is about contractual rent payable and not  about the standard real.  The "having regard to the. provisions of the Act" has reference to ss. 9 and 12. The scheme of sub-s.

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(3)  of s  15 is that the interim rent will be paid  at  the rate ordered by the Controller and if before the  proceeding is  disposed of standard rent is fixed by the Controller  in an  application  under  s.12 then in  order  to  obtain  the benefit of s.6 the tenant must pay the arrears calculated on the basis of the standard rent    within one month from  the date  on  which the standard rent is fixed  or  within  such further time as the Controller may allow.[402 B-G] 391     If  in a proceeding under s. 14(1)(a) the tenant  raises by  way  of defence a contention that the standard  rent  be determined  the Controller may treat that as an  application under s. 12 and deal with it according to law.  But the  Act confers  no  power under s. 15(3) upon the  Controller.  The power  to determine standard rent is  exercisable  under  s. 12  only. [402 H] (e) Acceptance of the appellant’s  contention would lead  to anomalous  results.  Under s. 12 standard rent may be  given retrospective operation for not more than one year.  But  if a  tenant  is  in arrears for more than  one  year,  on  the contention  of the appellant, the tenant would be liable  to pay  arrears at the rate of standard rent determined  for  a period longer than one year before the date on which he made a  claim  in  his written  statement  for  determination  of standard   rent  and  may  be  entitled  to  reopen   closed transactions.  The legislature could not have intended  that the  tenant  in  default should be  entitled  to  evade  the statutory  period of limitation prescribed by the  expedient of  refusing  to  make an application so  as  to  obtain  an advantage  to  which  he is not entitled  if  he  moves  the Controller  in a substantive application  for  &.termination of  standard  rent. [404 E---F] M/s.  Suraj Balram Sawhney & Sons v. Dr. D. Kid,  (1965)  67 P.L.R.  197, 8. K. Chatterjee & Anr. v.J.N. Ghoshal,  (1966) P.L.R.  (Delhi Section) 354 and Chander Bhan v. Nand  Lal  & Anr. (1969) All India Rent Control Journal 629, disapproved.     Jiwan  Industries  Private Ltd. v.  Santosh  &  Company, (1965)   67 P.L.R. 241, Lala Manohar Led Nathan Mal v. Medal Lal   Murari  Lal, A.I.R. 1956 Pb. 190,  and   Smt.   Radhey Piari   v.   S.   Kalyan  Singh, A.I.R.  1959  Punjab,  508, referred to..     (ii)  The earlier proceeding against the  appellant  was disposed  of  on his payment of arrears of  rent  for  seven months.   Thereby the appellant had on the earlier  occasion obtained the benefit of s. 14(2).  Having again made default in payment of rent and not having made any payment under  s. 15, he was not entitled for a second time to the benefit  of s.  14-(2).  The words "no tenant shall be entitled  to  the benefit under this sub-section    in the proviso sub-s.  (2) of s. 14 are not directory.  Even on the assumption that the proviso  is  not mandatory there was  no  justification  for interfering  with  the finding of the High  Court  that  the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of s. 14(2).  [405 E-G]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1461 of 1969.     Appeal  by  special leave from the judgment  and  decree dated January 24, 1969 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 203-D of 1966. B.C. Misra and R.P. Aggarwal, .for the appellant. Hardev Singh and S.K. Gambhir, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

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    Shah, J.  Man Mohan Chawla was since before l958 tenant     in  certain premises in Delhi belonging to  J.S.  Sethi. The contractual rent of the premises was Rs. 160 per  month. Sethi  filed  petition  under s. 14(1)  of  the  Delhi  Rent Control Act, 1958 for 392 an  order in ejectment against Chawla on the plea  that  the latter had committed default in paying rent for seven months consecutively.    Pursuant  to  a  direction  of  the   Rent Controller,  Chawla  deposited  the rent  claimed,  and  the amount  deposited was paid over to Sethi and the  proceeding was disposed of.     Chawla  again  committed default for  three  consecutive months,  and  Sethi commenced another  proceeding  under  s. 14(1)  of  the  Delhi  Rent Control  Act  for  an  order  in ejectment.  Chawla  denied the claim that he  had  committed default in payment of rent.  He pleaded that he had on March 19, 1963 sent to Sethi Rs. 320 by a postal money order which Sethi  had  refused to accept.  Sethi denied  that  a  money order sent by Chawla was brought to him by the postal  peon. Chawla also pleaded that the contractual rent was  excessive and  that  the  rent of the premises let to  him  could  not exceed Rs. 50 per month and prayed that standard rent may be fixed  by  the  Controller.  The  Controller  rejected  that contention of Chawla and passed an order in ejectment.   The order of ejectment passed by the Controller was confirmed in appeal by the Rent Control Tribunal, and a second appeal  to the  High Court was also unsuccessful.  Chawla has  appealed to. this Court with special ,leave.     In  support of the appeal counsel for Chawla  contended: (i) that the Controller was bound to determine the  standard rent of the premises in the proceeding instituted by  Sethi, and  since  the  Controller failed to do  so  the  order  in ejectment  was illegal; (ii) the Courts below were in  error in  holding that Chawla could not obtain the benefit  of  s. 14(2)  of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958; (iii)  that  the legal  presumption  arising from the despatch  of  a  postal money order for Rs. 320 addressed to Sethi had been  ignored by  all the courts; and (iv) that Chawla had made a  deposit of  rent for three months and if that deposit be taken  into account  Chawla  was not in arrears  for  three  consecutive months at the date of the initiation of the proceeding.     Not much need be said about contentions (iii) and  (iv). The  fourth plea was not raised before the  Rent  Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal; it was sought to be urged for the  first  time before the High Court and the  High  .Court declined  to  entertain  that plea. We  have  not  permitted counsel  to raise that plea, for its  determination  depends upon proof of facts which were never proved. All   the Courts have held that Chawla had failed  to  prove his  case  that  a postal money order for Rs.  320  sent  by Chawla was duly addressed to Sethi and that Sethi refused to accept  the postal money order when it was tendered to  him. The  only  evidence  in support of that case  was  a  postal receipt for despatch of a money order for Rs. 320 to  Sethi. It did not bear the residential address 393  of  Sethi.  Sethi deposed that no one had tendered  to  him the  postal money order.  His testimony has  been  believed. The third contention must therefore fail.     We   may  now  turn  to  the  first  and   the    second contentions  it is necessary to bear in mind that under  the Delhi  Rent Act, a proceeding for recovery of rent does  not lie  before  the Controller; lies in the  civil  court.  The Controller  is authorised to try a proceeding for  ejectment

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or for determination or for determination of standard  rent, or for determination of fair rent in respect of a hotel  and lodging house.     The  relevant provisions of the Delhi Rent Control  Act, 1958  which have a bearing on the two contentions  remaining to be determined may first be noticed:     Section  2(k)  defines  "standard rent"  as  meaning  in relation to any premises, "the standard rent referred to  in section  6  or where the standard rent  has  been  increased under  s. 7, such increased rent. Chapter II deals with  the quantum  and  the procedure for  determination  of  standard rent, and related matters.  Section 6 of the Act deals  with the quantum of standard rent.  Insofar as it is relevant, it provides:                   "(1)  subject  to the provisions  of  sub-               section  (2), ’standard rent’, in relation  to               any premises means--               (A) in the case of residential premises--                   (1) where such premises have been let  out               at any time before the 2nd day of June 1944--                   (a) if the basic rent of such premises per               annum  does not exceed six hundred rupees  the               basic rent; or                    (b)  if the basic rent of  such  premises               per  annum  exceeds six hundred  rupees,   the               basic rent together with ten per cent of  such               basic rent;                   (2) where such premises have been let  out               at,  any time on or after the 2nd day of  June               1944--                   (a)  in  any case where the rent  of  such               premises  has been fixed under the  Delhi  and               Ajmer-Merwara  Rent Control Act, 1947, or  the               Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952--                   (i) if such rent per annum does not exceed               twelve hundred rupees, the rent so fixed; or               394                   (ii) if such rent per annum exceeds twelve               hundred  rupees,  the rent so  fixed  together               with ten per cent of such rent;                   (b)  in any case,   the  rent   calculated               on   the basis of seven and one-half per  cent               per  annum  of  the aggregate  amount  of  the               reasonable cost of construction and the market               price of the land comprised in the premises on               the   date   of  the  commencement    of   the               construction:                   Provided that where the rent so calculated               exceeds twelve hundred rupees per annum,  this               clause  shall have effect as if for the  words               "seven  and  one  half per  cent",  the  words               "eight  and  one-fourth  per  cent"  has  been               substituted: Section  7 provides for lawful increase of standard rent  in certain cases and for recovery of other charges.  Section  9 authorises  the Controller to fix the standard rent  of  the premises.  In so far as it is relevant, it provides:                   "(1)   The   Controller   shall,   on   an               application  made  to  him   in  this  behalf,               either  by the landlord or by the  tenant,  in               the  prescribed manner, fix in respect of  any               premises--               (i)  the standard rent referred to in  section               6; or               (ii)  the  increase, if any,  referred  to  in

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             section 7;                   (2)  In  fixing the standard rent  of  any               premises  or the lawful increase thereof,  the               Controller  shall fix an amount which  appears               to  him to be reasonable having regard to  the               provisions  of section 6 or section 7 and  the               circumstances of the case.               (3)                (4)                   (5)  the standard rent shall in all  cases               be fixed for a tenancy of twelve months:                   Provided  that where any premises are  let               or  re-let  for a period of less  than  twelve               months,  the  standard rent for  such  tenancy               shall  bear the same proportion to the  annual               standard  rent as the period of tenancy  bears               to twelve months.               (6)               395                   (7)  In  fixing the standard rent  of  any               premises  under this section,  the  Controller               shall  specify a date from which the  standard               rent so fixed shall be deemed to have effect;                   Provided  that  in  no case  the  date  so               specified shall be earlier than one year prior               to  the date of the filing of the  application               for the fixation of the standard rent." Section  10  provides  for fixation of interim  rent  in  an application     for  determination of standard  rent.   That section states:                   "If an application for fixing the standard               rent or for determining the lawful increase of               such  rent  is  made  under  sect,ion  9,  the               Controller   shall,   as   expeditiously    as               possible, make an order specifying the  amount               of the rent or the lawful increase to be  paid               by  the tenant to the landlord  pending  final               decision on the application and shall  appoint               the  date  from  which  the  rent   or  lawful               increase so specified shall be deemed to  have               effect".               Section 12 insofar as it is relevant provides:                   "Any  landlord  or  tenant  may  file   an               application  to the Controller for fixing  the               standard   rent   of  the  premises   or   for               determining   the  lawful  increase  of   such               rent,--                   (a) in the case of any premises which were               let,  or  in  which the cause  of  action  for               lawful  increase  of  rent  arose  before  the               commencement  of this  Act,  within two  years               from such commencement;                   (b) in the case of any premises let  after               the commencement of this Act,--                   (i)  where the application is made by  the               landlord,  within two years from the  date  on               which  the  premises were let. to  the  tenant               against whom the application is made;                   (ii) where the application  is made by the               tenant,  within  two years from  the  date  on               which the premises were let to the tenant; and                   (c)  in the case of any premises in  which               the  cause  of action for lawful  increase  of               rent  arises  after the commencement  of  this               Act,  within two years from the date on  which

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             the cause of action arises:                   Provided that the Controller may entertain               the  application after the expiry of the  said               period of two years,               396               if  he  is satisfied that the  applicant   was               prevented by sufficient cause from filing  the               application in time". An  application for fixation of standard rent must  be  made within two years of the date of the commencement of the  Act if the premises were let before the date of the commencement of  the  Act,  and  if  the  premises  were  let  after  the commencement  of the Act within two years from the  date  of letting.  The  Controller  is authorised  to  entertain  the application after expiry of the period of two years if he is satisfied  that  the applicant was prevented  by  sufficient cause  from  filing  the  application  in  time.  Section  4 modifies the contract for payment of rent.  It provides:                   "(1)  Except  where  rent  is  liable   to               periodical increase by virtue of an  agreement               entered  into  before the 1st day  of  January               1939,  no  tenant shall,  notwithstanding  any               agreement to the contrary, be liable to pay to               his  landlord  for  the  occupation   of   any               premises any amount in excess of the  standard               rent of the premises, unless, such amount is a               lawful  increase  of  the  standard  rent   in               accordance with the provisions of this Act.                   (2)  Subject  to the  provisions  of  sub-               section (1), any agreement for the payment  of               rent  in excess of the standard rent shall  be               construed  as if it were an agreement for  the               payment of the standard rent only".               By section 5 it is provided:                   "(1)  Subject  to the provisions  of  this               Act, no person shall claim or receive any rent               in    excess    of    the    standard    rent,               notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary. Section  14  which is in Ch. III deals  with  protection  of tenant  against  eviction.  Insofar as it  is  relevant  the section provides:                   "(1)   Notwithstanding  anything  to   the               contrary   contained  in  any  other  law   or               contract, no order or decree for the  recovery               of possession of any premises shall be made by               any  court  or  Controller in  favour  of  the               landlord against a tenant:                   Provided  that the Controller may,  on  an               application  made  to him  in  the  prescribed               manner,  make  an order for  the  recovery  of               possession  of the premises on one or more  of               the following grounds only; namely :-                   (a)  That the tenant has neither paid  nor               tendered the whole of the arrears of the  rent               legally recoverable from him within two months               of the date on which a               397               notice  of demand for the arrears of rent  has               been  served  on him by the  landlord  in  the               manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer               of Property Act, 1882;                   (2)   No   order  for  the   recovery   of               possession  of any premises shall be  made  on               the  ground  specified in clause  (a)  of  the               proviso  to  sub-section (1),  if  the  tenant

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             makes  payment  or  deposits  as  required  by               section 15:                   Provided that no tenant shall be  entitled               to  the  benefit under this  sub-section,  if,               having  obtained such benefit once in  respect               of  any premises, he again makes a default  in               the  payment  of rent of  those  premises  for               three consecutive months.               Section   15,  insofar  as  it  is   relevant,               provides:                   "(1) In every proceeding for the  recovery                             of  possession  of any premises on  th e  ground               specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-               section  (1)  of section  14,  the  Controller               shall, after giving the parties an opportunity               of  being heard, make an order  directing  the               tenant to pay to the landlord or deposit  with               the Controller within one month of the date of               the order, an amount calculated at the rate of               rent at which it was last paid for the  period               for which the arrears of the rent were legally               recoverable  from  the  tenant  including  the               period subsequent thereto upto the end of  the               month  previous  to that in which  payment  or               deposit  is  made and to continue  to  pay  or               deposit,  month by month, by the fifteenth  of               each succeeding month, a sum equivalent to the               rent at that rate.               (2)                   (3 ) If, in any proceeding referred to  in               sub-section (1), or sub-section (2), there  is               any  dispute as to the amount of rent  payable               by  the tenant,  the Controller shall,  within               fifteen days of the date of the first  hearing               of  the  proceeding, fix an  interim  rent  in               relation  to  the  premises  to  be  paid   or               deposited in accordance with the provisions of               sub-section  (1)  or sub-section (2),  as  the               case  may  be,  until  the  standard  rent  in               relation thereto is fixed having regard to the               provisions  of  this Act, and  the  amount  of               arrears,  if any, calculated on the  basis  of               the  standard rent shall be paid or  deposited               by the tenant within one month of the date  on               which the standard rent               398               is   fixed  or  such  further  time   as   the               Controller may allow in this behalf.               (4)               (5)                   (6)  If a tenant makes payment or  deposit               as required by sub-section (1) or sub-section.               (3), no order shah be made for the recovery of               possession  on  the ground of default  in  the               payment  of  rent  by  the  tenant,  but   the               Controller may allow such costs as he may deem               fit to the landlord.                      (7)  If a tenant falls to make  payment               or  deposit as required by this  section,  the                             Controller   may  order  the  defence   against               eviction to be struck out and proceed with the               hearing of the application".     Counsel  for  Chawla  maintained  that  the  period   of

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limitation  prescribed  by s. 12 only applies  to  petitions made to the Controller by a landlord or a tenant for  fixing standard rent, but it has no application to a defence raised to a petition for ejectment filed by a landlord under s.  14 that  the  contractual rent exceeds the  standard  rent  and requests  that  the  standard rent  be  determined.  Counsel contends  that  since  in the present  case  the  Controller failed, though expressly requested by Chawla by his  written statement  to  enquire into the standard  rent  payable  the proceedings  were.  vitiated  and  the  order  made  by  the Controller  was  illegal.   It is  common  ground  that  the written  statement was filed more than two years  after  the date  on which the tenancy commenced and if  an  application under  s.  12(a)  or(b) was made on that date  it  would  be barred  by the law of limitation. But counsel said  that  in terms s. 12 applies to a substantive application and not  to a defence. He relied in respect of his contention to various indication,  which he contends, are to be found in the  Act. Counsel says that by virtue of the provisions of ss. 4 and 5 recovery  of  rent by a landlord in excess of  the  standard rent  is prohibited. But in our judgment the prohibition  in ss.  4  and  5  operates only after  the  standard  rent  of premises  is determined and not till then.  So long  as  the standard  rent  is  not determined by  the  Controller,  the tenant  must  pay the contractual rent: after  the  standard rent  is  determined  the landlord  becomes  disentitled  to recover an amount in  excess of  the standard rent from  the date on which the determination operates.     We  are  unable to agree that standard rent of  a  given tenement  is by virtue of s. 6 of the Act a fixed  quantity, and  the liability for payment of a tenant is  circumscribed thereby  even if the standard rent is not fixed by order  of the  Controller.  Under the scheme of the Act standard  rent of a given tenement is that amount only which the Controller determines. Until the standard rent is 399 fixed  by the Controller the contract between  the  landlord and the tenant determines the liability of the tenant to pay rent.   That  is clear from the terms of s. 9  of  the  Act. That section clearly indicates that the Controller alone has the  power  to  fix  the standard rent,  and  it  cannot  be determined  out  of  court.  An attempt by  the  parties  to determine by agreement the standard rent out of court is not binding.  By  section 12 in an application for  fixation  of standard   rent   of  premises  the  Controller   may   give retrospective operation to his adjudication for a period not exceeding one year before the date of the application.   The scheme  of  the Act is entirely inconsistent  with  standard rent  being  determined  otherwise  than  by  order  of  the Controller.  In our view,  the prohibition against  recovery of rent in excess of the standard rent applies only from the date  on which the standard rent is determined by  order  of the Controller and not before that date.     Counsel  contends  that  by s.  15(3)  it  is  expressly contemplated  that a request may be made’ for  determination of standard rent as a defence to an action in ejectment, and since the Legislature has provided no time for making such a defence,  the bar of limitation prescribed by s. 12  has  no application. But the Legislature  has provided for making an application  for  determination  of standard  rent  and  has prescribed a period of limitation in that behalf. Section 14 enables the landlord to file a petition in ejectment  before the  Controller on the ground that the tenant has failed  to pay  or tender the arrears of rent legally recoverable  from him  within  two, months of the date on which  a  notice  of

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demand for the arrears of rent has been served on him by the landlord   In such a case under s. 15(1) where the  rate  of rent is accepted but there is a dispute as to the payment of rent,  the  Controller will proceed  to  determine.  whether payment  according to the contract has been made.   By  sub- section  (1 ) of s. 15 it is provided that  the   Controller shall  make  an  order directing the tenant to  pay  to  the landlord or deposit with the Controller within one month  of the  date of the order, an amount calculated at the rate  at which  rent was last paid. But the clause in terms  provides that  this  has  to  be done after  giving  the  parties  an opportunity  of being heard.  If the Controller was  obliged to  pass  an order calling upon the tenant to  pay  to   the landlord,  or  to deposit in his Court the  amount  of  rent calculated’  at the rate at which it was last paid  for  the period   for  which  the  arrears  of  rent   were   legally recoverable from the  tenant,  there would be no scope for a hearing to be given to the tenant and it would put a premium upon  false claims by landlords. Even though the  expression "shall"  is  used, it is, in our  judgment,  directory.  The tenant  is  entitled  to  show that he  has  paid  the  rent claimed’ from him.  If he proves that he has paid the  rent, the  demand for deposit of arrears under sub-section (1)  of s.  15  cannot be made. Sub-section (3) of s. 15  refers  to cases in which there is a dispute 400  as  to the amount of rent payable by the tenant.   In  that case  the Controller has to fix within fifteen days  of  the date  of the first hearing of the proceeding,  interim  rent for the premises to be paid or deposited in accordance  with the  provisions of sub-section  (1) until the standard  rent in relation thereto fixed having regard to the provisions of the Act.  The determination of interim rent will be for  the period  after  the date of the application  and   also   for arrears. Counsel for Chawla contended that the expression "dispute as to  the amount of rent payable by the tenant" in sub-s.  (3) of  s.  15 means a dispute raised by the tenant  as  to  the "standard  rent  payable".   We are unable  to  agree.   The dispute,  referred  to  in s. 15(3)  is  the  dispute  about contractual rent payable.  When such a dispute is raised the Controller has, within fifteen days of the date of the first heating  of the proceeding, to fix interim rent  payable  by the  tenant in accordance with the provisions of sub-s.  (1) including the arrears, and such payment has to be made until the  standard  rent  in relation thereto  is  fixed  "having regard  to the provisions of the Act".  Sub-s. (3)  provides that  "interim rent" is to be paid at the rate at  which  it was last paid tilt standard rent is determined, but  thereby it is not implied that standard rent is to be determined  as an  issue arising in the action  for ejectment:  the  clause only means that when there is a dispute relating to the rate of  contractual  rent payable the  Controller  shall  within fifteen  days  of  the  date of the  first  hearing  of  the proceeding  fix  the interim rent, and the amount  so  fixed shall  be  paid  by the tenant until the  standard  rent  in relation  to  the  premises  is  fixed  in  an   appropriate proceeding under the Act.  The expression "having regard  to the provisions of this Act" has in our judgment reference to ss.  9 and 12.  Payment of arrears and standard  rent  under sub-s.  (3)  must be made within one month of  the  date  on which  the  standard rent is fixed, or within  such  further time as the Controller may allow in that behalf.     The scheme of sub-s. 3 of s. 15 is only that the interim rent will be paid at the rate ordered by the Controller, and

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before  the proceeding is disposed of standard rent  of  the premises is fixed by the Controller in an application  under s.  12, then in order to. obtain benefit of s. 6 the  tenant must pay the arrears calculated on the basis of the standard rent  within one month from the date on which  the  standard rent is fixed or within such further time as the  Controller may allow.     If  in a proceeding under s. 14(1)(a) the tenant  raises by  way  of defence a contention that the standard  rent  be determined  the Controller may treat that as an  application under s. 12 and deal with it according to law.  But the Act, confers  no power under s. 15(3) upon the  Controller.   The power to determine standard rent is exercisable under s. l 2 only.      401     Our attention was drawn to a number of decisions of  the Punjab  and the Delhi High Courts in which it was held  that the   Rent  Controller  has  in  a  petition  in   ejectment jurisdiction to determine, the standard rent payable by  the tenant.   In  Jiwan  Industries Private Ltd.  v.  Santosh  & Company(1).--Bedi,  J., held that the Rent Controller  could fix  the  standard rent in a proceeding  in  ejectment  even after the application of the landlord  for ejectment of  the tenant had been dismissed. In Messrs Suraj Balram Sawhney  & Sons.  v.  Dr. D. Kiri(2)--Gurdev Singh, J., held  that  the Controller had jurisdiction under s. 15(3) to determine  the standard  rent in an application for ejectment based on  the plea  of  non˜payment  of  rent,  if  the  tenant  raised  a contention  that  the contractual rent is in excess  of  the standard  rent.  The learned Judge was of the view that  the language  of sub-s. (3) of s. 15 covers even those cases  in which  an application for fixation of standard rent it  made independently would be barred by time prescribed under s. 12 of  the  Act, since the limitation prescribed  under  s.  12 applies only to an application made for fixation of standard rent and not to a plea taken up by the tenant in defence  to an  action for his eviction under proviso (a) to sub-s.  (1) of s. 14 of the Act.  If the tenant deposits the arrears  of rent,  observed  the  learned Judge, but at  the  same  time contends that the rent claimed from  him is in excess of the standard rent the Controller has to go into the question  of standard  rent  and he cannot order payment  of  the  entire arrears  of rent deposited unless he finds that the  arrears so deposited are not in excess of the arrears calculated  at the rate at which, the standard rent is fixed.     In S.K. Chatterjee and Anr. v.J.N. Ghoshal(3) S.K. Kapur J.,  held  that the words "any dispute as to the  amount  of rent payable by the tenant" in sub-s. (3) of s. 15 refers to the  dispute arising between the parties on account of claim of a party for fixation of standard rent. The learned  Judge further  held  that s. 15 (3 ) in terms  confers  powers  to order  payment or deposit of arrears at the interim rate  of rent. If the disagreement between the parties be both as  to agreed  rent  and  the  standard rent,  the  power  will  be exercised  under  s. 15(3) because the  standard  rent  will prevail  over  the  agreed rent. He also  held  that  s.  15 provides  a code by itself as to the nature of enquiry,  the Controller has to fix an interim rent within 15 days of  the date of the first hearing of the proceeding. If this has  to be done after a fullfledged enquiry compliance with  section 15(3)  would  become impossible.  This by  itself  indicates that the authorities constituted under the Act are to makean enquiry in a summary manner. (1) (1965) 67 P.L.R. 241. (2) (1965) 67 P.L.R.

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(3) (1966) P.L.R. (Delhi Section) 354. 402     V.S.  Deshpande, J., in Chander Bhan  v.  Nand  Lal  and Anr.(1)---observed that his observation in the case which is under appeal in this case that the expression "having regard to the provisions of this Act" used in s. 15 (3 ) seemed  to refer  inter  alia  to ss. 9 and 12 of  the  Act,  and  that observation was "not strictly necessary for the decision  of that  case" inasmuch as there was no dispute as to the  rate of rent in that case and hence s. 15(3) was not attracted at all.   The learned Judge also observed that there  were  two distinct  provisions  in the Act for  fixation  of  standard rent--the  first in s. 9 under which an application for  the fixation  of standard rent is made, for which limitation  is provided  by s. 12 of the Act; the other is in s.  15(3)  of the  Act,  and that applies only when there  is  "a  genuine dispute"  between  the parties regarding the  rate  and  the amount  of rent. These observations prompt the comment  that if  the view expressed be correct the period  of  limitation prescribed by s. 12 is rendered practically nugatory.  If  a written  statement  filed in an  application  for  ejectment under  s.  14(1)(a)  raises no defence  on  the  merits  and contains  a request for determination of standard  rent,  it would  be  illogical to hold that if made in  a  substantive petition  it  would be barred, but because it is  a  request made  in  a  written  statement in answer  to  a  claim  for ejectment it is free of the limitation prescribed by s. 12.     It  is to be noticed that under s. 12 standard rent  may be given retrospective operation for not more than one year. But if a tenant is in arrears for more than one year, on the contention  advanced by counsel for Chawla the tenant  would be  liable  to  pay arrears at the  rate  of  standard  rent determined for a period longer than one year before the date on  which  he  made a claim in  his  written  statement  for determination of standard rent and may be entitled to reopen closed   transactions.   The  legislature  could  not   have intended  that the tenant in default should be  entitled  to evade  the statutory period of limitation prescribed by  the expedient of refusing to make an application so as to obtain an  advantage  to which he is not entitled if he  moves  the Controller in a substantive application for determination of standard rent.  In our view the expression "having regard to the provisions of this Act" occurring in sub-s. (3) of s. 15 means "having regard to sections 9 and 12 and other relevant provisions  of the Act.  In our view Deshpande, J.,  in  the judgment  under appeal was right in the view that  he  took, and that the refinement he sought to introduce in the latter judgment  in Chandrabhan v. Nand Lal and Anr.(1) cannot   be accepted as correct.     The judgments to which our attention was invited  appear to have proceeded upon earlier judgments of the Punjab  High Court  in  Lala Manohar Lal Nathan Mal v. Madan  Lal  Murari Lal(2) (1)[1969] All India Rent Control Journal 623. (2) A. I. R. 1956 Pb. 190.       403 and Smt. Radhey Piari v.S. Kalyan Singh(1).  But both  these cases  were decided on the interpretation of ss. 8 to 11  of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 38 of 1952 in which  it was expressly provided that the standard rent shall be fixed on  an application made to the Court for that purpose or  in an  application in any suit or in any proceeding.   We  need express  no  opinion whether the cases under the  Delhi  and Ajmer  Rent Control Act 38 of 1952 were  correctly  decided. But the difference in the phraseology used in the Delhi Rent

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Control  Act  59  of 1958 does not appear     to  have  been noticed in the judgments cited at the Bar in support of  the contention  that  to a written statement filed by  a  tenant when an application is made under s. 14(1)(a) the conditions of s. 12 do not apply.     We  are of the view that the Rent Controller,  the  Rent Control  Tribunal and the High Court were right in the  view they have expressed.     The  second contention is also without  substance.   The tenant  had  made  no  attempt to pay  the  rent  which  was demanded  of him. Sub-section (2) of s. 14 enacts  that  the Controller  shall  not  pass    an  order  for  recovery  of possession  of any premises if the tenant makes  payment  or deposit  as required by s. 15.  The bar to the  jurisdiction of  the Controller arises when the tenant pays  or  deposits interim rent as required by s. 15(3) and an application  for fixation of standard rent is not payment or deposit required by s. s. 15.  In any event by virtue of the proviso to  sub- s.  (2)  of s. 14 Chawla is not entitled to the  benefit  of sub-s.  (2) for he had earlier committed default in  payment of  rent  in respect of the  premises and a  proceeding  was instituted  against  him for recovery of  possession.   That proceeding was disposed of after he deposited the amount  of rent  due by him.  By depositing the amount in court in  the previous  proceeding,  Chawla clearly obtained  the  benefit under s. 14(2) in respect of the premises occupied by him as a tenant.  Thereafter he made another default in payment  of rent  for three consecutive months.  Chawla was,  therefore, not entitled to claim the protection of sub-s. (2) of s.  14 for he made no payment as required by s. 15 and also because he  had  previously obtained the benefit of  sub-s.  (2)  by making a deposit in the earlier proceeding.     The contention of counsel for Chawla that the proceeding started  by Sethi against him was dismissed and that  Chawla had  not  obtained any benefit in respect  of  the  premises under  sub-s.  (2)     of s. 14  does  not  require  serious consideration.  Chawla obtained an order of disposal of  the proceeding by depositing the amount ordered to be  deposited by him under s. 15.  That was clearly a 404 benefit which he obtained under s. 14(2). The plea that  "no tenant  shall  be entitled to the benefit  under  this  sub- section"  is  only directory is without substance.   In  any event  the High Court was of the view that having regard  to the conduct of Chawla he having committed default previously and having obtained the benefit of sub-s. (2) in respect  of the premises he was not entitled to the same benefit in this proceeding.   Assuming that the proviso to sub-s. (2) of  s. 14  is  not  mandatory   on that  question   we  express  no opinion--we  are  clearly of the view that  the  High  Court having declined to grant the benefit of sub-s. (2) of s.  14 to Chawla, no case is made out for our interference. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. 405