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PETITIONER: M. KARUNANIDHI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT20/02/1979

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BHAGWATI, P.N. UNTWALIA, N.L. PATHAK, R.S.

CITATION:  1979 AIR  898            1979 SCR  (3) 254  1979 SCC  (3) 431  CITATOR INFO :  F          1983 SC1019  (52,66)  E          1984 SC 684  (50,51,52)  RF         1990 SC2072  (15,46)  RF         1991 SC1676  (15)  R          1992 SC1310  (9)

ACT:      Tamilnadu Public  Men (Criminal  Misconduct) Act, 1973- Whether inconsistent with the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 & Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952-Art. 254 of Constitution of India- Inconsistency between  laws made by Parliament and laws made by legislature of states-Effect of.      Constitution of  India  1950-Arts.  164  &  167-Nature, constitutional position  and status  of  Minister  or  Chief Minister.      Indian  Penal  Code  1869-S.  21(12)-Public  servant  & Criminal  Procedure   Code  1898-S.   199(2)-’Other   public servant’-Scope of-Chief Minister whether ’public servant’.      Words  &   Phrases-’in  the   service  or  pay  of  the Government’-S. 21(12)(a) IPC-Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:      In December  1973, the Madras Legislature passed an Act known as  the Tamil  Nadu Public  Men (Criminal  Misconduct) Act, 1973  after obtaining  the assent of the President. The State Act  was amended by Act 16 of 1974 and the President’s assent was received on April 10, 1974. The provisions of the State Act  were brought  into force  with effect from May 8, 1974. The  State Act was repealed and the President’s assent to the repealing Act was given on September 6, 1977.      The Act  provided for the investigation in respect of a complaint of  criminal misconduct against any ’public man by a Commissioner  or the  Additional Commissioner of Inquiries appointed for  this purpose.  The word ’public man’ had been given a  specific connotation  in s.  2(c) of  the  Act  and clearly excluded a Government servant.      The appellant  was the  former Chief  Minister  of  the State of  Tamilnadu. On June 15, 1976 the Chief Secretary to

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the  State   Government  requested  the  Central  Bureau  of Investigation to  make a detailed investigation into certain allegations that  the appellant  and others  were alleged to have  abused  their  official  position  in  the  matter  of purchase of  wheat from  Punjab. With  the State  Governor’s sanction a  charge sheet  was filed  after investigation for the prosecution  of the appellant under ss. 161, 468 and 471 IPC and  s. 5(2)  read with S. 5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption  Act   for  allegedly  having  derived  pecuniary advantage to  the extent  of Rs.  4 to  5 lakhs  for passing favourable orders in respect of some firms.      The appellant  applied for  discharge under  s. 239 Cr. P.C. on the ground that the prosecution against him suffered from various  legal and  constitutional infirmities.  On the application being  rejected, the  appellant applied  to  the High Court  for quashing  the proceedings  and  for  setting aside the  order of  the Special Judge refusing to discharge him. The High Court rejected the applications. 255      In the  appeals to  this Court,  it  was  contended  on behalf of the appellant:      (1)  Even  though  the  State  Act  was  repealed,  the provisions  of  the  Central  Acts  having  themselves  been protanto repealed  by the State Act when it was passed could not be  pressed into  service for the purpose of prosecuting the appellant unless these provisions were re-enacted by the appropriate legislature.      (2) It  was contended that even assuming that the State Act had  ceased to  exist and  the Central Acts applied, the appellant cannot  be prosecuted under any of the sections of the Penal  Code or  the Corruption Act, because by virtue of the position  that the  appellant enjoyed as Chief Minister, there was  no relationship of master and servant between him and the  Government and  he was  acting as  a constitutional functionary, and  therefore could  not  be  described  as  a ’public servant’  as contemplated  by s. 21(12) of the Penal Code.      (3) The  provisions contained  in  the  State  Act  run counter to  those of  the Central  Acts in  respect  of  the following matters;  (a) The  procedure for  investigation of the offences  by a  Central Agency  as contemplated  by  the Corruption Act  is dispensed with and is instead invested in a Commissioner  appointed  under  the  State  Act.  (b)  The provisions under  the Prevention of Corruption Act regarding the grant  of sanction  under s.  197 of  the  Code  to  the accused is given a complete go by and instead a Commissioner is appointed  to hold a regular inquiry for himself and then to submit  his report.  An accused who has to be tried under the State Act is thus deprived of the protection afforded to every Government  servant regarding  grant of  a sanction by the appointing  authority. Therefore  the protection if any, given by the State Act is purely illusory, and      (4) By  virtue of  the fact  that  the  State  Act  has obtained the  assent of  the President, it will be deemed to be a  dominant legislation, and therefore it would over-rule the Central Acts.      Dismissing the appeals, ^      HELD: 1. The scheme of the Constitution is a scientific and equitable  distribution of  legislative  powers  between Parliament and  the State Legislatures. First, regarding the matters contained  in List  I, i.e.  the Union  List to  the Seventh Schedule, Parliament alone is empowered to legislate and the State Legislatures have no authority to make any law in respect  of the Entries contained in List I. Secondly, so

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far as the Concurrent List is concerned, both Parliament and the State  Legislatures are  entitled to legislate in regard to any of the Entries appearing therein, but that is subject to the  condition laid  down by Art. 254(1). Thirdly, so far as  the  matters  in  List  II,  i.e.  the  State  List  are concerned, the  State Legislatures  alone are  competent  to legislate  on   them  and   only  under  certain  conditions Parliament can do so. [263 D-E]      2. In  such matters  repugnancy  may  result  from  the following circumstances:-      (i) Where  the provisions  of a Central Act and a State Act in  the Concurrent  List are  fully inconsistent and are absolutely irreconcilable,  the Central Act will prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy. 256      (ii) Where however a law passed by the State comes into collision with a law passed by Parliament on an Entry in the Concurrent List,  the State  Act shall prevail to the extent of the  repugnancy and  the provisions  of the  Central  Act would become  void provided the State Act has been passed in accordance with cl. (2) of Art. 254.      (iii) Where a law passed by the State legislature while being substantially  within the  scope of the entries in the State List entrenches upon any of the Entries in the Central List the  constitutionality of  the lay  may  be  upheld  by invoking the  doctrine  of  pith  and  substance  if  on  an analysis of the provisions of the Act it appears that by and large the  law falls  within the  four corners  of the State List an  entrenchment, if  any, being  purely incidental  or inconsequential.      (iv)  Where,   however,  a   law  made   by  the  State Legislature on  a subject  covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent with  or repugnant  to a  previous law  made by Parliament, then  such a  law can  be protected by obtaining the  assent  of  the  President  under  Art  254(2)  of  the Constitution. The  result of  obtaining the  assent  of  the President  would  be  that  so  far  as  the  State  Act  is concerned, it  will prevail  in the  State and over-rule the provisions of  the Central Act in their applicability to the State only.  Such a  state of  affairs will exist only until Parliament may  at  any  time  make  a  law  adding  to,  or amending, varying  or repealing  the law  made by  the State Legislature under the proviso to Art. 254. [263 F-264 D]      3.  A  careful  analysis,  therefore,  of  the  various provisions of  the  State  Act  leads  to  the  irresistible inference that  the State  Act was  passed with  a  view  to afford sufficient  protection to a public man by enjoining a summary inquiry  or investigation  by a high and independent Tribunal of  the status  of a  High Court  Judge or a Senior District Judge  to instil  confidence in  the people  and to prevent public men from being prosecuted on false, frivolous and  vexatious  allegations.  Although  the  ingredients  of criminal misconduct  as  defined  in  s.  5(1)  (d)  of  the Corruption Act  are substantially  the same in the State Act as in  the Central Acts but here also the punishment is much severer in  the case of the State Act than the one contained in the  Central Acts.  It is,  therefore, manifest  that the State Act  does not contain any provision which is repugnant to the  Central Acts,  but is  a sort  of complementary  Act which runs pari passu the Central Act. [270 G-271 A]      4. Prima  facie,  there  does  not  appear  to  be  any inconsistency between  the State  Act and  the Central Acts. Before any  repugnancy can  arise, the  following conditions must be satisfied:      (i) That  there is  a clear  and  direct  inconsistency

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between the Central Act and the State Act; (ii) that such an inconsistency is  absolutely irreconcilable;  (iii) that the inconsistency between  the provisions  of the two Acts is of such a nature as to bring the two Acts into direct collision with each  other and  a situation  is reached  where  it  is impossible to  obey the  one without  disobeying the  other. [272D-E]      5. (1)  In order  to decide the questions of repugnancy it  must   be  shown   that  the   two  enactments   contain inconsistent and irreconcilable provisions, 257 so that  they cannot  stand together  or operate in the same field; (2) that there can be no repeal by implication unless the inconsistency  appears on  the face of the two statutes; (3) that  where the  two statutes occupy a particular field, but there  is room  or  possibility  of  both  the  statutes operating in  the same  field without  coming into collision with each other, no repugnancy results; (4) that where there is no  inconsistency but  a statute occupying the same field seeks to  create distinct and separate offences, no question of repugnancy  arises and  both  the  statutes  continue  to operate in the same field. [278 F-H]      Hume v.  Palmer, 38 CLR 441; Union Steamship Co. of New Zealand v.  Commonwealth, 36  CLR 130; Clyde Engineering Co. v. Cowburn,  37 CLR  466; Ex.  Parte  McLean,  43  CLR  472; Zavarbhai Amaidas  v. State of Bombay, [1955] 1 SCR 799; Ch. Tika Ramji  & Ors.  etc. v.  The State of U.P. & Ors. [1956] SCR 393  Shyamakant Lal v. Rambhajan Singh, 1939 FCR 188; Om Prakash Gupta  v. State  of U.P., [1957] SCR 423; Deep Chand v. State  of UP & Ors. [1959] 2 Supp. SCR 8, Megh Raj & Ors. v. Allah Rakhia & Ors. AIR 1942 FC 27; State of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch  & Co.  [1964] 4  SCR 461; T. S. Balliah v. T. S. Rangachari, [1969] 3 SCR 65; referred to.      Colin Heward’s  Australian Federal Constitution Law 2nd Edn.  Nicholas  Australian  Constitution  2nd  Edn.  p.  303 referred to.      There can  be no  doubt  that  the  State  Act  creates distinct and  separate offences  with different  ingredients and different  punishments  and  it  does  not  in  any  way collide, with the Central Acts. On the other hand, the State Act itself permits the Central Act, namely, the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act to come to its aid after an investigation is completed and  a report  is submitted by the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner. [279 A-B]      6. Doubtless, the State Act is the dominant legislation but there  are no  provisions in  the State  Act  which  are irreconcilably or  directly inconsistent  with  the  Central Acts so as to over-rule them. [279 C]      The original  s. 29  of  the  State  Act  underwent  an amendment which  was brought  about by  Tamil Nadu Act 16 of 1974 which  substituted a  new s.  29 for  the old one. This amendment received  the assent  of  the  President  on  10th April, 1974  and was  published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Extra  ordinary, dated  16 April, 1974. Although the State Act  was passed  as far  back as  30 December, 1973 it received the  assent of  the President on the 10 April, 1974 that is,  on the  same date  as Act  16 of 1974. The Act was however brought  into force  on the 8 May, 1974 when the new s. 29  which had  already replaced  the old  section and had become a part of the statute. Therefore, for all intents and purposes the  State Act cannot be read in isolation, but has to be  interpreted in  conjunction with the express language contained in  s. 29 of the State Act. The legislature has in unequivocal terms expressed the intention that the State Act which was undoubtedly the dominant legislation would only be

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"in addition to and not in derogation with any other law for the time  being in  force"  which  manifestly  includes  the Central Acts,  namely, the Indian Penal Code, the Corruption Act  and   the  Criminal  Law  (Amendment)  Act.  Thus,  the Legislature about  a month  before the  main Act  came  into force clearly  declared its intention that there would be no question of  the State  Act colliding  with the Central Acts referred to above. The second part 258 of s.  29 also  provides that nothing contained in the State Act shall exempt any public man from being proceeded with by way  of   investigation  or  otherwise  under  a  proceeding instituted against  him  under  the  Central  Acts.  It  is, therefore, clear that in view of this clear intention of the legislature there  can be  no room for any argument that the State Act was in any way repugnant to the Central Acts. [279 D-280 D]      7. The  provisions of  s. 29 would be presumptive proof of the  fact that  there is  no repugnancy between the State Act and  the Central  Acts nor did either the legislature or the President  intend to create any repugnancy between these Acts as  a result  of  which  the  criticism  regarding  the repugnancy is completely obliterated in the instant case and we,  therefore,   hold  that  the  State  legislature  never intended to  occupy the same field as covered by the Central Acts. [281 B]      8. So  far as  the  first  part  of  cl.  (12)  (a)  is concerned,  namely   ’in  the   service  of  the  Government undoubtedly signifies  a relationship  of master and servant where the  employer employs  the employee  on the basis of a salary or  remuneration. However,  the second  limb  of  the clause, ’in  the pay  of the  Government’ is concerned, that appears to  be of  a much  wider amplitude  so as to include within its  ambit even  a public  servant who  may not  be a regular  employee   receiving  salary  from  his  master.  A Minister or  a Chief Minister will be clearly covered by the said expression. [282 E-F]      A careful analysis of the meanings assigned to the word ’pay’ in  the  various  dictionaries  and  the  texts  would clearly reveal  that the expression ’in the pay of’ connotes that a  person is getting salary, compensation, wages or any amount of money. This by itself however does not lead to the inference that  a relationship  of master  and servant  must necessarily exist  in all  cases  where  a  person  is  paid salary. [283 G-H]           Shorter Oxford  English Dictionary; Websters Third      New  International   Dictionary:  Websters   New  World      Dictionary: Words  and Phrases,  Permanent Edition Vol.      31A p.  176. Venkataramaya’s  Law Lexicon  Vol.  11  p.      1122. Corpus  Juris Secundum  Vol. 70  p. 200; referred      to.      9. By  virtue of  the provisions contained in Art. 167, the Chief Minister undoubtedly performs a public duty of the nature as  enjoined by clauses (a) to (c) of Art. 167. It is also clearly  provided in  the Constitution  that the  Chief Minister or  the  Ministers  are  entitled  to  salaries  or allowances obviously  in lieu  of public  duties  that  they perform. The  salaries given  to the  Chief Minister  or the Ministers  are   given  from   the  Government  funds,  and, therefore, there  will be  no difficulty in holding that the Ministers are  in the pay of the Government inasmuch as they receive their  salaries, remunerations  or  wages  from  the Government. [285 E-F]      Once it  is conceded  that the  Governor  appoints  the Chief Minister  who is  paid a salary according to a statute

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made by the legislature from the Government funds, the Chief Minister becomes a person in the pay of the Government so as to fall squarely within cl. (12) of s. 21 of the Penal Code. [286 B] 259      10. The  use  of  the  words  ’other  public  servants’ following a Minister of the Union or of a State clearly show that a  Minister would  also be  a public  servant as  other public servants  contemplated by  s. 199(2)  of the Code and the Code  being a  statute complementary  and allied  to the Penal Code can be looked into for the purpose of determining the real meaning and import of the words ’public servant’ as used in the aforesaid section [286 F]      Dattatraya  Narayan  Patil  v.  State  of  Maharashtra, [1975], Supp.  SCR 145;  Emperor v.  Sibnath Banerji & Ors., AIR 1945  PC 156; Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. The State of Vindhya Pradesh, [1953] SCR 1188; referred to.      S. Tara  Singh v.  Director Consolidation  of Holdings, Punjab, Jullundur  & Ors.  AIR 1958  Pub. 302, Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. v. G. M. Sadiq & Ors., AIR 1968 J & K 98; approved.      11. Three facts that have been proved beyond doubt:-      (i) That  a Minister  is appointed  or dismissed by the Governor and  therefore, subordinate  to him whatever be the nature and status of his constitutional function.      (ii) That  a Chief  Minister or  a Minister gets salary for the  public work  done or  the public  duty performed by him.      (iii) That  the  said  salary  is  paid  to  the  Chief Minister or the Minister from the Government funds. [290A-B]      12. It  is thus  incontrovertible, that the holder of a public office such as the Chief Minister is a public servant in respect  of which  the Constitution provides that he will get his salary from the Government Treasury so long he holds his  office  on  account  of  the  public  service  that  he discharges. The  salary  given  to  the  Chief  Minister  is coterminus with  his office  and  is  not  paid  like  other constitutional functionaries  such as  the President and the Speaker. These  fact, therefore,  point to  one and only one conclusion and that is that the Chief Minister is in the pay of the Government and is, therefore, a public servant within the meaning of s. 21(12) of the Penal Code. [290 C-D]

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Criminal  Appeal Nos. 270-271 of 1977.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  10-5-1977  of  the Madras High Court in W.P. No. 429 and Crl. R.P. No. 50/77.      K. K. Venugopal, N. A. Subramaniam, C. S. Vaidyanathan, Mrs. Shanta  Venugopal, K.  R. Chowdhary and Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna for the Appellant.      S. N.  Kackar, Sol.  Genl. (In  Crl. A.  No. 270) R. B. Datar and R. N. Sachthey, for the Respondent.      V. P.  Raman, Adv.  Genl and A. V. Rangam for the State of Tamil Nadu. 260      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      FAZAL ALI,  J. These  two appeals  by  certificate  are directed against  a common  order of  the Madras  High Court dated 10th  May,  1977  dismissing  the  applications  filed before the  High Court  by the  appellant for  quashing  the order of  the Special  Judge, Madras dated 4th January, 1977 refusing to discharge the appellant under section 239 of the Code of  Criminal Procedure  (hereinafter referred to as the

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Code).      The facts  of  the  case  have  been  detailed  in  the judgment of the High Court and it is not necessary for us to repeat the  same  all  over  again.  However,  in  order  to understand the  points in issue, it may be necessary to give a resume  of the important stages through which the case has passed and the constitutional points argued before us.      The appellant,  M.  Karunanidhi,  was  a  former  Chief Minister of  Tamil Nadu  and was  the petitioner  before the High Court  in the applications filed by him before the High Court. On  15-6-1976 a  D.O. letter was written by the Chief Secretary to  the Government  of Tamil  Nadu to  the  Deputy Inspector General  of Police,  CBI requesting  him to make a detailed investigation  into certain allegations against the appellant and  others who  were alleged to have abused their official position  in the  matter of  purchase of wheat from Punjab. A  first information report was accordingly recorded on 16-6-1976  and four  months later  sanction under section 197 of  the Code  was granted  by the Governor of Tamil Nadu for the prosecution of the appellant under sections 161, 468 and 471  of the Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) read with section  5  (1)(d)  of  the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act (hereinafter referred to as the Corruption Act). Thereafter, the police  submitted a  charge sheet  against the appellant for the  offences  mentioned  above  and  alleged  that  the appellant had derived for himself pecuniary advantage to the extent of  Rs. 4  to Rs.  5 lakhs  from Madenlal  Gupta  for passing favourable orders in respect of some firms. The case was registered  before the  Special Judge  and the necessary copies of  the records  were furnished to the appellant. The appellant on  appearing before  the Special  Judge filed  an application for  discharging him  under section  239 of  the Code on the ground that the prosecution against him suffered from  various  legal  and  constitutional  infirmities.  The Special  Judge,  however,  after  hearing  counsel  for  the parties rejected  the application  of  the  appellant  as  a result of  which the appellant filed two applications in the High Court  for quashing  the proceedings  and  for  setting aside the  order of  the Special Judge refusing to discharge the appellant. As indicated 261 above, the  High Court  rejected  the  applications  of  the appellant but  granted a  certificate for leave to appeal to this Court and hence these appeals before us.      As  far   back  as   30th  December,  1973  the  Madras Legislature had passed an Act known as The Tamil Nadu Public Men (Criminal  Misconduct) Act, 1973 hereinafter referred to as the  State Act.  The State Act was passed after obtaining the assent  of the  President of  India. This State Act was, however, amended  by Act  16 of  1974  and  the  President’s assent was  received on  10th April,  1974. According to the provisions of  the State  Act the  statute was  brought into force by virtue of a notification with effect from 8-5-1974. According to the allegations made against the appellant, the acts said  to have  been committed  by him  fell within  the period November  1974 to March, 1975. On 31-1-1976 by virtue of the  provisions  of  Article  356  President’s  rule  was imposed in  the State  of Tamil Nadu and the Ministry headed by the  appellant was  dismissed and  a Proclamation  to his effect was  issued on  the same date. The High Court decided the petitions  of the  appellant on  10-5-1977 and granted a certificate for  leave to appeal to this Court on 27-7-1977. Subsequently, however,  the State  Act was  repealed and the President’s assent  to the  repealing of  the State  Act was given on 6-9-1977. Thus, it is manifest that by the time the

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appeal has  reached this  Court and was taken up for hearing the State  Act no  longer exists.  Consequently, some of the constitutional points  raised by the learned counsel for the appellant before  the Court do not survive for consideration before us.      Faced with  this situation,  Mr.  Venu  Gopal,  learned counsel for  the appellant has raised only two points before us. In  the first  place, he  submitted that even though the State Act  was repealed  on 6-9-1977 during the time that it was in  force, it  was wholly repugnant to the provisions of the Code,  the Corruption Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act and  by virtue  of Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India the  provisions of  the aforesaid  Central Acts  stood repealed and  could not  revive  after  the  State  Act  was repealed. The  constitutional position, it is submitted, was that even  though the  State Act was repealed the provisions of the Central Acts having themselves been protanto repealed by the  State Act  when it  was passed  could not be pressed into service  for the  purpose of  prosecuting the appellant unless those  provisions were  re-enacted by the appropriate legislature. A  number of grounds were raised by counsel for the appellant  in support of the first plank of his argument that the  State Act  was repugnant  to the provisions of the Central Acts  as a  result of  which the former was rendered void. 262      Secondly, it  was argued  that even  assuming that  the State Act  has ceased to exist and the Central Acts apply to the facts  of the  present case,  the  appellant  cannot  be prosecuted under  any of  the sections  of the Penal Code or the Corruption  Act, because being the Chief Minister of the State at  the relevant  time he  was not a public servant as defined in  section 21 clause (12) of the Indian Penal Code. The argument  was that  by virtue  of the  position that the appellant  enjoyed   as  Chief   Minister   there   was   no relationship of  master and  servant  between  him  and  the Government and he was acting as a constitutional functionary and, therefore,  could not  be described as a public servant as contemplated by section 21(12) of the Penal Code.      We propose  to deal  with the two arguments separately. We would  first deal  with the  question  of  repugnancy  as raised by learned counsel for the appellant. It is true that the State  Act was  passed by  the Legislature of Tamil Nadu and the  assent  of  the  President  was  obtained  on  30th December, 1973.  By virtue  of the provisions of Article 254 (2) of  the Constitution  since the  assent of the President had been given the State Act was to prevail over the Central Acts so  far as  the State  of Tamil Nadu was concerned, but the serious  question to  be considered  is as to whether or not  there   was  a   real  repugnancy   resulting  from  an irreconcilable inconsistency  between the  State Act and the Central Acts. Article 254 of the Constitution runs thus:-           "254.   Inconsistency   between   laws   made   by      Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States:      (1) If  any provision  of a law made by the Legislature      of a  State is repugnant to any provision of a law made      by Parliament  which Parliament  is competent to enact,      or to  any provision of an existing law with respect to      one of  the matters  enumerated in the Concurrent List,      then, subject  to the provisions of clause (2), the law      made by  Parliament, whether passed before or after the      law made  by the  Legislature of such State, or, as the      case may  be, the  existing law,  shall prevail and the      law made  by the Legislature of the State shall, to the      extent of the repugnancy, be void.

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         (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State      with respect  to one  of the  matters enumerated in the      Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the      provisions of  an earlier  law made by Parliament or an      existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law      so made  by the  Legislature of such State shall, if it      has  been   reserved  for   the  consideration  of  the      President and  has received his assent, prevail in that      State: 263           Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent      Parliament from  enacting at  any  time  any  law  with      respect to  the same  matter including a law adding to,      amending, varying  or repealing  the law so made by the      Legislature of State".      It would  be seen  that so far as clause (1) of Article 254 is  concerned it clearly lays down that where there is a direct collision  between a  provision of  a law made by the State and that made by Parliament with respect to one of the matters enumerated  in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the State law would be void to the extent  of the  repugnancy. This  naturally  means  that where  both  the  State  and  Parliament  occupy  the  field contemplated by  the Concurrent  List then the Act passed by Parliament being  prior in  point of  time will  prevail and consequently the State Act will have to yield to the Central Act. In fact, the scheme of the Constitution is a scientific and equitable  distribution of  legislative  powers  between Parliament and  the State Legislatures. First, regarding the matters contained  in List  I, i.e.  the Union  List to  the Seventh Schedule, Parliament alone is empowered to legislate and the State Legislatures have no authority to make any law in respect  of the Entries contained in List I. Secondly, so far as the Concurrent List is concerned, both Parliament and the State  Legislatures are  entitled to legislate in regard to any of the Entries appearing therein, but that is subject to the  condition laid  down  by  Article  254(1)  discussed above. Thirdly,  so far as the matters in List II, i.e., the State List  are concerned,  the State Legislatures alone are competent to  legislate  on  them  and  only  under  certain conditions Parliament  can do  so. It is, therefore, obvious that  in   such  matters  repugnancy  may  result  from  the following circumstances :-           1. Where  the provisions  of a  Central Act  and a      State Act in the Concurrent List are fully inconsistent      and are absolutely irreconcilable, the Central Act will      prevail and  the State  Act will become void in view of      the repugnancy.           2. Where  however a  law passed by the State comes      into collision  with a  law passed  by Parliament on an      Entry in  the Concurrent  List,  the  State  Act  shall      prevail  to  the  extent  of  the  repugnancy  and  the      provisions  of   the  Central  Act  would  become  void      provided the  State Act  has been  passed in accordance      with clause (2) of Article 254.           3. Where  a law  passed by  the State  Legislature      while being  substantially  within  the  scope  of  the      entries in  the State  List entrenches  upon any of the      Entries in the Central List 264      the constitutionality  of the  law  may  be  upheld  by      invoking the  doctrine of  pith and  substance if on an      analysis of  the provisions  of the Act it appears that      by and  large the  law falls within the four corners of      the State  List an  entrenchment,  if  any,  is  purely

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    incidental or inconsequential.           4.  Where,  however,  a  law  made  by  the  State      Legislature on a subject covered by the Concurrent List      is inconsistent  with and  repugnant to  a previous law      made by Parliament, then such a law can be protected by      obtaining the  assent of  the President  under  Article      254(2) of the Constitution. The result of obtaining the      assent of  the President  would be  that so  far as the      State Act  is concerned,  it will  prevail in the State      and overrule the provisions of the Central Act in their      applicability to  the  State  only.  Such  a  state  of      affairs will  exist only  until Parliament  may at  any      time make  a law  adding to,  or amending,  varying  or      repealing the  law made  by the State Legislature under      the proviso to Article 254. So far  as the  present State Act is concerned we are called upon to  consider the  various shades  of the constitutional validity  of   the  same   under  Article   254(2)  of   the Constitution.      It is  neither alleged or argued that Parliament has at any time  after the  State Act  was passed proceeded to pass any law  as contemplated  by the Proviso to Article 254. As, however, the  State law  has already  been repealed  and the President’s assent  to the  said repeal has been received as far back  as 6-9-1977 we are concerned only with the limited question as  to whether  if the  State law  had repealed  or overruled the provisions of the Central law what will be the position after  the State  law itself ceases to exist. It is true that  the doctrine  of eclipse  would not  apply to the constitutionality of  the Central  law and the only question we  have   to  determine   is  whether  there  was  such  an irreconcilable inconsistency  between the  State Act and the Central Acts  that the  provisions of  the Central Act stood repealed and unless re-enacted the said provisions cannot be invoked even  after the  State Act  was itself  repealed. In order, however,  to enter  into the  domain of repugnancy of the two  Acts we have to consider the relevant provisions of the Central Acts and of the State Act. The High Court has on a  very   careful  and  cautious  analysis  of  the  various provisions of  the two  Acts come  to a  clear finding  that there is no repugnancy between the State Act and the Central Acts, but  the State  Act merely  creates a new and distinct offence which  in its  nature  and  purport  is  essentially different from the offences contemplated by the Indian Penal Code and  the Corruption Act. It has been pointed out by the High Court as also 265 by the  Solicitor General  that not  only the ingredients of the offences  created by  the State  Act are  different from those  of  the  Central  Act,  but  even  the  procedure  is different. It  was further  argued by  the Solicitor General that there  is absolutely no repugnancy between the two Acts and both can operate in their respective fields.      In order  to appreciate this question, we would briefly refer to  the scheme  of the  State Act.  Section 2  defines certain   dignitaries    like    Commissioner,    Additional Commissioner, Government, Public man, public servant.      Clause (a) of section 2 defines ’Commissioner’ thus:           "’Commissioner’ or "Additional Commissioner" means      the  Commissioner   of  Inquiries   or  an   Additional      Commissioner  of   Inquiries,  as   the  case  may  be,      appointed under section 4".      Clause (c) of section 2 defines ’public man’ thus:      "Public man" means           (i)  any person  who is  or  has  been  the  Chief

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              Minister or any other Minister of the State;           (ii) a person  who is  or has been a Member of the                Legislative Assembly  or of  the  Legislative                Council of the State; or           (iii)a person who is or has been a Mayor or Deputy                Mayor of  the Municipal Corporation of Madras                or of  Madurai or Chairman of any Standing or                Subject or  other  Committee  constituted  or                deemed to  be constituted  under  the  Madras                City Municipal  Corporation Act,  1919 (Tamil                Nadu Act  IV of  1919) or  the  Madurai  City                Municipal Corporation  Act, 1971  (Tamil Nadu                Act 15 of 1971) as the case may be;           (iv) a person  who is  or has been the Chairman or                Vice-Chairman  of   a  Municipal  Council  or                Chairman of  any Standing or Subject or other                Committee  constituted   or  deemed   to   be                constituted under  the  Tamil  Nadu  District                Municipalities Act, 1920 (Tamil Nadu Act V of                1920) or any other law for the time in force;           (v)  a person  who is  or has been the Chairman or                Vice-Chairman of a Panchayat Union Council or                Chairman or  President  of  any  Standing  or                Subject or  other Committee  of such  council                constituted or deemed to be 266                constituted under  the Tamil  Nadu Panchayats                Act, 1958  (Tamil Nadu  Act XXXV of 1958), or                any other law for the time being in force;           (vi) a person  other than a Government servant who                is or has been the Chairman of-                (a)  any  corporation   (not  being  a  local                     authority) established  by  or  under  a                     State or  Provincial Act  and  owned  or                     controlled by the State Government;                (b)  any  Government   company   within   the                     meaning of  section 617 of the Companies                     Act, 1956  (Central Act  1 of  1956), in                     which not  less than  fifty-one per cent                     of the  paid-up share capital is held by                     the State  Government,  or  any  company                     which is  a subsidiary  of a  company in                     which not  less than  fifty one per cent                     of the  paid-up share capital is held by                     the State Government". It may  be noticed  here that  the concept  of public-man as contemplated by  the State  Act differs  in certain respects from that  of a  public servant  as contemplated  by section 21(12) of the Penal Code.      To begin with, under the State Act a public-man clearly includes the  Chief Minister  or any  other Minister  of the State as  also a member of the State Legislative Assembly or Legislative  Council.   Secondly,  the   word  ’public  man’ appearing in  Section 2(c)  clearly  excludes  a  Government servant, unless  he falls  within the categories of (a), (b) and (c)  of clause  (vi) of section 2 of the State Act. This is a  basic departure  from the provisions of the Penal Code where the  word ’public servant’ has been used in the widest possible sense so as to include not only Government servants who are receiving salary from the Government, but also other dignitaries who are in the pay of the Government.      Section 3  clauses (1),  (2) and  (3)  define  criminal misconduct which  is almost  the  same  as  defined  by  the provisions  of   the  Corruption  Act  and  the  Penal  Code (sections 5(2)  and 5(1)  (d)  of  the  Corruption  Act  and

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section 161 of the Indian Penal Code).      It may,  however, be noted here that the State Act does not make  sections 468  and 471 of the Indian Penal Code any offence under  this Act.  Section 4 prescribes the procedure for appointment of a high 267 powered tribunal  for the  purpose of  holding investigation into the allegations made against any public man. Sections 4 and 5 run thus:-           "4. Appointment  of Commissioner  of Inquiries and      Additional  Commissioner  of  Inquiries:  (1)  For  the      purpose of  conducting investigation in accordance with      the provisions  of this  Act, the  Government shall, on      the recommendation  of the  Chief Justice  of the  High      Court appoint, by notification, a person to be known as      Commissioner of Inquiries and one or more persons to be      known as Additional Commissioner of Inquiries.           (2) The  Commissioner shall be a person who is, or      who is qualified for appointment as, or who has been, a      Judge of  a High  Court and  an Additional Commissioner      shall be  a person  who is,  or who  is  qualified  for      appointment as, or who has been, a District Judge.           (3) Every  person appointed as the Commissioner or      Additional Commissioner shall, before entering upon his      office, make  and subscribe before the Chief Justice of      the High  Court or some person appointed in that behalf      by him  an oath for affirmation in the form set out for      the purpose in the First Schedule.           (4) The  Additional Commissioner  shall be subject      to the  administrative control of the Commissioner, and      in particular,  for the  purpose of convenient disposal      of investigations  under this Act, the Commissioner may      issue such  general or  special directions  as  he  may      consider necessary to the Additional Commissioner;           Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be      construed to authorise the Commissioner to question any      finding conclusion  or recommendation  of an Additional      Commissioner.      x         x         x         x         x           5. Term  of office and other conditions of service      of Commissioner and Additional Commissioner:      x         x         x         x         x           (4) There  shall be  paid to  the Commissioner and      the  Additional   Commissioner  such  salaries  as  are      specified in the Second Schedule. 268           (5) The  allowances and  pension payable  to,  and      other conditions  of service  of, the  Commissioner  or      Additional  Commissioner   shall   be   the   same   as      admissible-           (a) to  a Judge of a High Court in the case of the      Commissioner,           (b)  to  a  District  Judge  in  the  case  of  an      Additional Commissioner:           Provided that  the allowances  and pension payable      to,  and   other  conditions   of   service   of,   the      Commissioner or an Additional Commissioner shall not be      varied to his disadvantage after his appointment".      Another important  provision which  is contained in the State Act  but not  in  the  Central  Acts  is  a  provision regarding limitation.  Under section  8 which was introduced by section 2 of the Tamil Nadu Amending Act 16 of 1974 it is provided   that   the   Commissioner   or   the   Additional Commissioner shall  not investigate  any complaint involving criminal misconduct  which is  made after  the expiry  of  5

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years  from  the  date  on  which  the  criminal  misconduct complained against  was alleged  to have  been committed  or after the  expiry of  one year  from the  date on  which the public man  ceased to  be such public man. The provisions of section 8 may be extracted thus:-           "6. Limitation  for preferring complaints: (1) The      Commissioner or  an Additional  Commissioner shall  not      investigate or  cause to  be investigated any complaint      involving  criminal  misconduct  if  the  complaint  is      made:-           (i) after  the expiry  of five years from the date      on which the criminal misconduct complained against was      alleged to have been committed; or           (ii) after  the expiry  of one year of the date on      which the public ceases to be such public man,      Whichever is later.           (2) Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub-      section  (1),   the  Commissioner   or  an   Additional      Commissioner shall  not  investigate  or  cause  to  be      investigated   any    complaint   involving    criminal      misconduct, the  complaint is  made after the expiry of      one year  from the  date on which the action complained      against becomes known to the complainant". 269      Similarly section  10 of  the State Act confers plenary powers on the Commissioner or the Additional Commissioner to prescribe a  procedure for  conducting an  investigation  in respect of a complaint and runs thus:-           "10. Procedure  in  respect  of  investigation  of      criminal misconduct:  (1) The  procedure for conducting      any investigation in respect of a complaint of criminal      misconduct against  any public man shall be such as the      Commissioner or  the Additional  Commissioner considers      appropriate in the circumstances of the case.           (2) Subject  to the provisions of sub-section (1),      where any  complaint of  criminal misconduct  against a      public  man   is  received   by  the   Commissioner  or      Additional Commissioner, the Commissioner or Additional      Commissioner  shall   make  or   cause  to  be  made  a      preliminary investigation  to find out whether there is      any prima  facie case against the public man in respect      of the allegation of criminal misconduct:           x x x           (3)   Where   the   Commissioner   or   Additional      Commissioner gives a finding under sub-section (2) that      there is  no prima facie case against the public man in      respect of  the allegation  of criminal  misconduct, he      shall dismiss the complaint after briefly recording his      reasons for doing so:           Provided  that   the  Commissioner  or  Additional      Commissioner shall not dismiss any complaint under this      sub-section, unless  the complainant  has been given an      opportunity of being heard, if such complainant has not      already been  heard under  clause (a) of the proviso to      sub-section (2).           x x x x" Under clause  (3) of  section 10  the  Commissioner  or  the Additional  Commissioner   is  empowered   to  dismiss   the complaint if  he is  satisfied  that  no  prima  facie  case against the  public man has been made out, but such an order of dismissal can be made only after the complainant has been given an opportunity of being heard.      Section 11  is also  a new provision as compared to the Central Acts  which provides for grant of compensatory costs to the  public man  if the  allegation made  against him are

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found to  be false,  frivolous or vexatious to the knowledge of the complainant. 270      Section 12  gives a right of appeal to a Division Bench of  the   High  Court   against  any  order  passed  by  the Commissioner or  Additional Commissioner  under  sub-section (1) of  section 11 granting compensatory costs to the public man and runs thus:-           "Appeal against  an order  under section  11:  (1)      Against  any   order  passed  by  the  Commissioner  or      Additional  Commissioner   under  sub-section   (1)  of      section 11,  the complainant may, within such period as      may  be  prescribed,  appeal  to  a  Special  Appellate      Tribunal consisting  of two  Judges of  the High  Court      nominated from  time to  time by  the Chief  Justice in      that behalf".      Section 14  provides the  procedure for  examination of witnesses, receiving  of affidavits,  issuing of commissions etc.      Section 15  provides an  enhanced punishment  of  seven years for  criminal misconduct as compared to the punishment provided by the Corruption Act.      Section 16 provides for prosecution of a complainant if his complaint  is found to be false, frivolous and vexatious and such  a complainant  is liable to be punished for a term which may  extend to  three  years  and  fine,  but  such  a prosecution can  be launched only with the previous sanction of the Commissioner. Section 16 runs thus:-           "16. Punishment  for false, frivolous or vexatious      complaint: (1)  Notwithstanding anything  contained  in      this Act,  every person who makes a false, frivolous or      vexatious complaint  against a  public man  under  this      Act, shall  on conviction be punished with imprisonment      for a  term which  may extend  to three years and shall      also be liable to fine".      A  careful   analysis,  therefore,   of   the   various provisions of  the  State  Act  leads  to  the  irresistible inference that  the State  Act was  passed with  a  view  to afford sufficient  protection to a public man by enjoining a summary inquiry  or investigation  by a high and independent Tribunal of  the status  of a  High Court  Judge or a Senior District Judge  to instill  confidence in  the people and to prevent public man from being prosecuted on false, frivolous and  vexatious  allegations.  Although  the  ingredients  of criminal misconduct  as defined  in section  5(1) (d) of the Corruption Act  are substantially  the same in the State Act as in  the Central Acts but here also the punishment is much severer in  the case of the State Act than the one contained in the  Central Acts.  It is,  therefore, manifest  that the State Act  does not contain any provision which is repugnant to the Central Acts, but is a sort of comple- 271 mentary Act which runs pari passu the Central Acts mentioned above. After the investigation by the Commissioner under the State Act  is complete and a report is submitted, section 18 of the State Act provides thus:-           "18. Report  of the  Commissioner  and  Additional      Commissioner: (1)  Where as  a result  of any  detailed      investigation under  sub-section (4)  of section  10 in      respect of a complaint of criminal misconduct against a      public  man,   the  Commissioner   or   an   Additional      Commissioner is of opinion,-           (a) that  it  is  expedient  in  the  interest  of      justice that  the  public  man  against  whom  criminal      misconduct has  been alleged,  should be prosecuted for

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    an offence under section 15; or           (b)   that    the   allegation    has   not   been      substantiated, he shall record a finding to that effect      stating his reasons therefor and report the same to the      Government.           (2) In  cases falling  under clause  (a)  of  sub-      section (1),  the public  man shall  be prosecuted  and      tried under  section 6  of the Criminal Law (Amendment)      Act, 1952 (Central Act 46 of 1952)". The State  Act enjoins  that the  public man  concerned will have to be prosecuted under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 1952.  Thus, far  from there being any inconsistency, the provisions of  the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act are directly applied  to  a  public  man  by  the  State  Act  after  the preliminary investigation  by the  Commissioner is  over. It seems to us that what the State Act does is merely to create different and  distinct offences  and not  to over-rule  any provisions of the Central Act.      It was,  however, strongly  contended by Mr. Venu Gopal that the  provisions contained  in the State Act run counter to those  of the  Central Acts  in respect  of the following matters:           1.   The  procedure   for  investigation   of  the                offences by  a Central agency as contemplated                by the  Corruption Act  is dispensed with and                is  instead   invested  in   a   Commissioner                appointed under the State Act.           2.   The  provision   under  the   Prevention   of                Corruption  Act   regarding  the   grant   of                sanction under section 197 of the Code to the                accused is given a complete go by and instead                a Commissioner is appointed to hold a regular 272                inquiry for  himself and  then to  submit his                report. Thus,  an accused  who has been tried                under the State Act is deprived of protection                afforded   to    every   Government   servant                regarding  grant   of  a   sanction  by   the                appointing authority.  It is  thus  suggested                that the  protection, if  any, given  by  the                State Act is purely illusory. In order, however, to understand the argument of the learned counsel for  the appellant,  it may be necessary to consider the question of repugnancy in a little broader perspective.      It is  well settled  that the  presumption is always in favour of  the constitutionality  of a  statute and the onus lies on  the person  assailing the  Act to  prove that it is unconstitutional. Prima  facie, there  does not appear to us to be  any inconsistency  between  the  State  Act  and  the Central Acts. Before any repugnancy can arise, the following conditions must be satisfied:-           1. That  there is a clear and direct inconsistency      between the Central Act and the State Act.           2.  That   such  an  inconsistency  is  absolutely      irreconcilable.           3. That  the inconsistency  between the provisions      of the two Acts is of such a nature as to bring the two      Acts into  direct  collision  with  each  other  and  a      situation is reached where it is impossible to obey the      one without disobeying the other.      In Colin  Howard’s  Australian  Federal  Constitutional Law, 2nd  Edition the  author while describing the nature of inconsistency  between   the  two   enactments  observed  as follows:-           "An obvious  inconsistency  arises  when  the  two

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    enactments produce different legal results when applied      to the same facts".      In the  case of  Hume v.  Palmer Knox, C.J. observed as follows:-           "The rules  prescribed by the Commonwealth Law and      the State  law respectively  are for  present  purposes      substantially identical,  but the penalties imposed for      the contravention differ........................           In these  circumstances, it is I think, clear that      the reasons  given by my brothers Issacs and Starke for      the deci- 273      sions of  this Court  in Union  Steamship  Co.  of  New      Zealand v. Commonwealth(1) and Clyde Engineering Co. v.      Cowburn establish that the provisions of the law of the      State  for  the  breach  of  which  the  appellant  was      convicted  are   inconsistent  with   the  law  of  the      Commonwealth within  the meaning  of sec.  109  of  the      Constitution and are therefore invalid".      Issacs, J. observed as follows:-           "There can  be no  question that  the Commonwealth      Navigation Act,  by its  own direct  provisions and the      Regulations made  under  its  authority,  applies  upon      construction to  the circumstances  of the  case. It is      inconsistent  with  the  State  Act  in  various  ways,      including (1)  general supersession  of the regulations      of conduct,  and so  displacing the  State regulations,      whatever those may be; (2) the jurisdiction to convict,      the  State   law  empowering   the  Court   to  convict      summarily,   the    Commonwealth   Law    making    the      contravention  an  indictable  offence,  and  therefore      bringing into  operation sec.  80 of  the Constitution,      requiring a  jury; (3) the penalty, the State providing      a maximum  of $  50 the  Commonwealth Act prescribing a      maximum of  $ 100,  or imprisonment,  or both;  (4) the      tribunal itself".      Starke, J. observed as follows:-           "It is  not difficult to see that the Federal Code      would be  ’disturbed or  deranged’ if  the  State  Code      applied a  different sanction  in respect  of the  same      act. Consequently  the State  regulations  are,  in  my      opinion, inconsistent  with the law of the Commonwealth      and rendered  invalid by  force  of  sec.  109  of  the      Constitution".      In a  later case  of the  Australian High  Court in Ex. Parte Mclean(3) Issacs and Starke, JJ. while dwelling on the question of repugnancy made the following observation:-           "In Cowburn’s case (supra) is stated the reasoning      for that  conclusion and  we will  now refer  to  those      statements without  repeating them.  In short, the very      same conduct  by the  same persons  is  dealt  with  in      conflicting terms by the Commonwealth and State Acts. A      Court, seeing that, has 274      no  authority   to  inquire  further,  or  to  seek  to      ascertain the  scope or  bearing of  the State  Act. It      must simply  apply sec.  109 of the Constitution, which      declares the invalidity protanto of the State Act".      Similarly Dixon, J. observed thus:-           "When the  Parliament of  the Commonwealth and the      Parliament of  a State  each legislate  upon  the  same      subject and  prescribe what  the rule  of conduct shall      be,   they    make   laws   which   are   inconsistent,      notwithstanding that  the rule  of conduct is identical      which each  prescribes, and sec. 109 applies. That this

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    is so  is settled,  at least  when the  sanctions  they      impose are diverse Hume v. Palmer (supra)".      In the  case of  Zaverbhai  Amaidas  v.  The  State  of Bombay(1)  this   Court  laid  down  the  various  tests  to determine  the  inconsistency  between  two  enactments  and observed as follows-           "The important thing to consider with reference to      this  provision  is  whether  the  legislation  is  ’in      respect of  the same  matter’. If the later legislation      deals not  with the matters which formed the subject of      the earlier  legislation but  with other  and  distinct      matters though  of a cognate and allied character, then      Article 254 (2) will have no application. The principle      embodied in section 107 (2) and Article 254 (2) is that      when there is legislation covering the same ground both      by the  Centre and  by the Province, both of them being      competent to  enact the  same, the  law of  the  Centre      should prevail over that of the State".           "It is  true, as  already pointed  out, that  on a      question under  Article  254  (1)  whether  an  Act  of      Parliament prevails  against a  law of  the  State,  no      question of  repeal arises;  but the principle on which      the rule  of implied  repeal  rests,  namely,  that  if      subject-matter of  the later  legislation is  identical      with that  of the  earlier, so  that they  cannot  both      stand together,  then the  earlier is  repealed by  the      later  enactment,  will  be  equally  applicable  to  a      question  under  Article  254(2)  whether  the  further      legislation by  Parliament is  in respect  of the  same      matter as that of the State law".      In the  case of Ch. Tika Ramji & Ors. etc. v. The State of Uttar  Pradesh &  Ors.(2) while dealing with the question of repugnancy 275 between a  Central and  a State enactment, this Court relied on  the   observations  of   Nicholas  in   his   Australian Constitution,  2nd   Ed.  p.303,   where  three   tests   of inconsistency or  repugnancy have  been laid  down and which are as follows:-           "(1) There  may be  inconsistency  in  the  actual      terms of  the competing  statutes R. Brisbane Licensing      Court(1).           (2) Though  there may  be no  direct  conflict,  a      State law  may be  inoperative because the Commonwealth      law,  or  the  award  of  the  Commonwealth  Court,  is      intended  to   be  a  complete  exhaustive  code  Clyde      Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Cowburn (supra).           (3) Even  in the  absence of intention, a conflict      may arise  when both  State and  Commonwealth  seek  to      exercise their  powers over  the  same  subject  matter      Victoria v. Commonwealth(2) Wenn v. Attorney General(3)      This Court  also relied on the decisions in the case of Hume v.  Palmer as  also the case of Ex Parte Mclean (supra) referred to above. This Court also endorsed the observations of Sulaiman,  J. in  the case of Shyamakant Lal v. Rambhajan Singh (4) where Sulaiman, J. observed as follows:           "When  the   question  is   whether  a  Provincial      legislation is repugnant to an existing Indian law, the      onus of  showing its repugnancy and the extent to which      it is  repugnant should  be on  the party attacking its      validity. There  ought to be a presumption in favour of      its validity,  and  every  effort  should  be  made  to      reconcile them  and construe  both so as to avoid their      being repugnant to each other, and care should be taken      to see  whether  the  two  do  not  really  operate  in

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    different   fields   without   encroachment.   Further,      repugnancy must exist in fact, and not depend merely on      a possibility".      In the  case of  Om Prakash  Gupta v.  State of U.P.(5) where  this  Court  was  considering  the  question  of  the inconsistency between  the two  Central enactments,  namely, the Indian  Penal Code  and the Prevention of Corruption Act held  that  there  was  no  inconsistency  and  observed  as follows:-           "It seems  to us, therefore, that the two offences      are distinct  and separate.  This is  the view taken in      Amarendra 276      Nath Roy  v. The State(1) and we endorse the opinion of      the learned  Judges, expressed therein. Our conclusion,      therefore, is  that the offence created under section 5      (1) (c)  of the Corruption Act is distinct and separate      from the one under section 405 of the Indian Penal Code      and, therefore,  there can  be no question of section 5      (1) (c) repealing section 405 of the Indian Penal Code.      If that is so, then, Article 14 of the Constitution can      be no bar".      Similarly in  the case  of Deep  Chand v.  The State of Uttar Pradesh  & Ors.  (2) this  Court indicated the various tests to  ascertain the  question of  repugnancy between the two statutes and observed as follows:-           "Repugnancy  between  two  statutes  may  thus  be      ascertained  on   the  basis  of  the  following  three      principles:-           (1) Whether  there is  direct conflict between the      two provisions;           (2) Whether  Parliament intended  to lay  down  an      exhaustive  code  in  respect  of  the  subject  matter      replacing the Act of the State Legislature; and           (3) Whether the law made by Parliament and the law      made by the State Legislature occupy the same field".      In the  case of  Megh Raj  and Ors.  v. Allah  Rakhia & Ors.(3) where  Varadachariar,  J.  speaking  for  the  Court pointed out  that where  as in Australia a provision similar to section  107 of the Government of India Act, 1935 existed in the  shape of section 109 of the Australian Constitution, there  was   no  corresponding  provision  in  the  American Constitution. Similarly, the Canadian cases have laid down a principle  too  narrow  for  application  to  Indian  cases. According to  the learned Judge, the safe rule to follow was that where  the paramount legislation does not purport to be exhaustive or  unqualified there  is no inconsistency and in this connection observed as follows:-           "The principle  of that decision is that where the      paramount legislation does not purport to be exhaustive      or unqualified,  but itself permits or recognises other      laws restricting  or qualifying  the general  provision      made in it, it can- 277      not be  said  that  any  qualification  or  restriction      introduced by another law is repugnant to the provision      in the main or paramount law".           "The  position  will  be  even  more  obvious,  if      another test  of repugnancy which has been suggested in      some cases is applied, namely, whether there is such an      inconsistency between  the two provisions that one must      be taken to repeal the other by necessary implication"      In the  case of  State of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch & Co. (1) Ayyangar J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:-           "Repugnancy arises when two enactments both within

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    the competence of the two Legislatures collide and when      the Constitution  expressly or by necessary implication      provides that  the enactment  of  one  Legislature  has      superiority over  the other  then to  the extent of the      repugnancy  the  one  supersedes  the  other.  But  two      enactments may  be repugnant  to each other even though      obedience  to   each  of   them  is   possible  without      disobeying the  other. The  test  of  two  legislations      containing contradictory  provisions is  not,  however,      the only  criterion of  repugnancy, for  if a competent      legislature  with  a  superior  efficacy  expressly  or      impliedly evinces  by its  legislation an  intention to      cover the  whole field,  the enactments  of  the  other      legislature whether  passed before  or after  would  be      overborne on  the ground  of repugnance.  Where such is      the position,  the inconsistency is demonstrated not by      a detailed comparison of provisions of the two statutes      but  by  the  mere  existence  of  the  two  pieces  of      legislation".      In the  case of T. S. Balliah v. T. S. Rangachari(2) it was pointed  out by  this Court  that before  coming to  the conclusion that  there is a repeal by implication, the Court must  be   satisfied  that   the  two   enactments  are   so inconsistent that  it becomes  impossible for  them to stand together. In other words, this Court held that when there is a direct  collision between  the  two  enactments  which  is irreconcilable  then   only  repugnancy   results.  In  this connection, the Court made the following observations:-           "Before coming  to the  conclusion that there is a      repeal by implication, the Court must be satisfied that      the two  enactments are  so inconsistent  or  repugnant      that they cannot 278      stand together  and the  repeal of  the  express  prior      enactment must  flow from  necessary implication of the      language  of  the  later  enactment.  It  is  therefore      necessary in  this connection  to scrutinise  the terms      and consider  the true  meaning and  effect of  the two      enactments".           "The provisions  enacted in  s. 52 of the 1922 Act      do not  alter the  nature or  quality  of  the  offence      enacted in  s. 177,  Indian Penal  Code but  it  merely      provides a new course of procedure for what was already      an offence.  In a  case of  this  description  the  new      statute is  regarded not  as superseding, nor repealing      by implication the previous law, but as cumulative".           "A plain  reading of  the section shows that there      is no  bar to  the trial  or conviction of the offender      under both  enactments but  there is  only a bar to the      punishment of  the offender twice for the same offence.      In other  words, the section provides that where an act      or  omission   constitutes   an   offence   under   two      enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished      under either  or both  the enactments  but shall not be      liable to be punished twice for the same offence".      On  a   careful  consideration,   therefore,   of   the authorities referred  to above,  the following  propositions emerge:-           1.   That in  order  to  decide  the  question  of                repugnancy it  must be  shown  that  the  two                enactments    contain     inconsistent    and                irreconcilable  provisions,   so  that   they                cannot stand  together or operate in the same                field.           2.   That there  can be  no repeal  by implication

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              unless the  inconsistency appears on the face                of the two statutes.           3.   That  where   the  two   statutes  occupy   a                particular   field,    there   is   room   or                possibility of both the statutes operating in                the same  field without coming into collision                with each other, no repugnancy results.           4.   That where  there is  no inconsistency  but a                statute occupying  the same  field  seeks  to                create distinct  and  separate  offences,  no                question of  repugnancy arises  and both  the                statutes continue  to  operate  in  the  same                field. 279      In the  light of  the  propositions  enunciated  above, there can  be no  doubt that  the State Act creates distinct and  separate   offences  with   different  ingredients  and different punishments  and it  does not  in any  way collide with the  Central Acts.  On the  other hand,  the State  Act itself permits  the Central  Act, namely,  the Criminal  Law (Amendment) Act  to come into its aid after an investigation is completed  and a  report is submitted by the Commissioner or the  Additional Commissioner. It was contended however by Mr. Venu Gopal that by virtue of the fact that the State Act has obtained  the assent of the President, it will be deemed to be  a dominant  legislation,  and,  therefore,  it  would overrule the  Central Acts.  Doubtless, the State Act is the dominant legislation  but we  are unable  to agree  with Mr. Venu Gopal  that there  are any  provisions in the State Act which are  irreconcilably or  directly inconsistent with the Central Acts so as to overrule them.      Last but  not the  least  there  is  a  very  important circumstance which  completely and conclusively clinches the issue and  takes the  force out  of the argument of Mr. Venu Gopal on  the question  of repugnancy. It would be seen that in the original State Act, section 29 ran thus:-           "Act to  overrule other  laws, etc.-The provisions      of this  Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything      inconsistent therewith  contained in  any other law for      the time  being  in  force  or  any  custom,  usage  or      contract or  decree  or  order  of  a  court  or  other      authority".      This section  underwent an  amendment which was brought about by  Tamil Nadu  Act 16 of 1974 which substituted a new section 29  for the  old one.  The  new  section  which  was substituted may be extracted thus:-           "Saving-The provisions  of this  Act shall  be  in      addition to,  and not  in derogation  of, any other law      for the  time being  in force,  and  nothing  contained      herein shall  exempt any public man from any proceeding      by way of investigation or otherwise which might, apart      from this Act, be instituted against him". This amendment  received the assent of the President on 10th April, 1974  and was  published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette  Extraordinary  dated  16th  April,  1974.  We  have already shown  that although the State Act was passed as far back as  30th December,  1973 it  received the assent of the President on  the 10th  April, 1974  that is  to say, on the same date  as Act  16 of  1974. The  Act was however brought into force on the 8th May, 1974 when the new section 29 280 which had  already replaced the old section and had become a part of the statute. Therefore, for all intents and purposes the State  Act cannot  be read  in isolation,  but has to be interpreted  in   conjunction  with   the  express  language

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contained in  section 29  of the State Act. This section has in unequivocable  terms expressed  the  intention  that  the State Act  which was  undoubtedly the  dominant  legislation would only be "in addition to and not in derogation with any other law  for the  time being  in force"  which  manifestly includes the  Central Acts,  namely, the  Indian Penal Code, the Corruption  Act and  the Criminal  Law (Amendment)  Act. Thus, the Legislature about a month before the main Act came into force  clearly declared  its intention that there would be no  question of  the State Act colliding with the Central Acts referred  to above.  The second part of section 29 also provides that  nothing contained  in  the  State  Act  shall exempt any  public man  from being  proceeded with by way of investigation or  otherwise under  a  proceeding  instituted against him  under the Central Acts. It is, therefore, clear that in  view of  this clear  intention of  the  legislature there can be no room for any argument that the State Act was in any  way repugnant  to the  Central Acts. We have already pointed out from the decisions of the Federal Court and this Court that  one of  the important  tests to  find out  as to whether or  not there  is repugnancy  is  to  ascertain  the intention of  the legislature  regarding the  fact that  the dominant legislature  allowed the subordinate legislature to operate in the same field pari passu the State Act.      Craies in  his Interpretation on Statute Law 6th Ed. p. 369 observes as follows:-           "Many earlier  statutes contain clauses similar in      effect to  the general  rule, but without the confusing      words as to contrary intention. These statutes, of some      of which a list is given below, seem not to be affected      by the  above rule,  save so  far  as  it  enables  the      revisers of  the statute-book  to excise the particular      clauses.  In   accordance  with  this  rule,  penalties      imposed by  statute  for  offences  already  punishable      under a  prior statute  are regarded  as cumulative  or      alternative and  not as  replacing the penalty to which      the offender was previously liable." Such an intention is clearly discernible from the provisions of section  29 of  the State  Act. Mr.  Venu Gopal  tried to rebut this argument on the ground that section 29 would have no application  where the inconsistency between the dominant statute and  the subordinate statute is direct and complete. We have already found on a discussion of 281 the various  provisions of  the State  Act that  there is no direct inconsistency  at all  between the  State Act and the Central Acts,  and this  affords a  sufficient answer to the argument of  Mr. Venu  Gopal. Having,  therefore, given  our anxious consideration  to the import and ambit of section 29 it seems  to us  that the  provisions of section 29 would be presumptive proof  of the  fact that  there is no repugnancy between the  State Act  and the  Central Acts nor did either the legislature  or  the  President  intend  to  create  any repugnancy between  these Acts  as a  result  of  which  the criticism regarding the repugnancy is completely obliterated in the  instant case  and we, therefore, hold that the State legislature never  intended to occupy the same field covered by the Central Acts.      It was  also contended  by Mr.  Venu Gopal  that if the Central Acts  being repugnant  to the  State Act are pressed into service  even after  the repeal  of the  State Act, the Central Acts  would stand  repealed hence the prosecution of the  appellant   would  be  hit  by  Article  20(3)  of  the Constitution, i.e. the appellant cannot be prosecuted for an ex post  facto offence.  On our  findings in  this case that

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there is  no inconsistency  between the  State Act  and  the Central  Acts  the  application  of  Article  20(3)  of  the Constitution to  the facts  of this  case does  not arise at all. We,  therefore, find  ourselves in  complete  agreement with the  view taken  by the  High Court  that the State Act creates new  and distinct  offences and  is not  in any  way repugnant  to   any  provisions  of  the  Central  Acts  and consequently overruled  the first  limb of  the argument  of counsel for the appellant.      Similarly the  contention  of  Mr.  Venu  Gopal  as  to whether or  not the  prosecution of  the appellant  would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution is not available to the  appellant, and consequently the learned counsel gave up this  point and in our opinion very rightly because since the State  Act has  now been  repealed the  question of  the prosecution of  the appellant  hereafter under the State Act does not  arise at  all, and, therefore, the question of two remedies being  open to the prosecution which they may elect at their  own option  does  not  arise  in  this  case.  The appellant can  be prosecuted  only under  the Corruption Act and the  Penal Code  and under  no other  Act at the moment. Moreover, it  was obviously  wrong to  say that  the earlier Central Law  became violative  of Article  14 as soon as the State law was enacted.      This brings  us to  the second  limb of the argument of the learned  counsel for  the appellant which relates to the import  and   connotation  of   the  term  ’public  servant’ appearing in section 21(12) of the Indian 282 Penal Code.  Clause 12  of section  21 which is the relevant provision so  far as the present case is concerned runs thus :-           "21. The  words ’public  servant’ denote  a person      falling  under  any  of  the  descriptions  hereinafter      following namely:-                 X             X              X      Twelfth-Every person-      (a)  in  the  service  or  pay  of  the  Government  or           remunerated  by   fees  or   commission  for   the           performance of any public duty by the Government:                 X             X              X      It was  vehemently contended  by Mr.  Venu  Gopal  that having regard  to the  constitutional and public duties of a Chief Minister  or a  Minister he  cannot be  deemed to be a public  servant  in  any  sense  of  the  term.  He  further contended that  the entire clause (12) (a) should be read as a whole  and cannot  be severed into two limbs in as much as the words ’in the service or pay of the Government’ are used as synonyms. It was further contended that the words ’in the service or  pay  of  the  Government’  clearly  connote  the relationship of  master and  servant-a relationship which is completely beyond  the concept of the position of a Minister or a  Chief Minister.  We, however, agree that so far as the first part  of clause  (12) (a) is concerned, namely "in the service  of   the  Government’   undoubtedly   signifies   a relationship  of  master  and  servant  where  the  employer employs  the   employee  on   the  basis   of  a  salary  or remuneration. But  we are  of the opinion that so far as the second limb  ’in the  pay of  the Government’  is concerned, that appears  to be  of a  much  wider  amplitude-so  as  to include within  its ambit even public servant who may not be a regular  employee receiving  salary from  his  master.  In other words,  we think  that even  a  Minister  or  a  Chief Minister will  be clearly  covered by the expression ’person in the  pay of  the Government’.  Mr. Venu  Gopal,  however,

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relied on  the meaning  of the  words "in  the  pay  of’  as appearing in the various dictionaries.      In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary the expression ’in the pay of’ is defined thus-           "To give  money, etc.,  in return for something or      in discharge of an obligation. Of a thing or action. To      yield an  adequate  return.  To  give  money  or  other      equivalent value for".      Similarly ’Payer’ is defined thus:           "One who pays a sum of money". 283      In Webster’s  Third New  International  Dictionary  the expression ’in the pay of’ is indicated to mean:-      "Compensate, remunerate, satisfy, reimburse, indemnify,      recompense, repay.  Pay  is  a  general  term,  lacking      particular connotation  but sometimes bluntly stressing      the purchase of service, pay a machinist high wages".           "Wages, salary remuneration".      In Webster’s  New World  Dictionary the  expression ’in the pay of’ is thus defined:-           "Stresses  the  idea  of  payment  for  a  service      rendered, but  it often  also carries an implication of      reward (a  bumper crop  remunerated the  farmer for his      labors)".      In Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition Vol. 31A p. 176 the meaning of the word ’pay’ is given thus:-      "Pay" is  remuneration, wages or salary. To remunerate;      to recompense, to give any pay".      In Venkataramaya’s  Law  Lexicon  Vol.  II  p.1122  the expression ’to pay money’ has the following connotation:-           "To pay  money is  to pay it in respect of a right      which some person has to receive it".      In Corpus  Juris Secundum  Vol. 70 at page 200 the word ’pay’ if  used as  a noun is defined as remuneration, wages, compensation, salary and the following observations are also made:-           "To noun  ’pay’ has  been held  equivalent to,  or      synonymous with,  ’compensation’, salary  and wages and      has  been   compared  with,   or  distinguished   from,      ’allowance’ and ’consideration’".      A careful analysis of the meanings assigned to the word ’pay’ in  the various dictionaries and the texts referred to above would  clearly reveal  that the expression ’in the pay of’ connotes  that a person is getting salary, compensation, wages or  any amount  of money.  This by itself however does not lead  to the inference that a relationship of master and servant must  necessarily exist  in all cases where a person is paid  salary. This  aspect of  the  matter  would  become crystal  clear   if  we   examine   the   nature   and   the constitutional position  and status of a Minister or a Chief Minister. 284 Article 164 of the Constitution runs thus:-           "Other provisions  as to  Ministers: (1) The Chief      Minister shall  be appointed  by the  Governor and  the      other Ministers  shall be  appointed by the Governor on      the advice  of the  Chief Minister,  and the  Ministers      shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor:           Provided that  in  the  States  of  Bihar,  Madhya      Pradesh and Orissa, there shall be a Minister in Charge      of tribal  welfare who  may in addition be in charge of      the  welfare  of  the  Scheduled  Castes  and  backward      classes or any other work".      This Article  clearly shows  that a  Chief Minister  is appointed by  the Governor  and having been appointed by the

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Governor it  is manifest  that  he  is  subordinate  to  the Governor. Even  in section 52 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935  which preceded our Constitution the provision was worded thus:-           "52 (1) The Governor of a Governor’s province may,      by notification,  appoint ministers,  not being members      of  his   executive  council   or  other  officials  to      administer transferred  subjects, and  any ministers so      appointed shall hold office during his pleasure:           There may  be paid to any minister so appointed in      any province  the same salary as is payable to a member      of the  executive council  in that  province, unless  a      smaller salary  is provided  by vote of the legislative      council of the province".      In this  section also it was the Governor who alone had the power  to choose  the ministers. In fact, in Article 164 the word  ’appointment’ is much higher than the concept of a person being  chosen. Article 164(5) provides for the salary and allowances of Ministers and runs thus:-           "164 (5)  The salaries and allowances of Ministers      shall be  such as the Legislature of the State may from      time  to   time  by   law  determine   and,  until  the      Legislature of  the State  so determines,  shall be  as      specified in the Second Schedule".      Under this  provision the  Ministers on being appointed by the Governor are entitled to such salaries and allowances as the  Legislature of  the State may determine from time to time and  until this is done, the emoluments will be such as are specified in the Second 285 Schedule. As  however all  the Legislatures of the States as also Parliament  have already  passed Acts providing for the salaries and  emoluments  of  the  Chief  Minister  and  the Ministers the  specification  of  their  emoluments  in  the Second Schedule to the Constitution have been deleted.      Article 167  lays down the duties of the Chief Minister and runs thus:-           "167. Duties  of Chief  Minister as  respects  the      furnishing of  information to Governor etc. It shall be      the duty of the Chief Minister of each State           (a)  to communicate  to the  Governor of the State                all decisions  of the  Council  of  Ministers                relating to the administration of the affairs                of the State and proposals for legislation;           (b)  to furnish  such information  relating to the                administration of  affairs of  the State  and                proposals for legislation as the Governor may                call for;           (c)  if the  Governor so  requires, to  submit for                the consideration of the Council of Ministers                any matter on which a decision has been taken                by  a   Minister  but   which  has  not  been                considered by the Council".      It  is,   therefore,  clear   that  by  virtue  of  the provisions contained  in Article  167,  the  Chief  Minister undoubtedly performs a public duty of the nature as enjoined by clauses  (a) to  (c) of  Article 167.  It is also clearly provided in  the Constitution that the Chief Minister or the Ministers are  entitled to  salaries or allowances obviously in lieu  of public  duties that  they perform.  The salaries given to  the Chief Minister or the Ministers are given from the Government  funds,  and  therefore,  there  will  be  no difficulty in  holding that  the Ministers are in the pay of the Government  inasmuch as  they  receive  their  salaries, remunerations or  wages from the Government. Mr. Venu Gopal,

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however, submitted  that no analogy can be drawn between the constitutional provisions  and the  provisions contained  in the Government  of  India  Act  because  the  constitutional position of  a Chief Minister under the Constitution was not the same  as under  the Government  of India  Act where  the Governor enjoyed  vast and  plenary powers and was not bound by the advice of the Council of Ministers as the Governor is under our  Constitution. It  is not  necessary to probe into this aspect  of the matter, because the Constitution clearly lays down  that the Governor appoints the Chief Minister and being the appoint- 286 ing authority  he is  also the  dismissing authority. We are not  at  all  concerned  in  the  instant  case  as  to  the circumstances  under  which  the  Governor  can  appoint  or dismiss the  Chief Minister.  Once it  is conceded  that the Governor appoints  the Chief  Minister who  is paid a salary according to  a statute  made by  the legislature  from  the Government funds, the Chief Minister becomes a person in the pay of  the Government  so as to fall squarely within clause (12) of section 21 of the Penal Code.      There is  another circumstance  to show  that  a  Chief Minister or a Minister is undoubtedly a public servant which was relied  upon by the High Court in repelling the argument of Mr. Venu Gopal. Section 199 of the Code runs thus:-           "199 (2)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in      this Code,  when any  offence falling under Chapter XXI      of the  Indian Penal  Code  is  alleged  to  have  been      committed against  a person  who, at  the time  of such      commission  is   the  President   of  India,  the  Vice      President of  India,  the  Governor  of  a  State,  the      Administrator of a Union Territory or a Minister of the      Union or  of a  State or  of a  Union territory, or any      other public  servant employed  in connection  with the      affairs of  the Union  or of  a State in respect of his      conduct in  the discharge  of his  public  functions  a      Court of  Session may  take cognizance of such offence,      without  the   case  being  committed  to  it,  upon  a      complaint in writing made by the Public Prosecutor".      The use  of words  ’other public  servants’ following a Minister of  the Union  or of  a State  clearly show  that a Minister would  also be  a public  servant as  other  public servants contemplated by section 199 (2) of the Code are the Code being  a statute  complimentary and allied to the Penal Code can  be looked  into for the purpose of determining the real meaning  and import  of the  words ’public  servant’ as used in the aforesaid section.      The Solicitor  General placed  reliance on the decision of this  Court in  the case  of Dattatraya  Narayan Patil v. State of  Maharashtra(1) where  this Court  had  held  in  a slightly different  context that  a Minister  was  a  public servant. Mr.  Venu Gopal  has, however,  distinguished  this decision on  the ground  that this  Court proceeded  on  the assumption that  it was  not disputed  before the Court that the Minister  was a  Public Servant and the case having been decided on the concession 287 of the  parties cannot  be  relied  upon  by  the  Solicitor General. In that case to which two of us (Untwalia and Fazal Ali, JJ.)  were  parties  to  the  judgment,  the  following observations were made:-           "The duty  assigned to  a public  servant  by  his      master, be  it be  under a  statute or  by an executive      order,  will  assume  the  character  of  public  duty,      provided the  duty assigned  is not  illegal or against

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    public policy.  Will it make any difference in the case      of a  Minister? In our judgment, not. The Minister is a      public servant-not disputed".      These observations  no doubt  fortify our  opinion that the Chief Minister is a public servant which is based on the reasons that  we have  already given and which are different from those given in the case cited before us.      In the case of Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji & Ors.(1) the Privy Council  clearly held that it was not in a position to accept the  suggestion of  the counsel that the Minister was not subordinate  to  the  Governor.  This  was  the  precise argument which  had been  put forward by Mr. Venu Gopal when he contended  that the  Chief Minister is not subordinate to the Governor.  The Privy Council observed as follows in this connection:-           "So far  as it  is relevant  in the  present case,      their Lord  ships are  unable to accept a suggestion by      counsel for  the respondents  that the Home Minister is      not an  officer subordinate  to the Governor within the      meaning of  s.49 (1),  and so  far as  the decision  in      Emperor v.  Hemendra Prosad Ghoshe (19) I.L.R. (1939) 2      Cal. 411 decides that a Minister is not such an officer      their Lordships  are unable  to agree  with it. While a      Minister  may  have  duties  to  the  Legislature,  the      provisions of  s.51 as  to the appointment, payment and      dismissal of Ministers, and s.59 (3) and (4) of the Act      of 1935, and the Business Rules made by virtue of s.59,      place beyond doubt that the Home Minister is an officer      subordinate to the Governor".      We find  ourselves in  complete agreement with the view taken by  the Privy  Council. In  fact the case of the Privy Council referred  to above  was noticed  and relied  upon by this Court in the case of Rao 288 Shiv Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. The State of Vindhya Pradesh(1) where this Court observed as follows:-           "Clause 9  of section  21 Indian  Penal Code shows      that every  officer in  the service or pay of the Crown      for the  performance of  any public  duty is  a ’public      servant’. The  decision of  the Privy  Council in  King      Emperor v.  Sibnath Banerji(2) is decisive to show that      a  Minister  under  the  Government  of  India  is  ’an      officer’ subordinate  to  the  Governor.  On  the  same      reasoning there  can be  no doubt  that the Minister of      Vindhya Pradesh  would be  an ’Officer  of the State of      Vindhya Pradesh.  Therefore, prior  to the  passing  of      ordinance No.  XLVIII of  1949 and on the view that the      Indian Penal  Code with  necessary  adaptation  mutatis      mutandis was  in force  at least in the Rewa portion of      Vindhya Pradesh  (if not  in the  entirety  of  Vindhya      Pradesh) the  first appellant  was a  public servant as      defined in  section 21,  Indian Penal Code, as adapted.      The  amendment   of  the  said  section  brought  about      therefore no  substantial change in the position of the      first appellant".      In the  case of Namdeo Kashinath Aher v. H. G. Vartak & Anr(3) Deshpande, J. Observed as follows:-           "Whatever be  the practical  and actual  position,      the fact remains that it is the Governor who can accept      the resignation  of the  Ministry or Minister and it is      the Governor  again  who  can  dismiss  or  remove  the      Minister  from  office.  Under  section  3(60)  of  the      General Clauses  Act, 1897, the word ’State Government’      has been  defined.  Clause  (c)  of  section  3(60)  is      applicable to  the present case and therefore the State

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    Government is  to mean  the Governor for the purpose of      the present  case. The result therefore is that accused      No.1 is  a  public  servant  who  can  be  said  to  be      removable only by the State Government, meaning thereby      the Governor,  and I  do not  find  any  difficulty  in      coming to the conclusion that the second requirement of      Section 197, Cr. P.C. also is fully satisfied as far as      accused No.1 is concerned". 289      In the  case of S. Tara Singh v. Director Consolidation of Holdings,  Punjab, Jullundur  & Ors.(1)  the Punjab  High Court took the same view and observed as follows:-           "It follows  from the  above conclusion that under      Article 154  (1) of  the Constitution  the Governor may      act directly  or through  his subordinate  officers. In      the present  case he  has acted through the Development      Minister. The  question arises whether he could so act.      Obviously  the   executive  authority  carries  on  the      business of the Government and part of this business is      the power  given to  the State Government under section      42 of  the Consolidation  Act. Under Article 166 (3) of      the  Constitution   the  Governor   can  allocate  this      business to any Minister he likes....... Moreover there      can be  no doubt  that a Minister is subordinate to the      Governor. The  Governor is  the executive  head of  the      State and  this position  he does  not share  with  the      Chief Minister  or any other Minister. He allocates his      executive duties to various Ministers under Article 166      (3) of the Constitution.           He appoints a Minister albeit on the advice of the      Chief Minister and the Minister holds office during his      pleasure. Therefore  it is open to a Governor under the      Constitution to  dismiss an  individual Minister at his      pleasure. In  these circumstances there can be no doubt      that a  Minister is  to be  considered  as  an  officer      subordinate to the Governor".      We find  ourselves in  complete agreement with the view taken and  the reasons given by the Punjab High Court in the aforesaid case.      To the  same effect  is a  decision of  the J  & K High Court in  the case  of Bakshi  Ghulam Mohd. v. G. M. Sadiq & Ors(2) where Anant Singh, J. observe as follows:-           "A Minister  of a  State is  paid from  its public      exchequer, and he is paid for doing public duty and, in      my opinion, a Minister is a ’public officer’ within the      meaning of Sec. 80 as defined in Sec. 2 (17) (h) of the      Civil Procedure Code".      The opinion  expressed by  the learned Judge is clearly in consonance with the view that we have taken in this case. 290 Three facts, therefore, have been proved beyond doubt:-           1. That  a Minister  is appointed  or dismissed by      the Governor  and is,  therefore,  subordinate  to  him      whatever be the nature and status of his constitutional      functions.           2. That a Chief Minister or a Minister gets salary      for the  public work  done or the public duty performed      by him.           3. That  the said  salary is  paid  to  the  Chief      Minister or the Minister from the Government funds.      It is  thus incontrovertible,  that  the  holder  of  a public office such as the Chief Minister is a public servant in respect  of whom  the Constitution  provides that he will get his salary from the Government Treasury so long he holds his  office  on  account  of  the  public  service  that  he

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discharges. The  salary  given  to  the  Chief  Minister  is coterminous with  his office  and is  not  paid  like  other constitutional functionaries  such as  the President and the Speaker. These  facts, therefor,  point to  one and only one conclusion and that is that the Chief Minister is in the pay of the Government and is, therefore, a public servant within the meaning of section 21 (12) of the Penal Code.      For the  reasons given  above, we  are satisfied that a Chief Minister or a Minister is undoubtedly a public servant as defined  in section  21(12) (a) of the Penal Code and the view taken  by the  High Court  on this point was absolutely correct in  law. The  result is  that  all  the  contentions raised by Mr. Venu Gopal, counsel for the appellant fail and the appeals are dismissed. The case before the Special Judge will now proceed to its ultimate end according to law. N.V.K.                                    Appeals dismissed. 291