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PETITIONER: M. KARUNANIDHI ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: H.V. HANDE & ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT31/03/1983

BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)

CITATION:  1983 AIR  558            1983 SCALE  (1)344  CITATOR INFO :  F          1984 SC 305  (14)  D          1984 SC 871  (13,14)  F          1990 SC 924  (26,28,33)  R          1991 SC1557  (29)

ACT:      Representation of  the People  Act, 1951(43  of  1951)- Interpretation of-Sub-s.  (1) of  s.117-two parts-Deposit of security  mandatory-Strict   compliance  necessary-Mode   of deposit directory-Substantial  compliance sufficient, sub-s. (3) of  s 81 read with sub-s. (2) of s.83-Election petition- Copies thereof include schedule or annexure-Integral part-If included  in  pleadings-Copy  of  election  petition  served without annexure-Non-compliance  with sub-s.  (3)  of  s.81- Dismissal of petition in limine.      Madras High  Court (Election  Petitions)  Rules,  1967- Rules 8  and 12  read with Madras High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1956  order 31,  r.2-Interpretation of-Cash deposited in Reserve  Bank through  pre-receipted challan  prepared by High Court-Substantial compliance.      Interpretation-Rule of-Statute  mandatory or  directory depends upon intent and not language of the Act.

HEADNOTE:      Respondent No.  1 in  C.A. 38 of 1981 filed an election petition  under   the  Representation   of  the  People  Act challenging the  election of  the  appellant  to  the  State Legislative Assembly  on various  grounds. The  petition was accompanied by  a  pre-receipted  challan  prepared  by  the Accounts Department  of the  High Court  on the basis of the lodgment schedule  initialled by the Assistant Registrar II, showing that  a sum  of Rs.  2000/- had been credited to the account of the Registrar, High Court, Madras, in the Reserve Bank of  India, Madras, as security for costs. The facts are more or  less similar  to all  the appeals.  In C.A.  38/81, which has  additional facts,  the respondent pleaded, inter. alia, that  the appellant  was guilty  of  corrupt  practice under sub-s.(6)  of s.  123 of  the Act. He alleged that the appellant had  erected about  50 fancy  banners each costing not less  than Rs.  1000/- and  if this  expenditure of  Rs. 50,000/- was added to the amount already disclosed by him in his  return   of  election  expenses  it  would  exceed  the prescribed limit  thus amounting  to a corrupt practice. The

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respondent filed  a photograph of one such fancy banner with the election  petition but  did not  annex a  copy  of  this photograph to the copy of the election petition furnished to the appellant.      The appellant  raised two  preliminary objections as to the maintainability  of the  petition on  the ground  of non compliance with  sub-s.(1) of  s. 117  read with r. 8 of the Election Petitions  Rules, and with sub-s.(3) of s. 81. High Court overruled  both the objections and held: (1) there was substantial compliance  with sub-s.  (1) of  s. 117: and (2) the banner  could not  be treated as an integral part of the election petition  but was  merely a piece of evidence as to the nature  and type  of the  fancy banners  erected by  the appellant and therefore failure 630 to supply  a copy  of its  photograph to the appellant along with the  copy of  the election petition did not amount to a breach of sub-s.(3) of of s. 81.      On appeal,  this Court by its order dated April 2, 1981 remitted back the issue with regard to non-compliance of sub s. (1) of s. 117 read with r. 8 for a decision afresh on the basis of  the evidence  to be  led  by  the  parties.  After considering the  evidence, the  High Court  adhered  to  its earlier view.      The  appellant   contended  in   this  Court:  (1)  the provisions of sub-s. (1) of s. 117 were mandatory; there was no distinction  between the  requirement as to the making of security deposit  and the manner of making such deposit; the words "in  accordance with  the rules  of the High Court" in sub-s. 117 were mandatory; r. 8 must be read as forming part of sub-s.  (1) of  s. 117  by incorporation;  in view of the definite stand  taken by the respondent t at he had complied with r.  8 it  was not  possible to fail back on Order 31 of the Madras High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1956. There was no compliance  with r.  8 as  the security  amount  was  not deposited with  the Registrar  in cash.  (2)  There  was  no compliance with  the requirements  of sub-s. (3) of s. 81 as the copy  of the  election petition  served on  him was  not accompanied by a copy of the photograph of the fancy banner.      Dismissing all  the appeals and special leave petitions except C.A. 38/81 which partly succeeds and is allowed. ^      HELD: 1(a).  Sub-s. (1)  of s. 117 is in two parts. The first part  provides that  at  the  time  of  presenting  an election petition,  the petitioner shall deposit in the High Court a  sum of  Rs. 2000  as security  for the costs of the petition, and  the second is that such deposit shall be made in the  High Court  in accordance with the rules of the High Court. The  requirement regarding  the making  of a security deposit of  Rs. 2000 in the High Court is mandatory, the non compliance of  which must  entail dismissal in limine of the election petition  under sub s. (1) of s. 86 of Act. But the requirement of  its deposit  in the High Court in accordance with rules  of the  High Court  is  clearly  directory.  The essence of  sub.s. (1)  of s.  117 is  that at  the time  of filing an  election petition  the petitioner  should furnish security for  the costs  of the petition. Section 117 should not be  strictly or  technically construed  and  substantial compliance  with  its  requirements  should  be  treated  as sufficient. [645-F, 651-E, 652-B]      1(b). A  literal and mechanical interpretation of r. 8. of the  Election Petitions  Rules  would  lead  to  manifest absurdity as  it would imply that in every case the election petitioner shall  have to  pay to the Registrar a sum of Rs. 2000 in cash towards security for costs and obtain a receipt

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from him  there for.  Rule 8 is silent as to how the cash is to be  handled. Inasmuch  as r.  8 does  not  lay  down  the procedure regulating  the manner  of deposit  of  cash,  the matter falls  to be  governed by  r. 2  of Order  31 of  the Madras High  Court (Original  Side) Rules, 1956 by reason of r. 12 of the Election Petitions Rules. Although Order 31, r. 2 does  not in  terms apply  because Order  31 relates  to " payment into  court of  moneys to  the credit of civil court deposits and  account of  suitors’  money",  and  though  no lodgment schedule  can be  prepared under  r.  2  except  in pursuance of a decree or order passed by the High Court i.e. in relation  to some  proceeding pending, or disposed of, by the High Court, still 631 by virtue  of r.  12 of  the Election Petitions Rule that is the procedure  to be  adopted for deposit of Rs. 2000 in the High Court  in cash  i.e. by  crediting the  amount  on  the strength of a pre-receipted challan prepared by the Accounts Department on the basis of a lodgment schedule.[649 A-E]      In the  present case the Assistant Registrar II, Madras High Court,  directed that  the money  be deposited  to  the credit of  the Registrar  of the  High Court  in the Reserve Bank of  India. The  election petitioner  deposited Rs. 2000 with  a   pre-receipted  challan   issued  by  the  Accounts Department to  the credit of the Registrar of the High Court and the Reserve Bank of India made the endorsement "received in cash".  It must  be regarded that the payment was made in the High  Court and  the pre-receipted  challan bearing  the endorsement of  the Reserve  Bank must  be  treated  as  the receipt of  the Registrar in terms of r. 8, the Reserve Bank acting as  an agent of the High Court. The procedure adopted by Assistant Registrar II, was in conformity with r.8. There was due compliance with the requirements of sub-s. (1) of s. 117 of  the Act  read with  r. 8  of the  Election Petitions Rules. [649-B, E-H]      K. Kamaraja  Nadar v.  Kunju Thevar  & Ors., [1959] SCR 583; Chandrika  Prasad Tripathi  v. Siv  Prasad Chanpuria  & Ors., [1959]  2 Suppl. SCR 527; Om Prabha Jain v. Gian Chand JUDGMENT: Jadav, 22  ELR 86;  Charan Lal  Sahu v.  Nandkishore Bhatt & ors.,  [1974]1   SCR  294;   Aeltemesh  Rein   v.  Chandulal Chandrakar & Ors., [1981] 3 SCR 142, referred to.      2(a). Sub-s.  (3) of  section 81  of the  Act is in two part. The  first part  provides that every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies there of as there are respondents mentioned  in the  petition and  the second part relates to  the manner  In which such copy shall be attested by the  petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the  petition. The  first part  is mandatory in character and non-compliance with it was fatal to the petition in view of sub-s. (1) of s. 86. [655. E, 659-F]      2(b). The words "copies thereof" in sub-s. (3) of s. 81 read in  the context of sub-s. (2) of s. 83 must necessarily refer not  only to  the election petition proper but also to schedules or annexures thereto containing particulars of any corrupt practice  alleged  therein.  Sub-s.  (2)  of  s.  83 applies only  to a schedule or annexure which is an integral part of  the election  petition and  not a document which is produced as  evidence  of  the  averments  of  the  election petition. [663-B-C, 656 F-G]      In  the  instant  case,  the  test  to  be  applied  in determining  whether  the  photograph  referred  to  in  the election petition  is  an  integral  part  of  the  election petition or  was merely  a piece of evidence in proof of the allegations contained  therein, depends  on whether  it is a

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part of  the pleadings.  The photograph which gives a visual description of the fancy banner, the cost of which at a mere look would show that the expenditure in setting up each such banner would  be Rs.  1000/-  or  more,  was  not  merely  a document accompanying  the election  petition but was a part and parcel  of the  pleading contained therein. The averment contained in  the election  petition would  be incomplete as regards the  allegation of the corrupt practice committed by the appellant without a 632 copy of  the photograph  being supplied  with a  copy of the election petition.  Merely alleging  that the  appellant had put up fancy banners would be of no avail unless there was a description of  the banner  itself together with the slogan. The failure  to supply a copy of the photograph along with a copy of  the election  petition to the appellant amounted to non-compliance of  sub-s. (3) of s. 81,[661 B, 654 F, 661 C, 654 C, 655 D, 663 A-B, F-G]      Sahodrabai Rai  v. Ram  Singh Aharwar, [1968] 3 SCR 13, held inapplicable.]      Ch. Subbarao  v. Member,  Election Tribunal  Hyderabad, [1964] 6  SCR 213;  Jagat Kishore Prasad Narayn Singh v. Raj Kumar Poddar  & Ors. [1971] 1 SCR 821; Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram & Ors., [1974] 3 SCR 20 and Kamalam (M) v. Dr. V.A. Syed Mohamad, [1978] 3 SCR 446, referred to.      Sharif-ud-din v.  Abdul Gani  Lone,[1980] 1  SCR  1176, distinguished.      3. It  is always  important  to  bear  the  distinction between mandatory and directory provisions of 3 statute. The general rule  of interpretation  is well known and it is but an  aid   for  ascertaining   the  true   intention  of  the legislature which  is the  determining factor  and that must ultimately depend on the context. The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory, depends upon the intent of the  legislature and  not upon  the language in which the intent  is   clothed.  The  meaning  and  intention  of  the legislature must  govern, and  these must be ascertained not only from the words used, but also by considering its object and consequences  which would  follow from construing it one way or  the other.  An absolute  enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly  but  it  is  sufficient  if  a  directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially. An enactment in form  mandatory might  in substance  be directory and the use of  the word  "shall" does not conclude the matter. [645 E-H, 646 A-C]      N.P. Ponnuswami  v. Returning Officer, Namakkal, [1952] SCR  218;   Wolyerhampton  New   Water  Works   Company   v. Hawkesford, [1859]  6 CB  (NS) 336  at 356;  Jagan  Nath  v. Jaswant Singh  &  Ors.,  [1954]  SCR  892;  Maxwell  on  the Interpretation of  Statutes, 12th  Edn. p.  314; Crawford on ’Statutory Construction’  p. 516; State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastva,  [1958] SCR  533; State of U.P. & ors, v.Babu Ram Upadhya, [1961] 2 SCR 679; Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board,  Rampur, [1965]  2  SCR  970  and  Montreal Street Railway  Company  v.  Normandin  LR  [1917]  AC  170, referred to.

&      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 38(NCE) of 1981.      Appeal by  Special leave  from the  judgment and  Order dated the  1st January,  1980 of  the Madras  High Court  in Application No.  4309 of 1980 in Election Petition No. 17 of

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1980.                             AND           Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1580 of 1981      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  the 13th  January, 1981 of the Madras High Court in Election Petition No. 13 of 1980, 633                             AND           Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5178 of 1981.      From the Judgment and Order dated the 8th July, 1981 of the Madras  High Court  in Application  No. 1967  of 1981 in Election Petition No. 14 of 1980.                             AND           Civil Appeal No. 4216(NCE) of 1982.      Appeal by  Special leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated the  22nd October,  1982 of  the Madras  High Court in Application No.  265 of  1981 in  Election Petition No. 5 of 1980.                             AND           Civil Appeal No. 1170 of 1981.      Appeal by  Special leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated the  4th February,  1981 of  the Madras  High Court in Application No.  189 of  1981 in  Election Petition No. 7 of 1980. IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 38/81      G. Ramaswamy,  K. Rajendra Chowdhury, N.A. Subhramanyam and Mahabir Singh for the Appellant.      N.T. Vanamalai,  R.K. Garg,  V.J. Francis  and  Bhaskar Shankar for the Respondent.      A.V. Rangam for Respondent No. 10.      A.T.M. Sampath for the intervener. IN SLP (C) NO. 1580 OF 1981      C.S. Vaidyanathan for the Petitioner.      A.T.M. Sampath for Respondent No. 1.      A.V.Rangam for Respondent No. 2. 634 IN SLP(C) NO. 5178 of 1981      K.R. Nambiar for the Petitioner.      P.N. Ramalingam for the Respondent. IN C.A. NO. 1170 of 1981      G. Ramaswamy and A.S. Nambiar for the Appellant.      A.T.M. Sampath for Respondent No. 1.      A.V. Rangam for Respondent No. 2. IN CA. NO. 4216 of 1980      A.S. Nambiar and P. Parmeswaran for the Appellant.      A.T.M. Sampath for Respondent.      A.V. Rangam for Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SEN J. These appeals by special leave and the connected special leave  petitions from the judgment and orders of the High Court  of Madras  raise the same question and therefore they are  disposed of  by this  common  judgment.  In  Civil Appeal No.  38 (NCE)  of 1981,  there is  a further question involved.      The facts  are  more  or  less  similar  in  all  these appeals, except  that in  Civil Appeal  No. 38(NCE)  of 1981 there are  certain additional facts. It will suffice for our purposes to set out the facts giving rise to that appeal.      At the  last general  election to the State Legislative Assembly  of   Tamil  Nadu  from  the  Anna  Nagar  Assembly Constituency No.  8 held  in May  1980,  the  appellant,  M. Karunanidhi, leader  of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam party, contested as  a candidate  of that  party and  secured 51290 votes. As  against  this,  the  respondent  Dr.  H.V.  Hande sponsored as  a candidate  by the  All  India  Anna  Dravida

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Munnetra Kazhagam secured 50591 votes. On June 1, 1980 635 the appellant,  M. Karunanidhi,  was  consequently  declared elected by  a margin  of 699 votes. The last date for filing an election  petition to challenge his election was July 16, 1980. On July 14, 1980 the respondent, Dr. H.V. Hande, filed an election  petition under  s. 81  read with  s. 100 of the Representation of  People Act  1951 (for the sake of brevity hereinafter  referred  to  as  ’the  Act’)  challenging  the election of  the appellant  on various grounds. The election petition was accompanied by a pre-receipted challan prepared by the Accounts Department of the High Court on the basis of a lodgment  schedule initialled  by the  Assistant Registrar II, High  Court, showing  that a  sum of  Rs. 2,000 had been credited on  July 11, 1980, to the account of the Registrar, High Court, Madras, in the Reserve Bank of India, Madras, as security for  costs along  with the lodgment schedule signed by the Assistant Registrar II.      The respondent  pleaded, inter alia, in paragraph 18 of the petition  that  the  appellant  was  guilty  of  corrupt practice under  sub-s.(6) of  s. 123 of the Act by incurring or authorising expenditure in contravention of s. 77. It was alleged that  he had  failed to  disclose certain  items  of expenditure in  his statement  of election expenses filed by him  in   connection  with   the  election  as  detailed  in subparagraphs (a)  to (e)  of paragraph  18 of the petition. The allegation  in paragraph 18(b) related to an expenditure of about  Rs 50,000 in erecting fancy banners throughout the constituency and  it was  alleged that there were such fancy banners about  50 in  number, the  cost of each banner being not less  than Rs  1,000 It  was averred  in paragraph 18(b) that a  photograph of  one such  banner was filed along with the petition.  Admittedly, though  the respondent  had filed with the  election petition a photograph of one such banner, a copy  of the photograph was not annexed to the copy of the petition furnished to the appellant.      On October  30, 1980  the appellant  filed his  written statement.  He   pleaded,  inter  alia,  that  the  election petition was  liable to  be dismissed in limine under sub-s. (1) of  s. 86 due to non-compliance with the requirements of sub-s.(1) of s.117 of the Act read with rule 8 of the Madras High Court  (Election Petitions) Rules, 1967, for the reason that there  was no  deposit of Rs. 2,000 in cash in the High Court as  security for  costs, and  also for  non-compliance with the  requirements of  sub-s.(3) of  s. 81 of the Act as the copy  of the  election petition  served on the appellant was not  accompanied by  a copy  of the  photograph  of  the alleged fancy banner annexed to the 636 petition, as alleged in paragraph 18(b) of the petition. The appellant accordingly  raised a  preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the election petition.      The High  Court by  its order  dated December  1, 1980, overruled both  the preliminary objections. In regard to the objection based  on sub-s.(1) of s. 117 of the Act read with Rule 8  of the Madras High Court (Election Petitions) Rules, 1967 (for  short ’the  Election Petitions  Rules’), the High Court held  that a  sum of  Rs. 2,000 as security amount had been deposited  by the  respondent in  the Reserve  Bank  of India to  the credit  of the  Registrar, High  Court, at the instance of  the High  Court, and  in  accordance  with  the procedure followed  for deposit  of  amounts  in  court.  In reaching that  conclusion, the  High Court  relied upon  the lodgment schedule  presented by  K. Subramaniam, counsel for the respondent,  which had  been prepared in the Registry by

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the Assistant  Registrar II,  and the  challan in triplicate prepared by  the Accounts  Department of  the High Court and signed by the official referee specifying the amount and the date within  which it  had to be deposited. It held that the requirements of  sub-s.(1) of  s. 117  of the  Act read with rule 8 of the Election Petitions Rules for the making of the deposit of Rs. 2,000 as security for costs in the High Court were mandatory  but the  manner of  making such  deposit was directory and  as the amount of Rs. 2,000 had, in fact, been deposited to the credit of the Registrar, High Court, within the time  allowed therefor, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of sub-s. (1) of s. 117 of the Act. As regards the  objection based  on the non-supply of a copy of the photograph  of the fancy banner adverted to in paragraph 18(b), the  High Court  relying upon  the decision  of  this court in  Sahodrabai Rai  v. Ram Singh Aharwar,(1) held that the banner  could not  be treated  to be an integral part of the election  petition but was merely a piece of evidence as to the  nature and  type of  fancy banners  erected  by  the appellant and  therefore failure  to supply  a copy  of  the photograph to  the appellant  did not  amount to a breach of the provisions  contained in  sub-s.(3) of s. 81 of the Act. These findings  were reached  by the High Court on the basis of the  affidavits filed  by the parties and the material on record. The  High Court had also before it a report from the Registry as  to the  procedure followed with regard to Court deposits: 637           "Any person  desirous of  paying money  into Court      shall present a lodgement schedule, duly vouched by the      concerned Section  regarding the  quantum and  the time      limit, and  initialled by the Officers of Original Side      or Appellate  side as  the case may be, to the Accounts      Department for  the issue  of a  Challan to  enable the      party to  make the  payment into Reserve Bank of India,      Madras to  the credit  of the  case concerned.  On  the      presentation of  the Lodgement Schedule to the Accounts      Department  a  Challan  in  triplicate  specifying  the      amount and the date within which it should be paid will      be issued  by the  Accounts Department  to the  person,      desirous of  making such  payment, who will deliver the      Challan to  the Bank.  The Bank  in turn  after deposit      deliver one  part of  the Challan  duly signed  to  the      person making  the payment.  On the  production of  the      Challan, the  Accounts Department  will make  necessary      credit  entries   in  the   ledgers  and   the  receipt      registers. The  remaining two  parts of the Challan are      sent by  Reserve Bank  of  India,  Madras  to  Pay  and      Accounts Office,  which in turn sends one part of it to      this Office. Sometimes it takes about one or two months      to receive  the said  Challan from the Pay and Accounts      Office. In  cases where  advocates do  not produce  one      part of  Challan in Accounts Department, credit entries      are made  on the  strength of  the Challan from Pay and      Accounts Office and the pass book from the Reserve Bank      of India, Madras.           Official receipt  for  such  deposits  are  issued      under  the   signature  of   the  Assistant   Registrar      (Original Side)  for Original  Side Deposits and of the      Deputy Registrar for Appellate Side Deposits to such of      those parties  who produce  one part of the Challan and      make a request for official receipt to that effect.           It is also submitted that Accounts Department will      not  receive  cash  without  specific  orders  to  that      effect.

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         This is  the procedure  that is  being followed by      the Accounts Section of High Court with regard to Court      Deposits."      It is  against this  order of  the High Court that this appeal was  filed. The appeal was first heard in April 1981, and this Court by 638 its order  dated April 2, 1981, remitted back the issue with regard to  the alleged  non-compliance with the requirements of sub-s.(1)  of s.  117 read  with rule  8 of  the Election Petitions Rules  to the High Court for a decision afresh, as it was  felt that the point raised was primarily a matter of evidence, but  the parties  had unfortunately  not  led  any evidence on  the point.  It accordingly  directed  the  High Court to  record the evidence that may be adduced as regards the practice  and procedure  followed by  the High  Court in regard to  the making of an election petition under s. 81 of the Act  and the  manner in which the security amount of Rs. 2,000 was deposited in the High Court in compliance with the requirements of  sub-s.(1) of  s. 117  of the  Act read with rule 8 of the Election Petitions Rules.      After the  issue was  remitted, the  High Court allowed the parties  to lead  their evidence  both oral  as well  as documentary and  has recorded  its findings  dated July  20, 1981. The  High Court  adhered to its earlier view that on a construction of  sub-s. (1) s. 117 of the Act, the factum of making of  deposit of Rs. 2,000 as security for costs in the High Court  was mandatory  but the  manner  of  making  such deposit was  directory and  further held that although there was no strict or literal compliance with the requirements of rule 8  of the  Election Petitions  Rules,  there  had  been substantial compliance with the requirements of sub-s.(1) of s.117 of  the Act, in that the requisite amount of Rs. 2,000 had actually  been deposited to the credit of the Registrar, High Court,  in the  Reserve Bank of India on July 11, 1980, that is,  before the election petition was filed on July 14, 1980, and  the same  was available  for payment of costs. In the connected  cases also,  the High  Court reached the same conclusion after taking evidence of the respective parties.      It appears from the evidence adduced in all these cases that after  the general  elections to  the State Legislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu, the then Chief Justice Ismail, C.J., nominated K.S. Natarajan (P.W. 4) Assistant Registrar II, to deal with  all election  petitions filed  under s. 81 of the Act. The evidence of P.W. 4 shows that he met the officer in charge of  the Accounts  Department of  the High  Court  and ascertained the  procedure to  be followed  for  making  the security deposit  of Rs.  2,000/- in cash in the High Court. He was  informed by  the officer  in charge  that the  party filing the  election  petition  should  bring  the  lodgment schedule duly  filed and  that P.W.4  should initial  it and then the lodgment schedule had to 639 be taken  to the  Accounts Department.  He was told that the Accounts Department  would prepare  a challan  in triplicate and hand over the same to the party for depositing the money in the  Reserve Bank  of India in the name of the Registrar, High Court,  and that  the duplicate  challan must  be filed along with  the election  petition. He deposed that the same procedure  was  adopted  in  all  the  cases.  The  lodgment schedule, Ex  P-2B,  prepared  by  K.  Subramaniam  (P.W.6), counsel for  the respondent,  had been initialled by him and that he  had also  put the  date July 14, 1980 by which date the deposit  had to  be made K. Subramaniam (P.W.6), counsel for the respondent, stated that the respondent had given him

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the amount  of Rs. 2,000 in the first week of July 1980, and accompanied  by   an  authorised   representative   of   the respondent, he  took the lodgement schedule Ex. P-2B to K.S. Natarajan (P.W.4),  Assistant Registrar  II, who  initialled the same  and indicated the date by which the deposit was to be made.  He then took the lodgment schedule to the Accounts Department where  S.  Seturaj  (P.W.1)  working  as  challan issuing  clerk,   prepared  the   challan   in   triplicate. Thereafter, he took the challan in triplicate to the Reserve Bank of  India and deposited the amount of Rs. 2,000 in cash in the  name of the Registrar, High Court, and the duplicate copy of  the challan  was handed  over to him. The duplicate copy of the challan, Ex. P-2C, bears the seal of the Reserve Bank of  India, with  the endorsement ’received in cash’ and is dated July 11, 1980. The duplicate copy of the challan Ex P-2C, was filed along with the election petition.      At this  point, it is necessary to refer to the entries of the  duplicate copy  of the  challan.  Column  1  of  the challan bears  the  heading  "By  whom  paid  and  name  (or designation) and address of the person on whose behalf money is paid" and the entry reads "Registrar, High Court, Madras" and bears  the seal  of the  High Court.  Column 2 reads "On what account with authority, if any" and the entry bears the name of the counsel for the election petitioner and mentions that the  amount was  deposited as  security deposit for the election petition.  Column 3  bears the heading "Amount" and the amount  deposited in  each case is entered as Rs. 2,000. The last  column bears  the heading  "Head of  account"  and gives the  head as "P.D.A/c, Registrar, High Court, Madras". A bare reading of the challans would show that the amount of Rs. 2,000  as security  for costs  was received  by the High Court and  credited to  its own account. When the High Court asked the counsel for the election 640 petitioner to  credit the  amount in  the Reserve Bank along with the  pre-receipted challan,  it must be deemed that the Reserve Bank  was acting  as an agent of the High Court. All the challans bear the seal of the Reserve Bank of India with the endorsement "received in cash".      Article 329(b)  of the  Constitution provides  that  no election to  either House  of Parliament  or to the House or either House of the Legislature of the State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and  in such manner as may be provided by or under any  law   made  by   the   appropriate   Legislature.   The Representation of  the people  Act, 1951  is a  law made  by Parliament under Art. 327 of the Constitution to provide for adjudication of  disputes regarding  such elections. Part VI of the  Act is  headed "Disputes  regarding  elections’  and Chapter II  in that  Part deals  with  the  presentation  of election petitions  to the  High Court.  Section 80 provides that no  election shall  be called  in question except by an election  petition   presented  in   accordance   with   the provisions of  Part VI.  Section 80A provides that the Court having jurisdiction to try an election petition shall be the High  Court.   In  N.P.  Ponnuswami  v.  Returning  Officer, Namakkal,(1) this  Court restated  the  principle  that  the right to  vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right  but is a creature of statute or special law and must be  subject to the limitations imposed by it. The Court having regard  to the  non obstante  clause in  Art. 329 (b) held that  the Act  having furnished  a  complete  Code  for challenging an  election, the election must be challenged in the manner  provided. The  Court relied  upon the  dictum of Wiles, J.  in  Wolverhampton  New  Water  Works  Company  v.

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Hawkesford(2) which  has become  classical. It  is now  well recognised that  where a  right or liability is created by a statute which  gives a  special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of.      As observed  by this  Court in  Jagan Nath  v.  Jaswant Singh & Ors.,(3) an election contest is not an action at law or a  suit in  equity but  is a  purely statutory proceeding unknown to  the common  law and  that the Court possesses no common law power. It also added that:      "It is  a sound  principle of  natural justice that the      success of  a candidate  who has  won  at  an  election      should not be 641      lightly interfered  with and  any petition seeking such      interference must  strictly conform to the requirements      of the law."      At the same time, the Court added a note of caution:           "It is  always to be borne in mind that though the      election of a successful candidate is not to be lightly      interfered with,  one of  the essentials of that law is      also to  safeguard the  purity of  the election process      and also  to see  that people  do not  get  elected  by      flagrant breaches  of that law or by corrupt practices.      In cases  where the election law does not prescribe the      consequence or  does not  lay  down  penalty  for  non-      compliance with certain procedural requirements of that      law, the  jurisdiction of  the tribunal  entrusted with      the trial of the case is not affected."      There are  two questions  that fall  for determination. The first  is whether  the election  petition filed  by  the respondent under s. 81 read with s.100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 was liable to be dismissed in limine under sub-s.  (1) of  s.86 on the ground that there was non- compliance with  the requirements of sub-s. (1) of s. 117 of the Act  read with r. 8 of the Election Petitions Rules. The second is whether the election petition is also liable to be dismissed under  sub-s. (1)  of s.86  of the Act inasmuch as the copy of the election petition furnished to the appellant was not accompanied by a copy of the photograph of the fancy banner referred  to in  paragraph 18(b)  of the  petition as required by sub-s. (3) of s.81 of the Act.      In view  of  the  arguments  addressed  to  us,  it  is necessary to  set out a few of the relevant provisions which bear upon the points raised. S.81 deals with presentation of election petitions. It runs:           "81. (1)  An election petition calling in question      any election  may be  presented on  one or  more of the      grounds specified in sub-section (1) of section 100 and      section 101  to the High Court by any candidate at such      election or  any elector  within forty-five  days from,      but not  earlier than,  the date  of  election  of  the      returned candidate,  or if  there  are  more  than  one      returned candidate  at the  election and  the dates  of      their election  are different,  the later  of those two      dates. 642           Explanation-In this sub-section, ’elector’ means a      person who  was entitled  to vote  at the  election  to      which the  election petition  relates, whether  he  has      voted at such election or not.           (3) Every  election petition  shall be accompanied      by as  many copies  thereof as  there  are  respondents      mentioned in the petition, and every such copy shall be      attested by  the petitioner  under his own signature to      be a true copy of the petition."

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    Section 82  which is  the next  section lays  down  who shall be  parties to an election petition. We need not refer to this  section in  detail since  we are not concerned with it. S.83  is however  material and it provides what shall be the contents of an election petition. It reads:      "83 (1) An election petition-           (a) shall  contain  a  concise  statement  of  the           material facts on which the petitioner relies;           (b)  shall  set  forth  full  particulars  of  any           corrupt  practice  that  the  petitioner  alleges,           including as  full a  statement as possible of the           names of  the parties  alleged to  have  committed           such corrupt  practice and  the date  and place of           the commission of each such practice and           (c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified           in the  manner laid  down in  the  Code  of  Civil           Procedure, 1908  (5 of  1908) for the verification           of pleadings:           Provided that  where the  petitioner  alleges  any      corrupt  practice,   the   petition   shall   also   be      accompanied by  an affidavit  in the prescribed form in      support of  the allegation of such corrupt practice and      the particulars thereof.      (2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also      be signed  by the  petitioner and  verified in the same      manner as the petition."      The next  chapter which  is Chapter  III deals with the trial of  election petitions  but here we are concerned only with sub-s. (1) of 643 s. 86 which interdicts that the High Court shall, in certain circumstances, dismiss  an election petition in limine. Sub- s. (1) of s. 86 provides as follows:           "86 (1)  The High  Court shall dismiss an election      petition which  does not  comply with the provisions of      section 81 or section 82 or section 117.           Explanation: An order of the High Court dismissing      an election  petition under  this sub-section  shall be      deemed to  be an order made under clause (a) of section      98."      Sub-s. (1)  of  s.  117  which  is  important  for  our purposes is in these terms:      "117. Security for costs-      (1)  At the  time of  presenting an  election petition,           the petitioner  shall deposit in the High Court in           accordance with  the Rules of the High Court a sum           of two  thousand rupees  as security for the costs           of the petition."      Rule 8  of the  Madras High  Court (Election Petitions) Rules, 1967  framed by  the High Court under Art. 225 of the Constitution which  is also  important for  the purposes  of these cases provides as follows:           "8. An  Election Petitioner  before presenting his      Election Petition  shall deposit  in the  High Court in      cash a  sum of two thousand rupees towards security for      costs as  provided for under Section 117 of the Act and      shall produce the receipt of the Registrar for the same      at the time of presentation of the petition."      Rule  12  of  the  Election  Petitions  Rules  is  also relevant and reads:      "12. Subject  to the  foregoing rules and to the extent      they are  not inconsistent  with the  provisions of the      Act the  Rules of  the High Court, 1956 (Original Side)      shall, as  far  as  practicable,  be  observed  in  all      Election  Petitions   and  all  applications  taken  in

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    respect of them." 644      Taking up  the contentions  in the  order in which they were advanced,  we shall first deal with the submission that there was  non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of sub-s. (1)  of s.  117 of  the Act  read  with  r.8  of  the Election Petitions  Rules framed by the High Court, which is common to  all these  cases. The  factum of  deposit of  Rs. 2000/- in  each of  these cases  on  the  strength  of  pre- receipted challans  issued by the Accounts Department of the High Court in the Reserve Bank of India to the credit of the Registrar, High  Court, Madras  as security  for costs  well within the  period of  limitation for  filing  the  election petition is  not in dispute and the controversy turns on the question whether  the deposit  of the security amount was in accordance with  the rules  of the  High  Court.  There  are different sets  of rules  framed by  different  High  Courts under Art.  225 of  the Constitution regulating the practice and procedure  to be  observed in  all matters coming before the High  Court in  exercise of its jurisdiction under s.80A of the  Act. The  words "in  accordance with the rules" must therefore connote  "according to the procedure prescribed by the High Court". The mode of making deposit must necessarily be an internal matter of the concerned High Court.      In support  of this  appeal, learned  counsel  for  the appellant contends  that the  provisions of sub-s. (1) of s. 117 of  the Act  are mandatory, non-compliance of which will entail dismissal  of the  election petition  in limine under sub-s.  (1)  of  s.86  of  he  Act.  It  is  urged  that  no distinction can  be drawn  between the requirement as to the making of  a security deposit in the High Court under sub-s. (1) of s. 117 and the manner of making such deposit and sub- s. (1)  of s.  117 cannot  be dissected  into two parts, one part being  treated as mandatory and the other as directory. It is  further urged  that the words "in accordance with the rules of  the High Court under sub-s. (1) of s. 117" were as much a  mandatory requirement  as the  requirement that  the election petitioner  shall, at  the time  of  presenting  an election petition,  deposit in  the High  Court a sum of Rs. 2000/- as  security for  the costs of the petition. There is therefore no  warrant for  the view  taken by the High Court that the  factum  of  deposit  of  the  security  amount  of Rs.2000/- in the High Court was mandatory and not the manner in which  the security  deposit was  made. It  is also urged that r.8  of the Election petitions Rules framed by the High Court under  Art. 225 to regulate the mode of making deposit must be  read as  forming part  of  sub-s.(1)  of  s.117  by incorporation and therefore the only manner prescribed is by 645 making deposit  in cash  with the  Registrar. When a statute requires that something shall be done in a particular manner or from expressly declaring what shall be the consequence of non-compliance with  it, the requirement must be regarded as imperative. Having regard to the definite stand taken by the respondent that  he had  complied with  the requirements  of r.8, it  is not  permissible to  fall back on the provisions contained in  order  31  of  the  Madras  High  Court  Rules relating to  deposit of  suitors’ money. The last submission is that  in view  of the  finding reached  by the High Court that there  was no  strict or literal compliance of r.8, the election petition  must be  dismissed. Even  if the  rule of substantial compliance applies, it is clear on evidence that there  has   been  no   compliance  at  all  much  less  any substantial compliance.  There is intrinsic evidence to show that there  has been  tampering with  the documents.  We are

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afraid, the  contention that there was no compliance of sub- s. (1)  of s.117  of the  Act cannot prevail in the light of the well settled principles.      The submissions  advanced by  learned counsel  for  the appellant  cannot   be  accepted  as  they  proceed  on  the assumption that  no distinction  can be  drawn  between  the requirement as  to the making of a deposit in the High Court under sub-s.  (1) of  s.117 and  the manner  of making  such deposit. There  was considerable  emphasis laid  by  learned counsel that  sub-s. (1)  of s.117  cannot be dissected into two parts, one part being treated as mandatory and the other as directory.  The contention  is  wholly  misconceived  and indeed runs  counter to  several decisions of this Court. It is always  important to  bear the  distinction  between  the mandatory and  directory provisions of a statute. Sub-s. (1) of s.117  is in  two parts.  The first part of sub-s. (1) of s.117 provides  that at  the time  of presenting an election petition, the  petitioner shall  deposit in the High Court a sum of Rs. 2000/- as security for the costs of the petition, and the  second is  that such  deposit shall  be made in the High Court  in accordance  with the rules of the High Court. The requirement  regarding the  making of a security deposit of Rs.  2000/- in  the High  Court is  mandatory,  the  non- compliance of  which must  entail dismissal in limine of the election petition  under sub-s.  (1) of s.86 of the Act. But the  requirement  of  its  deposit  in  the  High  Court  in accordance with  the rules  of the  High  Court  is  clearly directory. As  Maxwell on  the Interpretation  of  Statutes, 12th edn.  at p.314  puts it: "An absolute enactment must be obeyed or  fulfilled exactly,  but it  is  sufficient  if  a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled 646 substantially."   The rule  of construction  is well settled and we need not burden the judgment with many citations.      It is  well  established  that  an  enactment  in  form mandatory might in substance be directory and the use of the word "shall"  does not conclude the matter. The general rule of interpretation  is well-known  and it  is but  an aid for ascertaining the  true intention of the Legislature which is the determining  factor, and  that must ultimately depend on the  context.   The  following   passage  from  Crawford  on ’Statutory Construction’ at p.516 brings out the rule:           "The question as to whether a statute is mandatory      or directory depends upon the intent of the legislature      and not  upon the  language  in  which  the  intent  is      clothed. The  meaning and  intention of the legislature      must govern,  and these are to be ascertained, not only      from the  phraseology of  the provision,  but  also  by      considering   its   nature,   its   design,   and   the      consequences which  would follow from construing it the      one way or the other."      This passage  was quoted  with approval by the Court in State of  U.P. v.  Manbodhan Lal Srivastava,(1) The State of Uttar Pradesh  & Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya(2) and Raza Buland Sugar Co.  Ltd. v.  Municipal Board, Rampur.(3) The Court in Manbodhan Lal’s  case, (supra) where Art. 320 (3) (c) of the Constitution was  held to  be directory  and not  mandatory, relied upon  the following observations of the Privy Council in Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandih(4):      "The question  whether  provisions  in  a  statute  are      directory or  imperative has  very frequently arisen in      this country, but it has been said that no general rule      can be  laid down, and that in every case the object of      the statute must be looked at. The cases on the subject      will be  found collected  in Maxwell  on Statutes,  5th

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    ed., p.596  and following pages. When the provisions of      a statute  relate to  the performance  of a public duty      and the case is such 647      that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this      duty  would  work  serious  general  inconvenience,  or      injustice to  persons who  have no  control over  those      entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not      promote the main object of the Legislature, it has been      the practice  to hold  such provisions  to be directory      only, the  neglect  of  them,  though  punishable,  not      affecting the validity of the acts done."      In Manbodhan  Lal’s case,  (supra) the  contention  was that the  reduction in  rank after  departmental inquiry was invalid for  noncompliance with the requirements of Art. 320 (3) (c)  of the  Constitution which  read literally  made it obligatory for  the Government of India or a Government of a State to  consult the Union Public Service Commission or the State Public  Service Commission in all disciplinary matters affecting a  person in service of the State. In turning down the contention it was observed by this Court:           "The use  of the word "shall" in a statute, though      generally  taken   in  a   mandatory  sense,  does  not      necessarily mean  that in every case it shall have that      effect, that  is to  say, that  unless the words of the      statute are  punctiliously followed, the proceeding, or      the outcome of the proceeding, would be invalid."      Following the  principle laid down by the Privy Council in Montreal Street Railway Company’s case, (supra) the Court held  that  Art.  320  (3)  (c)  itself  contemplates  three grounds, and  the word  "shall"  appeared  in  almost  every paragraph and every clause or sub-clause of that Article. If it were  held that  the provisions  of Art, 320 (3) (c) were mandatory in terms, the other clauses or sub-clauses of that Article would  have to  be equally  held to be mandatory. If they were  so held,  any appointments  made  to  the  public services without  observing strictly the terms of these sub- clauses in  cl. (3)  of Art.  320 would adversely affect the person so  appointed to  a public service, without any fault on his part and without his having any say in the matter and this could  not have  been contemplated by the makers of the Constitution. The  Court  held  that  if  the  Article  were construed as  mandatory,  it  would  cause  serious  general inconvenience and  injustice to  persons who  had no control over those  entrusted with  the duty.  As the  Privy Council itself pointed  out, the  question whether  provisions in  a statute are directory or mandatory cannot be decided 648 by laying  down a  general rule and in every case the object of the statute must be looked at.      In Raza  Buland Sugar  Co.  Ltd.’s  case,  (supra)  the question for  consideration was  whether the  whole of  sub- s.(3) of  s 131  of the  U.P. Municipalities  Act, 1916  was mandatory, or  the part  of it  requiring publication in the manner laid  down in sub-s.(3) of s.94 was merely directory. Per majority,  the Court held that sub-s.(3) of s. 131 could be divided  into two  parts-the first one providing that the proposal and  draft rules  for a  tax intended to be imposed should be  published for  the objections  of the  public, if any, and the second laying down that the publication must be in the  manner laid down in sub-s. (3) of s. 94. Considering the object  of the  provisions for  publication, namely,  to enable the  public to  place its view point, the Court found it necessary  to hold that the first part of the section was mandatory, for  to hold  otherwise would  be to  render  the

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whole  procedure   prescribed  for  the  imposition  of  tax nugatory. The second part of the section was however held to be merely  directory. In  that case,  there was no regularly published local Hindi newspaper but the publication was made in Hindi  in a  local paper  which on the evidence seemed to have  good   circulation  in   Rampur.  There  was,  in  the circumstances, substantial compliance with the provisions of sub-s.(3) of s. 94 of that Act.      There was  quite some  discussion at  the Bar as to the legality and  propriety of  the  procedure  adopted  in  the Madras High  Court as  to the  making of  a security deposit under sub-s.  (1) of  s.117 of  the Act. The objection is to the manner  of such  deposit being  made on  the strength of pre-receipted challan prepared by the Accounts Department on the basis  of the lodgment schedule into the Reserve Bank of India to the credit of the Registrar, High Court, Madras. It was submitted  that this was in complete violation of r.8 of the Election  Petitions Rules.  It is said that r. 8 must be read as  forming part  of sub-s.(1)  of s.  117 and the only manner prescribed  is by  making deposit  in cash  with  the Registrar and obtain his receipt therefor. It was urged that it is  paradoxical to  say that  deposit of  money into  the Reserve Bank  to the  credit of  the Registrar,  High Court, Madras is a sufficient compliance of sub-s.(1) of s.117 when r. 8 provides that the money should be deposited in the High Court in  cash, and  that is  the only mode prescribed under sub-s.(1) of  s. 117.  We are afraid we are unable to accept this line of argument. 649 A literal and mechanical interpretation of r.8 would lead to manifest absurdity  as it would imply that in every case the election petitioner shall have to pay to the Registrar a sum of Rs.  2,000 in cash towards security for costs as required by sub-s.(1)  of s.117  of the Act and obtain a receipt from him therefor.  Rule 8  is silent as to how the cash is to be handled. It cannot ordinarily be expected that the Registrar of a  High Court would accept the amount of security deposit in cash.  The procedure adopted by II Assistant Registrar in directing that  the money  be deposited to the credit of the Registrar of the High Court in the Reserve Bank of India was in conformity  with the  requirements of r.8 of the Election Petitions Rules.  Inasmuch as  r. 8  does not  lay down  the procedure regulating  the manner  of deposit  of  cash,  the matter falls to be governed by r.2 of Order 31 of the Madras High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1956 by reason of r. 12 of the Election  Petitions Rules.  Although Order 31, r. 2 does not in terms apply because Order 31 relates to "Payment into court of  moneys to  the credit  of civil court deposits and account of  suitor’s money", and though no lodgment schedule can be prepared under r.2 except in pursuance of a decree or order passed  by the  High Court  i.e. in  relation to  some proceeding pending, or disposed of, by the High Court, still by virtue  of r.  12 of the Election Petitions Rules that is the procedure  to be  adopted for deposit of Rs. 2000 in the High Court  in cash  i.e. by  crediting the  amount  on  the strength of a pre-receipted challan prepared by the Accounts Department on the basis of a lodgment schedule. That was the only procedure applicable and there was nothing wrong in the procedure adopted in making the deposit. When the amount was so deposited  with a  pre-receipted challan  issued  by  the Accounts Department  to the  credit of  the Registrar of the High  Court   and  the   Reserve  Bank  of  India  made  the endorsement "Received in Cash", it must be regarded that the payment was  made in  the High  Court and  the pre-receipted challan bearing the endorsement of the Reserve Bank of India

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must be  treated as the receipt of the Registrar in terms of r. 8, the Reserve Bank acting as an agent of the High Court. We are  informed that  the same  practice and  procedure has been followed during the relevant period in all the election petitions filed  in the  Madras High  Court and there was no separate receipt  of the  Registrar except in one case where the election  petition was  not tried. We need not dilate on the point  any further.  It must  accordingly be  held  that there was  due compliance with the requirements of sub-s.(1) of s.  117 of  the Act  read  with  r.  8  of  the  Election Petitions Rules. 650      The matter  is no  longer res  integra. The  submission runs counter to the decision of this Court in the well-known case of  K.Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar & Ors.(1) That was a case  under the old s. 117 of the Act as it stood prior to its amendment by Act 47 of 1966. It read:           "The petitioner  shall enclose with the petition a      Government Treasury  receipt showing  that a deposit of      one  thousand   rupees  had   been  made  either  in  a      Government Treasury  or in the Reserve Bank of India in      favour of  the Secretary  to the Election Commission as      security for the costs of the petition."      In that  case, the  petitioner  enclosed  a  Government Treasury receipt  showing a  deposit of  Rs.1000 as security for costs  in the State Bank of India, Ranchi Branch, but it did not show that the deposit had been made in favour of the Secretary to  the  Election  Commission.  A  question  arose whether the  election petition  was liable  to be  dismissed summarily  under   s.85  or   sub-s.(3)  of   s.90  as   the requirements of  s. 117  of the  Act had  not been  complied with. The  Court  analyzed  s.  117  and  observed  that  it consisted of  three parts,  viz: (1) The Government Treasury receipt must  show that  such deposit had actually been made in a  Government Treasury  or in  the Reserve Bank of India. (2) It  must show  that it  had been  made in  favour of the Secretary to  the  Election  Commission.  And  (3)  it  must further show that it had been made as security for the costs of the  petition. The  question then arose whether the words "in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission" were mandatory in  character so  that if the deposit had not been made in  favour of  the Secretary to the Election Commission as therein  specified, the  deposit even  though made  in  a Government Treasury  or in  the Reserve Bank of India and as security for  costs of the petition, would be invalid and of no avail.  This Court  held that  these words in s. 117 were directory and  not mandatory in their character and that the essence of  the provision  contained in  s. 117 was that the petitioner should  furnish security  for the  costs  of  the petition and  should  enclose  along  with  the  petition  a Government Treasury  receipt showing  that a  deposit of Rs. 1000/- had  been made by him either in a Government Treasury or in the Reserve Bank of India to be at the disposal of the 651 Election Commission  to be  utilized by  it  in  the  manner authorized by law and was under its control and payable on a proper application being made in that behalf to the Election Commission or to any person duly authorized by it to receive the same,  be he the Secretary to the Election Commission or any one  else. If  this essential  requirement was  complied with, no  literal compliance  was at  all necessary with the words  "in   favour  of   the  Secretary   to  the  Election Commission". Though  therefore the making of the deposit and the presentation  of the  receipt  thereof  along  with  the petition was  held to be mandatory, this Court held that the

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form in which the deposit should be made was only directory. This  Court   rejected  the  contention  that  the  election petition was liable to be dismissed in limine under s. 85 or sub-s.(3) of  s. 90 for non-compliance with the requirements of s. 117 of the Act and observed:           "It would be absurd to imagine that a deposit made      either in  a Government Treasury or in the Reserve Bank      of India  in favour  of the  Election Commission itself      would not  be sufficient compliance with the provisions      of s. 117 and would involve a dismissal of the petition      under s.  85 or  s. 90(3).  The above  illustration  is      sufficient to  demonstrate that the words "in favour of      the Secretary to the Election Commission" used in s.117      are directory  and not  mandatory in  their  character.      What is of the essence of the provision contained in s.      117 is  that the petitioner should furnish security for      the costs  of the  petition, and  should enclose  along      with the petition a Government Treasury receipt showing      that a  deposit of one thousand rupees has been made by      him either  in a  Government Treasury or in the Reserve      Bank of  India, is  at the  disposal  of  the  Election      Commission  to   be  utilised   by  it  in  the  manner      authorised by  law and is under its control and payable      on a  proper application  being made  in that behalf to      the  Election   Commission  or   to  any   person  duly      authorised by  it  to  receive  the  same,  be  he  the      Secretary to the Election Commission or any one else."      The same  question was  dealt with  in Chandrika Prasad Tripathi v.  Siv Prasad  Chanpuria &  Ors.(1) In  that case, security deposit  of Rs.  1000/-had been  made, but  not, in terms, in the name of the Secretary 652 to the  Election Commission;  instead, the  deposit was made "refundable by  order of  the Election  Commission of India, New Delhi".  The Court  held that the objection based on the peculiar wording of the deposit was purely technical. To the same effect  are the  decisions of  this Court  in Om Prabha Jain v.  Gian Chand  & Anr.(1) and Budhi Nath Jha v. Manilal Jadav.(2) The Court in all these cases followed the decision in Kamaraja  Nadar’s case,  (supra) that  s. 117  of the Act should not  be strictly  or technically  construed and  that substantial  compliance  with  its  requirements  should  be treated as sufficient.      In contrast,  the  decisions  in  Charan  Lal  Sahu  v. Nandkishore Bhatt  & Ors.(3) and Aeltemesh Rein v. Chandulal Chandrakar &  Ors.(4) were  cases where the petitioners made no security  deposit before filing their election petitions. In Charan  Lal Sahu’s case, supra, the petitioner applied to the High  Court for  being absolved from making any security deposit or  to reduce  the amount  required to  be deposited under the  Act. This  Court referred  to Art. 329 (b) of the Constitution and  held that  the petitioner  had no right to file an  election petition  except in the manner provided by the Act.  There being no provision to absolve the petitioner from payment of security for costs, this Court held that the Madhya  Pradesh  High  Court  was  right  in  rejecting  the election petition  under sub-s.  (1) of  s.86 of the Act. In Aeltemesh Rein’s  case, supra, it was stated in the petition that a  security amount of Rs. 2000 was being deposited, but in fact  no deposit  was made. The Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed the  election petition.  On appeal, the petitioner contended that  sub-s. (1)  of s.117  of the  Act was  ultra vires Art.  329 (b)  of the  Constitution and  therefore the High Court  was in error in dismissing the election petition on the  ground of non-compliance of the provisions of sub-s.

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(1)  of  s.117.  This  Court  repelled  the  contention  and expressed the  view that  the words "in such manner" in Art. 329(b) could not be limited in their operation to procedural requirements. The Court held :           "The provision  of law  which prescribes  that  an      election petition  shall be  accompanied by the payment      of security  amount pertains to the area covered by the      manner of the 653      making of the election petition and is therefore within      the authority of Parliament."      Adverting to  the dismissal of the election petition by the High  Court, this  Court held that the High Court had no option but to dismiss the petition as it was not accompanied by payment of the security deposit for sub-s. (1) of s.86 of the Act  clearly provides  that the High Court shall dismiss an  election   petition  which   did  not  comply  with  the provisions of s.81, or 82 or 117 of the Act.      The remaining  part  of  the  case  is  not  free  from difficulty. There  are two questions that arise, namely: (1) Whether the  photograph referred to in paragraph 18(b) was a schedule or  annexure within  the meaning  of sub-s.  (2) of s.83 and  therefore formed  an integral part of the election petition and  thus the failure to furnish the appellant with a copy  of the  photograph along with a copy of the election petition amounted  to a non-compliance of sub-s. (3) of s.81 (2) Whether  the High  Court was  right in  relying upon the decision of  this Court  in  Sahodrabai  Rai  v.  Ram  Singh Aharwr(1) in  holding  that  the  photograph  was  merely  a document filed  along with  the election petition as a piece of  evidence   in  proof  of  the  allegation  contained  in paragraph 18(b)  and therefore  there was  no need  for  the respondent to  supply the  appellant  with  a  copy  of  the photograph.      To bring  out the  points in controversy, the averments in paragraph 18(b) may be set out ;           "18.  The   Petitioner  submits   that  the  first      Respondent is  guilty of  the  corrupt  practice  under      Section 123(6)  of the Act by incurring and authorising      expenditure in  excess of  the limit  of  Rs.  35,000/-      fixed under Section 77 of the Act. The first Respondent      has  submitted   a  statement   of  election   expenses      disclosing a  total  of  Rs.  10,125.75  only.  A  true      photostat copy  of the  Return filed  by him  is  filed      herewith as  Annexure-V. He  has,  however,  failed  to      disclose  the  following  amount  incurred  by  him  in      connection with  the election,  between the date of his      nomination and  the date  of  the  declaration  of  the      result thereof.           (b) The  first Respondent  erected  fancy  banners      throughout the constituency and the number of such 654      banners is about 50. A photograph of one such banner is      filed herewith.  The cost  of each  such banner will be      not less  than Rs.  1000. The  expenditure involved  in      erecting these fifty banners is about Rs. 50,000. It is      submitted that  the first  Respondent has  incurred the      above  said  expenditure  which  added  to  the  amount      disclosed in  the Return  of Election  Expenses exceeds      the amount  fixed under  Section 77 (3) of the Act thus      amounting to a corrupt practice under Section 123(6) of      the Act."      Admittedly, a  copy of the photograph was not furnished to the appellant along with a copy of the election petition, The  averment   contained  in   paragraph  18(b)   would  be

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incomplete without  a copy  of the photograph being supplied with a  copy of  the election petition. The averment therein is that  the appellant  committed a  corrupt practice  under sub-s.(6) of  s.123 of  the Act  by incurring or authorising expenditure in contravention of s.77. It is alleged that the appellant  had   set  up   fancy  banners   throughout   the constituency and  the number  of such  banners was about 50, the cost  of each  such banner  being not less than Rs. 1000 and therefore  the expenditure involved in erecting these 50 banners was  not  less  than  Rs.  50,000/-,  but  that  the appellant had  not disclosed the amount in the return of the election expenses  and thus  committed  a  corrupt  practice under sub-s.(6) of s.123 of the Act.      It is  not possible to conceive of the dimension of the large fancy  banner unless one has a look at the photograph. The photograph  filed with  the election  petition  gives  a visual description of the fancy banner, the cost of which at a mere  look would  show that  the expenditure in setting up each such  banner would  be Rs. 1000 or more. The photograph depicts two  election banners.  One of  them is a huge fancy banner or  a hoarding  on the  left side of the road and the other on  the right  is a smaller election banner. The fancy banner depicts  two groups,  and the appellant is present in both. On  the left  hand top there is a large picture of the appellant with  the late Sri Annadurai and at the right hand below there  is a smaller picture of the appellant with Smt. Indira Gandhi.  The fancy  banner shown  in  the  photograph contains an  election  slogan  in  Tamil  appealing  to  the electorate  to   vote  for  the  appellant.  This  has  been translated for us into English and it reads: 655      "To           The Electorate in Anna Nagar Constituency           I request you to mark on the Rising Sun and ensure      success to enable service to you.           Always your affectionate,                                 Kalaignar M. Karunanidhi Polling Date 31.5.80"      It is  true  that  paragraph  18(b)  must  be  read  in conjunction with  the opening  part of  paragraph 18. Though the words  "in connection  with" do  not appear in paragraph 18(b), these  words are  there in paragraph 18 and therefore it must  be taken  that the  fancy banners  were set  up  in connection with  the election.  Nevertheless, without  being furnished with  a copy  of the  photograph, the averments in paragraph  18(b)   would  be   incomplete  as   regards  the allegation  of   the  corrupt   practice  committed  by  the appellant.      We are  driven to  this  conclusion  by  the  mandatory requirement of  sub-s. (3)  of s.  81 of the Act which is in two parts.  The first  part of  sub-s. (3)  of s.81 provides that every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof  as there  are respondents  mentioned in  the petition, and the second part relates to the manner in which such copy  shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to  be a true copy of the petition. It has already been stated  that mandatory  provisions  must  be  fulfilled exactly whereas it is sufficient if directory provisions are substantially fulfilled. In Ch. Subbarao v. Member, Election Tribunal, Hyderabad,(1) this Court held that (1) if there is a total  and complete  non-compliance of  the provisions  of sub-s.(3) of  s.81 the  election petition  might not  be "an election  petition   presented  in   accordance   with   the provisions of  this Part"  within the meaning of s.80 of the

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Act, and (2) by the expression "copy" in sub-s. (3) of s.81, it was  meant not  an exact  copy but  only one so true that nobody can  possibly misunderstand  it being not the same as the original.  In Ch.Subbarao’s  case, supra,  there was  no attestation at  the foot  of the  copies that they were true copies. It  was held  that the absence in the copy of a note to the effect that it was a ’true copy’ 656 could not detract the copy from being a true copy. The facts and circumstances  of the  case therefore  showed that there had been  a substantial  compliance with the requirements of sub-s (3)  of s.81  of the  Act. The  wider question whether sub-s. (3)  of s.  81 or  a part  thereof  is  mandatory  or directory was left open. On the facts of that case the Court held that  if there  was  substantial  compliance  with  the requirements of  sub-s. (3)  of s.81,  the election petition could not be dismissed.      It was  submitted on behalf of the appellant that there was total and complete non-compliance of the requirements of sub-s. (3)  of s. 81 and therefore the election petition was liable to  be dismissed  in limine under sub-s. (1) of s.86. The argument  to the  contrary advanced  on  behalf  of  the respondent was  that the  photograph filed  along  with  the election petition  had to  be treated as a document in proof of the allegations contained in paragraph 18(b) and not as a part of  the election petition. The submission is that there is a  distinction ’between  a schedule  or annexure  to  the petition referred to in sub-s. (2) of s. 83" and "a document which is merely evidence in the case which is annexed to the election petition" and to such a document sub-s. (3) of s.81 is not attracted.      The preliminary  issue and  the appeal  turn on a short point of  construction. The  question that arises is whether the words  "copies thereof" in sub-s. (3) of s.81 comprehend the election  petition proper  or do  they  also  include  a schedule  or   annexure  annexed  thereto.  The  controversy whether the  photograph was  a schedule or annexure in terms of sub-s.  (2) of s.83 or merely a document only in proof of the  allegations   in  paragraph   18(b)  must   turn  on  a construction of  sub-s. (3)  of s.81  read with sub-s.(2) of s.83. It now appears to be well settled by Sahodrabai’s case (supra) that  sub-s. (2)  of s.83 applies only to a schedule or annexure  which is  an  integral  part  of  the  election petition and not to a document which is produced as evidence of the election petition. In dealing with sub-s. (2) of s.83 of the Act it was observed:           "We are  quite clear  that sub-s.  (2) of s.83 has      reference not  to  a  document  which  is  produced  as      evidence of  the averments of the election petition but      to averments  of the  election petition  which are put,      not in  the election  petition but  in the accompanying      schedules or  annexures. We  can give quite a number of      examples 657      from which  it would  be  apparent  that  many  of  the      averments of the election petition are capable of being      put as schedules or annexures. For example, the details      of the  corrupt practice  there in the former days used      to be  set out  separately in  the schedules  and which      may, in some cases, be so done even after the amendment      of the present law. Similarly, details of the averments      too compendious  for being  included  in  the  election      petition may  be set  out in the schedules or annexures      to the  election petition.  The law  then requires that      even though  they are  outside the  election  petition,

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    they must be signed and verified, but such annexures or      schedules are  then  treated  as  integrated  with  the      election petition  and copies of them must be served on      the respondent  if the requirement regarding service of      the election  petition is  to be  wholly complied with.      But what  we have said here does not apply to documents      which are  merely evidence  in the  case but  which for      reasons of  clarity and  to lend  force to the petition      are not  kept back  but  produced  or  filed  with  the      election petitions.  They are  in no  sense an integral      part of  the averments  of the  petition but  are  only      evidence of  those averments  and in proof thereof. The      pamphlet therefore  must be  treated as  a document and      not as  a part  of the  election petition  in so far as      averments are concerned."      The High  Court rests its conclusion on the decision of this Court  in Sahodrabai’s  case, supra, but that decision, in  our   opinion,  is   inapplicable  to   the  facts   and circumstances of  the present  case.  In  Sahodrabai’s  case (supra) an  election petition  was filled  together  with  a pamphlet as  annexure thereto.  A translation  in English of the pamphlet  was incorporated  in the  body of the election petition and  it was  stated that  it  formed  part  of  the petition. A  preliminary objection was raised that a copy of the pamphlet  had not  been  annexed  to  the  copy  of  the petition served  on the returned candidate and therefore the election petition was liable to be dismissed under sub-s.(1) of s.86  of the Act. The Madhya Pradesh High Court sustained the  preliminary   objection  and   dismissed  the  election petition. On  appeal, this Court held that the words used in sub-s. (1)  of s.  81 are  only "the  election petition" and there was  no mention of documents accompanying the election petition. Since  the election petition itself reproduced the whole of the pamphlet in translation 658 in English,  it could  not be  said that  the averments with regard to  the  pamphlet  were  themselves  a  part  of  the petition and  therefore the pamphlet had in fact been served on the  returned candidate although in a translation and not in the  original. The Court then stated that even if it were not so, sub-s. (2) of s.83 of the Act has reference not to a document which  is produced  as evidence of the averments of the election  petition but  to  averments  of  the  election petition which  are put, not in the election petition but in the accompanying schedules or annexures.      It was  observed that  the details  of averments may be too compendious  for being  included in the petition and may be set  out in  the schedule  or annexure  to  the  election petition. The  Court then gave examples on which it would be apparent that many of the averments of the election petition are capable  of being put as schedules or annexures. It then went on  to say that such annexures or schedules are treated as integrated  with the election petition and copies of them must be  served on the returned candidate if the requirement regarding service  of the  election petition is to be wholly complied with.  But that  this rule  was not  applicable  to documents which  are merely  an evidence  in  the  case  but which, for  reasons of  clarity  and  to  lend  force  to  a petition, are  not kept  back but are produced or filed with the election petition. The Court added:           "They are  in no  sense an  integral part  of  the      averments of  the petition  but are  only  evidence  of      those averments and in proof thereof."      In that  view of  the matter  the Court  held that  the pamphlet in question had to be treated as a document and not

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as a  part of  the election petition so far as the averments were concerned.      It said:           "It would be stretching the words of sub-s. (2) of      s.83 too  far to  think that every document produced as      evidence in the election petition becomes a part of the      election petition proper. In this particular case we do      not think that the pamphlet could be so treated."      It  follows  as  a  necessary  corollary  that  if  the pamphlet had  not been  incorporated  in  the  body  of  the election petition, the decision of the Court in Sahodrabai’s case, supra,  would have  been otherwise.  That precisely is the case here. 659      In this  connection, we may next refer to the decisions of this  Court in  Jagat Kishore Prasad Narayan Singh v. Raj Kumar Poddar & Ors. (1) and Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram & Ors. (2) In  Jagat Kishore  Prasad Naryan  Singh’s  case,  supra, there  were   serious  discrepancies  between  the  original election petition filed in the Court and the copies supplied to the  contesting  candidates.  This  Court  dismissed  the election petition  on the ground of non-compliance of sub-s. (3) of  s.81 as  the  copies  furnished  to  the  contesting respondents were  not true  copies and  there was divergence between  the  allegations  made  in  the  petition  and  the allegations made in the copies, and that such divergence was bound to  mislead the  contesting candidates  and  prejudice their defence,  particularly in  a case  where the  returned candidate is  charged with corrupt practice. That is because he must  know the  nature of the charge against him, so that he may  prepare his  defence.  It  was  observed:  "The  law requires that  a true copy of an election petition should be served on  the respondents.  That requirement  has not  been either fully or substantially complied with."      The next  case in  point is Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram & Ors.(supra) where  the election petition was not accompanied by the  requisite number  of spare copies for service on the respondent and  no  schedules  were  filed  along  with  the petition. When the petition came up for scrutiny, the Deputy Registrar of the High Court asked the election petitioner to remove the defects. Before the date refixed the spare copies were filed  and the  defect removed. The question before the Court was whether the petition was liable to be dismissed in limine under  sub-s.  (1)  of  s.86  of  the  Act  for  non- compliance of  sub-s. (3)  of s.81.  The importance  of  the decision in  Satya Narain’s  case (supra)  lies in  the fact that the  Court laid  down that the first part of sub-s. (3) of s.81  which required that the election petition should be accompanied  by   as  many  copies  thereof  as  there  were respondents mentioned  in the  petition,  was  mandatory  in character and  non-compliance  with  it  was  fatal  to  the petition in view of sub-s. (1) of s.86.      The decision in Kamalam v. Dr. V.A. Syed Mohamad(3) may also be  referred. What  had happened in that case was this. The  signature   of  the   election  petitioner  by  way  of authentication appeared 660 at the  foot of  the copy  of the affidavit but there was no such signature  separately appended  at the foot of the copy of the  election petition. There was a preliminary objection raised that  since the copy of the election petition had not been attested  by the  petitioner under her own signature to be a  true copy,  there was  no compliance with sub-s.(3) of s.81 of  the Act  and hence  the petition  was liable  to be dismissed in  limine under sub-s. (1) of s.86 of the Act. In

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repelling the contention, the Court observed that the second part of  sub-s.(3) of  s.81 had  been complied with upon the view that  the copy  of the petition and the affidavit filed along with  it as  required by  law constituted  one  single document and  the signature in original of the petitioner in proof of  the affidavit  satisfied the  requirements of sub- s.(3)  of  s.81  of  the  Act.  In  explaining  as  to  what constitutes an  election petition for purposes of sub-s. (3) of s.81, it was observed:           "Now, the  first question  which arises  is as  to      what constitute an election petition for the purpose of      section 81,  sub-section (3).  Is it  confined only  to      election petition  proper or  does it  also  include  a      schedule or annexure contemplated in sub-section (2) of      section 83 or a supporting affidavit referred to in the      proviso to  section 83, sub-section (1)? To answer this      question, we  must turn  to section 83 which deals with      contents of  an election  petition. Sub-section  (1) of      that section  sets out  what an election petition shall      contain and  provides that  it shall  be signed  by the      petitioner and  verified in the manner laid down in the      Code of  Civil Procedure,  1908 for the verification of      pleadings.  The   proviso  requires   that  where   the      petitioner alleges  any  corrupt  practice,  prescribed      form in  support of  the  allegation  of  such  corrupt      practice  the   election   petition   shall   also   be      accompanied by  an affidavit in the and the particulars      thereof.  The  context  in  which  the  proviso  occurs      clearly suggests  that the  affidavit is intended to be      regarded as  part of  the election petition. Otherwise,      it need  not have  been introduced in a section dealing      with contents  of an election petition nor figured as a      proviso to  a sub-section which lays down what shall be      the contents  of an  election petition. Sub-section (2)      also by  analogy supports  this inference.  It provides      that any  schedule or  annexure to an election petition      shall be  signed by  the petitioner and verified in the      same  manner   as  an  election  petition.  It  is  now      established by the decision of this Court in Sahodrabai      Rai v. 661      Ram Singh  Aharwar that sub-section (2) applies only to      a schedule or annexure which is an integral part of the      election petition  and not  to a  schedule or  annexure      which is  merely evidence  in the  case  but  which  is      annexed to the election petition merely for the sake of      adding strength to it."      The test  to be  applied  in  determining  whether  the photograph referred  to in  paragraph 18(b)  is an  integral part of  the election  petition or  was merely  a  piece  of evidence in  proof of  the  allegations  contained  therein, depends on  whether it  is a part of the pleadings. Upon the view  that   the  photograph   was  not  merely  a  document accompanying the election petition but was a part and parcel of  the   pleading  contained  in  paragraph  18(b),  it  is unnecessary for  us to  deal with  the submission  based  on order VII,  r.14 of  the Code  of Civil Procedure, 1908. Our attention was  drawn to  the passage  in Sahodrabai’s  case, supra, at  p.18 of the Report. The Court observed that under order VII,  r.14 where  a plaintiff  sues upon a document in his possession  or power,  he is  required to  file only one copy of  the document  and not  as many  copies as there are defendants and  therefore a  copy of  the  document  is  not expected to be deliberate with the copy of the plaint to the answering defendants when summons is served on them and that

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it would be too strict a reading of the provisions of sub-s. (3) of  s.81 and  sub-s. (2)  of s.83  to lay  down that the election law provides anything different. These observations cannot, in our opinion, be read out of context. The decision in Sahodrabai’s  case, supra,  was that  since the  election petition itself  reproduced the  whole of  the pamphlet in a translation in  English, the  pamphlet filed  along with the petition had  to be  treated as a document and not as a part of the  election petition  and  that  being  so,  the  Court observed that it would be stretching the words of sub-s. (3) of s.81  and sub-s.  (2) of s.83 too far to think that every document produced  as  evidence  in  the  election  petition becomes a part of the election petition proper.      We would  add for the sake of completeness that we have been referred to the decision of this Court in Sharif-ud-din v. Abdul  Gani Lone (1) but that decision is not directly in point. One  of us  (Venkataramiah, J.)  had occasion to deal with the  corresponding sub-s.  (3) of  s.89 of  the Jammu & Kashmir Representation of the people Act, 1957 which reads: 662           "Every election  petition should be accompanied by      as  many   copies  thereof  as  there  are  respondents      mentioned in  the petition and every such copy shall be      attested by  the petitioner  under his own signature to      be true copy of the petition."      In that  case, both the copies of the election petition contained the  endorsement "Attested  true copy,  Piyare Lal Handoo, Advocate".  The question  arose whether  there was a sufficient compliance  with the  provisions of sub-s. (3) of s.89 of  that Act.  The Court pointed out that sub-s. (3) of s.89 consists  of two  parts. The  first part  requires that every election  petition shall  be accompanied  by  as  many copies thereof  as there  are respondents  mentioned in  the petition and  the second  part requires that every such copy shall be  attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be  a true  copy of  the petition.  The first part of the section has  been held to be a mandatory requirement by this Court in  Satya Narain’s  case (supra)  The Court  held  the second part also to be mandatory and observed:           "It is  true that sub-s.(3) of s.89 of the Act was      purely procedural  in  character  and  that  ordinarily      procedural law  should not  be given  that  primacy  by      courts as  would defeat  the ends  of justice. But if a      law even  though it  may  be  procedural  in  character      insists that an act must be done in a particular manner      and further  provides that  certain consequences should      follow if  the act  is not  done in  that  manner,  the      Courts have no option but to enforce the law as it is."      Upon that  view it was held that the attestation of the copies by counsel for the election petitioner as true copies was not  a sufficient compliance with the provisions of sub- s. (3) of s.89 of that Act as it required attestation by the election petitioner  himself. The decision is an application of the  rule that  mandatory provisions  must  be  fulfilled exactly.      It is  obvious  that  photograph  was  a  part  of  the averment contained  in paragraph  18 (b).  In the absence of the photograph  the averment  contained in  paragraph 18 (b) would be incomplete. The photograph referred to in paragraph 18 (b)  was therefore  an  integral  part  of  the  election petition. It  follows that  there was  total  non-compliance with the  requirements of  sub-s. (3  of s.81  of the Act by failure to  serve the  appellant with a copy of the election petition. In 663

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Ch. Subbarao’s  case, supra, the Court held that if there is a total  and complete  non-compliance with the provisions of sub-s. (3)  of s.81,  the election  petition  could  not  be treated an  "election petition  presented in accordance with the provisions  of this  Part" within the meaning of s.80 of the Act. Merely alleging that the appellant had put up fancy banners would  be of no avail unless there was a description of the banner itself together with the slogan.      The conclusion  is irresistible  that the words "copies thereof" in  sub-s.(3) of  s.81 read  in the context of sub- s.(2) of  s.83  must  necessarily  refer  not  only  to  the election petition  proper but also to schedules or annexures thereto  containing  particulars  of  any  corrupt  practice alleged therein.  That  being  so,  we  are  constrained  to reverse the  judgment of  the High Court insofar as it holds that the  photograph of  the fancy  banner  adverted  to  in paragraph 18 (b) could not be treated to be an integral part of the  election petition but was merely a piece of evidence as to  the nature  and type  of fancy  banner erected by the appellant and  therefore failure  to supply  a copy  of  the photograph to the appellant did not amount to a violation of the provisions of sub-s. (3) of s.81 of the Act.      For these  reasons, all  the appeals  and special leave petitions except Civil Appeal No. 38 (NCE) of 1981 must fail and are  dismissed. Civil  Appeal No.38(NCE)  of 1981 partly succeeds and  is allowed.  The judgment  of the  High  Court holding that the amount of Rs. 2000 having been deposited to the credit  of the Registrar, High Court in the Reserve Bank of India on the strength of pre-receipted challans issued by the  Accounts   Department  on  the  basis  of  a  lodgement schedule,  there   was   substantial   compliance   of   the requirements of  sub-s. (1)  of s.117 of the Act, is upheld. But the  judgment of  the High Court is set aside insofar as it holds that the failure to supply a copy of the photograph of the  fancy banner  referred to  in paragraph 18 (b) along with a  copy of  the election  petition to the appellant did not amount to a breach of the provisions contained in sub-s. (3) of s.81 of the Act, and instead we hold that the failure to do  so amounted  to non-compliance  of sub-s. (3) of s.81 inasmuch as  the photograph  of  the  fancy  banner  was  an integral part  of the  election petition  and therefore  the election petition  must be  dismissed summarily under sub-s. (1) of  s.86 of  the Representation of the People Act, 1951. We further  direct that  the High  Court  shall  permit  the appellant to  withdraw the  recrimination petition  filed by him under  s.97 of the Act in terms of the undertaking given by learned 664 counsel for  the appellant  during the course of the hearing of the appeal.      The costs  throughout shall  be borne by the parties as incurred. H.S.K                                 Civil Appeal No. 38/81                                           partly by allowed.                                     Petitions & Civil Appeal                                     Nos. 4216/82 and 1170/81                                                   dismissed. 665