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PETITIONER: THE MANAGING DIRECTOR, MADRASMETROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY ANDSE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: R.RAJAN ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/11/1995

BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) BENCH: JEEVAN REDDY, B.P. (J) MAJMUDAR S.B. (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCC  (1) 338        JT 1995 (8)   447  1995 SCALE  (6)723

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T B.P.JEEVAN REDDY,J.      Leave granted. Heard counsel for the parties.      These appeals are preferred against the judgment of the Division Bench  of the  Madras High  Court disposing of writ appeals,  preferred   by  the   respondents,  with   certain directions.      The  respondents,   R.Rajan  and   C.A.Rajan,  are  the Secretary and  President respectively  of the Association of Assistant  Engineers   in  the   service   of   the   Madras Metropolitan Water  Supply and  Sewerage Board  (The Board). Disciplinary action  has been  initiated against  them under the Madras  Metropolitan Water  Supply  and  Sewerage  Board Employees  (Discipline   and   Appeal)   Regulations,   1978 (Regulations). After  the receipt  of the  Enquiry Officer’s report, the  General Manager  of the Board issued notices to the respondents  calling upon  them to submit their defence, if any within seven days of the receipt of the said notices. A  copy   of  the   Enquiry  Officer’s   report  along  with depositions of  witnesses was  enclosed to the said notices. At that  stage, the  respondent approached  the Madras  High Court by  way of writ petitions contending that the Board is bent upon dismissing them from service, that they were being victimised for union activities and that the General Manager who has  issued the aforesaid notices has no jurisdiction to impose the punishment of dismissal. They also raised several grounds with  respect to  the regularity and validity of the manner in  which the enquiry against them was conducted. The appellants (respondents  in the  writ petitions) opposed the writ petitions  inter alia on the ground that the High Court ought not  have interfered  at that  stage  of  disciplinary proceedings. They  denied the  charges of  victimisation  or unfair labour  practice levelled  by the  respondents.  They also denied  that the  Board had already made up its mind to dismiss the  respondents. While  affirming the  power of the

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General Manager  to impose the penalty of dismissal upon the respondents, the  learned counsel  for the  Board appears to have stated  before the  learned Single Judge that the Board does not  propose to  impose the  punishment of dismissal on the respondents  (writ  petitioners)  even  if  the  charges against them  are established - vide Para 29 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge.      The learned  Single Judge  dismissed the writ petitions on the  ground that  no interference  is called  for at that stage of  the disciplinary  proceedings but  observed at the same time  that "even if the charges are held proved against the petitioners,  the punishment  of dismissal  from service shall not  be imposed on the petitioners in the light of the statement made  on behalf of the respondents". (In the above extract,  the   expression  "petitioners"   means  the  writ petitions who  are respondents  in  these  appeals  and  the expression "respondents" means the appellants herein.)      The respondents  filed two  writ  appeals  against  the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench was also  of   the  opinion   that  at   the  present  stage  of disciplinary proceedings,  no interference  is warranted  by the Court  under Article  226 of  the Constitution of India. The Bench  observed that "this is not the stage at which the Court can  issue a direction as to what punishment should be imposed and  what not". But then, it noted, "however, in the light of  the assertion on the part of the Managing Director that he  has  powers  to  impose  a  penalty  of  compulsory retirement, it  becomes necessary  to indicate  what are his powers relating to the officers having revised pay scales of Rs.2000-760-2300-75-3200-100-3500."* The  Bench examined the relevant regulations, the old and the revised pay scales and concluded that  the Managing  Director is  not competent  to impose the  penalty of  dismissal or  compulsory  retirement upon the respondents. The Division Bench held:      "The Managing  Director is not competent      authority to  impose penalties mentioned      in (f),  (g) and (h), viz., with-holding      otherwise than  on attaining  the age of      superannuation   and    dismissal   from      service respectively.  According to  the      regulations,  Board   is  the  competent      authority to  impose penalties mentioned      in (f)  and (g)  and Government  is  the      competent  authority   to   impose   the      penalty mentioned in (h)." ------------------------------------------------------------ *The respondents are in this pay scale. The writ appeals were accordingly disposed of with the above observations.      In the  present appeals  preferred by  the  Board,  the holding of  the Division Bench with respect to the powers of the Managing Director is called in question.      As rightly  held by  the learned  Single Judge  and the Division  Bench,  no  interference  was  called  for  at  an interlocutory stage  of the  disciplinary  proceedings.  The enquiry was  no doubt  over but  the competent authority was yet to  decide whether  the charges  against the respondents are established either wholly or partly and what punishment, if any,  is called for. At this stage of proceedings, it was wholly unnecessary  to go  into the  question as  to who  is competent to  impose which  punishment upon the respondents. Such an  exercise is  purely academic  at this at age of the disciplinary proceedings. So far as the learned Single Judge is concerned,  he did not examine the regulations nor did he record any  finding as to the powers of the General Manager,

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the Board  or the  Government, as the case may be. He merely directed that  in view  of the statement made by the learned counsel for the Board, the punishment of dismissal shall not be imposed  upon the respondents even if the charges against them  are  established.  When  the  respondents  filed  writ appeals, the  Division Bench  was also  of the  opinion that this was not the stage to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution  nor  was  it  a  stage  at  which  one  should speculate as  to the  punishment that may be imposed. But it appears that  the Board  insisted upon  a  decision  on  the question of  power. It  is because  of the  assertion on the part of  the appellants  (that the Managing Director has the power to  impose the  penalty of compulsory retirement) that the Division Bench examined the question of power on merits. The said  assertion of the Managing Director that he has the power to  impose the  punishment  of  compulsory  retirement probably created an impression in the mind of the Court that the Board  has already decided to impose the said punishment upon the  respondents and probably it is for the said reason that they  examined the said question on merits. (Insofar as the  respondents   are  concerned,   it  was  their  refrain throughout that  the Board had already decided to impose the punishment of  dismissal/compulsory retirement upon them and that the  enquiry and  all the other proceedings were merely an eye-wash.)      While we  agree that  expression of  any opinion on the question of  powers of  the Managing  Director, the Board or the Government  in the  matter of  imposition  of  penalties under the  regulations was unnecessary at this stage, we are of the  opinion that the Board cannot complain of it when it itself has invited the decision of the Division Bench on the said  question.   On  our   part,  we  refuse  to  make  any pronouncement on such an academic question at this stage and leave it open. Accordingly, we dismiss these appeals without expressing any  opinion on  the correctness  or otherwise of the holding of the Division Bench with respect to the powers of the Managing Director, the Board or the Government in the matter  of  imposition  of  punishments/penalties  upon  the respondents under  the aforesaid regulations. We only affirm the view  of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench that at  this stage  of  the  disciplinary  proceedings,  no interference is  warranted by  the High  Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.      No costs.