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PETITIONER: LINKS ADVERTISERS & BUSINESS PROMOTERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: COMMISSIONER,     CORPORATION     OF    THE     CITY     OFB

DATE OF JUDGMENT21/04/1977

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA GOSWAMI, P.K.

CITATION:  1977 AIR 1646            1977 SCR  (3) 670  1977 SCC  (3) 204

ACT:            City  of  Bangalore Municipal Corporation  Act,  1949--S.         136,  third proviso, cl (e)--Scope of--Advertisement  front-         ing  a  street put up within  railway  premises   "Fronting"         meaning of.         Words and Phrases--"fronting" meaning of.

HEADNOTE:             Section 136 of the City of Bangalore Municipal  Corpora-         tion Act, 1949 provides that every person who erects, exhib-         its  etc., over any land or structure any  advertisement  or         who  displays any advertisement to public view in any  place         whether public or private, shall pay on every  advertisement         a  tax levied by the Corporation.  Clause (e) of  the  third         proviso  to  the section enacts that no such  tax  shall  be         levied  on any advertisement which is exhibited  within  any         railway  station  or upon any wall or other  property  of  a         railway,  except any portion of the surface of such wall  or         property fronting any street.             An  advertisement facing a public street was put  up  by         the appellant adjacent to the compound fencing of a  railway         station  but  within  the railway  premises.  The  Municipal         authorities  levied tax on the  advertisement.  The   appel-         lant’s writ petition challenging the levy was dismissed by a         single judge of the High Court and this decision was  upheld         by a division bench.             On  appeal to this Court it was contended that  the  ex-         pression  "fronting  any street" occurring  in  the  proviso         qualified the railway property and  not  the advertisement.         Dismissing the appeal,             HELD:  1.  (a) Since the  advertisements  were  fronting         public   street  and were exposed to public view.  were  not         covered  by  the exemption contemplated by the  proviso  and         were, therefore exigible to tax. [677 D]             (b)  The  word  "fronting" qualifies  not  the  wall  or         property  mentioned  in the latter part of the  proviso  but         "advertisement".  The test laid down by the proviso is  that         the  Court has to see if the advertisement  affixed  whether         inside the compound of the railway or not fronts the street.         If  it fronts  the  street  or faces the street, even if  it         is  within the railway premises it will be exigible to  tax.         [674 D & F]

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           (c) The word "fronting" has been used in the proviso not         in  any legal technical sense but it ordinary parlance.   It         is  not  a term of art but one that  signifies  its  meaning         according to common notions. [675 D]             The Corporation of Madras v. Messrs The Oriental Mercan-         tile  Company  Ltd., Madras, [1966] 2 M.L.J.  440  and  Ware         Urban District Council v. Gaunt & Others. [1960] 3 All  E.R.         778, 787 distinguished.             2.  The view of the single Judge that since  the  public         street  to which the advertisements were facing,  ran  along         the  railings with no other obstacle between the  advertise-         ment  and the public view, it could reasonably be said  that         they  were fronting public street is correct.  On the  other         hand, the view of the Division Bench that the proviso  would         only apply to advertisements of  such hoardings whose owner-         ship lay with the railway or which  belonged  to  the  rail-         way is not borne out by el. (e).  The question of exigibili-         ty to tax is relatable not to the ownership of the hoardings         but their situs. [676 G-H]         671

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 325/1976.             (From the Judgment and Order dated the 3.12.1975 of  the         Karnataka High Court in Writ Appeal No. 284/74).                V.S.  Desai, Sanjev Aggarwal and R.B. Datar, for  the         appellant.               S.S. Javali, Jagannath Shetty and B.P. Singh for resp.         No. 1.             S.N.  Prasad  and Girish Chandra,  for  the   Intervener         Union of  India.             Nemo for respondent No. 2.              The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             FAZAL  ALI, J.---Whether hoardings  containing    adver-         tisements fixed in the premises of a railway station  front-         ing  a ,public  street are exigible to tax under the  provi-         sions of s. 136 of the City of Bangalore Municipal  Corpora-         tion Act, 1949 (Act No. LXIX of 1949)-- hereinafter referred         to as ’the Act’--is the substantial question of law involved         in this appeal by certificate.             The  facts of the case lie within a narrow  compass  and         the  point  raised by counsel for the appellant  is  one  of         first impression   and undoubtedly requires serious  consid-         eration.   The appellant is   a firm of advertising  commer-         cial goods and other items by putting up hoardings  contain-         ing advertisements on properties taken on lease licence from         various  owners.    The appellant also has been  putting  up         hoardings on railway lands in the compound of the  Bangalore         Railway  Station.    In the instant case, we are  only  con-         cerned  with the hoardings containing advertisements put  up         adjacent  to. the railway   compound fencing but within  the         railway premises by being placed on girders affixed to.  the         earth.   The fencing of the railway compound is adjacent  to         and faces a public street.   It is also not disputed by  the         parties  that  the advertisements are put up  at  sufficient         height  so.  as  to be clearly visible to  and  attract  the         attention  of  the  members of the  general  public  passing         through  the  public  street.  The  appellant  has  produced         photographs of some of the hoardings      which  demonstrate         these facts.             The Municipal Corporation of the City of Bangalore being         of the opinion that the hoardings containing  advertisements         put up by the appellant were exigible to tax issued a demand

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       notice dated  March  7, 1973 calling upon the. appellant  to         pay a sum o.f Rs. 5871-83 as the advertisement tax including         arrears.    The  appellant  represented   to  the  Municipal         authorities that as the hoardings containing  advertisements         were situate within the railway premises they squarely  fell         within clause (e) of the third proviso to s. 136 of the Act.         The  Municipal Corporation did not accept the contention  of         the appellants and pressed for-paying up the tax.             The appellant then filed a writ petition before the High         Court of Karnataka praying that the order of the Corporation         demanding payment of tax be quashed, because the  advertise-         ments were clearly         672         exempt  from tax by virtue of the aforesaid  proviso..   The         writ  petition was in the first instance heard by  a  single         Judge  who by his order dated April 4, 19.74  overruled  the         contention  of  ’the appellant and dismissed  the  petition.         Thereupon  the appellant filed an appeal under  the  Letters         Patent  before  a Division Bench which  also  affirmed   the         order of the single Judge, though on different grounds.  The         Division  Bench later on being approached under Art. 133  of         the Constitution granted a certificate of fitness and  hence         this appeal before us.               The only point that has been raised before us is  that         the hoardings containing advertisements squarely fall within         the exemption contained in the third proviso to s. 136    of         the  Act and, therefore, they  are not belong to   The  High         Court found that as the advertisements did not exigible   to         the Railway nor for the purpose of the Railway, the  proviso         in question did not apply and the Single Judge was right  in         holding  that the advertisements were exigible to tax.   The         single Judge had, however, found that as the  advertisements         were much above the railings which faced the public  street,         the proviso had no application.            Before  examining the view of the High Court, it  may  be         necessary  to extract the relevant portions of  the  statute         which we are called upon to interpret.  The relevant part of         s. 136 of the Act runs thus:                          "Every person who’ erects, exhibits,  fixes                       or retains upon   or over any land,  building,                       wail,  hoarding or structure  any   advertise-                       ment  or  who displays  any  advertisement  to                       public     view in any manner  whatsoever,  in                       any place whether public or private, shall pay                       on every advertisement which is so    erected,                       exhibited,  fixed,  retained or  displayed  to                       public view a tax calculated at such rates and                       in such manner and subject to such exemptions,                       as the corporation may, with  the approval  of                       the Government, by resolution determine:                         x       x      x       x                        "Provided  further that no such tax shall  be                       levied   on any advertisement which is  not  a                       sky-sign and which-                        x       x      x       x                          (e) is exhibited within any railway station                       of  upon  any  wall or other  property   of  a                       railway except any portion of the  surface  of                       such wall  or property fronting any street.                          Explanation  1.--The  word  ’structure’  in                       this ’section shall include any movable  board                       on wheels used as an advertisementor an adver-                       tisement medium."        (Emphasis supplied)         Section 136 of the Act which is the charging section clearly         shows  that the intention of the statute was to tax  certain

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       types  of  advertisements.  The pith and  substance  of  the         entire section, therefore, is the taxation of advertisements         fixed,  erected  or exhibited on any  land,  building  wall,         hoarding,  structure etc.  Thus it  is  manifest,  that   s.         136 contemplates tax on advertisements and not tax on  prem-         ises or         673         buildings.    This clear distinction has to be kept in  mind         in  construing the third proviso to s. 136 of the Act  which         falls  for determination in this case, particularly in  view         of  some  of the authorities relied upon  by  the  appellant         which  deal with tax on premises rather than tax  on  adver-         tisements.             The  essential conditions necessary for the  application         of s. 136 of the Act are--                           (i)  that a person should erect,  exhibit,                       fix or retain any advertisement upon any land.                       building,  wall,  hoarding  or  structure   or                       display any  advertisement  in  any manner;                           (ii)  that erection, exhibition,  fixation                       or retention or display of that  advertisement                       must be exposed to public view; and                           (iii)  that  the  advertisement  must   be                       exhibited in any place public or private.         The  sine  qua non for the application of this  section  is,         therefore,  that the advertisements displayed by any  person         must  be  to public view in any  manner  whatsoever.    Once         these conditions are satisfied, the person who exhibits  the         advertisements  is liable to pay tax on such  advertisements         As,  however,  the Act was merely to regulate  the  premises         falling within the Bangalore Municipal Corporation, it    is         obvious  that  the premises which did not  fall  within  the         Corporation  or which belonged to other autonomous  authori-         ties  could not be exigible to tax unless expressly so  pro-         vided.   Furthermore,   it appears  that the object  of  the         Municipal Corporation in charging tax was to keep the public         premises  clean and water-tight and  protect  advertisements         which  may amount to nuisance, because the ,Act lays down  a         procedure which has to be followed before the advertisements         could   be exhibited.   Consistent with this object,  there-         fore,  the  third  proviso to s. 136 of the  Act  grants  an         exemption  from tax on any advertisement which is  exhibited         in any railway station or upon any wail or other property of         a  railway.   Here also an exception is carved out which  is         that if such an advertisement, even though on any portion of         the railway property, faces any street it will not earn  the         exemption.             The central argument put forward before us by Mr. V.  8.         Desai  counsel  for  the appellant is  that  the  expression         "fronting  any  street" appearing in cl. (e)  of  the  third         proviso to s. 136 qualifies the railway property and not the         advertisement  so  that  the fact  that   the  advertisement         fronting  the street or which is exposed to public view   or         is  visible  to the public from the public street  will  not         make   the advertisement exigible to tax, if the  advertise-         ment  is within the railway premises or is adjacent  to  the         compound wall or any other property which itself is fronting         the street.   In other words, the contention was that having         regard  to the terminology of the word "fronting" it is  not         possible  to conceive that two portions of the property  can         front  a street at one and the same time unless they are  in         the same         674         line.    From  the photographs produced before us,  as  also         before  the High Court, it appears that the  hoardings  con-

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       taining  the advertisements are no doubt fixed just 2  or  3         feet  behind  the compound fencing  of the  railway  station         premises.    Mr. Desai, therefore, contended that  once  the         compound wall which is in front of the girders on which  the         advertisements  are  fixed faces the street,  there  is  no.         question of the advertisement facing the street.   Secondly,         it  was  contended that the test of fronting the  street  as         contained  in the third proviso is   that what  is  fronting         the street is not the advertisement but the property of  the         railway.    In  other words, it was argued that  as  in  the         instant  case the compound wall already fronted the  street,         the hoardings containing the advertisements being behind the         compound  wall,  though adjacent to it, cannot  be  said  to         front  the street, because two properties cannot  front  the         street at the same time.   We have given anxious  considera-         tion  to the arguments advanced by the learned  counsel  for         the appellant, but on a proper interpretation of the proviso         we are unable  to accept the same.   To. begin with, if  the         proviso  is read with reference to the context, then  it  is         absolutely clear that the verb "fronting" qualifies not  the         wall  or the property but the advertisement.    The  central         subject-matter  of  s. 136 as also of the proviso is  not  a         place  or building but advertisement which  alone  attracted         tax.    If we read the  third proviso in the following  man-         ner,  then the intention of the statute  becomes  absolutely         clear:                             "Provided further that no such tax shall                       be levied on any advertisement                        (e)  which  is exhibited within  any  railway                       station  or upon any wall of other property of                       a railway except any portion of the surface of                       such wall or property/fronting any street."                                (Emphasis supplied)         The  verb "fronting",’ therefore, does not qualify  wall  or         property  mentioned in the latter part of the. proviso.  but         the  noun advertisement. The test, therefore, laid  down  by         this proviso is that the Court has to see whether the adver-         tisement affixed whether inside the compound  of the railway         or not fronts the street.   If the advertisement fronts  the         street or faces the street even if it is within the  railway         premises, it will be exigible to tax.   For instance if the;         hoardings  containing the advertisements were  affixed  just         behind the compound wall and the advertisements did not face         the  street at all but faced the other side of  the  railway         station their back being to the street, then the  advertise-         ments  will  certainly be exempt from tax  and  the  proviso         would  clearly apply.   This seems to us to be  the  natural         interpretation  of the proviso having regard to the  context         in which it is placed.             Mr.  Desai learned counsel for the appellant  relied  on         the  definition of the word "fronting" as used  in  Stroud’s         Judicial Dictionary, 4th End., at p. 1121, where the learned         author while defining "fronting" observed thus:                             "Fronting.    (1)  Premises   "fronting,                       adjoining,  or abutting" on a STREET,  and  as                       such chargeable with expense                       675                       of  road-making under Public Health  Act  1875                       (c. 55), s. 150, did not need to be absolutely                       contiguous."         In  the first, place the author defines the word  "fronting"         within   the meaning of the Public Health Act,  1875,  which         levied  tax  on premises.   The author was not at  all  con-         cerned  with  tax on advertisement as in the  instant  case.         In  the case referred to in the book, the Court  was  called

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       upon  to judge the expenses on road-making under the  Public         Health Act.  It is, therefore, manifest that these consider-         ations would not apply to the facts of the present case.                           On  the other hand in Webster’s Third  New                       International  Dictionary  Vol.  I,  the  word                       "front" used as a verb is defined thus:                             "something   that  confronts  or   faces                       forward:  as (1): a face of a  building;  esp.                       the   face   that   contains   the   principal                       entrance   ...........................  put  a                       facing upon (e.g. the building with brick)  5:                       to face or look forward have the front toward,                       opposite,  or  over against  the   houses  the                       street)."         According  to the aforesaid dictionary  meaning   "fronting"         merely means that the article should face or have its  front         toward,  opposite or over against the house or  the  street.         In  our  opinion the word "fronting" has been  used  in  the         proviso  not in any legal or technical sense but as used  in         ordinary  parlance.   It is not a term of art but  one  that         signifies  its  meaning according to common  notions.    For         these reasons, therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that         as the advertisements upon the hoardings in the instant case         were  undoubtedly  facing or fronting the street  they  were         exigible to tax and the fact that they were a f[axed on  the         earth  which  formed the compound of the   railway  premises         would make no difference in view of the plain and  unambigu-         ous language of the proviso.             Learned counsel for the appellants relied on a  decision         of   the Madras High Court in The Corporation of Madras   v.         Messrs   The  Oriental Mercantile Company Ltd.,  Madras.  C)         This  authority,  however, can have no  application  to  the         facts  of the present case, because to begin with, there  is         nothing to show that the hoardings containing the advertise-         ments  were in any way fronting or facing the  street.    On         the  other hand, the advertisements were merely on the  out-         side   wall within the railway compound.   In these  circum-         stances,  therefore, this case does not appear to be of  any         assistance to the appellant.             Reliance  was then placed on a decision of  the  Queen’s         Bench  Division in Ware Urban District Council v. Gaunt  and         Others(2) and particularly on the observations of  Ashworth,         J., where  the  Judge observed as follows:                             "The remaining issue is, in a sense, the                       most troublesome of all, namely, whether it is                       open  to the appellants to apportion  part  of                       the expense on premises situate on the wester-                       ly                        (1) [1966] 2 M.L.J. 440,                       (2) [1969] 3 All E.R. 778, 787.                        4--707SCI/77                       676                       side of Walton Road but separated from it  b,y                       the public footpath.   This issue involves  as                       an ancillary problem the question whether part                       of  the expense should in any event be  appor-                       tioned on’ the public footpath.   Section 6 of                       the Act of 1892 provides, inter alia, that                              ".:..the expenses incurred by the urban                       authority  in executing private  street  works                       shall  be apportioned (subject as in this  Act                       mentioned)  on the premises fronting,  adjoin-                       ing,  or abutting on such street or pan  of  a                       street." "         The observations extracted above will show that there  also.

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       the Court was dealing not with a tax on advertisements but a         tax on premises, and the question of the frontage was inter-         preted  having regard to the place where the  premises  were         situate.   In the same judgment,  the learned Judge observed         as follows:                             "In each case, as it seems to me, regard                       must be paid to the context in which the words                       appear  and,  quite apart  front  any  decided                       cases, I am inclined to think that the context                       in  the  present case points  to  an  enlarged                       rather  than a restricted meaning of the  word                       "adjoin"."                                          (Emphasis ours)         It  is, therefore, clear that the meaning of the words  used         in  a particular statute has to be construed with  reference         to  the context and not in isolation, not is it possible  to         lay down any rule of universal application in a matter  like         this.    For these reasons, therefore, this  authority  also         does not appear to be apposite so far as the present case is         concerned.             The  Single Judge of the High Court, while  interpreting         the proviso, observed as follows:                             "These  advertisements in  question  are                       displayed on  the hoardings standing close  to                       the  cement fencing at the outer mark  of  the                       railway  property.   The cement  railings  are                       hardly  about 3 feet in height and the  adver-                       tisement boards are very much above the  rail-                       ings.    The Public street to which the adver-                       tisements  are  facing runs along  the  cement                       railings,  with no other obstacle between  the                       advertisement  boards  and  the  public  view.                       Therefore,  it  can reasonably, be  said  that                       they are fronting the Public Street."         We find ourselves in complete agreement with the view  taken         by the Single Judge.             The  Division  Bench of the High Court,  however,  while         upholding  the  judgment of the Single  Judge,  observed  as         follows:                             "In  the instant case, we are not  faced                       with any situation as the one envisaged in the                       second  part of the exemption clause  relative                       to advertisement on a wall or other property                       677                             of the railway ’frontage by street’.  We                       are concerned herein with the case of a hoard-                       ing  put up by and belonging to the  appellant                       and not the railway.   Hence, it is plain that                       no exemption on that score could be claimed on                       behalf of the appellant."         The  High  Court  does not appear to  have  interpreted  the         proviso  correctly.   The view of the High  Court  that  the         proviso would only apply to advertisements of such hoardings         whose  ownership lies with  the Railway or which  belong  to         the Railway is not borne out by cl. (e) of the third proviso         to  s. 236.   In other words the question of exigibility  to         tax  is relatable not to the ownership of the hoarding   but         its  situs.  Even if the hoarding does not belong   to   the         Railway  but to some private party, if it does not front the         street and is situated within the Railway premises or within         the  compound of the railway premises it is clearly  exempt.         We,  therefore,  do  not approve of the  line  of  reasoning         adopted by the Division Bench.             On a close and careful interpretation, therefore, of cl.         (e) of the third proviso to s. 136 of the Act we are clearly

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       of the opinion that on the facts proved in the present  case         as the hoardings,containing  the advertisements were  front-         ing  the  public street and were clearly exposed  to  public         view  and  the  members of the public  passing  through  the         street,  they are not covered by the exemption  contemplated         by  the proviso and are, therefore, exigible to tax.     The         demand  notice,  therefore, served on the appellant  by  the         Municipal  Corporation  for payment of tax  is  not  legally         erroneous.         The result is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.         P.B.R.                                     Appeal dismissed         678