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PETITIONER: LILLY KURIAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SR. LEWINA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT15/09/1978

BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH UNTWALIA, N.L. KOSHAL, A.D.

CITATION:  1979 AIR   52            1979 SCR  (1) 820  1979 SCC  (2) 124  CITATOR INFO :  R          1980 SC1042  (2,12,64,81,108)  E          1987 SC1210  (5,8,9,11)  RF         1988 SC  37  (15,16)  D          1988 SC 305  (8,10,17)  RF         1990 SC 695  (5)  R          1990 SC1147  (7)  R          1991 SC2230  (4)

ACT:      Constitution of  India-Article  30(1)-Scope  ambit  and nature of  right of  linguistic  and  religious  minorities- Whether regulatory restrictions can be imposed -What are the limits-interference  with   right  to  appoint  and  dismiss teaching and other staff-Whether providing a right of appeal against dismissal permissible.

HEADNOTE:      The Appellant  was appointed  as Principal  of the  St. Joseph Training  College for  Women, Ernakulam  in the  year 1957. In  October 1969,  there was  an unfortunate  incident between the  Appellant and  on Rajaratnam  a lecturer of the College placed on deputation by the Government. On the basis of a  complaint by  Rajaratnam, the Managing Board initiated disciplinary proceedings against the Appellant and appointed a retired  Principal of  a College to be an Inquiry officer. The Appellant  did not  participate in  the proceedings. The Inquiry officer  held the  Appellant guilty of misconduct. A show cause  notice was given to the Appellant. The Appellant however, filed  a  suit  challenging  the  validity  of  the proceedings. An  interim injunction  was issued by the Civil Court  restraining  the  Management  from  implementing  the decision, if  any. taken  in the meeting. The Managing Board after due  notice to the Appellant found that the charges of misconduct were  proved. Subsequently,  the Court  held that the dismissal  of the Appellant was legal and proper. During this period the Appellant was functioning as a Principal and had  sent   two  communications  to  the  Secretary  to  the Government  calling   for  termination   of  deputation   of Rajaratnam. The  Managing Board viewed the sending, of these

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communications by  the Appellant  without reference to it as an act of insubordination, and therefore, decided to conduct inquiry against  the Appellant and she was suspended pending inquiry. A substitute Principal was appointed. The Appellant filed an  appeal against  the order  of suspension  and  the Vice-Chancellor directed  that the status quo be maintained. The substitute  Principal filed  a suit  for  an  injunction restraining the  appellant from  functioning or  interfering with the  discharge of  duties of  the substitute  Principal which was  granted by the Munsif. The Vice-Chancellor by his orders held  that the  orders of  dismissal  and  suspension passed against  the Appellant  were  in  breach  of  natural justice and  fair play  and were  consequently illegal, null and void. He therefore, directed the Management to allow the Appellant to  function as  Principal. The Kerala. University Act, 1957  was enacted  to reconstitute  the  University  of Travancore into  a teaching  University for the whole of the State of Kerala. The definition of "teacher" in section 2(j) of the Act is wide enough to take in a Principal. Section 19 empowers  the   Syndicate  to  make  ordinances  fixing  the conditions of service of teachers. The Kerala University Act 1957 was  repealed by  the Kerala  University Act, 1969. The earlier ordinances  have been  saved and continued under the new Act.  Ordinance 33  provides for  an appeal to the Vice- Chancellor against  any order  passed by  the Management  in respect of the penalties including penalty of dismissal. 821      The Management  filed a suit in the Munsif’s Court. The substitute Principal   also filed a further suit against the Appellant and  the postal  authorities for  prohibiting  the postal authorities  from delivering  and the  Appellant from receiving the  articles addressed  to the  Principal of  the College.      The Trial  Court dismissed  the suits  holding that the Appellate  power   conferred  on   the  Vice  Chancellor  by ordinance framed  by the Syndicate was a valid conferment of power  and   even  after  the  commencement  of  the  Kerala University Act, 1969, both the Vice-Chancellor and Syndicate had concurrent  powers of  Appeal. It, therefore, upheld the orders of the Vice-Chancellor directing reinstatement of the Appellant in service. On appeal the District Judge held that the orders  of the  Vice-Chancellor were perfectly valid and with jurisdiction  and that  his direction to the Management to continue the Appellant as Principal was legal. The Kerala High Court reversed the judgment of the Courts below holding that the  conferment by the Syndicate of the right to appeal to a  teacher against the order of dismissal from service to the Vice-Chancellor  cannot be  said to  be in excess of the permissible limits  of the power to prescribe the duties and conditions of  service of  teachers in  private colleges  in terms of  s. 19(j)  of the  Kerala University Act, 1957, and the provisions  for a  right to appeal were not violative of the rights  guaranteed to  the  religious  minorities  under Article 30(1)  and were,  therefore, valid. According to the High Court  although the  Vice Chancellor  had the  power to hear an appeal against an order of dismissal he did not have expressly or  impliedly, the power to order reinstatement or even to  grant  a  declaration  that  the  services  of  the appellant had  been wrongly  terminated. It  was held that a statutory tribunal like Vice-Chancellor could not grant such a relief  as the same would amount to specifically enforcing the contract of service.      Dismissing the appeals the Court, ^      HELD: 1.  The expression conditions of service includes

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everything from  the stage  of appointment  to the  stage of termination of  service  and  even  beyond  and  relates  to matters pertaining  to disciplinary  action. The  High Court thus, rightly held that the right of the appeal conferred by ordinance 33 (4) forms part of the conditions of service and is, therefore, valid. [828F-G, 829A]      N.W.F. Province  v. Suraj Narain, 75 I.A. 343, State of U.P. v.  Babu Ram,  [1961] 2  SCR 679  and State of M.P. and Ors. v Shardul Singh [1970] 3 S.C.R. 302; relied on.      2. Protection  of the minorities is an article of faith in the  Constitution of  India. The  right is subject to the regulatory power  of the  State.  Article  30(1)  is  not  a charter for  maladministration; however  regulation, so that the right  to administer.  may be  better excised  for.  the benefits of  the institution, is permissible; but the moment one goes beyond that and imposes what is in truth not a mere regulation but  an impairment of the right to administer the Article comes  into play  and  the  interference  cannot  be justified by  pleading the  interests of the general public. the  interests  justifying  interference  can  only  be  the interests of the minority concerned. [837C-E]      3. It is clear from the judgment in St. Xaviers College case that  7 out  of  9  judges  held  that  the  provisions contained in  clauses (b) of sub sections 1 and 2 of Section 51(A) of  the Act  therein providing  for  the  disciplinary control of the 822 Management, over  the staff  of its  educational institution were not  applicable to an education institution established and managed  by religious  and  linguistic  minorities.  The reasons given  by the  majority were  that the  power of the Management to  terminate the  services of  any member of the teaching or  other academic and non-academic staff was based on the  relationship between  the employer and his employees and no  encroachment can  be made  on this right to dispense with their  services under the contract of employment, which was an integral part of the right to administer. [842B-D]      4. The  High Court went wrong in holding that the Vice- Chancellor  while  exercising  the  appellate  powers  under Ordinance 33(4) cannot direct rein statement of a teacher or grant a declaration that his dismissal was wrongful. It also fell into  error in  holding that the right of appeal before the Vice-Chancellor against the teachers of Private Colleges in the  matter of suspension and dismissal was not violative of the rights to religious minorities under Article 30(I) of the Constitution. [829B-C]      Ahmedabad st. Xaviers College Society and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Anr.  [1975] 1 SCR 173; relied on.      5. Unlike  Article 19,  the fundamental  freedom  under Article 30(1)  is absolute  in terms; it is not made subject to any reasonable restrictions of the nature the fundamental freedoms enunciated  in Article  19 may be subjected to. All minorities, linguistic or religious have by article 30(1) an absolute  right  to  establish  and  administer  educational institution of  their  choice,  and  any  law  or  executive direction which  seeks to  infringe the  substance  of  that right under  Article 30(1)  would be  to that  extent  void. [835F-G]      Rev. Sidhajbhai  Sabhai v.  State of  Bombay, [1963]  3 S.C.R. 837.      6. The  conferment of  a right  of appeal to an outside authority like  the Vice-Chancellor  under  Ordinance  33(4) takes away  the disciplinary power of a minority educational authority. The  right of  the vice-Chancellor  to  veto  the disciplinary power  of the  minority institution  is a clear

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interference with  its right.  It amounts to a letter on the right of administration under Article 30(1). [837E-G]      7. The power of appeal conferred on the Vice Chancellor in ordinance  33(4) is  not only a grave encroachment on the right of  the institution to enforce and cover discipline in its administration but it is uncanalised and unguided in the sense that  no ‘restrictions’  are placed on the exercise of the power.  The extent  of the  appellate power  of the Vice Chancellor is  unlimited and undefined. The grounds on which the Vice  Chancellor  can  interfere  are  not  defined  and indeed, the  powers are  unlimited. He  can  even  interfere against the  infliction of  punishment.  There  is  complete interference with  the  disciplinary  power  of  a  minority institution. In  the absence of any guidelines, it cannot be held that power of the Vice Chancellor under order 33(4) was merely a  check on  mal-administration.  The  ratio  of  St. xavier Colleges case is fully applicable. [842G-H, 843A-B]      8. Accordingly,  the judgment of the High Court setting aside the  two orders  of the Vice Chancellor upheld by this Court although for different reasons. [844E.-F]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 728-730 of 1975. 823      Appeals by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and Order dated 19-7-1973  of the  Kerala High  Court in S.A. Nos. 340 and 341/73 and A.S. No. 176/73.      M.  K.  Ramamurthy,  Amicus  Curiae,  S.  Balakrishnan, Amicus Curiae,  Miss R.  Vaigai and Lilly Kurian (In person) for the Appellant.      V. A. Seyid Muhammed and K. R. Nambiar for the State of Kerala.      L. N.  Sinha (for  RR 1,  2 and  11 in  CA 728),  M. I. Joseph (CA  729), P. P. Singh, (C.A. 729, 728 and 730/78) A. G. Puddissery  (C.A. 730/75)  and K. M. K. Nair for RR 1, 2, 11 and 12 in C.A. 728, RR. 3, 11, 12 and 13 and RR 1, 3-5 in C.A. 730/75.      P.  K.   Keshava  Pillai,   Frank  Anthony,  M.  K.  D. Namboodiry, K.  R. Choudhury, Baby Krishnan, B. Parthasarthi and Panduranga Rao for the Interveners.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SEN, J.-These appeals by special leave directed against the Judgment  of the  Kerala High Court dated July 19, 1973, raise a question of far reaching importance. The question is whether an  educational institution  established and managed by a  religious or  linguistic  minority  is  bound  by  the provisions  of   Ordinance  33(4),   Chapter  LVII   of  the Ordinances framed  by the  Syndicate of  the  University  of Kerala, under  section 19(j)  of the  Kerala University Act, 1957.      Smt. Lilly  Kurian, the appellant herein, was appointed as Principal  of the  St. Joseph Training College for Women, Ernakulam in  the year  1957. The College was established by the Congregation  of the  Mothers  of  Carmal,  which  is  a religious society  of Nnus  belonging to  the Roman Catholic Church, and is affiliated to the University of Kerala. It is administered by  a Managing Board, and the Provincial of the Congregation is its President.      On October  30, 1969, there was an unfortunate incident between the  appellant and  one P. K. Rajaratnam, a lecturer of the  College, placed  on deputation by the Government. On

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the basis  of a  complaint by Rajaratnam, the Managing Board initiated disciplinary proceedings against the appellant and appointed a  retired Principal  of the  Maharaja’s  College, Ernakulam, to  be the Enquiry Officer. The appellant did not participate in  the proceedings. The attitude adopted by the appellant unfortunately  was one  of  supreme  indifference, taking the  stand that  the Managing Board had no competence whatsoever to  initiate any  such disciplinary  action.  The Enquiry Officer by his 824 report dated November 27, 1969, held the appellant guilty of misconduct. The  Secretary of the Managing Board accordingly served her with a notice dated December 2, 1969 stating that a meeting  of the Board was to be held on December 19, 1969, to consider the representation, if any, made by her and also the punishment  to be  imposed, on the basis of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer.      In the wake of the disciplinary action, on December 16, 1969, the appellant filed a suit O.S. No. 819 of 1969 in the Munsiff’s Court,  Ernakulam, challenging the validity of the proceedings of  the Managing Board. On December 19, 1969 the Munsiff  issued   an  interim   injunction  restraining  the Management from  implementing the decision, if any, taken by it at  the meeting  to be held on that day. A meeting of the Board had,  in fact,  been held  and a decision was taken to remove the  appellant from  service. The  Provincial of  the Congregation by virtue of her office as the President of the Managing Board,  by order  dated January  2, 1970, dismissed the appellant  from service. It was stated that the Managing Board had after giving due notice to the appellant, and on a careful  consideration   of  the  enquiry  report,  and  the findings thereon,  found that the charges of misconduct were proved. The  appellant was accordingly directed to hand over all papers, files, vouchers and documents connected with the College to  Sr. Lewina,  Professor, without  further  delay, stating that  the order for her dismissal from service would be implemented immediately after the decision of the Munsiff on the application for temporary injunction.      On  January   17,  1970,  the  Munsiff  held  that  the dismissal of  the appellant  was free from any infirmity and was by  the competent authority, that is the Managing Board, and, therefore,  she had  no prima  facie case.  The Munsiff accordingly vacated  the injunction  with a  direction  that temporary injunction already issued will remain in force for two weeks to enable the appellant, if she wanted to move the Vice Chancellor  and obtain  from him a stay of the order of dismissal. The  appellant had,  in the meanwhile, on January 9, 1970;  already filed an appeal before the Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance  33(4), Chapter LVII of the Ordinance framed by the  Syndicate, against the order of dismissal. The Vice- Chancellor by  his order  dated January 24, 1970, stayed the operation of  the order  of dismissal. The suit filed by the appellant was  subsequently  dismissed  by  the  Munsiff  as withdrawn.      It  appears  that  the  appellant  was  all  the  while functioning as  principal of  the College. It was brought to light that  she had sent two communications dated October 6, 1969, and November 5, 1969, to 825 the  Secretary  to  the  Government,  Education  Department, calling  for   termination  of   deputation  of  Rajaratnam, appointed as a Lecturer in the College by the Management, as a result  of which  his  deputation  was  cancelled  by  the Government on  December 9,  1969. The  Managing Board viewed the sending of these communications by the appellant without

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reference  to   it  as   an  act  of  insubordination,  and, therefore,  decided   to  conduct  an  enquiry  against  the appellant  and   she  was   suspended  pending   enquiry.  A substitute Principal,  Sr. Lewina,  was  appointed  and  the appellant was  relieved of  the duties on April 10, 1970. On April 13,  1970 the  appellant filed  an appeal  to the Vice Chancellor against  the order  of suspension under Ordinance 33(1) of  Chapter LVII, and the Vice-Chancellor by his order dated April  20,  1970  directed  that  the  status  quo  be maintained. In  view  of  this  order,  the  Management  was presumably  apprehensive  that  the  appellant  might  force herself upon  the College.  The  substitute  Principal,  Sr. Lewina,  appointed   by  the  Management  in  place  of  the appellant accordingly  on July  2, 1970  filed the suit O.S. No. 405  of 1970  in the  Munsiff’s Court,  Ernakulam for an injunction restraining  the appellant  from functioning  and from  interfering   with  her   discharging  the  duties  as Principal. The  Munsiff granted  a temporary  injunction, in the terms prayed for, which was subsequently confirmed.      The Vice-Chancellor,  University of  Kerala, by his two orders dated  October  19,  1970  held  that  the  order  of dismissal from  service and  the order  of suspension passed against the appellant were in breach of the rules of natural justice and fair play and were consequently illegal and null and void,  and accordingly  directed the Management to allow her  to  function  as  Principal.  Before  the  orders  were communicated, the  Management filed the suit O.S. No. 110 of 1970 in the Munsiff’s Court, Ernakulam on October, 22, 1970, seeking  an   injunction  restraining   the  appellant  from functioning as  Principal of  the  College  and  obtained  a temporary injunction.  While these  two injunctions  were in force, the appellant wrote to the Superintendent of the Post Offices demanding  delivery  of  letters  addressed  to  the Principal at  her residence.  The  non-delivery  of  letters created a dead lock in the administration of the College. On July  22,   1972,  the   substitute  Principal,  Sr.  Lawine accordingly filed  a suit  O.S.  No.  569  of  1972  in  the Munsiff’s Court,  Ernakulam against  the appellant  and  the Postal Authorities  for prohibiting  the one  from receiving and the other from delivering, the postal articles addressed to the Principal of the College. All the three suits pending in the  Munsiff’s Court,  Ernakulam were transferred, by the order of the District Judge, Ernakulam to the 1st Additional Sub-Court, Ernakulam for disposal. 826      The trial  court by its judgment dated December 6, 1972 dismissed  the   suits  holding  that  the  appellate  power conferred on  the Vice  Chancellor by  cls. (1)  and (4)  of Ordinance 33,  Chapter LVII  of the  Ordinance framed by the Syndicate under  s. 19(j) of the Act, was a valid conferment of  power   on  the   Vice-Chancellor  and  even  after  the commencement of  the Kerala  University Act,  1969, both the Vice Chancellor  and the  Syndicate had concurrent powers of appeal. It,  therefore,  upheld  the  orders  of  the  Vice- Chancellor  directing  reinstatement  of  the  appellant  in service. On  appeal, the  District Judge,  Ernakulam by  his judgment dated  March 17,  1973 held  that the orders of the Vice-Chancellor   were    perfectly   valid    and    within jurisdiction, and  that his  direction to  the Management to continue the  appellant as  Principal in her office was also legal. He, accordingly dismissed the appeals.      The Kerala  High Court,  however, by its judgment dated July 19,  1973 reversed the judgment and decree of the court below and  decreed the plaintiffs’ suit holding that (i) the conferment by  the Syndicate  of a  right  of  appeal  to  a

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teacher against  his order  of dismissal from service to the Vice-Chancellor cannot  be said  to  be  in  excess  of  the permissible limits  of the power to prescribe the duties and conditions of  service of  teachers in  private colleges  in terms of  s. 19(j) of the Act, and (ii) the provisions for a right of  appeal  contained  in  Ordinance  33(1)  and  (4), Chapter LVII  of the  Ordinance were  not violative  of  the rights guaranteed  to the religious minorities under Article 30(1),  and   were,  therefore,   valid,  following  certain observations of  its earlier  Full Bench decision in V. Rev. Mother Provincial  v. State of Kerala. According to the High Court, although the Vice-Chancellor had the power to hear an appeal against  an order of dismissal under Ordinance 33(4), he had  not, expressly  or impliedly,  the  power  to  order reinstatement or  even  to  grant  a  declaration  that  the services of  the appellant  had been  wrongly terminated. It held that  a statutory  tribunal  like  the  Vice-Chancellor could not  grant such  a relief  as the same would amount to specifically enforcing  the contract of service. In reaching the conclusion,  the  High  Court  observes  that  this,  in effect, "amounts  to eviscerating the right of appeal to the Vice-Chancellor, but  the remedy  lies  elsewhere",  in  the light of the authorities cited by it.      The Kerala  University Act,  1957, "the  Act",  as  the preamble shows,  was enacted  to reconstitute the University of Travancore  into a  teaching University  for the whole of the State  of Kerala. Section 2(a) defines "college" to mean a college maintained by, or affiliated 827 to the  University. The  definition of  "teacher" in section 2(j) of  the Act  is wide  enough to take in a Principal, as any ’other  person imparting  instruction’. Section  5(viii) confers power  on the  University  to  affiliate  to  itself colleges within  the State in accordance with the conditions to be  prescribed  in  the  statutes  regarding  management, salary and  terms of  service of  members of  the staff, and other  such   matters,  and  to  withdraw  affiliation  from colleges. Section  15(2)(ii) enjoins  that the  Senate shall make, amend  or repeal  statutes of its own motion or on the motion of  the Syndicate.  The powers  of the  Syndicate are enumerated in  section 19,  the relevant provisions of which read:           "19.  Powers   of  the  Syndicate-Subject  to  the      provisions of  this Act and the Statutes, the Executive      Authority  of  the  University  including  the  general      superintendence and  control over  the institutions  of      the University  shall be  vested in  the Syndicate; and      subject  likewise,   the  Syndicate   shall  have   the      following powers, namely:-           (a)   to affiliate institutions in accordance with                the conditions prescribed in the Statutes;           (b)  to make  Ordinance and to amend or repeal the                same;                x    x    x    x    x    x    x    x           (j)  to  fix  the  emoluments  and  prescribe  the                duties  and  the  conditions  of  service  of                teachers  and   other  employees  in  Private                Colleges."      The Kerala  University Act,  1957 was  repealed by  the Kerala University  Act, 1969  which  came  into  force  with effect from  February 28,  1969. Section  75(2) of  the  Act provides that the statutes, ordinances, rules and byelaws in force immediately  before the commencement of the Act shall, in so  far as they are not inconsistent with its provisions, continue to be in force unless they are replaced.

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    The material  provisions of  Ordinance 33, Chapter LVII of the  Ordinances framed  by the  Syndicate  under  section 19(g) are as follows:-           "33(1) Suspension:  The management may at any time      place a  teacher under  suspension where a disciplinary      proceedings against  him is contemplated or is pending.      He  shall  be  paid  subsistence  allowance  and  other      allowances by  the  management  during  the  period  of      suspension at  such rates  as may  be specified  by the      University in each case. The teacher 828      shall  have  right  to  appeal  against  the  order  of      suspension to  the Vice-Chancellor  of  the  University      within a period of two months from the date on which he      receives the order of suspension.           (2) Nature  of penalties:  The following penalties      may for  good and  sufficient reasons  be imposed  on a      teacher by the Management:-            (i) Censure.           (ii) Withholding of increment.            (iii) Recovery  from pay  of any  pecuniary  loss                caused  to   the  institution/monetary  value                equivalent to the amount of increment ordered                to be withheld.           (iv) Reduction  to a  lower rank  in the seniority                list or to a lower grade or post.            (v) Dismissal from service.             The   Management  shall   be  the   Disciplinary      Authority in imposing the penalties.      X    X    X    X    X    X    X    X           (4) Appeal:  A teacher shall be entitled to appeal      to the  Vice-Chancellor of  the University  against any      order passed  by  the  management  in  respect  of  the      penalties referred to in items (ii) to (v). Such appeal      shall be  submitted within  a period  of  60  days  the      appellant receives the order of punishment."      The expression  "conditions of  service" covers  a wide range, as  explained by the Privy Council in N.W.F. Province v. Surai Narain which was approved by this Court in State of U.P. v.  Babu Ram. These decisions and also a later decision of this  Court in State of M.P. & Ors. v. Shardul Singh have made it  clear that  the expression  conditions of  service’ includes everything  from the  stage of  appointment to  the stage of termination to service and even beyond, and relates to matters  pertaining to  disciplinary  action.  Thus,  the expression ’conditions  of  service’  as  explained  in  the decisions of  the Privy  Council and  of this Court includes the power  to take  disciplinary action. The rules regarding these  matters   are  contained   in  Chapter  LVII  of  the Ordinances.  The  Management  of  a  private  college  under Ordinance  33(2)  is  constituted  the  appointing  and  the disciplinary 829 authority in  respect of  imposition of  punishment. In  the course of  any disciplinary  proceeding, a  right of  appeal before the  Vice-Chancellor is  given to a teacher dismissed from service  under Ordinance  33(4) of  the Ordinances. The High Court  thus rightly  held  that  the  right  of  appeal conferred by  Ordinance 33(4)  forms part of the ’conditions of service’ and, therefore, is valid.      The  High  Court  was,  however,  wrong  in  two  ways. Firstly, it  fell into  an error  in holding  that the Vice- Chancellor  while  exercising  the  appellate  powers  under Ordinance 33(4),  had not  the power to direct reinstatement of a  teacher or  grant a declaration that his dismissal was

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wrongful. It also fell into an error in holding that a right of appeal  before the  Vice-Chancellor given to the teachers of private  colleges under  Ordinance 33(1)  and (4), in the matter of suspension and dismissal, was not violative of the rights of  religious minorities  under article  30(1) of the Constitution.      Under  Ordinance   33(1),  a   teacher   placed   under suspension, has  a right  of appeal  against  the  order  of suspension to  the Vice-Chancellor. Under Ordinance 33(4), a teacher shall  be entitled  to appeal to the Vice-Chancellor against any  order passed  by the  management in  respect of penalties referred  to in  items (ii)  to (v)  of  Ordinance 33(2). Merely  because a right of appeal is provided without defining the powers of the appellate authority, it cannot be implied that such right does not include the power to direct reinstatement. The  conferment of  a power to hear an appeal necessarily invests  the appellate  authority with the power to annul,  vary or  set aside  the order appealed from. Such power is  incidental to  or is implied in, the power to hear an  appeal.  It  necessarily  has  the  power  to  grant  an appropriate relief.  Indeed, the  extent  of  the  appellate power under  Ordinance 33(4)  is not defined. When a teacher is dismissed  from service, the Vice-Chancellor can not only direct  reinstatement   but  also   modify  the   nature  of Punishment. The whole matter is at large before him.      In V. Rev. Mother Provincial v. State of Kerala (supra) a Full  Bench of  the Kerala  High Court  while dealing with section 56(4)  of the  Kerala University Act, 1969, observed that the  right of  appeal to  the Syndicate,  which being a large body  comprising of  as many as seventeen members will be subject  to pulls  and pressures,  was not  a body  which could be  entrusted with a judicial function of this nature. In that  view, it held that sub-section (4) suffers from the defect of  the appeal  being to  a forum  which seems  to be entirely unsuitable for the purpose, being unreasonable, and so much against the interests of the 830 institution, that  it can  hardly be  justified either  as a regulation of,  or as  a reasonable restriction on the power of the management. Incidentally, it observed:           "Though the  appeal lies  not, as  one would  have      expected, to  a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal but      to an  executive  body  which,  having  regard  to  its      composition, would  hardly be  able to  produce what is      ordinarily called a speaking order."      The High  Court has  read  more  into  the  Full  Bench decision than  there is,  and from the mere observation that the proper  remedy against  any abuse  of  the  disciplinary power would  be an  appeal, seem  to assume that a provision like Ordinance  33(4) would  not affect the right guaranteed to a  minority under Article 30(1), in matters pertaining to discipline. On the contrary, the Full Bench observed:-           "The Vice-Chancellor  can hardly  be  expected  to      have the  time to  deal with  such matters,  and in any      case, the  long delay that will necessarily be involved      would, by  itself render  the managing body’s powers of      disciplinary control largely ineffectual."      It is  contended on  behalf of  the appellant  that the right to  administer guaranteed  by  Article  30(1)  of  the Constitution  does   not  carry   with  it   a   ’right   to maladminister’.  It   is  urged   that  while   autonomy  in administration means  right to administer effectively and to manage and  conduct the  affairs  of  the  institution,  the University will  always have a right to see that there is no maladministration.  If   there  is   maladministration,  the

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University must  take steps  to cure  the same. The right to administer is,  therefore to  be  tampered  with  regulatory measures to  facilitate smooth  administration.  Regulations which will  serve the interests of the students, regulations which will  serve the  interests  of  the  teachers  are  of paramount importance  under good administration. Regulations in the  interest of  efficiency of  teachers, discipline and fairness in  administration  are  necessary  for  preserving harmony among  affiliated institutions.  It is urged that if the State  has any  role to  play in  the system  of general education, its power cannot be confined merely to the laying down of  a prescribed  standard of  education  for  minority educational institutions  but  should  also  extend  to  all necessary measures to secure an orderly, efficient and sound administration of  such institutions.  Once the  role of the State  in  the  system  of  general  education  is  properly understood  its   regulatory   power   over   the   minority educational institutions, it is submitted, would depend upon the nature or type of the educational institutions set up by a minority  and all other relevant factors, and no universal or general test can be 831 laid down.  The degree  of  permissive  State  control  must depend upon  the circumstances of each case. The right under Article 30(1)  forms part  of a  complex and inter-dependent group of  diverse social  interests.  There  cannot  be  any perpetually fixed  adjustment of  the right and those social interests. They  would need adjustment and readjustment from time to  time and in varying circumstances. Undoubtedly, the management of  a minority institution could not be displaced by the  regulatory measure.  But the  State has  a power  to regulate through  the agency  of the  University the service conditions of teachers and to secure a fair procedure in the matter of disciplinary action against them. These safeguards must  necessarily  result  in  the  security  of  tenure  of teachers and  must attract competent and qualified staff and thus could  ultimately improve the excellence and efficiency of the educational institution.      It is further urged that the reconciliation of minority rights  in  education  with  wider  social  and  educational objectives is  inevitably necessary  and this  involves  the judicial task  of  balancing  the  guaranteed  rights  under Article 30(1)  with social,  national or  educational values sought  to   be  regulated  or  protected  by  the  impugned legislation. It  has to  be kept  in  mind  that  today  the education has  to be  so designed  which would  subserve not only the  well being  of the  citizens in  the intellectual, ethical and  financial spheres  but would  inculcate amongst them a  senses of  individual and  social  consciousness  to contribute to  the welfare  and prosperity of an egalitarian society. It  is,  therefore,  urged  that  Ordinance  33(4). Chapter LVII of the Ordinances farmed by the Syndicate under s.19(j) of  the Act  is not violative of Article 30(1) as it seeks to  ensure justice  and  fair  play  to  the  teachers against arbitrary actions of the management.      It  is  next  urged  that  the  Vice-Chancellor,  while exercising his  appellate power  under  Ordinance  33(4)  is indeed clothed  with the  State’s inherent judicial power to deal with disputes between the parties and determine them on the merits, fairly and objectively.      It is urged that the contention that the impugned order passed by  the Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance 33(4) affects the fundamental  rights of  minority religious  institutions under Article  30(1), is  based on  a complete misconception about the  true nature and character of judicial process and

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of judicial  decisions. If this basic and judicial aspect of the judicial  process is  borne in mind, it is submitted, it would  be  plain  that  the  decision  given  by  the  Vice- Chancellor cannot  be said  to affect the fundamental rights guaranteed under  Article 30(1).  The remedy  for  a  person aggrieved by  the decision  of a competent judicial tribunal is to  approach for redress a superior tribunal, if there be one. 832      Lastly it is urged that the rights of the religious and linguistic  minorities   in  respect  of  their  educational institutions,  however,   liberally  construed,   cannot  be allowed  to   dominate  every   other  fundamental   rights, directive principles of State policy and broad ideals of the Constitution.  Article   30(1)  enables  the  minorities  to establish and  administer educational  institutions of their choice but  it is  said they  cannot be  entitled  to  exact unjustifiable preferential  or discriminatory  treatment for minority institutions so as to obtain benefits but to reject obligations  of   statutory  rights.  We  fail  to  see  the relevance of  these submissions while adjudging the validity of Ordinance 33(1) and (4) in the light of Article 30(1).      The appellant, who appeared in person, supplemented the arguments of  the learned counsel appearing as amicus curiae and urged  that if  the Court  does not uphold the powers of the  Vice-Chancellor  under  Ordinance  33(4)  it  would  be tantamount to  negation of  the State’s  regulatory power to prevent or  cure the  abuse of  power by the  management and throw the  teachers to  their arbitrary  actions without any security of  tenure. She  urged that the religious, cultural and linguistic  minorities though  deserve  a  generous  and sympathetic treatment,  cannot at  the same time be absolved of their  obligations to  conform to  the norms  of  natural justice and fair employment.      In assailing  the  view  of  the  High  Court,  learned counsel for  the  Management  contends  that  the  right  of administration of  minority educational  institutions  rests with the Management and the right of appointment, suspension and dismissal  of the  staff also  is part and parcel of the administration. In  a private  college, the  appointing  and disciplinary  authority  is  the  management.  Ordinance  33 relating to  the service  conditions of  teachers in private colleges authorises  the management to take any disciplinary proceedings. The  University has  no power to interfere into the administration  of the  college or into the disciplinary action taken  against a member of the staff. The creation of an appellate authority like the Vice-Chancellor, which is an outside agency, itself is an illegal abridgment of the right of  management  enshrined  in  Article  30(1).  That  apart, directing a dismissed Principal, who is the academic head of the college,  to hold  office  against  the  wishes  of  the founders of  the college  without  specific  power  in  that regard, is  an  anathema  to  the  right  of  administration guaranteed by  Article 30(1)  of the  Constitution.  If  the Vice-Chancellor were  to have  power of  reinstatement of  a dismissed  teacher,   the  result   would  be,   in  effect, appointing a  person against the will of the founders of the institution. The  conferment of  such a  power on  the Vice- Chancellor is  destructive of  the right  of management.  In support of the contention 833 that Ordinance  33(1) and  (4)  were  violative  of  Article 30(1), reliance  was placed on the decision in Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College Society & Anr. v. State of Gujarat & Anr.      Learned counsel  for the  interveners contends that the

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interposition  of   an  outside  authority  like  the  Vice- Chancellor,  demits  the  entire  disciplinary  power  of  a minority educational  institution  to  the  Vice-Chancellor. Under Ordinance  33(4) the  Vice-Chancellor has the power to veto   its   disciplinary   control.   There   is   complete interference with  the disciplinary  power of  the  minority institution. The  State may  ’regulate’ the  exercise of the right of  administration, but  it has no power to impose any ’restriction’ which  is destructive  of the right itself. In matters relating to discipline, the process of decision must be left  to the  institution. There  is direct  interference with this  right.  The  post  of  principal  is  of  pivotal importance in  the life of a college, around whom wheels the tone and  temper of  the institution,  on whom  depends  the continuity of  its traditions, maintenance of discipline and the  efficiency  of  its  teaching.  The  character  of  the institution depends  on the right choice of the principal by the management. The right to choose the principal is perhaps the most  important facet  of  the  right  to  administer  a college. In  the same  way, the  right to  dispense with the services of  the principal  is an equally important facet of the same  right. The  imposition of  any  trammel,  thereon, except  to   the  extent   of  prescribing   the   requisite qualifications and the experience or otherwise fostering the interests  of   the  institution   itself,  cannot   but  be considered as  a violation  of  the  right  warranted  under Article 30(1).      Learned counsel  appearing for  the  State  of  Kerala, however, while  conceding that  conferral of  arbitrary  and unguided  powers   on  an  outside  agency  like  the  Vice- Chancellor, would  be destructive of the right of management under Article  30(1), contends  that the  power of the Vice- Chancellor under  Ordinance 33(4)  to hear an appeal against an order  of dismissal  does not  suffer from  this vice. He tries to  limit the  appellate power  of the Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance  33(4) to  a case  where the  action of  the management is mala fide or where the order of dismissal is a nullity or  where the  management has acted in breach of the rules of  natural justice.  When so  read, it is urged, that the conferment of the right of appeal to the Vice-Chancellor in case  of disciplinary  powers of  a minority  educational institution, amounts  only to  a regulation  of such  power, and, therefore,  Ordinance 33(4) is not violative of Article 30(1).      Article 30(1) of the Constitution provides:- 834           "30. (1) All minorities, whether based on religion      or language,  shall have  the right  to  establish  and      administer educational institutions of their choice."      It is  clear beyond  doubt that  Article 30(1),  though couched in  absolute and  spacious terms  in marked contrast with other  fundamental rights  in Part  III, has to be read subject to  the regulatory  power of  the State. Though this Court has consistently recognized this power of the State as constituting an implied limitation upon the right guaranteed under Article  30(1), the  entire  controversy  has  centred around the  extent of  its regulatory  power  over  minority educational institutions.      In re  the Kerala  Education Bill,  1957(1), S. R. Das, C.J. explained  the content of the right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution, in these words:-           "We have already observed that Article 30(1) gives      two rights  to the minorities, (1) to establish and (2)      to administer educational institutions of their choice.      The right  to administer  cannot obviously  include the

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    right to  maladminister. The minority cannot surely ask      for aid  or recognition  for an educational institution      run by  them in  unhealthy  surroundings,  without  any      competent  teachers   possessing   any   semblance   of      qualification, and  which does not maintain even a fair      standard  of   teaching  or   which   teaches   matters      subversive of the welfare of the scholars. It stands to      reason,  then,   that  the   constitutional  right   to      administer an  educational institution  of their choice      does not  necessarily militate against the claim of the      State to  insist that  in order  to grant aid the State      may prescribe  reasonable  regulations  to  ensure  the      excellence of the institutions to be aided."      Thus, a  contention based  on the absolute freedom from State control  of the  minorities’ right to administer their educational institutions  was expressly  negatived  in  this case. The  Court clearly  laid down  a principle,  namely, a regulation, which  is not destructive or annihilative of the core or  the substance  of the  right under  Article  30(1), could legitimately be imposed.      The right  of a  minority community  to  establish  and administer educational  institutions  of  their  choice  was subject matter  of decision  by this  Court in more than one case.      In Rev.  Sidhajbhai Sabhai  v. State of Bombay, Shah J. (as he  then was)  speaking  for  the  Court,  negatived  an argument advanced on 835 behalf of  the State  that a  law could  not be deemed to be unreasonable  unless   it   was   totally   destructive   or annihilative of the right under Article 30(1), stating:                "The right  established by  Art. 30(1)  is  a           fundamental  right  declared  in  terms  absolute.           Unlike the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Art.           19, it  is not subject to reasonable restrictions.           It  is  intended  to  be  a  real  right  for  the           protection of  the minorities  in  the  matter  of           setting up  of educational  institutions of  their           own choice.  The right is intended to be effective           and is  not  to  be  whittled  down  by  so-called           regulative measures  conceived in the interest not           of the  minority educational  institution, but  of           the public  or the  nation as  a whole.  If  every           order which while maintaining the formal character           of a  minority institution  destroys the  power of           administration is  held justifiable  because it is           in the  public or national interest, though not in           its interest  as an  educational institution,  the           right guaranteed  by Art.  30(1)  will  be  but  a           ’teasing illusion’, a promise of unreality."      The learned Judge then went on to say:                "Regulation which  may  lawfully  be  imposed           either by  legislative or  executive action  as  a           condition of  receiving grant  or  of  recognition           must be  directed to  making the institution while           retaining its  character as a minority institution           effective  as  an  educational  institution.  Such           regulation must  satisfy a  dual test-the  test of           reasonableness, and the test that it is regulative           of the  educational character  of the  institution           and is  conducive to  making  the  institution  an           effective vehicle  of education  for the  minority           community or other persons who resort to it."      Unlike Article  19(1)  the  fundamental  freedom  under Article 30(1)  is absolute  in terms; it is not made subject

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to any reasonable restrictions of the nature the fundamental freedoms enunciated  in Article  19 may be subjected to. All minorities, linguistic  or religious,  have by Article 30(1) an absolute  right to  establish and  administer educational institutions of  their choice;  and  any  law  or  executive direction which  seeks to  infringe the  substance  of  that right under Article 30(1) would to that extent be void.      The extent  of the  regulatory power  of the  State was explained by Shah J., thus :           "This, however,  is not to say that it is not open      to the State to impose regulations upon the exercise of      this right. 836      The  fundamental   freedom  is   to  establish  and  to      administer educational  institutions : it is a right to      establish and  administer what are in truth educational      institutions,   institutions   which   cater   to   the      educational needs of the citizens, or sections thereof.      Regulation made  in the true interests of efficiency of      instruction, discipline,  health, sanitation, morality,      public order  and the  like may undoubtedly be Imposed.      Such regulations  are not restrictions on the substance      of the  right which  is  guaranteed;  they  secure  the      proper  functioning  of  the  institution,  in  matters      educational."      In Rev. Father W. Proost & Ors. v. The State of Bihar & Ors.(1) Hidayatullah  C.J. while dealing with Articles 29(1) and 30(1), said :           "In our opinion, the width of Article 30(1) cannot      be cut  down by  introducing in  it  considerations  on      which Art.  29(1) is  based. The  latter article  is  a      general protection  which is  given  to  minorities  to      conserve their  language, script or culture. The former      is  a   special  right   to  minorities   to  establish      educational institutions  of their  choice. This choice      is not  limited to  institution,  seeking  to  conserve      language, script or culture and the choice is not taken      away if  the minority  community having  established an      educational  institution  of  its  choice  also  admits      members of  other communities.  That is  a circumstance      irrelevant for  the application  of Article 30(1) since      no  such  limitation  is  expressed  and  none  can  be      implied, although  it is possible that they may meet in      a given case."      Incidentally, in  dealing with  the right under Article 30(1) and  the extent  of the  State’s power  of  regulatory control of  such right,  this Court in State of Kerala v. V. Rev. Mother Provincial observed:           "Administration means  ’management of the affairs’      of the  institution. This  management must  be free  of      control so  that the  founders or  their  nominees  can      mould  the  institution  as  they  think  fit,  and  in      accordance with their ideas of how the interests of the      community in  general and the institution in particular      will be  best served. No part of this management can be      taken away  and  vested  in  another  body  without  an      encroachment upon the guaranteed right.           There is,  however, an exception to this and it is      that the  standards of  education are  not  a  part  of      management as  such. These  standards concern  the body      politic and are dictated 837      by considerations of the advancement of the country and      its  people.   Therefore,  if   universities  establish      syllabi for examinations they must be followed, subject

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    however to  special subjects which the institutions may      seek to  teach, and  to a  certain extent the State may      also regulate  the conditions of employment of teachers      and  the   health  and   hygiene  of   students.   Such      regulations do  not bear  directly upon  management  as      such although  they may  indirectly affect  it. Yet the      right of  the State  to regulate education, educational      standards and  allied matters  cannot  be  denied.  The      minority institutions  cannot be  allowed to fall below      the standards  of excellence  expected  of  educational      institutions, or  under the guise of exclusive right of      management, to  decline to  follow the general pattern.      While the  management must be left to them, they may be      compelled to keep in step with others."      Projection of  the minorities is an article of faith in the Constitution  of India.  The right to the administration of institutions  of minority’s  choice enshrined  in Article 30(1) means  ’management of the affairs’ of the institution. This right  is, however,  subject to the regulatory power of the  State.   Article   30(1)   is   not   a   charter   for maladministration;  regulation,   so  that   the  right   to administer may  be better  exercised for  the benefit of the institution is  permissible; but  the moment one goes beyond that and  imposes, what  is in  truth, not a mere regulation but an  impairment of  the right  to administer, the Article comes into  play and the interference cannot be justified by pleading the  interests of the general public; the interests justifying interference  can only  be the  interests of  the minority concerned.      The conferment  of a  right of  appeal  to  an  outside authority like  the Vice-Chancellor  under  Ordinance  33(4) takes away  the disciplinary power of a minority educational authority. The  Vice-Chancellor has  the power  to veto  its disciplinary control. There is a clear interference with the disciplinary power  of the  minority institution.  The State may ’regulate’  the exercise  of the right of administration but it  has no  power to  impose any  ’restriction’ which is destructive of the right itself. The conferment of such wide powers on  the Vice-Chancellor  amounts  in  reality,  to  a fetter on  the right  of administration under Article 30(1). This, it  seems to  us, would  so  affect  the  disciplinary control of  a minority  educational  institution  as  to  be subversive of  its constitutional  rights and  can hardly be regarded  as  a  ’regulation’  or  a  ’restriction’  in  the interest of the institution.      In St.  Xaviers College  v. Gujarat  (supra) a Bench of nine Judges,  by a  majority of  seven  to  two,  held  that clauses (b)  of sub-sections  (1) and  (2) of  s. 51A of the Gujarat University Act, 1949 were violative 838 of Article 30(1). Section 51A(1)(b) enacts that no member of the teaching,  other academic  and non-teaching  staff of an affiliated college  shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank  except after  an enquiry  in  accordance  with  the procedure prescribed  in clause  (a) and  the penalty  to be inflicted on  him is  approved by the Vice-Chancellor or any other officer  of the  University authorised  by  the  Vice- Chancellor in  this behalf.  Similarly, clause  (b) of  sub- section  (2)   requires  that  such  termination  should  be approved by  the  Vice-Chancellor  or  any  officer  of  the University authorised by the Vice-Chancellor in this behalf.      It  was   argued  that   the  requirement   that   such termination  must   be  with   the  approval  of  the  Vice- Chancellor,  creates   a  fetter   in  matters  relating  to disciplinary control  over the  members of  the teaching and

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non-teaching staff.  The approval by the Vice-Chancellor, it was  said,   may  be   intended  to   be  a   check  on  the administration but  there were  no guidelines  provided and, therefore, clauses (b) of sub-section (1) and (2) of section 51A cannot  be said  to be  a permissive regulatory measure. These contentions were upheld by the majority.      While seven  Judges who constituted the majority upheld the provisions  of clauses (a) of sub-section (1) and (2) of section 51A,  as they  provided for a reasonable opportunity of showing  cause against  a penalty  to be imposed as being ’regulatory’, they held that clauses (b) of sub-sections (1) and (2)  of section  51A of  the Act, which confer a blanket power  on   the  Vice-Chancellor   to  interfere   with  the disciplinary  control   of  the  management  of  a  minority educational institution  over its  teachers, make  a serious inroad on  the  right  of  the  minority  to  administer  an educational institution guaranteed under Article 30(1).      To appreciate  the point  involved,  we  may  refer  to certain passages  of  the  judgment.  In  dealing  with  the question, Ray C.J., with whom Palekar, J. agreed, observed:           "In  short,   unlimited  and  undefined  power  is      conferred on  the Vice-Chancellor.  The approval of the      Vice-Chancellor may  be intended  to be  a check on the      administration. The provision contained in section 51A,      clause (b) of the Act cannot be said to be a permissive      regulatory measure  inasmuch as  it  confers  arbitrary      power on  the Vice-Chancellor to take away the right of      administration of  the minority  institutions.  Section      51A of  the Act  cannot, therefore,  apply to  minority      institutions."      The provision  for approval  of the Vice-Chancellor was held  to   be  bad   because  it   acted  as   a  check   on administration. Further, it was 839 held to  confer  arbitrary  powers  on  the  Vice-Chancellor because there  was no  guidelines on  the basis of which the Vice-Chancellor could withhold his approval.      Jaganmohan Reddy  J.,  speaking  for  himself  and  for Alagiriswami J. agreed with the opinion of Ray C.J.      In explaining  the extent of regulatory control, Khanna J. stated :           "Although disciplinary  control over  the teachers      of a minority educational institution would be with the      governing council,  regulations, in any opinion, can be      made for  ensuring proper  conditions of service of the      teachers and  for securing  a  fair  procedure  in  the      matter of  disciplinary action  against  the  teachers.      Such provisions  which are  calculated to safeguard the      interest of teachers would result in security of tenure      and thus  inevitably attract  competent persons for the      posts  of   teachers.  Such   a  provision  would  also      eliminate a  potential cause of frustration amongst the      teachers. Regulations  made for  this purpose should be      considered  to   be  in   the  interest   of   minority      educational institutions  and as  such they  would  not      violate article 30(1)."      He  accordingly  upheld  the  validity  of  clause  (a)      stating :           "Clause (a) of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section      51A of the impugned Act which make provision for giving      a reasonable  opportunity of  showing cause  against  a      penalty to  be proposed  on a member of the staff of an      educational  institution  would  consequently  be  held      to’be valid."      But he held clause (b) to be invalid saying :

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         "Clause (b)  of those  sub-sections which  gives a      power  to   the  Vice-Chancellor  and  officer  of  the      University authorised  by him to veto the action of the      managing body of an educational institution in awarding      punishment to  a member  of the  staff, in  my opinion,      interfere with the disciplinary control of the managing      body over  its teachers.  It is  significant  that  the      power of  approval conferred  by clause  (b) in each of      the two  sub-sections  of  section  51A  on  the  Vice-      Chancellor or  other officer  authorised by  him  is  a      blanket power.  No guide  lines are  laid down  for the      exercise of  that power and it is not provided that the      approval is  to be withheld only in case the dismissal,      removal, reduction in rank or termination of service is      mala fide  or by  way of victimisation or other similar      cause. The  conferment of  such blanket  power  on  the      Vice- 840      Chancellor or  other  officer  authorised  by  him  for      vetoing the disciplinary action of the managing body of      an educational  institution makes  a serious  inroad on      the  right  of  the  managing  body  to  administer  an      educational institution.  Clause (b) of each of the two      sub-sections of  section 51A should, therefore, be held      to be  violative of  article 30(1)  so far  as minority      educational institutions are concerned."      It  was  held  that  clause  (b)  interferes  with  the disciplinary control of the managing body over its teachers. The provision  does not  restrict its  operation in cases of mala fides  or victimisation, etc. In other words, the power of the  Vice-Chancellor was  complete. He  could refuse  his approval on  facts, that is to say, on reaching a conclusion that the action of the management was improper or invalid.      Mathew  J.,   speaking  for  himself  and  one  of  us, Chandrachud J. (as he then was) observed :           "It was  argued for  the petitioners  that  clause      (1)(b) of  s.51A has the effect of vesting in the Vice-      Chancellor a  general power of veto on the right of the      management to dismiss a teacher. The exact scope of the      power of  the Vice-Chancellor  or of  the office of the      University authorised by him in this sub-section is not      clear. If  the purpose  of the  approval is to see that      the provisions  of sub-section  51A(1) (a) are complied      with, there can possibly be no objection in lodging the      power of  approval even  in  a  nominee  of  the  Vice-      Chancellor.  But   an  uncanalised  power  without  any      guideline  to  withhold  approval  would  be  a  direct      abridgement of  the right  of the management to dismiss      or remove  a teacher or inflict any other penalty after      conducting an enquiry."      The Learned Judge then proceeded to observe:           "The relationship  between the  management  and  a      teacher is  that of  an employer  and employee  and  it      passes one’s  understanding why  the management  cannot      terminate the services of a teacher on the basis of the      contract of  employment. Of  course, it  is open to the      State in  the  exercise  of  its  regulatory  power  to      require that  before the  services  of  a  teacher  are      terminated, he  should be given an opportunity of being      heard  in   his  defence.   But  to  require  that  for      terminating the  services of  teacher after  an inquiry      has been  conducted, the  management  should  have  the      approval of  an outside agency like the Vice-Chancellor      or of  his nominee would be an abridgement of its right      to   administer   the   educational   institution.   No

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    guidelines are provided by the legis- 841      lature to  the Vice-Chancellor  for the exercise of his      power. The  fact that the power can be delegated by the      Vice-Chancellor to  any officer of the University means      that any  petty officer  to whom the power is delegated      can exercise  a general  power of  veto.  There  is  no      obligation under  the sub-sections (1)(b) and 2(b) that      the Vice  Chancellor or  his nominee  should  give  any      reason for  disapproval. As  we said  a  blanket  power      without any  guideline to  disapprove the action of the      management would  certainly encroach  upon the right of      the management  to dismiss or terminate the services of      a teacher after an enquiry."      He was of the opinion that such a provision constitutes a direct  abridgement of  the right  of  the  management  to dismiss or  remove a  teacher or  inflict any other penalty, after conducting an enquiry.      Dissenting two  of the  other Judges,  namely Beg,  and Dwivedi, J.  struck a  discordant note.  Beg J.  (as he then was) observed:           "Section 51A  of the Act appears to me to lay down      general  conditions   for   the   dismissal,   removal,      reduction  in  rank  and  termination  of  services  of      members of  the staff  of  all  colleges  to  which  it      applies. Again, we have not to consider here either the      wisdom or  unwisdom of such a provision or the validity      of any  part of  section 51A  of the  Act on the ground      that it  violates any  fundamental right other than the      ones conferred by Art. 30(1) of the Constitution."      Dwivedi J. stated:           "The purpose  of s.  51A is  to check this kind of      misuse of  the right  to fire an employee. So the Vice-      Chancellor’s power  of approval  is  not  unguided  and      unreasonable. After the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor      is the  next highest  officer  of  the  University.  It      should be  presumed that  in  granting  or  withholding      approval  ’he   would  act   according  to  reason  and      justice’.           When the  matter goes  before the  Vice-Chancellor      for approval,  both the  management and  the teacher or      the member of the non-teaching staff should be heard by      him.  Hearing  both  parties  is  necessarily  implied,      because without  hearing either  of  them  it  will  be      difficult for him to make up his mind whether he should      grant or  withhold approval  to the  action proposed by      the managing  body of  the educational  institution. It      would also follow that while granting approval 842      or  disapproval,   the  Vice-Chancellor  should  record      reasons, for  the exercise  of his  power is subject to      control by  courts. The statute does not make his order      final, and  courts would surely nullify his order if it      is arbitrary, mala fide or illegal."      An analysis  of the  judgments in St. Xaviers College’s case (supra)  clearly shows  that seven  out of  nine Judges held that  the provisions  contained in  clauses (b) of sub- sections (1)  and (2)  of section  51A of  the Act  were not applicable to  an educational  institution  established  and managed  by   religious  or   linguistic  minority  as  they interfere with  the disciplinary  control of  the management over the  staff of its educational institutions. The reasons given by  the majority were that the power of the management to terminate  the services  of any member of the teaching or other academic  and non-academic  staff  was  based  on  the

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relationship between  an employer  and his  employees and no encroachment could  be made  on this  right to dispense with their services  under the  contract of employment, which was an integral  part of the right to administer, and that these provisions conferred  on the  Vice-Chancellor or  any  other officer of  the University  authorised by  him, uncanalised, unguided and  unlimited power  to veto  the actions  of  the management. According  to the  majority view, the conferment an such blanket power on the Vice-Chancellor and his nominee was  an   infringement  of   the  right   of  administration guaranteed under  Art. 30(1)  to the  minority institutions, religious and  linguistic. The  majority was  accordingly of the view  that the  provisions contained  in clauses  (b) of sub-sections (1)  and (2)  of section 51A of the Act had the effect of  destroying the minority institutions disciplinary control over  the teaching  and non-teaching  staff  of  the college  as   no  punishment   could  be  inflicted  by  the management on  a member of the staff unless it gets approval from an  outside authority  like the  Vice-Chancellor or  an officer  of   the  University  authorised  by  him.  On  the contrary, the  two dissenting  Judges were  of the view that these provisions were permissive regulatory measures.      The power  of appeal  conferred on  the Vice-Chancellor under Ordinance  33(4) is  not only  a grave encroachment on the institution’s  right to enforce and ensure discipline in its  administrative   affairs  but  it  is  uncanalised  and unguided in the sense that no restrictions are placed on the exercise of  the power. The extent of the appellate power of the Vice-Chancellor  is not defined; and, indeed, his powers are unlimited.  The grounds on which the Vice-Chancellor can interfere in  such appeals  are also not defined. He may not only set  aside an order of dismissal of a teacher and order his reinstatement,  but may  also interfere  with any of the punishments enumerated in items- 843 (ii) to  (v) of Ordinance 33(2); that is to say, he can even interfere against  the infliction  of minor  punishments. In the absence  of any  guidelines, it  cannot be held that the power of  the  Vice-Chancellor  under  ordinance  33(4)  was merely a check on maladministration.      As laid  down by  the majority in St. Xaviers College’s case (supra),  such a blanket power directly interferes with the disciplinary  control of the managing body of a minority education  institution   over  its  teachers.  The  majority decision in  St. Xaviers  College’s case squarely applies to the facts  of the  present case  and accordingly  it must be held that  the impugned Ordinance 33(4) of the University of Kerala is violative of Article 30(1) of the Constitution. If the conferment  of such  power on  an outside authority like the Vice-Chancellor,  which  while  maintaining  the  formal character of  a minority  institution destroys  the power of administration, that  is, its  disciplinary control, is held justifiable  because  it  is  in  the  public  and  national interest, though  not in  its  interest  as  an  educational institution, the  right guaranteed by Article 30(1) will be, to use  the well-known  expression, a  ’testing illusion’, a ’promise of unreality’.      A distinction  is, however,  sought to be drawn between the provisions  contained in  clauses (b) of sub-section (1) and (2)  of section  51A of the Gujarat University Act, 1949 which provided  that no  penalty could  be  inflicted  on  a member of  the teaching  staff without the prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor  or his  nominee, and  that contained in Ordinance 33(4)  which confer  on  the  Vice-Chancellor  the power to hear an appeal against an order of dismissal. It is

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said that while a provision making the prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor a  condition  precedent  against  dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of an employee creates a fetter on  the  exercise  of  a  disciplinary  control,  which  the employer undoubtedly  has, the  provision conferring  on the Vice-Chancellor a  power to  hear an appeal leaves the power of the  employer untouched.  We are  afraid, the distinction tried to be drawn is without any basis.      We  must,   accordingly,  hold  that  Ordinance  33(4), Chapter LVII  of the  ordinances framed  by the Syndicate of the University  under section 19(J) of the Kerala University Act,  1969   would  not  be  applicable  to  an  educational institution  established  and  managed  by  a  religious  or linguistic minority  like St.  Joseph’s Training College for Women, Ernakulam.      Incidentally, the  Kerala University Act, 1969 has been repealed by  the Kerala University Act, 1974, which has come into force  with effect  from August 18, 1974. Section 65 of that Act  confers power  on the  Government to constitute an Appellate Tribunal. Any 844 teacher  aggrieved   by  an   order  in   any   disciplinary proceedings taken against him may under section 60(7) appeal to the  Appellate Tribunal  and the  Appellate Tribunal may, after giving  parties an  opportunity of  being  heard,  and after such  further inquiry  as may  be necessary, pass such orders thereon  as it  may deem  fit, including  an order of reinstatement of  the teacher  concerned. Section  61 of the Act  provides   that  (i)   pending  disputes   between  the management of  a private college and any teacher relating to the conditions  of service  are to  be decided  under and in accordance  with  the  provision  the  Act,  and  (ii)  past disputes of  such nature  which have  arisen after August 1, 1967, and  had been  disposed of  before the commencement of the Act,  shall, if the management or the teacher applies to the Appellate  Tribunal in that behalf within thirty days of the commencement  of the  Act, be  reopened and  decided  in accordance with  the provisions  of the  Act. We  have  been informed that  the appellant  has filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal,  Kerala under  section  61  (a)  of  the Kerala University  Act, 1974.  We refrain  from  making  any observation with  regard to that appeal. We wish to say that the validity  of sections  60(7),  61  and  65  was  not  in question before  us, and  so we express no opinion in regard thereto.      The result, therefore, is that the appeals fail and are dismissed. The  judgment of the High Court setting aside the two orders  of the  Vice-Chancellor  of  the  University  of Kerala dated  October  19,  1970,  is  upheld  though  on  a different  ground,   namely,   the   Vice-Chancellor   under Ordinance 33(1)  and (4)  had  no  power  to  entertain  the appeals from  the impugned orders of dismissal or suspension of the  appellant. The  costs shall  be borne by the parties throughout as incurred.      We are  thankful to  Sri M. K. Ramamurthi, who appeared as  an  amicus  curiae  for  the  appellant,  for  the  able assistance he has rendered. P.H.P.                                    Appeals dismissed. 845