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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1363 of 2007

PETITIONER: Lilawati Agarwal (dead) by Lrs.& Ors.

RESPONDENT: State of Jharkhand

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/04/2008

BENCH: DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT & P. SATHASIVAM

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT

CIVIL  APPEAL NO. 1363 OF 2007 WITH (Civil Appeal No. 2468/2008 @ SLP (C) NO. 15653 OF 2004 (Civil Appeal No. 2469/2008 @ SLP (C) NO. 15657 OF 2004  (Civil Appeal No. 2470/2008 @ SLP (C) NO. 15683 OF 2004  (Civil Appeal No. 2471/2008 @ SLP (C) NO. 20741OF 2004)  

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1.      Leave granted in SLP(C) Nos. 15653, 15657, 15683 and  20741 of 2004. 2.      All these appeals involve identical questions and are  therefore, taken up together for disposal.  The basic issues  involved in these appeals relate to entitlement of the  claimants/appellants for benefits under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2)  and Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short the  ’Act’).

3.      Factual position is almost undisputed and essentially as  follows:

Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was issued on  21.4.1965, Section 6 notification was issued on 10.11.1966 and  the Land Acquisition Collector’s Award was made on 6.4.1972.   Section 30 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (in  short the ’Amendment Act’) was introduced and made operative  with effect from 24.9.1984.

The reference court decided  reference on 30.9.1985, the  High Court held that in view of the decision of this Court in K.S.  Paripoornan v. State of Kerala [1994(5) SCC 593] the appellant  was not entitled to the benefit under Section 23(1-A), 23(2) and  Section 28 of the Act.

4.      Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the  benefit under Section 23(1-A) may not be available in view of  what has been stated in K.S. Paripoornan’s case (hereinafter  referred to as ’Paripuranan I’) yet in view of the decision of this  Court in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh [1989(2) SCC 754] and  in K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala [1995(1) SCC 367]  (hereinafter referred to as ’Paripoornan II’ )the benefit under  Section 23(2) and Section 28 of the Act are available.

5.      Learned counsel for the respondent-State and Bharat

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Coking Coal Ltd. (in short the ’BCCL’) the beneficiary for whose  benefit the land was acquired submitted that the view in  Paripuranan II is not correct as a three judge Bench had taken a  view clearly contrary to what has been stated by the Constitution  Bench in Raghubir Singh’s case (supra).

6.      By way of reply learned counsel for the appellant submitted  that even recently in Panna Lal Ghosh v. Land Acquisition  Collector [2004(1) SCC 467]  this Court has adopted a view taken  in Paripuranan II’s case (supra).

7.      In order to appreciate the rival submissions it is necessary  to take note of what has been stated in Raghuveer Singh’s case  (supra) which is as follows:

"31. In construing Section 30(2), it is just  as well to be clear that the award made by the  Collector referred to here is the award made by  the Collector under Section 11 of the parent  Act, and the award made by the Court is the  award made by the Principal Civil Court of  Original Jurisdiction under Section 23 of the  parent Act on a reference made to it by the  Collector under Section 19 of the parent Act.  There can be no doubt that the benefit of the  enhanced solatium is intended by Section  30(2) in respect of an award made by the  Collector between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984.  Likewise the benefit of the enhanced solatium  is extended by Section 30(2) to the case of an  award made by the Court between 30-4-1982  and 24-9-1984, even though it be upon  reference from an award made before 30-4- 1982.

34. Our attention was drawn to the order  made in State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh  [1986(1) SCC 365], but in the absence of a  statement of the reasons which persuaded the  learned Judges to take the view they did we  find it difficult to endorse that decision. It  received the approval of the learned Judges  who decided Bhag Singh v Union Territory of  Chandigarh [1985(3) SCC 737] but the  judgment in Bhag Singh’s case (supra) as we  have said earlier, has omitted to give due  significance to all the material provisions of  Section 30(2), and consequently we find  ourselves at variance with it. The learned  Judges proceeded to apply the principle that  an appeal is a continuation of the proceeding  initiated before the Court by way of reference  under Section 18 but, in our opinion, the  application of a general principle must yield to  the limiting terms of the statutory provision  itself. Learned counsel for the respondents has  strenuously relied on the general principle that  the appeal is a rehearing of the original matter,  but we are not satisfied that he is on good  ground in invoking that principle. Learned  counsel for the respondents points out that the  word ’or’ has been used in Section 30(2) as a  disjunctive between the reference to the award  made by the Collector or the Court and on an  order passed by the High Court or the

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Supreme Court in appeal and, he says,  properly understood it must mean that the  period 30-4-1982 to 24-9-1984 is as much  applicable to the appellate order of the High  Court or of the Supreme Court as it is to the  award made by the Collector or the Court. We  think that what Parliament intends to say is  that the benefit of Section 30(2) will be  available to an award by the Collector or the  Court made between the aforesaid two dates or  to an appellate order of the High Court or of  the Supreme Court which arises out of an  award of the Collector or the Court made  between the said two dates. The word ’or’ is  used with reference to the stage at which the  proceeding rests at the time when the benefit  under Section 30(2) is sought to be extended.  If the proceeding has terminated with the  award of the Collector or of the Court made  between the aforesaid two dates, the benefit of  Section 30(2) will be applied to such award  made between the aforesaid two dates. If the  proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal  before the High Court or the Supreme Court, it  is at that stage when the benefit of Section  30(2) will be applied. But in every case, the  award of the Collector or of the Court must  have been made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9- 1984.  (underlined for emphasis)

8.      In Raghubir Singh’s case (supra) two terminus points were  fixed i.e. Award by the Collector or decision of the reference Court  must have been taken between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984.  It has  been clearly stated in the last line of para 34 that every case  "must" have been decided between the aforesaid terminus.  In  Paripuranan II’s case (supra) at para 4 it was observed that  restrictive interpretation should not be given.  With great respect  we are unable to subscribe to the view. As a matter of fact a three  judge Bench was trying to give an interpretation different from  what was specifically given by the Constitution Bench.   

9.      Therefore, we think it appropriate to refer the matter to a  larger bench to consider correctness of the view expressed in  para 4 in Paripurnan II’s case (supra) holding that a restricted  interpretation should not be given, on the face of what has been  stated in para 34 of Raghuveer Singh’s case (supra).  Records  may be placed before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for  necessary orders.