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PETITIONER: LILA RAM ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/08/1975

BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ KRISHNAIYER, V.R. GUPTA, A.C. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA

CITATION:  1975 AIR 2112            1976 SCR  (1) 341  1975 SCC  (2) 547  CITATOR INFO :  R          1978 SC 515  (7)  D          1984 SC1767  (12)

ACT:      Land Acquisition  Act, Section  4-Execution of  Interim General Plan  for the Greater Delhi, if a public purpose for the purposes of the section.

HEADNOTE:      on September  3, 1957  the Chief  Commissioner of Delhi issued  a   notification  under   section  4   of  the  Land Acquisition Act  in respect  of land  measuring about  3,000 acres  mentioned   in   the   schedule   attached   to   the notification. lt  was also stated that the land is likely to be required  to be  taken at the public expense for a public purpose, namely,  for the  execution of  the Interim General Plan for  the Greater  Delhi. The notification was published in the  Delhi Gazette  on September 12 1957. Large tracts of land belonging  to the  appellant and  situated in  villages Garhi Jaharia Maria and Zamurdupur were covered by the above notification. Declaration  dated  February  15,  1961  under section 6 of the Act in respect of the land of the appellant and some  other lands  covered by the above notification was published on  February 23,  1961. On  or about  February 24, 1961 the  appellant filed  petition under article 226 of the Constitution challenging  the validity  of the  notification under section 4 of the Act on various grounds. It was argued on behalf  of the  appellant in  the  High  Court  that  the acquisition of  the land  was not for a public purpose. that the so-called  public purpose was merely a colourable device for freezing  huge areas of land and that there could not be successive declarations  under  section  6  of  the  Act  in respect of  the lands  covered  by  one  notification  under section  4   of  the   Act.  The  High  Court  rejected  the contentions and dismissed the writ petition.      Dismissing the appeal. ^      HELD :  ( I  ) The  public  purpose  mentioned  in  the notification  namely,  for  the  execution  of  the  Interim General Plan  for the  Greater Delhi,  is  specific  in  the

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circumstances and  does not  suffer from  any vagueness. The land covered  by the notification is not a small plot, but a huge area  covering thousands  of acres. In such cases it is difficult to  insist upon  greater precision  for specifying the public purpose because it is quite possible that various plots covered  by the  notification may  have to be utilised for different  purposes set out in the Interim General Plan. No objection  was also  taken by  the appellant  before  the authorities  that   the  public  purpose  mentioned  in  the notification was  not specific enough and as such he was not able to  file  effective  objections  against  the  proposed acquisition. [343F-H, 344A]      Munshi Singh  & Ors.  v Union  of India [1973] 1 S.C.R. 973: Aflatoon  & Ors.  v. Lt.  Governor of Delhi ors. A.I.R. 119741 S.C.  2077 and  Ratni Devi v. Chief Commissioner W.P. Nos. 332 and 333 of 1971 decided on April 13, 1975, referred to.      (ii)  The   lnterim  General   Plan  was  prepared  and published by the Government after approval by the Cabinet as a policy  decision for  development of  Delhi as  an interim measure till  a Master Plan could be made ready. In Aflatoon case this  Court laid  down that  the planned development of Delhi was  a public  purpose for the purpose of section 4 of the Act.  As the  object of  the Interim General Plan was to prevent haphazard  and unplanned  development of  Delhi  and thereby ensure  planned development  of Delhi. the execution of the  Interim General  Plan must  be held  to be  a public purpose for  the purpose  of section  4 of the Act. [344G H, 345A]      (iii) It  is, true the effect of the notification under section 4  of the  Act was to freeze the land, but that fact would  not   in  any   way  affect   the  validity   of  the notification. The  object of  a notification under section 4 is to  give public notice that it is proposed to acquire the land mentioned in the notification and 342 that any  one who  deals in  that  land  subsequent  to  the notification would  do so  at his  own  risk.  According  to section  23  of  the  Act,  in  determining  the  amount  of compensation to  be awarded for land acquired under the Act, the Court  shall  take  into  consideration,  besides  other factors the  market-value of  the land  at the  date of  the publication of  the notification  under  section  4.  It  is further provided  in section  24 of  the Act  that the Court shall not  take into consideration any outlay or improvement on, or  disposal of  the land  acquired, commenced,  made or affected without  the sanction  of the  Collector after  the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, It is,  therefore, obvious  that  the  consequences  of  the "freezing of  the land"  is inherent in the nature of things once the notification under section 4 is issued. [345B-D]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION; Civil  Appeal No. 35 and 989 of 1968.      From the  Judgment and order dated the 8th May, 1964 of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench) at Delhi in Civil Writ Nos. 76-D of 1961 and 604-D of 1962 respectively.      B. R.  L. Iyengar,  K. P.  Gupta, for the Appellants in C.A. No. 35 of 1968.      L. N.  Sinha, Solicitor  General of India, S. N. Prasad and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents in C.A. No 35 of 1968.      Hardayal Hardy, P. C. Bhartari and J. B. Dadachanji and

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Co., for the appellants in C.A. No. 989 of 1968.      L N.  Sinha, Solicitor  General of  India, S. N. Prasad and S. P. Nayar, the Respondents in C.A. No. 989 of 1968.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KHANNA, J.-This judgment would dispose of civil appeals No. 35  and 989 of 1968 which have been filed on certificate against the common judgment of the Punjab High Court whereby petitions under  article 226 of the Constitution file by the appellants and  others challenging  the validity of the land acquisition proceedings were dismissed.      We may  now set out the facts giving rise to appeal No. 35. On  September 3,  1957 the  Chief Commissioner  of Delhi issued  a   notification  under   section  4   of  the  Land Acquisition Act  (hereinafter refer-  red to  as the Act) in respect of the land measuring about 3,000 acres mentioned in the schedule attached to the notification. The material part of the notification reads as under:           "Whereas it  appears to  the Chief Commissioner of      Delhi that land is likely to be required to be taken at      the public  expense for a public purpose namely for the      execution of  the Interim  General Plan for the Greater      Delhi it  is hereby notified that the land described in      the Schedule  below is  likely to  be required  for the      above purpose." 343 The notification  was published  in  the  Delhi  Gazette  on September 12,.  1957. Large  tracts of land belonging to the appellant and  situated in  villages Grahi Jaharia Maria and Zamurdupur  were   covered  by   the   above   notification. Declaration dated  February 15,  1961 under section 6 of the Act in  respect of  the land of the appellant and some other lands covered  by the  above notification  was published  on February 23,  1961.  on  or  about  February  24,  1961  the appellant  filed   petition  under   article  226   of   the Constitution challenging  the validity  of the  notification under section  4 of  the Act  on various  grounds, to  which reference would  be made  hereafter. The  Union of India the Delhi Development  Authority and the Chief Commissioner were impleaded as  respondents in  the petition and affidavit was filed  on  their  behalf  by  Shri  K.  L.  Rathee,  Housing Commissioner. Delhi  Administration  in  opposition  to  the petition.      It was  argued on  behalf of  the appellant in the High Court that  the acquisition of the land was not for a public purpose, that  the so  called public  purpose was  merely  a colourable device  for freezing  huge areas of land and that there could  not be  successive declaration under section of the Act  in respect of the lands covered by one notification under section  4 of  the Act.  A Division  Bench of the High Court consisting  of Falshaw, C.J. and Mehar Singh J. (as he then was)  repelled  the  various  contentions  advanced  on behalf of  the appellants  and in  the result  dismissed the writ petitions.      Mr. Iyengar  on behalf  of the  appellant  has  at  the outset contend  ed  before  us  that  the  so-called  public purpose, namely,  "for the  execution of the Interim General Plan for  the Greater  Delhi"  is  vague  and  as  such  the notification is  liable to  be  quashed.  Reliance  in  this context has been placed by the learned counsel upon the case of Munshi  Singh and  ors. v.  Union of  India(1).  In  this collection we find that the judgment of the High Court shows that the  appellant did  not challenge  the notification  in question or  the acquisition  proceedings on the ground that the public  purpose mentioned in the notification was vague. As such,  the appellant in our opinion, cannot be allowed to

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agitate this  question for  the first  time in appeal. Apart from that,  we are  of the  view  that  the  public  purpose mentioned in  the notification. namely, for the execution of the Interm  General Plan  for the Greater Delhi, is specific in the circumstances and does not suffer from any vagueness. It is  significant that the land covered by the notification is not  a small  plot but  a huge area covering thousands of acres. In  such cases it is difficult to insist upon greater precision for  specifying the  public purpose  because it is quite  possible   that  various   plots   covered   by   the notification may  have to be utilised for different purposes set out  in the Interim General Plan. No objection. was also taken by the appellant before the authorities concerned that the public  purpose mentioned  in the  notification was  not specification enough  and as  such he  was not  able to file effective objections  against the  proposed acquisition.  In the case  of Munshi  Singh and Ors. (supra) the complaint of the appellant  was that  he was unable to object effectively under section 5A of the Act to the proposed acquisition. The      (1) [1973] 1 S.C.R. 973. 344 appellant in  that case in that context referred to the fact that a  scheme of planned development was not made available to him  in spite  of his  application. As  against that,  as already mentioned,  no objection  was taken by the appellant that because  of alleged  vagueness of the public purpose he was not  able to  file any effective objection under section 5A of  the Act.  The case  of Munshi  Singh, it  may also be pointed out,  was considered  by the  Constitution Bench  of this Court  in the case of Aflatoon and ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and ors.(l) and it was observed that in the case of acquisition of a large area of land comprising several plots belonging to  different persons,  the specification  of  the Purpose can only be with reference to the acquisition of the whole area.  Unlike in  the case  of acquisition  of a small area, it  might practically  be  difficult  to  specify  the particular public  purpose for  which each and every item of land comprised  in the  area is  needed. This  Court in that case upheld  the validity  of the  notification by  for  the acquisition of  land for "the planned development of Delhi". In  a   subsequent  unreported  case  Ratni  Devi  v.  Chief Commissioner(2) this  Court reiterated  after  referring  to Aflatoon’s case  that acquisition  OF land  for the  planned development of Delhi was for a public purpose.      There is also no force in the submission made on behalf of the  appellant that  the execution of the Interim General Plan is  not a  public purpose. The affidavit of Shri Rathee shows that consequent upon the increase in the population of Delhi  after  the  partition  of  the  country  the  Central Government decided  that a  single planning  and development authority should be set up to deal with the land and housing problems in  Delhi. As the constitution of such a body would have taken some time and as none of the existing authorities had the  necessary  lower  to  check,  control  or  regulate building  activities   which  were   rapidly  creating  slum conditions in  the city,  the  Delhi  (Control  of  Building operations) Ordinance  1955 was  promulgated on  October 22, 1955. The  Delhi  Development  (Provisional)  Authority  was constituted under the provisions of the ordinance to prevent unplanned and  haphazard development  and constructions. The ordinance was  later on  superseded by the Delhi (Control of Building operations)  Act,  1955.  Simultaneously  the  Town Planning organisation was set up in November 1955 to to draw up  a   Master  Plan  for  Delhi.  In  September  1956  this organization submitted  an Interim  General Plan  which  was

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considered by  the Central  Cabinet in  October 1956 and was approved subject  to such  variations,  as  might  be  found necessary on further examinations. It will thus be seen that the Interim  General Plan  was prepared and published by the Government  after  approval  by  the  Cabinet  as  a  policy decision for  development of  Delhi as  an interim  measure, till a  Master Plan  could be  made ready.  We have  already referred to  the case  of Aflatoon  wherein this  Court laid down that  the planned  development of  Delhi was  a  public purpose for  the purpose  of section  4 of  the Act.  As the object of  the Interim General Plan was to prevent haphazard and unplanned  development of  Delhi and  thereby to  ensure planned de-      (1) A. l’. R. 1974 S. C. 2077.      (2) WP.Nos.  332and 333  of 1971  decided on  April 13, 1975. 345 velopment of  Delhi, the  execution of  the Interim  General Plan must  be held to be a public purpose for the purpose of section 4 of the Act.      Equally devoid  of force  is the  submission  that  the proceedings for  the acquisition  of land  are liable  to be struck down  on  the  ground  that  the  notification  under section 4  of the  Act was issued for the collateral purpose of freezing  the land  of the  appellant. As  already stated above, the  public purpose  mentioned  in  the  notification under section  4 of the Act was the execution of the Interim General Plan  for the  Greater Delhi.  It is  true that  the effect of the notification under section 4 of the Act was to freeze the  land, but  that fact would not in any way affect the  validity   of  the   notification.  The   object  of  a notification under  section 4  is to give public notice that it  is  proposed  to  acquire  the  land  mentioned  in  the notification and  that  any  one  who  deals  in  that  land subsequent to  the notification  would do so at his own risk According to  section 23  of the  Act,  in  determining  the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under the Act,  the Court  shall take  into consideration, besides other factors,  the market  value of the land at the date of the publication  of the  notification under section 4. It is further provided  in section  24 of  the Act  that the Court shall not take into consideration any outlay or improvements on, or  disposal of,  the land  acquired, commenced, made or affected without  the sanction  of the  Collector after  the date of the publication of the notification under section 4. It  is  therefore,  obvious  that  the  consequence  of  the "freezing of  the land"  about which complaint has been made by the appellant is inherent in the nature; of things once a notification under section 4 is issued.      Reference has also been made by Mr. Iyengar to the fact that the  lands  of  some  others.which  were  also  earlier proposed  to   be  acquired   under  the  notification  were subsequently ordered  not to  be acquired. This fact too, in our opinion,  would not militate against the validity of the acquisition of  the land  of  the  appellant.  According  to section SA  of the  Act, any  person interested  in any land which has been notified under section 4, sub-section (1), as being need ed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a Company may, within thirty days after the issue of the notification, object  to the  acquisition of  the land or of any land  in the  locality, as the case may be. The objector is then  given opportunity  of being  heard and thereafter a report is  submitted to  the appropriate  Government by  the Collector containing  his recommendations on the objections. It is  for the appropriate Government thereafter to take the

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decision on the objections. There is, therefore, no inherent infirmity in  the decision  of the  Government in  accepting some of the objections and rejecting others. The question as to what  factors weighed  with the  authorities concerned in deciding not  to acquire the land of others need not be gone into in  these proceedings because that would not in any way affect the  validity of  the acquisition  of the land of the appellant      Civil Appeal  No. 989  of 1968  has been  filed by  the Birla Cotton  Spg. &  Wvg. Mills Ltd. in connection with the acquisition of its land 346 measuring 9  bighas 1  biswas situated in village Ada Chini. Notification under  section 4  of the  Act in respect of the appellant’s  land   was  issued   on  November   13,   1959. Declaration under section 6 of the Act was issued on May 14, 1962. Various  grounds were  urged before  the High Court on behalf of  the appellant  challenging the  validity  of  the acquisition of its land. We are not, however, concerned with them all  as Mr.  Hardy on  behalf of  the appellant in this appeal has  advanced only  one contention.  According to the learned counsel,  no adequate  opportunity was  given to the appellant of  being heard  after  the  appellant  had  filed objections under section 5A of the Act to the acquisition of the land. Clause (2) of section SA reads as under:           "(2) Every  objection under  sub-section (1) shall      be made  to the Collector in writing, and the Collector      shall give  the objector  an opportunity of being heard      either in  person or by pleader and shall after hearing      all such  objections  and  after  making  such  further      inquiry, if  any, as he thinks necessary, either make a      report in  respect of  the land which has been notified      under section  4, sub-section  (1), or  make  different      reports in  respect of  different parcels of such land,      to   the   appropriate   Government,   containing   his      recommendations on  the objections,  together with  the      record of the proceedings held by him, for the decision      of that  Government. The  decision of  the  appropriate      Government shall be, final." After notification  under section 4 of the Act was issued on November 13,  1959 the appellant company filed objections on December 12,  1959. Intimation  was thereupon  given to  the appellant that  the objections were fixed for hearing in the office of  the Collector  on May   9, 1961. According to the case of  the respondents,  no one representing the appellant company appeared  on the  date of  hearing. The  High  Court apparently accepted  this stand and in this context observed that no affidavit of the person who was alleged to have been present on  behalf of  the appellant on May 9, 1961 had been filed. In any case, the learned Judges had no doubt that the objections submitted  by the appellant were considered along with the  objections of  other interested persons before the decision was taken to go ahead with acquisition proceedings.      At the  hearing of the appeal Mr. Hardy has referred to judgment G  dated May  15 1972  of the Delhi High Court in a case filed  by the appellant company against the respondents relating to  the acquisition  of  some  other  land  of  the appellant. In  that case  a number  of affidavits were filed and on consideration of those affidavits as well as the fact that the  respondents had  not  been  able  to  produce  the relevant file before the High Court, the High Court inferred that a representative of the appellant has actually appeared before the Collector on May 9, 1961 when objections relating to the  acquisition of  the other  land were  taken up.  The finding of the Delhi High Court in

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347 the other  case cannot,  in our opinion, be of much avail to the appellant  because we  are  unable  to  rely  upon  that finding for  coming to  the conclusion that a representative of the  appellant actually  appeared before the Collector in support of the objections relating to the acquisition of the land in dispute in the present case. The present case has to be decided  upon the material brought on the record in this, case As  already observed  above, no affidavit of the person who was  alleged to have appeared on behalf of the appellant before the  Collector in  the proceedings  with which we are concerned was  filed. There  is also nothing to rule out the possibility of  a person  deputed to  attend the hearings of two different  cases fixed  for the  same date  in  a  court appearing in only one of them and not being present when the second case is called. The relevant file was sent for at the instance of  the appellant  company and  was produced before us. It contains the written representation of the appellant. We find  no indication  therein that a representative of the appellant was  actually present  before the Collector on May 9,  1961.   The  report  of  the  Collector  shows  that  he considered objections of a ,number of other parties who were present before  him and  sent his  recommendations about the lands of  those objectors.  As regards  the lands upon which nothing had  been built,  the recommendation  was  that  the objections of the objectors be ignored. The appellant’s land belonged to  the last mentioned category. We are, therefore, of the  view that  there is  no force in the contention that opportunity was not afforded to the appellant of being heard before the  Collector made  his report  to  the  appropriate Government with  his recommendations on the objections under clause (2) of section 5A of the Act.      As a result of the above, both the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs one hearing fee. V.M.K.                                     Appeals dismissed 348