25 November 2005
Supreme Court
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LIFE INSURNACE CORPORATION OF INDIA Vs R. DHANDAPANI

Bench: ARIJIT PASAYAT,R.V. RAVEENDRAN
Case number: C.A. No.-006200-006200 / 2004
Diary number: 1042 / 2004
Advocates: Vs S. R. SETIA


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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  6200 of 2004

PETITIONER: Life Insurance Corporation of India

RESPONDENT: R. Dhandapani                                                    

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/11/2005

BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & R.V. RAVEENDRAN

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.  

       The Life Insurance Corporation of India (in short the  ’LIC’) calls in question legality of the judgment rendered  by a Division bench of the Madras High Court, in a writ  appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent holding  that even if the penalty of removal from service is held to  be in order, the respondent-employee nevertheless would be  entitled to pension to which he would be entitled "but for  his removal".   

       Background facts in a nutshell are as under:

       Respondent was employed as an Assistant in the LIC in  the year, 1962.  He worked in the Coimbatore Branch of the  LIC from 1967 onwards.  Prior to that he had worked at Erode  for a period of 2 years i.e. from 1965 to 1967.  On  14.12.1983 he was transferred to Attur and therefore  relieved from the Coimbatore Branch.  However, the  respondent did not join duty at Attur and sought for  privileged leave.  Thereafter he claimed leave on medical  grounds.  He did not appear before the doctor designated by  the LIC to substantiate his claim of leave on medical  grounds.  Thereafter he continued to remain absent till the  time the charge sheet was issued to him on 16.8.1984.  As  the period of absence from duty was about 233 days, LIC  asked the respondent to appear before the doctor designated  by it pursuant to the powers under applicable Regulation  30(8) of LIC which inter alia provided that in the case of  sickness or accident an employee shall not absent himself  without submitting "a medical certificate satisfactory to  the competent authority". He failed to do so. After the  charge sheet setting out his misconduct of disobedience to  lawful order, insubordination and unauthorized absence from  duty was issued, he submitted a reply but did not take part  in the enquiry by asserting that no enquiry was needed.  The   enquiry officer after completing the enquiry found the  charges levelled against the employee had been proved.  The  disciplinary authority after taking note of that report held  that in view of charge of insubordination and disobedience  which were charges of serious nature and which had been  proved, it was not in the interest of the appellant - LIC to  continue him in service and directed his removal from

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service.  Respondent raised an industrial dispute under the  Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the ’Act’) before  the Industrial Tribunal, Madras.  In the counter affidavit  to the claim made by the respondent, the past conduct of the  respondent-employee was highlighted and it was pointed out  that he had been issued  charge sheets earlier in a span of  6 years on seven occasions.  It was also pointed out that he  had been penalised pursuant to the charge sheets on more  than one occasion.  The Industrial Tribunal after examining  the claim and the counter and the records of enquiry  concluded that the enquiry had been properly held, the  respondent was stubborn and adamant and there was not  justifiable reason for not reporting for duty to Attur.   Tribunal held that even in spite of all the lapses  highlighted, punishment of removal from service was harsh.   Instead of imposing of any specific punishment, directions  were given that the workman was to be deprived of three  fourth of the back wages from 17.12.1983 (the date when he  was relieved on transfer) till 15.4.1987 (date of   reference) and order for reinstatement in service with full  back wages from 16.4.1987 and all other benefits including  continuity of service.                    A writ petition was filed by LIC before the High  Court. A learned Single Judge dismissed it.  Thereafter the  Letters Patent Appeal was filed.  Stand of LIC before the  Division Bench was that in view of the provisions of Section  11-A of the Act it was not open for the Industrial Tribunal,  however wide the provision may be       construed, to substitute  its view solely on the ground that it felt that the penalty   was excessive without demonstrating as to how the penalty  which had been imposed was grossly disproportionate.  Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in CMC  Hospital Employees’ Union v. CMC Vellore Association (1987  (4) SCC 691)

       The High Court held that on the facts of the case, the  conduct of the respondent disclosed gross disobedience and  the proved misconduct was one of deliberate disobedience to  the orders of the superiors compounded by  adamant attitude  in remaining absent for a period of 233 days.  He did not  even appear before the doctor which the employer had  required him to do.  The Appeal was therefore allowed and  the Award of the Tribunal directing reinstatement with back  wages was set aside.  After doing so, the High Court granted  some reliefs which form the subject matter of challenge in  this Appeal.  The reliefs granted are contained in  Paragraphs 20 and 21 of the impugned order which read as  follows :

       "20: The employee had put in twenty two  years of service before he was removed.  We do  not think that it is just to deprive of the  benefit of those twenty two years of service and  permit the employer to withhold from him the  pension which he was, but for his removal,  qualified to receive on the basis of his  service.  In the circumstances, we feel it  appropriate and just to direct the employer to  grant him the pension for the period of service  that he had put in before his removal.  The  employer shall make the necessary computation  and shall disburse the amount due to him as  early as possible.

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21.     During the pendency of the matter in this  Court, the employee had been paid his last drawn  wages under Section 17 B of the I.D. Act.  The  respondent shall not be liable to refund all or  any of the sums so received by him."  

       Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the  High Court was not justified in granting the relief as noted  above after having found the conduct of the respondent to be  obnoxious and holding that his acts amounted to gross  insubordination.  It was pointed out after coming into force  of Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employees) Pension  Rules, 1995 (in short the ’Pension Rules’) as notified by  the Central Government, the employees who retired  after  1986 were alone eligible for pension.  Under the said Rules,  for the employees who had retired prior to 1.1.1986 and were  living  as on 1.11.1997 a scheme was framed for grant of   ex-gratia relief.  Such ex-gratia amount was to be paid from  1.11.1997 at a specified monthly rate with dearness relief   etc. The said scheme for ex-gratia relief specifically  provided that the same was not applicable to those who were  removed, dismissed or terminated from service of the  Corporation and those who had resigned from the Corporation  or to those who are on daily wage employment of the   Corporation.  Therefore the High Court could not have  granted relief of proportionate pension since the question  of payment of pension to the respondent would not arise as  he was removed from service on 25.3.1985.

       In response, learned counsel for the respondent  submitted that certain calculations were filed by the  appellant before the High Court indicating as to what would  be the amount of pension payable and the same was filed  during the course of hearing of a review application.  It  was, therefore, submitted that there was implied acceptance  of the direction and the question whether the Pension Rules  will apply or not, did not arise.  

       Learned counsel for the appellant by way of reply  submitted that the calculations on which reliance is placed  by the respondent was to show to the High Court, the quantum  of pension that would have been payable if the High Court’s  directions were to be implemented and it did not come in the  way of appellant challenging that part of the order, in  regard to which it had a grievance.  

       It is not necessary to go into in detail regarding the  power exercisable under Section 11-A of the Act.  The power  under said Section 11- A has to be exercised judiciously and  the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may  be, is expected to interfere with the decision of a  management under Section 11-A of the Act only when it is  satisfied that punishment imposed by the management is  wholly and shockingly disproportionate to the degree of  guilt of the workman concerned.  To support its conclusion  the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may  be, has to give reasons in support of its decision.  The  power has to be exercised judiciously and mere use of the  words ’disproportionate’ or ’grossly disproportionate’ by  itself will not be sufficient.

       In recent times, there is an increasing evidence of  this, perhaps well-meant but wholly unsustainable, tendency  towards a denudation of the legitimacy of judicial reasoning

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and process.  The reliefs granted by the Courts must be seen  to be logical and tenable within the framework of the law  and should not incur and justify the criticism that the  jurisdiction of the Courts tends to degenerate into  misplaced sympathy, generosity and private benevolence.  It  is essential to maintain the integrity of legal reasoning  and the legitimacy of the conclusions.  They must emanate  logically from the legal findings and the judicial results  must be seen to be principled and supportable on those  findings.  Expansive judicial mood of mistaken and misplaced  compassion at the expense of the legitimacy of the process  will eventually lead to mutually irreconcilable situations  and denude the judicial process of its dignity, authority,  predictability and respectability. [See: Kerala Solvent  Extractions Ltd. v. A. Unnikrishnan and Anr. [1994 (1) SCALE  631)].

       Though under Section 11-A, the Tribunal has the power  to reduce the quantum of punishment it has to be done within  the parameters of law.  Possession of power is itself not  sufficient; it has to be exercised in accordance with law.

       The High Court found that the Industrial Tribunal had  not indicated any reason to justify variations of the  penalty imposed.  Though learned counsel for the respondent  tried to justify the Award of the Tribunal and submitted  that the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge have  considered the case in its proper perspective, we do not  find any substance in the plea.  Industrial Tribunals and  Labour Courts are not forums whose task is to dole out  private benevolence to workmen found by Labour  Court/Tribunal to be guilty of misconduct.  The Tribunal and  the High Court, in this case, have found a pattern of  defiance and proved misconduct on not one but on several  occasions.  The compassion which was shown by the Tribunal  and unfortunately endorsed by learned single Judge was fully  misplaced.

        In the aforesaid background the Division Bench of the  High Court was wholly unjustified in giving directions  contained in paragraph 20 of its order, having set aside the  award of the Tribunal as affirmed by learned Single Judge.   The High Court has not even indicated as to under what  provision of law and/or statutory enactment or Regulation or  Scheme, pension was payable to the respondent.  On the  contrary, the Pension Rules and the Scheme referred to above  clearly justified the stand of the appellant that the  respondent was not entitled to receive any pension or  benefit under the scheme.   

       However direction given in Para 21 relating to payment  under Section 17-B of the Act needs no interference.

       The appeal is accordingly allowed in part and we set  aside the directions contained in para 20 of the order of  the Division Bench of the High Court.  Costs made easy.