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PETITIONER: LAXMIKANT REVCHAND BHOJWANI AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PRATAPSING. MOHANSINGH PARDESHI DECEASED THROUGH HIS HEIRSAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/09/1995

BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J)

CITATION:  1995 SCC  (6) 576        JT 1995 (7)   400  1995 SCALE  (5)481

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T Kuldip Singh, J.      Special leave granted.      Shantabai, predecessor  in interest  of the respondents herein, instituted  a suit under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging  House   Rates  Control  Act,  1947  (the  Act)  for possession of  the suit  premises  against  the  appellants- tenants. The  suit was  decreed  by  the  trial  court.  The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court and decreed the  suit. The Aurangabad Bench of Bombay High Court set aside  the judgment  of the appellate court and restored that of  the trial  court. This  appeal, by  the tenants, is against the judgment of the High Court.      The suit  premises was  rented to  the  appellants  for residential purposes  at a monthly rent of Rs.70/-. The rent was, later  on, increased  to Rs.80/-. The landlady served a notice  dated  July  28,  1972  terminating  the  appellants tenancy on  the grounds  of default  in payment  of rent and bona fide requirement by her. It was mentioned in the notice that arrears  of rent  from April  1, 1971 were due from the tenants. As  far as  the bona  fide requirement is concerned the trial  court rejected  the case  of the landlady. On the issue of  arrears of  rent the  trial  court  negatived  the contention of the landlady that the tenants neglected to pay the rent for more than six months. The trial court, however, held that the case of the landlady was covered under Section 12(3)(b) of  the Act  and since the tenants failed to comply with the said provisions they were liable to be evicted. The appellate court  came to  the conclusion  that the bona fide requirement was  not proved by the landlady. On the issue of arrears it  was held  that the  landlady, having  failed  to prove that  the tenants  neglected to pay rent for more than six months,  neither the  provisions of Section 12(3)(a) nor of Section  12(3)(b) of  the Act  were attracted and as such the appellate  court allowed  the appeal  and set  aside the

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judgment of  the trial  court. During  the pendency  of  the appeal the  original landlady  died and her legal heirs were brought on record.      The judgment  of the  appellate court was challenged by the respondents  by way of petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of  India. The High Court converted itself into an appellate  court and  reappreciated all  the issues dealt with and  decided by  the two  courts below.  The High Court reversed the  findings of  the appellate court and held that the appellants  neglected to  make payment of the arrears of rent in  terms of  Section 12(3)(a)  of the  Act and as such were liable to be evicted.      We may  at this  stage notice the provisions of Section 12 of the Act which are reproduced hereunder:-      "Section 12:      1)   A landlord shall not be entitled to      the  recovery   of  possession   of  any      premises so  long as the tenant pays, or      is ready  and willing to pay, the amount      of  the   standard  rent  and  permitted      increases,  if  any,  and  observes  and      performs the  other  conditions  of  the      tenancy,  in   so  far   as   they   are      consistent with  the provisions  of this      Act.      2)   No suit  for recovery of possession      shall  be   instituted  by   a  landlord      against tenant  on the  ground  of  non-      payment  of   the   standard   rent   or      permitted  increase   due,   until   the      expiration  of   one  month  next  after      notice in  writing of  the demand of the      standard rent  or permitted increase has      been  served  upon  the  tenant  in  the      manner provided  in Section  106 of  the      Transfer of Property Act, 1882.      3)a) Where the  rent is  payable by  the      month and  there is no dispute regarding      the amount of standard rent or permitted      increase, if  such rent or increases are      in arrears for a period of six months or      more and  the tenant  "neglects to  make      payment" thereof until the expiration of      the period  of one  month  after  notice      referred  to   in  sub-section  (2)  the      (court shall pass a decree) for eviction      in  any   such  suit   for  recovery  of      possession.      b)   In any  other case,  no decree  for      eviction shall  be passed  in  any  such      suit, if, on the first day of hearing of      the suit or on or before such other date      as the  Court may fix the tenant pays or      tenders in  court the  standard rent and      permitted   increases   then   due   and      thereafter continues to pay or tender in      court regularly  such rent and permitted      increases  till   the  suit  is  finally      decided and  also pays costs of the suit      as directed by the Court."      As mentioned above, the landlady served notice in terms of Section 12(2) of the Act on July 28, 1972. The notice was received by the appellants on August 1, 1972. The appellants sent a money order for Rs.400/- to the landlady on September 1, 1972. It is not disputed that the said amount covered the

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arrears upto  August 31,  1972. It  is also  on record  that another money  order for Rs.500/- was sent by the appellants on October  4, 1972  which covered  the arrears upto October 31, 1972.  The landlady  refused to  accept both  the  money orders.      As mentioned  above, the  notice under Section 12(2) of the Act was received by the appellants on August 1, 1972 and they sent  the first  money order  on September 1, 1972. The High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the money order, having  been sent  on September  1, 1972,  was within "the period  of one  month after  notice referred to in sub- Section 2".  The High Court, however, fell into patent error in reaching  the conclusion  that the  actual payment having not been  received by  the landlady  within the  said period there was  neglect on  the  part  of  the  tenants  to  make payment. The  sine qua  non for  eviction of  a tenant under Section 12(3)(a)  is "the  neglect to  make payment" and not the actual  making of the "payment". When a money order or a demand draft  is sent  to the landlord, during the specified period, it  cannot be said that the tenant has "neglected to make payment".  The expression  "neglect" means  "to fail to give due  care, attention,  or  time  to.  To  fail  through thought lessness  or carelessness.  To ignore or disregard". We are  of the view that in the facts of the present case it is not  possible to  hold that  the appellants  neglected to make payment  within the  specified period after the receipt of the notice.      Since the  total arrears  mentioned in the notice dated July 28,  1972 were  paid by the appellants and there was no neglect  on   their  part   to  make  payment,  neither  the provisions of  Section 12(3)(a)  nor of Section 12(3)(b) are attracted in  this case.  The High  Court fell  into  patent error in reversing the judgment of the appellate court.      Before parting  with this judgment we would like to say that the  High Court  was not  justified  in  extending  its jurisdiction under  Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the  present case.  The  Act  is  a  special  legislation governing landlord-tenant  relationship  and  disputes.  The legislature has,  in its  wisdom, not provided second appeal or revision  to the  High  Court.  The  object  is  to  give finality to  the decision  of the  appellate authority.  The High Court  under Article  227 of  the Constitution of India cannot assume  unlimited prerogative  to correct all species of hardship  or wrong  decisions. It  must be  restricted to cases of  grave dereliction  of duty  and flagrant  abuse of fundamental  principles  of  law  or  justice,  where  grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes.      We allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the appellate court. No costs.      The appellants  are paying  Rs.80/- per  month as  rent since 1980.  It would  be fair and just to increase the rent reasonably. After  hearing learned  counsel  we  direct  the appellants  to   pay  Rs.600/-  as  rent  with  effect  from September 1, 1995.