http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7  

PETITIONER: LAXMI DEVI SUGAR MILLS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NAND KISHORE SINGH.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/10/1956

BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. BENCH: BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA DAS, S.K. MENON, P. GOVINDA

CITATION:  1957 AIR    7            1956 SCR  746

ACT: Industrial  Dispute-Application for permission to dismiss  a workman-Resolution  passed at a meeting of the Labour  Union for  removal  of the General Manager-Vice President  of  the Union  addressing the meeting to instigate the  workers,  if guilty  of  misconduct and  indiscipline-Refusal  to  answer queries   by   the   General   Manager,   if   an   act   of insubordination-Theory   of  dual  capacity,   if   tenable- Dismissal,  if can be permitted on a ground not included  in the  charge  -Industrial Disputes (Appellate  Tribunal)  Act (XLVIII  of 1950) -U.  P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947  (U. P. Act XXVIII of 1947),a.     3,   Standing   Orders,    cl. L(1)(j).

HEADNOTE: The respondent, a stenotypist and the Vice-President of  the Labour  Union, was charged by the appellant with  misconduct and indiscipline under clause L(1)(j) of the Standing Orders of  the  Government  of Uttar Pradesh  for  instigating  the workmen to pass a resolution for the removal of the  General Manager by a defamatory speech delivered at a meeting of the Union.  The question in issue was whether the respondent  by doing  so had committed "any act subversive  of  discipline" within  the  meaning  of  that clause.   In  course  of  the correspondence with the General Manager over the matter,  as also during the enquiry made by him, the respondent took  up the  attitude that he, as a stenotypist, was not  answerable to his employers for his activities as Vice-President of the Union  outside the factory area and persistently refused  to answer  questions  categorically put to him by  the  General Manager.   The  appellant applied to  the  Labour  Appellate Tribunal  under s. 22 of the Industrial Disputes  (Appellate Tribunal)  Act  of  1960  for  permission  to  dismiss   the respondent.   That  application  having  been  refused   the appellant  obtained Special Leave to appeal to  the  Supreme Court  and  it  was  contended  that  the  passing  of   the resolution and the refusal to answer questions in course  of the   correspondence,and  the  enquiry  amounted   to   acts subversive of discipline and the respondent was liable to be dismissed.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7  

Hold, that it was perfectly legitimate for the Union to pass the, resolution they did and no guilt either of a breach  of the  Standing Orders or of committing an act  subversive  of discipline  could attach to the respondent for what part  he took  in the meeting as Vice President of the Union and  the order  of dismissal passed by the Labour Appellate  Tribunal must be affirmed. That where, as in the present case, the members of the Union were  of  opinion  that  the  circumstances  warranted   the resolution, it 747 was  not  for  the court to scrutinies  the  correctness  or otherwise the reasons for it. Held further, that the respondent was primarily an employ of the  appellant before he could be anything else and  was  in dut  bound to answer such queries as were put to him by  the Gener  Manager and his persistent refusal to do so,  on  the pretext  of  a dual capacity,  amounted  to  insubordination which  would have justifie his dismissal but  the  appellant having  omitted  to include this as ground  in  the  charge- sheet, which was served on the responds and formed the basis of the enquiry, could not be allowed to rel on it.

JUDGMENT: CiviL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 162 of 1954. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated the  21st day of July 1953 of the Labour Appellate  Tribunal of  India,  Lucknow in Miscellane ous Case No.  C-III-33  of 1952. H.J. Umrigar and R. A. Govind for the appellant B.P. Maheshwari for the respondent. 1956.  October 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI  J.-The  Labour  Appellate  Tribunal  of  India  at Lucknow  dismissed  the application of  the  appellant  made under  section  22  of the  Industrial  Disputes  (Appellate Tribunal)   Act,  1950,  for  permission  to   dismiss   the respondent,  its  workman, and the appellant  obtained  from this Court Special Leave to Appeal against that order. The  respondent has been working as a Steno-typist with  the appellant  since 3rd December, 1946, and is also  the  Vice- President of the Union of workers which is affiliated to the Indian  National Trade Union Congress and is known as  Chini Mills  Mazdoor  Sangh One M. P. Singh has  at  all  relevant times  been  and  is  still  the  General  Manager  of   the appellant. The  relations  between the appellant and its work  men  are governed  by the Standing Orders framed by mutual  agreement between  the  Labour and the Sugar Mills  in  Uttar  Pradesh which have been approved by 97 748 the  Government of Uttar Pradesh.  ClauseL(1)(j)of the  said Standing Orders runs as under:- "Drunkenness or gambling or riotous or disorderly  behaviour while  on duty in factory premises, or in quarters  provided by  the  mills  or  elsewhere  or  any  act  subversive   of discipline". These are among the items of misconduct which would  entitle the appellant, after due enquiry, to dismiss a workman  from its employ. There  were longstanding disputes between the appellant  and its  workmen since October, 1946, and on the 23rd  February, 1949,  Kedar  Nath  Khetan,  one  of  the  partners  of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7  

appellant,   wrote  to  Shri  Kashi  Nath  Pandey,   General Secretary,   Indian  National  Sugar   Workers   Federation, promising  to  remove  the General Manager as  soon  as  the season  of  the  Chhitauni factory  was  over.   There  was, however, an agreement arrived at between the partners of the factory  and  the  Chini Mills Mazdoor  Sangh  on  the  13th September,  1949, under which the demand for the removal  of the  General  Manager  was withdrawn by  the  workers.   The disputes,  however, continued and matters came to a head  in 1952.   In May, 1952, the management charged 76  members  of the  Union for participation in a  ’Tools-down’strike.   The matter  went up to the Labour Appellate Tribunal  which,  by its  award, reinstated all the 76 workmen.   The  management preferred  writ petitions Nos. 402 and 409 in the  Allahabad High Court but the same also were dismissed.  Special  Leave was obtained from this Court against those decisions of  the Allahabad High Court and the same are pending. During the pendency of the application of the management for the  discharge  of  the said 76 workmen  before  the  Labour Appellate Tribunal., the workers held a meeting on the  10th June,  1952,  near an old mosque outside  the  factory  area to  consider the situation arising out of the suspension  of the  76 workmen and the ways and means of meeting the  same. The respondent participated in the said meeting as the Vice- President  of  the Union and made a speech  criticising  the attitude of the General Manager in terms 749 which  were set out in the report dated the 10th June,  1952 submitted  by  two  workers by name Ganga  Dhar  Tewari  and Jamuna  Prasad  to the General Manager.  The speech  of  the respondent as reported there was to the following effect:- "The  General  Manager of this factory wants  to  crush  the Labour movement from the very beginning.  He allowed some of his  intermediaries to join strike when Shri  Shibban.   Lal Saxena  had  served  a  strike notice.   His  men  had  also persuaded  some  of our members to join the  strike.   As  a result  of this we had decided to launch a strike.   On  the other  hand, the Manager Sahib was sitting on the phone  for the  permission of the Collector to dismiss all  our  fellow workers.   Shri  Moti Lal Singh was able  to  discover  this conspiracy and he at once prevented us from going on strike. Then Manager Sahib could not succeed in his plan. This  time  he  has falsely accused 76  of  our  workers  of resorting  to Tools-down strike.  These workers will  surely be reinstated.  But our efforts are rendered useless due  to the  acts of the Government Officers; the Collector of  this District  is  getting some thing secretly from  the  Manager Sahib.   We  have only one alternative open to  us,  let  us again  agitate for his dismissal.  Many of  the  proprietors have written to me against him". A resolution was moved at that meeting for the reinstatement of the 76 workers and dismissal of Shri Madan Pal Singh, the General Manager and the same was passed. As  stated  above,  the two workers Ganga  Dhar  Tewari  and Jamuna  Prasad reported the proceedings of the said  meeting to  the General Manager on the very same day.   The  General Manager thereafter addressed a letter to the respondent  on- the  16th July, 1952  stating that he, the  respondent,  was present  in and addressed a meeting held on the  10th  June, 1952,  wherein,  among other matters, a resolution  for  the reinstatement of the 76 suspended workers and the removal of the General Manager was passed.  He asked the respondent  to give him information regard- 750 ing the above-mentiond facts within 24 hours of the  receipt

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7  

of  the  letter.  The respondent replied on the  17th  July, 1952, stating that he never attended any meeting whatever in his  capacity  as  the  Steno-typist  of  the  factory   and expressed  his inability, therefore, to say anything in  the capacity in which the letter dated the 16th July, 1952,  had been  addressed  by the General Manager to him.   Not  being content  with bypassing the whole issue in this  manner,  he proceeded  to  observe  that it was none  of  the  factory’s business  to  seek information from him  for  his  personal, social or political activities outside the factory area.  He stated  that as a matter of courtesy any  information  asked for  would  have been supplied by him, but,  as  the  things stood,  he very much regretted his inability to comply  with the  wishes  of the General Manager.   The  General  Manager again addressed a letter to the respondent on the 17th July, 1952,  stating that he was entitled to seek the  information from him even in his personal capacity and asked him to  let him  have the reply to the queries contained in  the  letter dated  the 16th July, 1952.  The respondent, in  his  letter dated  the 17th July, 1952 in reply, observed that  some  of the  conclusions drawn by the General Manager  were  "simply out  of  self-complacency" and he  respectfully  begged-  to differ  from  the General Manager.  He stated  that  he  had nothing  further to add to his earlier reply dated the  17th July, 1952. The  General  Manager  waited for a while  and  on  the  1st August,  1952,  served  upon the  respondent  a  chargesheet calling upon the respondent to show cause why action  should not  be  taken  against  him under  clause  L(1)(j)  of  the Standing  Orders for making a speech in a meeting held  near the  local  mosque on the 10th June, 1952,  ’wherein,  among other defamatory remarks he, the respondent, instigated  the workers  to  take  steps  for the  removal  of  the  General Manager.  The respondent was asked to submit his explanation latest  by 10 a.m. on the 2nd August, 1952.  The  respondent submitted  his  written  statement  accordingly  wherein  he stated that there was absolutely no justification whatsoever for charging him with broach of 751 the  Standing  Orders under clause L(1)(j).  He  denied  the allegations  contained in the charge-sheet and wound  up  by asking the General Manager to enlighten him as to under what rules of the Factories Act, Commercial Establishments Act or the  Standing Orders, written replies in the  matters  other than  one’s daily routine work of the factory were  demanded at such short notice. The General Manager fixed 10 a.m. on Monday the 4th  August, 1952, for the holding of the enquiry and the respondent  was called  upon  to  present himself in time and  he  was  also intimated  that  he would be at liberty to produce  oral  or documentary  evidence in defence against the charges  framed against him. An  enquiry was accordingly (held by the General Manager  on the 4th August, 1952.  The proceedings thereat were recorded in  the  form  of questions  and  answers.   The  respondent adopted an attitude which was consistent with the one  which he  had  adopted in the course of the  correspondence  above referred to.  He refused to answer the questions which  were categorically  put by the General Manager to him and  stated that  he had nothing -to add to his written  statement.   He also  took up the attitude that if he had taken part in  any meeting  held under the auspices of the Chini Mills  Mazdoor Sangh outside the factory, the General Manager should  write to  the  officials of the Sangh for  necessary  information. When  it  was specifically put to him that  no  confidential

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7  

work  was  taken  from  him as he  had  been  taking  active interest  in the anti-management activities maliciously  and had  been exploiting the poor labour to force himself  being confirmed  by the management, he said that he did not  agree with it and it was not a question which needed any reply. As  a  result of the enquiry, the General Manager  made  his report on the 24th October, 1952, wherein he found that  the respondent  had made a speech exhorting the workmen  of  the factory  to pass a resotion for the removal of  the  General Manager, that the management was bound to lose confidence if a worker who had excited other workers against the General 752 Manager  of  the concern refused to give a direct  reply  to direct questions, that, in the absence of a Stenotypist  who could  enjoy  the  confidence  of  the  management,  it  was impossible  to  run  the factory without  the  risk  of  any trouble   and  that  the  respondent  was  thus  guilty   of misconduct and acts subversive of discipline.  As,  however, there  was  a  pendency of a proceeding  before  the  Labour Appellate  Tribunal, an application should be made  to  that authority for permitting his dismissal. This report was accepted by the management and the appellant made  the  application under section 22  of  the  Industrial Disputes  (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, for permission  to dismiss the respondent from its employ. The  Labour  Appellate Tribunal embarked on the  freedom  of speech  vouchsafed  to the citizens of India  under  article 19(1)(a)  of the Constitution, observed that the  making  of the speech in question at the meeting held by the respondent as  the Vice-President of the Union was within the scope  of the  legitimate  activities of the Union and held  that  the speech  said  to  have been made by the  respondent  at  the meeting  could  not  be  said to be  an  act  subversive  of discipline.    The   application  of   the   appellant   was accordingly dismissed.  Hence this appeal before us. The only question for determination before us is whether the speech  made  by the respondent at the meeting held  on  the 10th  June, 1952, was an act subversive of discipline.   The respondent  was the Vice President of the Union  and,  prima facie,  any  resolution passed by the Union asking  for  the removal of the General Manager would be perfectly legitimate if the members of the Union thought that there were  circum- stances  warranting the same.  The correctness or  otherwise of the reasons given for such removal would not be liable to scrutiny  by the Court, the only thing requisite being  that the  Union was not acting mala fide or was not  actuated  by any malice or illwill against the General Manager in passing such  resolution.  The resolution by itself would  not  have the effect of harming the General Manager at all,                  753 It  would  have to be forwarded to the  management  and  the management  would  take such steps as it may be  advised  on receipt  of  the  resolution.   It would  then  be  for  the management to find for itself whether the reasons given  for the  removal of the General Manager were such as to  warrant his  removal.   The  management would then,  if  it  thought necessary,  institute proper enquiries and come to  his  own conclusion  as to the desirability or otherwise of  the  re- moval  of  the  General Manager.  So far  as  the  Union  is concerned,  apart from mala fides or malice or illwill,  the act  of  its passing the resolution would be  innocuous  and would  not be liable to be visited with any  punishment  and the  members of the Union would no be committing any  breach of  the Standing Orders nor would they be guilty of any  act subversive  of discipline.  The gravamen of the charge  made

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7  

by the management against the respondent, however, was  that the  latter  was not merely responsible for the  passing  of such  resolution,  but,  in  the speech  which  he  made  in support,  he  gave vent to such expressions  as  were  quite false and defamatory and was actuated by malice against  the General  Manager.   He Edited the members of the  Union  who were  there assembled against the General Manager  with  the result that his act was thus subversive of discipline.   The speech had the effect of lowering the General Manager in the esteem  of  the  workmen and subjecting  him  to  hatred  or ridicule  and  the necessary effect of  making  such  speech before  the workmen would be that they would look down  upon the General Manager and would not be amenable to  discipline and  it would be impossible to conduct the  management  with efficiency  with  such disgruntled workmen in  the  factory. The  words  used by the respondent were, therefore,  it  was urged, calculated to undermine the discipline in the factory and his act was, therefore, subversive of discipline  bring- ing him well within the mischief of clause L(1) (j). of  the Standing Orders. It  was further urged that the conduct of the respondent  in the  course of the correspondence which took  place  between the General Manager and himself 754 was,  to say the least, impudent.  He relied upon  his  dual personality  distinguishing  between  his  capacity  as  the Steno-typist  and his capacity as the Vice-President of  the Union.  The act complained of was attributed to his capacity as  the Vice-President of the Union and he refused  to  give any  reply  to the queries addressed to him-because  in  the letter;  addressed  by  the General Manager to  him  he  was described  as  the  Steno-typist.  He refused  to  give  any information  to  the  General  Manager  and  asked  him   to communicate  with the Sangh or the Union if any  information was  required by the General Manager in the matter  of  what took  place  at the meeting of the Union on the  10th  June, 1952.   In the enquiry also, he adopted a  similar  attitude and refused to answer the direct questions addressed to  him by the General Manager in regard to the proceedings of  that meeting. It  was strenuously urged before us by the  learned  counsel for  the  appellant that this conductor the  respondent  was subversive of discipline and amounted to such misconduct  as would entitle the appellant to dismiss him from its  employ. There  is considerable force in this argument and we are  of the   opinion  that  the  respondent  adopted  an   attitude unbecoming  an  employee  of the appellant.   He  adopted  a truculent  attitude in the course of the correspondence  and resorted  to the theory of his dual personality refusing  to answer the queries addressed to him by the General  Manager. This  attitude was, to say the least,  reprehensible.   Even though  he happened to occupy what he considered to  be  the august  position of the Vice President of the Union  he  did not cease to be an emPloyee of the appellant and the attempt to distinguish between his capacity as the Steno-typist  and his  capacity  as  the  Vice-President  of  the  Union   was absolutely  puerile.  He ought to have realised that he  was first-and  foremost an employee of the appellant and owed  a duty  to the appellant to answer all the queries  which  had been  addressed to him by the General Manager.  His  evasion to  give  such replies on the pretext of  shielding  himself under  his capacity as the Vice-President of the  Union  was absolutely                 755 unjustifiable  and  if such insubordination  and  breach  of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7  

discipline had been the subject-’Matter of the charges  made against  him,  we do not see how the respondent  could  have escaped the punishment of dismissal. Similar is the position in regard to the attitude which  the respondent adopted at the enquiry.  He refused to answer the direct  questions  which were addressed to him and  had  the temerity  to  ask  the General Manager to  see  his  written statement and find out for himself the answers to the  same. To say the least, the respondent was guilty of  insubordina- tion  and if his attitude was such as would not  conduce  to the  maintenance of discipline in the factory, here also  we would  have  found it difficult to  resist  the  appellant’s claim  for his dismissal if he had been charged with  having been guilty of such misconduct. The charge-sheet, however, only complained about the  speech which  he  had made on the 10th June, 1952,  wherein,  among other defamatory remarks, he, the respondent, had instigated the  workers  to take steps for the removal of  the  General Manager.   The  enquiry which was held on  the  4th  August, 1952,  also concentrated on this particular charge  and  the report  which  was made by the General Manager on  the  24th October,  1952,  also found that the respondent had  made  a speech exhorting the workers to pass the resolution for  the removal of the General Manager.  The acts of insubordination calculated to undermine the discipline in the factory  which we  have adverted to above were neither the  subject-matters of  the  charge  nor were they relied upon  by  the  General Manager in his report as the grounds of misconduct entitling the  management to dismiss the respondent’ from its  employ. The passing of the resolution for the removal of the General Manager  by  itself  was  not, as  already  stated,  an  act subversive   of  discipline  and  would  not   entitle   the management to dismiss him and we are of the opinion that, on the  record as it stood, the Labour Appellate  Tribunal  was justified  in  refusing to the appellant the  permission  to dismiss the respondent from its employ. The charge-sheet which was furnished by the appel- 98 756 lant to the respondent formed the basis of the enquiry which was held by the General Manager and the appellant could  not be  allowed to justify its action on any other grounds  than those  contained  in the chargesheet.   The  respondent  not having  been charged with the acts of insubordination  which would have really justified the appellant in dismissing  him from  its employ, the appellant could not take advantage  of the  same  even though these acts could be brought  home  to him.   We have, therefore, come to the  conclusion’that  the order  made  by the’ Labour Appellate Tribunal  was  correct even  though  we have done so on grounds  other  than  those which commended themselves to it. We accordingly dismiss this appeal but having regard to  the conduct of the respondent which We have characterised  above as  reprehensible we feel that the ends of justice  will  be met  if we ordered that each party do bear and pay  its  own costs of this appeal. Appeal dismissed.