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PETITIONER: LAXMAN PURSHOTTAM PIMPUTKAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF BOMBAY AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/12/1962

BENCH: MUDHOLKAR, J.R. BENCH: MUDHOLKAR, J.R. IMAM, SYED JAFFER SUBBARAO, K. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1964 AIR  436            1964 SCR  (1) 200  CITATOR INFO :  R          1965 SC1767  (4,17)  R          1974 SC 111  (2)

ACT: Watan    Lands-Resumption-Government’s    order    directing resumption-If  can be reviewed by Government-Bombay  Heredi- tary Offices Act, 1874 (Bom. 3 of 1874) ss. 12, 74, 79.

HEADNOTE: In  1944, the plaintiff moved the Government for  resumption of Watan Lands which were in the possession of defendants  2 to 4 and for making them over to him.  The Government, after causingsome  enquiry to be made, resumed those  lands  by its orderdated   October  9,  1946,  and   directed   their restoration  to the plaintiff.  Thereafter,  the  defendants moved the Government for reconsideration of that order,  and the Government modified its previous order by directing that the  defendants who were in possession of the lands,  should continue to retain them but they should pay such rent as may be fixed by the Government from time to time. The  plaintiff instituted a suit for a declaration that  the order  of the Government modifying the order of  October  9, 1946,  was null and void and inoperative.  It was  contended that the order made by Government on October 9, 1946, was a judicial  order passed by the Government in exercise of  its revisional jurisdiction under s.;79 of the Watan Act, and it was  not  competent for the Government to revise  or  review that  order  in  the  absence of  a  provision  in  the  Act empowering the Government to do so.  The suit was decreed by the trial court, but the District Judge set aside the decree and  the High Court confirmed his decision.   The  plaintiff came to this Court by Special leave. Held,  that the decision of the trial court was correct  and the  Government was not competent to modify the order  dated October 9, 1946.  The scheme of certain sections of Part  II of  the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874,  including  ss. II and 12, discloses that a judicial or quasi- judicial duty is  imposed on the Collector to decide what is in  effect  a lis  or quasi-lis between the, Watandar and the  alience  of the Watan land.  The whole process, including the order made

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under   s.  3  of  the  Act,  is  quasi-judicial   and   not administrative.  As the order made by  201 the  Collector under S. 12 is not ;in  administrative  order but a quasi-judicial order, it can be rectified or  modified or set aside by the Commissioner in  appeal or by the  State Government in revision under S. 79 and not otherwise. When an authority exercises its revisional powers, it  nece- ssarily  acts  in  a judicial  or  quasi-judicial  capacity. Hence,  the order of the Government dated October  9,  1956, must  be  deemed to be a judicial or  quasi-judicial  order. Such  an  order cannot be set aside or revised  or  modified just  as an administrative order can be revised or  modified under  S. 74.  Finality attaches to the  Government’s  order under  S.  79 and in the absence of  any  express  provision empowering  it  to review the order,  the  subsequent  order passed  by  the Government was ultra vires  and  beyond  its jurisdiction. An  order will be deemed to be of  quasi-judicial  character not only when there is a contest between one individual  and another  but also when the contest is between  an  authority purporting  to do an act and a person opposing it,  provided the  statute  imposes  a  duty  oil  the  authority  to  act judicially. No  period of limitation is specified in the Watan  Act  for preferring  an  application  for  revision.   Normally,  the Government  would  not  interfere  unless  moved  within   a reasonable time.  What should be considered as a  reasonable time  in  a particular case, is a matter  entirely  for  the Government  to  consider.   In  this  case,  the  Government thought  that  it had strong reasons  for  interfering  even after a Ion, lapse of time, and that is why it interfered. It  is  settled  law that civil courts have  the  power  and jurisdiction  to consider and decide whether a  tribunal  of limited  jurisdiction  has  acted within the  ambit  of  the powers conferred upon it by the statute to which it owes its existence  or whether it has transgressed the limits  placed on those powers by the legislature. Gullapalli  Nageswara  Rao v. Andhra  Pradesh           Road Transport Corporation, [1959] 1 S. C. R. 319, Board of  High School and     Intermediate   Education,   U.P.    Allahabad v.Ghanshyam Das     Gupta,  [1962]  Supp.3  S.  C.  R.   36, Robinson v.Minister of Town & Country Planning,[1947] I All. E. R.851, Franklin v. Minister of Town and A. C. 87,  Ramrao Jankiram Kadam v. State of Bombay, [1963] Supp.  I S. C.  R. 322,  Shrimant  Sardan  Bhujangarao  Daulatrao  Ghorpade  v. Shrimant  Malojirao Daulatrao Ghorpade, [1952] S.C. R.  402, Province of Bombay v. Hormusji Manekji,(1947) 202     L.    R. 74 I. A. 103 and The Secretary of State v.   Musk   & Co. I.   L. R. 1940 Mad. 599, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 206 of 1960. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and decree  dated February 17, 1955, of the Bombay High Court in Second Appeal No. 1533 of 1952. P.   K. Chakravarti for B. C. Misra, for the appellant. N.   S. Bindra, S. B. Jathar and P.D. Menon for  R.H.Dhebar, for respondent No. 1. K.   V. Joshi and Ganpat Rai, for respondents Nos. 2--4. 1962.     December  13.   The  judgment  of  the  Court  was delivered by

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MUDHOLKAR,  J.-This is an appeal by special leave  from  the judgment of the High Court of Bombay affirming the decree of the  District  judge,  Thana, setting aside  the  decree  in favour of the Plaintiff-appellant. The relevant facts which are no longer in dispute are  these : Tile plaintiff’s family are grantees of the Patilki  Watan of  some villages in Umbergaon taluka of the Thana  District of Maharashtra, including the villages of Solsumblha, Maroli and  Vavji.  Defendants 2 to 4 also belong to the family  of the  plaintiff.   The plaintiff  represents  the  seniormost branch  of the family while the defendants 2 to 4  represent other branches.  The dispute with which we are concerned  in this appeal relates to the Patilki of Solsumbha.  Under  the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 (111 of 1874) the person who  actually performs the duty of a hereditary  Office  for the time being is called an Officiator.  It is common ground 203 that the Officiator had been selected from the branch of the plaintiff  from the year 1870 in which year  the  propositus Krishna  Rao  Pimputkar  died.   After  his  death  he   was succeeded  by  his eldest son Vasudev, upon whose  death  in 1893  his eldest son Sadashiv was the Officiator.   Sadashiv died  in  1901  and was succeeded  by  Purshottam,  who  was Officiator   till  the  year  1921  when,  because  of   the disqualification incurred by him, a deputy was appointed  in his  place.  After the death of Pursliottam in 1940 his  son the plaintiff-appellant Laxman became the Officiator. In  the  year 1914 the descendents of Krishnarao,  who  were till then joint, effected a partition of the family property which consisted of inam and Watan lands in various  villages including the villages of Solsumbha, Maroli and Vavji.The document  embodying the partition is Ex. 49.Under      that partition lands which had so far beenassigned         for remuneration  of the Patilki of Solsumbha were  allotted  to the  branch  of the defendants while some other  lands  were given to the branch of the plaintiff.  It would appear  that Purshottam  had not subscribed to the partition deed in  the beginning  but later on he appears to have acquiesced in  it and  apparently  for  this reason it has been  held  by  the Courts  below that he was a party to the partition.  It  may be   mentioned   that  after  Purshottam  bad   incurred   a disqualification,  the deputies who acted for him  were  not allowed  to take possession of the lands of Solsumbha  which are now in dispute inspite of the objections raised by these persons.   They were instead allowed a remuneration  of  Rs. 240/-per  annum which was to be paid by the members  of  the family  in  possession of the Watan  lands.   This  position continued till 1946.  It  maybe mentioned that after the death of purshottam  the plaintiff was initially appointed Patil 204 for five years.  But eventually he was appointed  officiator for life. In  the year 1944 the plaintiff moved the  Government,  vide Ex. 47, for the resumption of the Watan lands which were  in the possession of defendants 2 to 4 and for making them over to  him.  The Government, after causing some enquiry  to  be made,  resumed  those lands by its order  dated  October  9, 1916,  Ex.  36,  and  directed  their  restoration  to   the plaintiff.   The defendants thereafter moved the  Government for   reconsideration   of  that  order.    The   Government eventually modified its previous order by directing that the defendants  2  to 4, who were in possession  of  the  lands, should  continue to retain it but that they should pay  such amount  of rent as may be fixed by Government from  time  to

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time.   This order was passed on May 2, 1947, and by  virtue of  that  order the rent payable by defendants 2  to  4  was raised  from  Rs.  240/-  to  Rs.  1,000/-.   The  plaintiff thereupon  instituted  the  suit out of  which  this  appeal arises  for a declaration that the order of  the  Government dated May, 2,1949, and an ancillary order dated March, 1,  1 94-9, are null and void and inoperative; that the defendants should  remove "all obstruction,, and hindrances  caused  to the   property   acquired   by  the   plaintiff   as   Watan grant.........  and that they should give the same into  the plaintiff’s  Possession"; that the defendants should  render to the plaintiff the account of the income from his property and pay him the costs of the suit. The  suit was resisted by the defendants, the first of  whom was  the  State  of Bombay,  (now  Maharashtra)  on  various grounds.   The main grounds were that the orders  complained of  were administrative orders and no suit lies to set  them aside,  that the suit was barred by the provisions of  s.  4 (b)  of  the  Bombay Act 10 of 1876 and that  the  suit  was barred by limitations It may, however, be mentioned that  205 when the defendants preferred an appeal before the  District judge they confined their attack to the decree to one ground only  and  that was about the competance  of  Government  to reconsider the order of 1946. The plaintiff’s contention that the order made by Government on  October  9,  1946, was a judicial order  passed  by  the Government in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction  under s. 79 of tile Watan Act and that it was not competent to the Government to revise or review that order in the absence  of a provision in the Act empowering the Government to do so. It  is not disputed that alienation of Watan  lands  without the sanction of the Government is prohibited by s. 5 of  the Watan Act.  Similarly the alienation of Watan lands assigned as  remuneration without the sanction of the  Government  is prohibited  by  s. 7 of the Act.  Section  11  empowers  the Collector,  after  recording  his  reasons  in  writing,  to declare  certain types of alienations to be null  and  void. Section  12  provides  that  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the Collector  whenever it may be necessary in carrying out  the provisions  of  certain  sections, including s.  11  (a)  to summarily  evict any person wrongfully in possession of  any land  or  (b)  to levy any rent due by any  person  in  tile manner that may be prescribed in any law for the time  being in force for the levy of a revenue demand.  According to the defendants the discretion conferred upon the Collector by s. 12  -either to evict a person in wrongful possession of  any land or to require him to pay rent with respect to it is  of an  administrative nature and, therefore, the order  of  the Collector  made under s. 12 can be varied from time to  time by the Collector or can be challenged by the party aggrieved only  in  the  manner  provided by  the  Act,  that  is,  by preferring an appeal or an application in revision and in no other   manner.   Undoubtedly,  if  the  order  is   of   an administrative nature it would be beyond the purview of  the juris- 206 diction  of  the  civil court.  The  first  question  to  be considered  is whether the order of a Collector under s.  1’ is administrative in character.  It has to be borne in  mind that  before action is taken under s. 12, the collector  has to make a declaration under s.11. This declaration has to be supported  by reasons in writing and, therefore, it  follows that  it  can be made only after holding  an  enquiry  which means  that the Collector has to hear both the  parties  and

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consider  such  evidence, oral and documentary,  as  may  be adduced  by  them  before  him.   So  far,  therefore,   the procedure must be considered as quasi-judicial in character. This  Court has held in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao  v.  Andhra Pradesh  Road Transport Corporation(1), as well as  recently in  Board of High School and Intermediate Education U.P.  v. Ghanshyam  Das Gupta(2), that an order will be deemed to  be of quasi-judicial character not only when there is a contest between one individual and another but also when the contest is between an authority purporting to do an act and a person opposing  it  provided  the statute imposes a  duty  on  the authority to act judicially.  Section 12 undoubtedly confers discretion  on the Collector to make an order of one of  two kinds,  after  he declares that an alienation  is  null  and void.   The  order  of  the Collector  in  exercise  of  his discretion affects the rights of parties to property and  is further  open to challenge before the Commissioner  and  the State  Government under sections 77 and 79 of the Watan  Act respectively.   It is therefore difficult to appreciate  how the order can be regarded as administrative. Mr. Bindra who appears for the State,however,contends that though  the enquiry contemplated bys. I I may be regarded as a  quasi- judicial  proceeding the ultimate decision of the  Collector either to restore the property to the Watandar or to confirm the  possession of the person in actual  possession  thereof and  make  him liable to pay rent is not the exercise  of  a quasi-judicial  function  but is  purely  an  administrative function.  He contends that the (1) [1959] Supp, 1 S C.R 319. (2) [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 36.  207 Collector  has  to exercise his discretion one  way  or  the other  in  the  light of the policy of  the  Government  and refers in this connection to the provisions of s. 74 of  the Watan  Act.  That section provides that the  proceedings  of the  Collector  shall be under the general  control  of  the Commissioner  and of the State Government.  It may be  borne in mind, however, that the collector has been given  various kinds  of powers and is required to perform numerous  duties under   the  Act,  some  of  which  are  administrative   in character.  Since the decision taken by the Collector cannot properly be reached by exercising the appellate jurisdiction of the Commissioner and of the State Government, as the case may be, it was necessary to incorporate a general  provision of this kind. The right of appeal conferred by s. 77 extends only  to  decisions of the Collector  or  other  authorities inferior  to  the  Collector only in  respect  of  decisions rendered by them after investigation recorded in writing and not  against  each  and every  decision  rendered  by  them. Section 73 of the Act requires investigation to be  recorded in writing in respect of orders made under certain parts  of the  Act.   But apart from that provision  there  are  other provisions like s. 11 which provide for recording of reasons in  writing which by implication also require  investigation by  the  Collector.  These provisions do not  represent  the totality of the Collector’s power under the Act.  Section 74 is thus clearly a provision which relates to orders made  by the  Collector without making any investigation in  writing. This provision, therefore, does riot assist the defendants. Relying  upon the decision in Robinson v. Minister  of  Town and  Country  Planning(1),  and  other  decisions  in   that category  Mr. Bindra contended that the  Collector’s  quasi- judicial  function  ended  with  the  declaration  that  the alienation  wits null and void and the decision pursuant  to it   which   he  took  under  s.  12  thereof   was   purely

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administrative.  Apart from the (1)[1947] 1 All.  E.R. 851. 208 fact  that  the decision in Robinson’s case (1),  and  other decisions  taking  similar  view  have  been  criticised  in England  (see  Griffith  and  Street,  Principles  of  Admi- nistrative Law, p. 168 and Robson,Justice and Administrative Law, p. 533) we may point out that the scheme of the statute which  was considered in those decisions is  different  from that  of Part II of the Watan Act which contains ss. 11  and 12.   The  Town and Country Planning Act, 1944,  with  which Robinson’s  case(1),  deals  confers  a  discretion  on  the Minister  to accept wholly or with modification or reject  a scheme prepared by a local authority.  For a certain purpose that Act requires that the Minister has to cause an  enquiry to  be made by the Inspector or to make an  enquiry  himself and it has been held that such an enquiry is  quasi-judicial in nature.  After the enquiry is made it is for the Minister to exercise his authority under the Act and to accept wholly or  in a modified form or reject the scheme.  The Courts  in England  have  held  that  proceedings  under  the  Act  are administrative  in nature except to the limited extent  that the enquiry is to be made in consonance with the  principles of natural justice.  Whether the view taken by the Courts in England  is right or wrong it is sufficient to say that  the nature of proceedings as well as what is required to be done under the English Act is something quite different from  the nature  of proceedings or what is required to be done  under the  relevant  provisions of the Watan Act.   Here,  as  Mr. Bindra  himself  concedes, the whole of the enquiry  is  not administrative  in charactcr.  In fact its foundation  is  a lis  between two parties: it Watandar out of possession  and an alienee in possession of Watan property.  When the  final order is made by the Collector under s. 12 this lis comes to an end and, therefore, there is no scope for the  contention that  any  part  of  the  proceeding  is  administrative  in character.  Even in an ordinary suit there are matters which are  in  the  discretion  of the  court,  as  for  instance, awarding costs or (1)  [1947] 1 All.  E.R. 851.  209 fixing  the  rate  of interest or  of  granting  one  relief instead  of  another.   But  merely  because  discretion  is conferred  on  it in dealing with a  particular  matter,  it cannot  be contended that while exercising  that  discretion the  Court  acts  otherwise  than in  the  exercise  of  its judicial function.  The proceedings before the Collector are of course not judicial but they are certainly quasi-judicial and  where  the Collecter has to exercise a  discretion  for giving  effect to his decision that a certain alienation  is null and void it would not be permissible to say that all of a  sudden  his  act ceases to be a  quasi-judicial  act  and becomes an administrative one.  The declaration made by  him under  s.  I  I that an alienation is null and  void  is  by itself of little help to the Watandar and can be effectuated only  after an order is made by the Collector under  s.  The provisions of these two sections are thus interlinked and it is  difficult to conceive that as the  proceedings  progress their    quasi-judicial   nature   degenerates    into    an administrative one, We may recapitulate that the Collector’s order under s. 12 is appealable but not so the order of  the Minister.  This, in our opinion, is an important distinction between the class of cases of which Robinson’s case, (1)  is representative, and the present case. We  may refer to the decision in Gullapalli Nageswara  Rao’s

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case(2),  where  this Court has considered the  decision  in Robinson’s case (1), as also that in Franklin v. Minister of Town,  and  Country Planning (3).  While  dealing  with  the argument advanced before it that the Government, in conside- ring a scheme provided for road transport service under-  s. 68(c)  of  the  Motor  Vehicles  Act,  was  discharging   an administrative function, one of us (Subba Rao, J.)  speaking for the majority of the Court has observed as follows :-               "A  comparison of the procedural  steps  under               both the Acts brings out in bold relief the               (1) [1947]  1 All.  E.R. 851.               (2) [1959] Supp.   1 S.C.R. 319.               (3) [1948] A.C, 87.                210               nature of the enquiries contemplated under the               two  statutes.   There, there is  no  lis,  no               personal  hearing and even the public  enquiry               contemplated  by a third party  is  presumably               confined   to   the  question   of   statutory               requirements, or at any rate was for eliciting               further  information for the Minister.   Here,               there  is  a  clear dispute  between  the  two               parties.   The  dispute comprehends  not  only               objections raised on public grounds, but  also               in  vindication  of private rights and  it  is               required to be decided by the State Government               after giving a personal hearing and  following               the rules of judicial procedure.  Though there               may be sonic justification for holding, on the               facts  of the case before the House  of  Lords               that  that Act did not contemplate a  judicial               act-on  that  question we do  not  propose  to               express  our opinion-there is absolutely  none                             for  holding  in  the  present  case that  the               Government  is not performing a judicial  act.               Robson  in ’Justice and  Administrative  Law’,               commenting upon the aforesaid decision,  makes               the following observation at p.533:               ‘It  should have been obvious from  a  cursory               glance at the New Towns Act that the rules  of               natural   justice  could  not  apply  to   the               Minister’s action in making an order, for  the               simple  reason that the intiative lies  wholly               with him.  His role is not to consider whether               an  order made by a local authority should  be               confirmed,  nor  does he has  to  determine  a               controversy  between  a public  authority  and               private  interests.   The  responsibility   of               seeing  that  the intention of  Parliament  is               carried out is placed on him’."               The   aforesaid   observations   explain   the               principles  underlying that decision and  that               principle cannot have any -application to  the               facts   of  this  case.   In  ’Principles   of               Administrative law’ by Griffith and               211               Street, the following comment is found on  the               aforesaid  decision:  After  considering   the               provision of s. 1 of the New Towns Act,  1946,               the authors say-               ’Like  the  town-planning  legislation,   this               differs  from  the Housing Acts  in  that  the               Minister is a party throughout.  Further,  the               Minister   is  not  statutorily  required   to

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             consider  the objections.  It is  obvious,  as               the statute itself states that the creation of               new towns is of national interest.’ (pp.  349-               50).               After   concluding   the  above   passage   he               observed:               "It is therefore clear that Franklin’s case is               based   upon   the   interpretation   of   the               provisions of that Act and particularly on the               ground  that the object of the enquiry  is  to               further  inform the mind of the  Minister  and               not to consider any issue between the Minister               and the objectors.  The decision in that  case               is not of any help to decide the present  case               which turns upon the construction of the  pro-               visions   of  the  Act.   For  the   aforesaid               reasons,  we hold that the State  Government’s               order under s. 68-D is a judicial Act." As  we have already said the scheme of certain  sections  of Part  II  of  the Watan Act, including ss. 11  and  12  also discloses that a judicial or quasi-judicial duty is  imposed on the Collector to decide what is in effect a lis or quasi- lis between the Watandar and the alience of the Watan  land. We  must, therefore, hold that the whole process,  including the  order made under s. 3 of the Act, is  a  quasi-judicial one  and not administrative as contended for’ by the  defen- dants-respondents. Since the order made by the Collector under s. 12 is not  an administrative  order but a quasi-Judicial order it  can  be rectified or modified or set aside 212 by the Commissioner in appeal or by the State Government  in revision  under s. 79.  It is not a kind of order which  can be reached tinder s. 74.  Section 79 provides that the State Government  may  call  for and examine  the  record  of  the proceedings  of  any officer for the purpose  of  satisfying itself  as to the legality or propriety of any order  passed and may reverse or modify the order as it seem fit or if  it seems  necessary may order a new enquiry.  Now, in the  year 1944  when  the  plaintiff moved  the  State  Government  by petition  it  returned the petition to him on  November  28, 1944, with the remark that he should apply to the  Collector of Thana in the first instance and then if’ necessary to the Commissioner,  Northern  Division.  The plaintiff  was  also informed  that  if  he was not  satisfied  with  the  orders passed,  he  may  approach  the  Government,  presumably  by preferring an application for revision.  At the foot of  the letter r. 11 of the Petition Rules was set out. the relevant portion of which runs thus : "Government,  however,  will not receive a Petition  on  any matter,  unless  it  shall appear that  the  petitioner  has already applied to the Chief Local Authority, and where such exists, to the controlling authority.  The petitions to  the chief local and to the controlling authorities or copies  of them  and the answers to or orders upon those  petitions  in original,  or  copies  of  them,  must  be  annexed  to  all petitions addressed to Government........." The  plaintiff sent a reply to the aforesaid letter  of  the Government on December 15, 1944, and enclosed with it a copy of  the  application made by him to  the  Collector,  Thana, together with his order of March 20, 1925, and said : "In  1924 a revision application to the Collector  of  Thana was  preferred.  The Collector in his reply informed  us  on the authority of the 213

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Commissioner’s   decision  that  our  case  could   not   be considered (order No. W. T. N. No. 5 of 1925--Copy  enclosed Ex. 7).  It is against this order that the present appeal is being  submitted.  As the Collector has informed us  on  the authority  of  the  Commissioner  we  think  it  is  no  use approaching the Commissioner again against the very decision already confirmed by him. I, therefore, approach Government with a request that a full and  proper  justice be done to my case which  both  on  the question of facts and of law deserves careful consideration. With  reference  to  paragraph 2 of your letter  it  may  be mentioned  that we have already approached the Collector  of Thana and copy of his order was attached to my previous peti- tion   also.   It  is  being  resubmitted  for   your   kind consideration." After receiving this letter the Government caused a thorough enquiry to be made by the revenue officials in the  presence of  the parties and after giving them opportunity to  adduce such  evidence  as they wished to. The  proceedings  of  the subordinate officers, along with their reports, were in  due course  submitted to the Government and it was on the  basis of this report that the Government made an order in October, 1946,  restoring  possession  of  the  Watan  lands  to  the plaintiff.   It is true that the order does not say that  it was  passed  under  s. 12 (a) of the Act  read  with  s.  79 thereof, but since both these provisions taken together give power  to the Government to make an order of the kind  Which it  -made in October, 1946, its order must be held  to  have been  made  under  those  provisions.   When  an   authority exercises  its  revisional powers it necessarily acts  in  a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.  Therefore, 214 the  Government’s order of October, 1946, must be deemed  to be  a  judicial or a quasi-judicial order.   Such  an  order cannot  be  set  aside or revised or  modified  just  as  an administrative  order can be under s. 74. Finality  attaches to the Government’s order under s. 79 and in the absence  of any  express provision empowering it to review the order  we are  clear that the subsequent order made by the  Government on  May 2, 1947 is ultra vires and beyond its  jurisdiction. We  must,  however,  notice the  contention  raised,  though faintly,  by  Mr. Bindra that the Government  could  not  be deemed  to  have dealt with the matter in  a  quasi-judicial capacity  under  s. 79 because the order revised by  it  was more  than  20 years old.  It is sufficient to say  that  no period of limitation is specified in the Act for  preferring an  application  for  revision.   of  course,  normally  the Government   would   not  interfere  unless   moved   within reasonable  time.   But,  what should  be  considered  as  a reasonable  time  in  a particular case would  be  a  matter entirely for the Government to consider.  Apparently in this case  the Government thought that it had strong reasons  for interfering even after a long lapse of time and that is  why it interfered. Mr.  Joshi who appears for the defendants 2 to 4  sought  to support  the  decision of the High Court by  resort  to  the provisions  of s. 4 (a) of the Bombay  Revenue  Jurisdiction Act, 1876.  That section reads thus :               " Subject to the exceptions hereinafter appea-               ring,   no   Civil   Court   shall    exercise               jurisdiction  as  to  any  of  the   following               matters :               (a)   claims  against the Government  relating               to any property appertaining to the office  of               any    hereditary   officer    appointed    or

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             recoganised  under Bombay Act No.1874  or  any               other law for the time being in force,...."  215 He  points  out  that  in  the  plaint,  the  plaintiff  has specifically sought relief against the State Government  and in  this  connection  referred to prayers 1  and  2  of  the plaint.  In prayer No. 1 the plaintiff sought a  declaration to  the effect that the orders passed by the  Government  on May  2,  1947,  and March 1, 1949, are  null  and  void  and inoperative.   In  prayer  No.  2  he  asked  that  all  the defendants  be  ordered to remove  "their  obstructions  and hindrances"  to the possession of the property which is  the plaintiff’s  Watan property, and further ordered to  deliver the  possession  of the property to him.  It  seems  to  us, however,  that prayer No. 1 was really redundant because  if the  orders referred to therein were  without  .jurisdiction and  thus  null and void it was not necessary  to  set  them aside.  Therefore, by making a prayer of that kind it cannot be said that the plaintiff had sought any relief against the State Government.  As regards the second prayer it seems  to us that the inclusion of the State Government therein was  a slip  because it is nobody’s case that the Government is  in possession  of  the  lands or is  actively  obstructing  the plaintiff  in  getting  back  its  possession.   We   would, therefore, read the second prayer as referring to defendants 2 to 4 only.  Reference was also made by learned counsel  to the  third prayer in which the plaintiff has asked  for  the accounts  to  be  taken  of  the  income  obtained  by   the defendants  from  January 6,1942 till the date of  suit  and subsequently.   Here again, though the defendants  generally have been referred to, the plaintiff must be deemed to  have meant  only  those defendants who were in  actual  physical, possession of the property and earning income therefrom  and enjoying  it.   It  was., however, represented  to  us  that during the period of possession defendants 2 to 4 have  been crediting  certain  amounts to the treasury for  paying  the remuneration  of  the  officiator and  since  they  will  be entitled to the credit for these amounts the Government  was a necessary party.  In our opinion 216 that  question has no relevance to prayer No. 3 made by  the plaintiff.   What  he  wants is the accounts  of  rents  and profits  and  he  is  not concerned  with  any  claim  which defendants   2  to  4  may  have  against  the   Government. Therefore, considering all these prayers together we are  of opinion  that  no  relief was in  fact  sought  against  the Government and it was made only a formal party to the  suit. If  that  view is correct the provisions of s. 4  (a)of  the Bombay Revenue jurisdiction Act, 1876 will not stand in  the way. This  Court, while dealing with an objection that  the  suit was  barred  by  the provisions of s. 4 (c)  of  the  Bombay Revenue  jurisdiction  Act has observed recently  in  Ramrao Jankiram Kadam v. The State of Bombay (1), as follows :               "As to the applicability of s. 4 (c), it would               be noticed that resort to the Civil Courts  is               barred  only  as  regards  certain   specified               classes  of  suits in which  the  validity  of               sales  for arrears Land Revenue are  impugned.               The  classes so specified are those  in  which               the  plaintiff  seeks to set  aside  sales  on               account  of  irregularities  etc.  other  than               fraud.   The provision obviously assumes  that               there is in existence a sale though  irregular               under which title has passed to the  purchaser

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             and  that  that sale has to be set  aside,  on               grounds other than fraud, before the plaintiff               can  obtain  relief.  Where however  there  is               only  a  purported sale which  does  not  pass               title  and the suit is for recovery of  posse-               ssion  of property ignoring such a  sale,  the               provision and the bar that it creates have  no               application." Thus it would be clear that where something done or an order made is no act or order in law at all because it is  without jurisdiction and null and void, (1)  [1963] Supp.  1 S.C.R. 322, 217 the provisions of s. 4 are not attracted.  We may,  however, refer to a decision of this court in Bhujangtao Daulatrao v. Malojirao  Daulatrao  (1), which is claimed to  support  the contention  of  the  defendants.  In that case  a  suit  was instituted by a Saraniamdar in which the representatives  of two other ’branches of the Saranjam family and the  province of  Bombay were impleaded as defendants.  It was alleged  by the  plaintiff  that  a certain  resolution  passed  by  the Government   in  the  year  1936  modifying   the   previous resolution  passed by the Government in the years 189-1  and 1932 by declaring that the portion of the estate held by the branches  shall be entered as de facto shares and that  each share  shall  be continuable hereditarily as if  it  were  a separate  saranjam estate was ultra vires and for a  further declaration  that  the plaintiff had the sole right  to  all privileges appertaining to the post of saranjamdar and  also sought  in injunction restraining the defendants from  doing any act in contravention of the plaintiff’s right.  The suit was  held by this court to be barred by s. 4 of  the  Bombay Revenue jurisdiction Act.  This court held that the suit was a  suit against the Crown and also a suit relating to  lands held  as Saranjam within the meaning of s. 4 of  the  Bombay Revenue  jurisdiction  Act  and that  civil  courts  had  no jurisdiction to entertain it.  Further this court held  that the plaintiff could not be given reliefs against  defendants I and 2 alone as the right claimed against these  defendants could not be divorced from the claim against the  Government and considered separately.  The decision in The Province  of Bombay v. Hormusji(2) was cited before this court in support of  the  contention that civil courts have  jurisdiction  to decide whether the Government acted in excess of its powers. Bose, J., who delivered the judgment of the court,  however, expressed the opinion that that decision would not apply and then he observed ,Is follows :-               "As pointed out by Strangman, K.C., on behalf               (1) [1952] S.C.R. 402.      (2) (1947) L.R. 74               I.A. 103.               218               of the plaintiff-respondent ’authorised’  must               mean ’duly authorised’, and in that particular               case the impugned assessment would not be duly               authorised  if the Government  Resolution  of’               11-4-1930  purporting to treat  the  agreement               relied  on by the respondent as cancelled  and               aurhorising  the levy of the  full  assessment               was ultra vires under section 211 of the  Land               Revenue  Code.  Thus, before the exclusion  of               the Civil Court’s jurisdiction under section 4               (b)  could  come into play, the Court  had  to               determine  the issue of ultra  vires.   Conse-               quently,   their  Lordships  held  that   that               question  was  outside the scope of  the  bar.

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             But  the position here is different.   We  are               concerned  here with section 4 (a)  and  under               that  no question about an authorised  act  of               Government arises.  The section is general and               bars  (ill ’claims against the Crown  relating               to  lands......... held as Saranjam.’ That  is               to’  say,  even  if the  Government’s  act  in               relation  to  such lands was ultra,  vires,  a               claim  impugning the validity of such  an  act               would  fall within the scope of the  exclusion               in  clause  (a) provided it  relates  to  such               land." It  is settled law that the civil courts have the power  and jurisdiction  to consider and decide whether a  tribunal  of Iimited  jurisdiction  has  acted within the  ambit  of  the powers conferred upon it by the statute to which it owes its existence  or whether it has transgressed the limits  placed on  those  powers  by  the  legislature.   The  decision  in Hormusiji Maneklal’s case (1), proceeds on the basis of this rule.  There are a number of decisions in the books in which this  principle  has  been stated and  followed.   One  such decision  is  The Secretary of State v. Musk  &  Co.(2),  in which the judicial Committee has observed thus :               It  is settled law that the exclusion  of  the               Civil  Courts is not to be  readily  inferred,               but that               (1) (1947) L.R. 74 I.A. 103.  (2) I.L.R.  1940               Mad,_599                219               such   exclusion  must  either  be   explicity               expressed  or  clearly implied.   It  is  also               well-settled  that even if jurisdiction is  so               excluded,  the Civil Courts have  jurisdiction               to examine into cases where the provisions  of               the  Act have not been complied with,  or  the               statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity               with  the fundamental principles  of  judicial               procedure." (p. 614). We  do not think that it was the intention of this court  to over-rule  a  rule which has been firmly  established.   Had that  been  the  intention, we would  have  found  a  fuller discussion of the question. In  the  course of the judgment Bose, J., pointed  out  that there was difference of opinion in the Bombay High Court  as to  whether  s.  4 is attracted if the  only  relief  sought against  the  Government  is  a  declaration  and  expressed agreement  with  the view that s. 4 applies even  where  the relief sought against Government is only a declaration.   As we have pointed out this part of the judgment does not  help the  defendants’  case because no  declaration  against  the Government was at all necessary.  Indeed the plaintiff could ignore the two orders complained of by him as being  without jurisdiction  and  null  and void and proceed  to  seek  the relief  of possession on the strength of the  earlier  order made by the Government in October, 1946. For these reasons we reverse the decision of the High  Court which  affirmed that of the District Court and  restore  the decision of the trial court.  Costs throughout will be borne by the defendants. Appeal allowed. 220