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PETITIONER: LAXMAN  BALWANT  BHOPATKAR  ( Since deceased  )  By  ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE CHARITY COMMISSIONER, BOMBAY

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/05/1962

BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) SUBBARAO, K. MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1962 AIR 1589            1963 SCR  (2) 625  CITATOR INFO :  R          1965 SC1281  (290)

ACT: Public  Trust-Charitable  purpose-Education  to  mak  people conscious  of political rights-Political purpose--Object  of general public utility-Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950  (Bom. 29 of 1950), ss 2 (13), 9(4).

HEADNOTE: Lokamanya Tilak died on August 1, 1920, leaving a will.   On August 16, 1920, his two sons and the executor appointed  by him  under the will executed a trust deed in respect of  two newspapers  "The  Kesari"  and  "The  Maharatta",  and   the property and the machinery pertaining thereto.  Clause 1  of the trust deed recited: "This Trust deed has been made as  a means  to the fulfillment perpetually  and  uninterruptedly. after the death of the late Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak  of that  very object of his with which he took  all  activities after  he  took  charge of  the  newspapers-the  Kesari  and Maratha such as of spreading political education through the newspapers   and  thereby  making  people  alive  to   their political  rights and carrying on other multifarious  public activities conducive to the national ideal etc." A survey of the  public life and activity of Lokmanya Tilak showed  that his purpose in taking over and conducting the newspapers was political,  in the sense of seeking to achieve by  means  of rousing the consciousness of the people to their  condition, a  political awareness, by which adjustments of a  political character would be demanded and enforced by the persons  who imbibed  those truths or were influenced by  such  writings. The  question was whether the aforesaid trust was  a  public charitable  trust  within the definition in S. 2  (13)  read with s. 9 (4) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, ’1950, so  as to  justify an order by the charity  Commissioner  requiring the trustees to have the trust 626 Held, (Subba Rao, J., Dissenting), that a political  purpose is  not  a charitable purpose and does not come  within  the meaning of the expression "for the advancement of any  other

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object of general public utility" in s. 9 (4) of the  Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. The life mission of Lokmanya Tilak which he sought to active and  achieved through the two newspapers, and which was  set out  in the trust deed dated August 16, 1920, as the  object for  which  the trust was founded, was a  political  purpose and, therefore, the trust was not required to be  registered under s. 18 of the Act.  Per Subba Rao, J.-The, object of Tilak, after he took  over the  newspapers,  was to work for the  regeneration  of  the country,  and  he thought that  national  education  through newspapers  and  writings which would make people  alive  to their  political rights, was the most important item in  the uplift of the country.  The trust executed to perpetuate the said  object was clearly a trust for general public  utility within  the meaning of s. 9 (4) of the Act.  The  expression "object of general public utility" is very comprehensive and it  includes every purpose, whether political or  otherwise, provided it is an object of general public utility. Bonar Law Memorial Trust v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, (1938)  17  Tax  Cas. 508, Trustees of  the  Tribune  Press, Lohore  v Commissioner of Income Tax, (1939) L. R. 66 I.  A. 241,  All  India Spinners’ Association  v.  Commissioner  of Income  Tax (1944) L. R. 71 1. A. 159, Re Hopkinson:  Lloyds Bank  Ltd. v. Baker, [1949] 1 All E. R. 346, Subhas  Ohandra Bose  v. Gordhandas Patel, I. L. R. [1940] Bom. 254, and  In re Lokmanya TilakJubilee National Trust Fund Bombay,  (1941) 43 Bom.  L. R. 1027, considered.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 313 of 1958. APPEAl from the judgment and decree dated February 2,  1956, of  the  Bombay High Court, in Appeal No. 775 of  1955  from Original Decree. Veda  Vyasa,  S.  G.  Patwardhan  and  Ganpat  Rai  for  the appellants. H.   N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor-General of India, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondent and the State of Maharashta (Intervener). 627 1962.  May 1. The following Judgments were delivered. The judgment of Sinha, C. J., Rajagopala Ayyangar, Mudholkar and  Venkatarama  Aiyar, JJ., was delivered  by  Rajagopala, Ayyangar, J. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, J.--This is an appeal on a  certificate of  fitness granted by the High Court of Bombay  under  Art. 133  (1)  (b) & (c) of the Constitution,  and  the  question raised  for consideration is whether the "Kesari &  Mahratta Trust"  of which the appellants are the Trustees was or  was not a "public Trust" within the meaning of the Bombay Public Trust Act (Act XXIX of 19-50) which it will be convenient to refer to as the Act. The Act which by its long title was enacted "to regulate and to  make better provision for the administration of  public, religious  and  charitable Trusts, in the State  of  Bombay" came into force on August 14, 1950.  Section. 18 of the  Act enacted:               "18.  (1) It shall be the duty of the  trustee               of  a public trust to which this Act has  been               applied   to  make  an  application  for   the               registration       of-       the        public               trust. ..................... Section  66  of the Act provides penalties  according  to  a

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table  appended  to  it for  contravention  of  the  several sections set out in it and among the sections so included is s.  18(1).   In this state of affairs the  trustees  of  the appellant-trust addressed on April 16, 1952, a communication to the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Poona region,  Poona- being the authority empowered to effect the registration  of the  Trust,  if it was a public Trust-that  ,,the  Kesari  & Mahratta  Trust"  was  not a  "’public  Trust" Within  the meaning  of the Act and submitted that it was not liable  to be,  registered thereunder.  Section 19 of the Act  empowers an Assistant 628 Charity  Commissioner to make an enquiry  for  ascertaining, inter alia, "whether a Trust exist and whether such Trust is a  public  Trust." This officer held an enquiry  under  this provision,  giving  an opportunity to the  trustees  of  the Trust  to make representations and urge  their  contentions. Thereafter be recorded a finding under s. 20 of the Act that it was a public Trust to which the Act applied and passed an order directing the Trust to be registered. Section  70  of  the Act provides for  appeals  being  filed against  findings recorded and orders passed under s. 20  by Assistant   Charity   Commissioner   s,   to   the   Charity Commissioner  and  the trustees availed themselves  of  this remedy  and  repeated their contentions before  the  Charity Commissioner.   The appellate-authority however reached  the same  conclusion as the Assistant Charity  Commissioner  and dismissed the appeal.  Section 72 of the Act enables a party aggrieved by the decision of the Charity Commissioner  under a.  70 on the question "whether a trust exists  and  whether such  trust is a public trust" to apply to the Court to  set aside the said decision.  The trustees moved the Court under this  provision  but this application was dismissed  by  the learned District Judge, Poona.  It was from this judgment of the learned District Judge that the trustees filed an appeal to  the High Court of Bombay who also dismissed  the  appeal but  granted the certificate which has enabled  the  present appeal to the filed. It  would be seen from the above narrative that  the  entire question raised by the appeal is concerned with whether  the Kesari  &  Mahratta Trust was a "Public  Trust"  within  the meaning  of  the  Act  so as to justify  the  order  of  the assistant  Charity  Commissioner requiring the  trustees  to have the institution registered.  Section 2 of the Act 629 which  contains  definitions defines a public Trust  in  cl. (13) thus: "an  express  or  constructive  trust  for  either   public, religious or charitable purpose or both.............. to  read  only the portion relevant for  this  appeal.   The other  material provision is s. 9 of the Act  which  defines "Charitable purpose".  The purpose defined include: (1)  relief of property or distress, (2)  education, (3)  medical relief, and (4)  the  advancement of any other object of general  public utility but does not include a purpose which relates- (a)  exclusively to sports, or (b)  exclusively to religious teaching or worship." There  are certain other provisions of the Act to which  our attention  was drawn during the course of the arguments  but as  both their construction as well as their  constitutional validity  which were the subject of debate before  us  would arise  only  if  the Trust were a  public  charitable  Trust within the definition in a. 2(13) read with s. 9, we purpose

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immediately  to proceed to consider the submissions made  by learned Counsel in relation to this crucial point. The Trust in question was created by a deed dated August 16, 1920  by three persons.  The first two authors of the  Trust were  the sons of Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak who had  died on August 1, 1920, leaving a will executed on April 5, 1918, to  the terms of which we shall refer presently.  The  third executant was the executor 630 appointed  by the deceased under his said will.   The  Trust deed in its preamble refers to the execution of the will and after  reciting the fact that the will was agreed to in  all respect  by the three exeoutants proceeds to state that  the Trust deed in regard to the Kesari Printing Press Newspapers etc. was being executed in order that the objects recited in the  will  may  be fulfilled.  The Trust  deed  contains  13 clauses but of these those relevant for the consideration of the matters arising in the appeal are only two and they  are cls.  1 and 8. Clauses 1 specifies the objects of the Trust, while  el. 8 makes provision for contingencies arising  from the trustees becoming incapable of discharging their  duties as well as from the institution ceasing to exist.  It reads:               "In  the  event of any_ of the  said  Trustees               becoming  incapable of discharging the  duties               of  the Trust for any reason whatsoever,  such               person as in the opinion of both the trustees,               may be fit to discharge the duty in accordance               with  the wishes of the Lokamanya Tilak  shall               be  appointed  as  a  trustee  for  the   prep                             etuation  of this institution and  Trust.   If  perchance, there is only one Trustee left for               making  this appointment, he shall  appoint  a               Trustee  following the above policy.  And  all               the  rights of the Trustee of the said  insti-               tution  under this Trust deed, shall  vest  in               the  Trustee so appointed.  If for any  reason               whatever,  new Trustees are not  appointed  or               none of the prior Trustees survives, the  pan-               chas  mentioned  (under  appointment  of   New               Trustees  by the Panchas) in clause  8,  under               the  heading  of ’the Printing Press’  in  the               Will  of  the Lokamanya Tilak or  the  Panohas               appointed in their own place by such  Panchas               shall  appoint the new Trustees.  But if  such               appointment of New Trustee is not made in               631               the  manner  stated above,  the  Trust  Estate               shall  revert  to Nos.  1 and 2 of  us  or  to               their  heirs, ’Primarily’ in the  capacity  of               Trustees  as  such.  If for  any  reason  this               institution  ceases functioning, for the  time               being  but  if it is possible to  revive  that               institution, such Trustees who may be  present               and fit to carry on the institution under this               Trust-deed.   However,  if  this  institution,               ceases  to exist, for any  reason  whatsoever,               and  it is thought that it is not possible  to               revive  it  at any time later  on,  the  trust               property shall be of the ownership of Nos.   1               and  2 of us or their heirs.  The trustees  of               the  institution individually, or their  heirs               shall   have  no  private   (personal)   right               whatever to this property." It  is  only necessary to add that learned Counsel  for  the appellant-Trustees  assured  us that the appellants  had  no

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intention at all of abandoning the objects of the’ Trust  or ceasing  to be bound by the terms of the Trust deed even  in the  event  of our holding that the Trust was not  a  public charitable trust, but that cherishing as they did the memory of Lokmanya Tilak they would carry on the mission  entrusted to them by the great leader for ever.  As almost the  entire argument  in  the appeal before us as well as  the  decision against  the  appellants  in the Courts  below  have  rested wholly  on  the  interpretation  and  legal  effect  of  the provisions  contained in el.  1 it is necessary to set  this out in full.  The Trust deed is in Marathi and the following is its English translation accepted by both parties :               "This  Trust deed has been made as a means  to               the fulfilment perpetually and uninterruptedly               after  the  death  of the  late  Lokmanya  Bal               Gangadhar  Tilak  of that very object  of  his               with  which  he took all activities  after  be               took charge of the newspapers-the               632               Kesari  and  Maratha  such  as  of   spreading               political education through the newspapers and               thereby making people alive to their political               rights  and  carrying  on  other  multifarious               public  activities conducive to  the  national               ideal etc." Pausing   here,  is  it  necessary  to  mention   that   the translation as it appears in the Paper Book reads ",such  as spreading national education through those newspapers  etc." It was however agreed that the adjective "national" was  not a  correct  rendering of the Marathi  expression  "’Rajakia" which  was more accurately denoted by the  word  "political" and  we  therefore  proceed on  the  translation  which  was accepted before us by both the parties. It will be seen from the preamble and cl.  1 that the  Trust was brought into existence or the purpose of fulfilling  the last  wishes of the Lokmanya as expressed in his will  dated April  5,  1918.,  The  terms of  the  will  have  therefore relevance for understanding the object sought to be achieved by  the  Trust.  The will was made in Colorado on  April  5, 1918.   Most  of the dispositions of the will are  taken  up with  legacies  to his sons but the disposition we  are  now concerned  with  occurs in cls. 3 and 4 of the will  and  we shall read the relevant portions of those clauses.  Clause 3 (1) which is headed "The Printing Press" reads:               "I have made a public trust of the newspapers,               the  office, the printing press,  the  machine               and  the  foundry, the newspaper  library  and               security-money in respect of newspapers" This,  however, was not accurate; for though  evidently  the Lokmanya  had  intended to create a trust,  no  formal  deed therefor  had been executed and it was this deficiency  that was supplied by 633 his sons and the executor appointed under the will.   Clause 4 of the will is of relevance and it ran:               "The  policy of the papers (editorial  policy)               shall be kept as it is, Under no circumstances               shall it be changed." The other provisions of the will do not bear upon the points arising in this appeal. The question now for our consideration is whether under  cl. 1  of the deed of trust a public charitable trust  has  been created.  Analysing the provision of the clause it would  be seen  that the prime object of the trust was the  fulfilment of  the basic purpose which animated the activities  of  the

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late Lokmanya and which he sought to accomplish through  the two  newspapers-Kesari and Mahratha after he took charge  of them.   This has to be read with the provision of  the  will directing  the continuance of the two newspapers with  their policy   entirely  unchanged.   As  if  in  explanation   or exemplification of this prime purpose we have the statement that  the object the Lokmanya sought to achieve through  the two  newspapers was that of ,spreading  political  education and  thereby  making  the people alive  to  their  political rights and carrying out other multifarious public activities conducive to the national ideal. Pausing  here,  it is necessary to mention that  though  the object  of the trust was thus intimately bound up  with  the policy  and  purpose of the Kesari and  Mahratha  after  the Lokmanya  took  charge of them, no evidence was led  at  any stage by either party as to what precisely was the policy or the  object  of the two newspapers which was  sought  to  be achieved  by  the Lokmanya through them. Nor  was  evidence placed  before  the Court of the precise  aims  and  objects which the Lokmanya incalcuted by to teachings through  these nows- 634 papers.   It was, possibly assumed that the life and  ideals for which the Lokmanya stood, and in particular the  matters which he considered as the prime purpose and policy of these two  newspapers  with which he, was connected for  over  two decades, were matters of history so well-known to the Courts and  authorities  in Maharashtra and therefore on  which  no formal  evidence  was  required to  be  adduced.   We  would however,  add  that such evidence on the record  would  have lightened  our task and that it is with this  handicap  that the point in controversy in the appeal has to be decided. This might be the convenient stage at which reference  could be  made to a previous occasion when the  interpretation  of the trust-deed with particular reference to the question  of its  character  as  a public charitable trust  came  up  for consideration  before  the  Courts.  Section 4  (3)  of  the Indian  Income tax Act, 192 2 exempts from income tax  "any income  derived  from property held under a trust  or  other legal obligation wholly for religious or charitable purposes in  so far as such income-is applied or is  accumulated  for application   to  such  religious  or   charitable   purpose The  section  carried a definition of  "charitable  purpose" which was stated to include "relief of the poor,  education, medical  relief and the advancement of any other  object  of general public utility" which, it would be seen, is in terms the  same as the definition of a "charitable purpose"  under the  Act.  The claim of "the Kesari and Mahratha  Trust"  to exemption  under  this provision came up  for  consideration before  the High Court of Bombay on a reference under s.  66 (2)  of the Indian Income-tax Act.  The reference was  heard by Beaumont, C. J., and Rangnekar, J., and the learned Chief Justice delivering the judgment of the Court said:               "To  my mind the trust which is  contained  in               cl.  I of the deed is too vague and wide to               635               be  regarded as a charitable trust within  the               meaning  of the Income-tax Act.  Some  of  the               purposes, no doubt, are charitable but  others               are  not  and the whole of the  funds  may  be               applied   to  non-charitable  purposes.    The               purposes  include organising public  movements               and  even if you limit those general words  by               the words ’calculated to promote the  national               ideal,  it seems to me impossible to say  that

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             the  promotion of public movements  calculated               in  the  view of the trustees to  promote  the               national ideal can be regarded as  necessarily               of public utility." The  learned  Judges therefore held that the trust  was  not entitled to exemption under s. 4(3) of the Income-tax Act  . Learned  Counsel fortheappellant did not contend  before  us that  this judgment was yes judicature in these  proceedings for  the  decision  of  the matter now  before  us,  but  as expressing the views of the learned Judges on the  construc- tion of the document whose interpretation is the subject  of dispute  in  the present case.  With these  observations  we shall  put aside that decision and proceed to  construe  the terms of cl. (1) of the deed to find out how far the  object sought   to  be  achieved  are  within  the  definition   of "charitable purpose" within the Act. In  doing this, it would be convenient first to set out  the construction  which found favour with the learned Judges  of the  High  Court in the judgment now under appeal  and  then consider the sub. missions made by learned Counsel on either side.   Referring  to  cl.  1 and the matters  to  which  it refers  as needed to be done for fulfilling the  objects  of the trust, the learned Judges said that these were : (1) the awakening  in  the minds of the people  a  consciousness  of their  political  rights  by  spreading  the  knowledge   of politics through the newspapers" 636 Kesari"  and  "Mahratha" and (2) organising  various  public movements  calculated to promote the national  ideal.   They went on to state that the second purpose could not amount to a  charitable purpose under the Bombay Public Trust Act  and observed               "As  the  nature and character of  the  public               movements  which  were  to  be  promoted   for               furthering  the national ideal were  not  even               indicated, much less specified it seems  impo-               ssible to say that the Organisation of  public               movements which in the opinion of the trustees               might  be calculated to promote  the  national               ideal can be regarded necessarily as an object               of  general public utility within the  meaning               of clause (4) of section 9 of the Act.   Those               public  movements  would  obviously  not  fall               under  any of the other clauses of  section  9               either.  Clearly, therefore, the second of the               two  purposes  mentioned in clause  1  of  the               trust-deed  cannot be considered a  charitable               purposes." They,  however,  were of the view that  the  first  purpose, viz.,  of  "awakening a consciousness  of  political  rights among  the  people by spreading the  knowledge  of  politics through  the newspapers" would be a charitable purpose.   In this  context  they  considered that the  decisions  of  the English  Courts  that the attainment of  political  purposes would not be a charitable purpose as advancing an object  of general  public utility could not be applied in  India,  and that even if the same were applicable, that under the Trust- deed  before them, the awakening of political  consciousness among  the people was not identical with the advancement  of political objects and that the awakening of such  conscious- ness  need  not  necessarily be for  achieving  a  political purpose  being  out  of the way  they  considered  that  the awakening, of such consciousness would be 637 an advancement of an object of public utility.

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Several  points  were  raised by  learned  Counsel  for  the appellant  in support of his contention that the  trust-deed did not create a charitable trust.  His first submission was that  the  learned Judges of the High Court  were  wrong  in considering  that there were two objects to be subserved  by the trust for the attainment of which the trust was founded, but  only a single object and that object was  political  in its  nature  and that consequently it was not  a  charitable purpose within the meaning of the law.  His next  submission was  that  even  if there were two objects  as  the  learned Judges  of  the High Court had held, they  were  not  really independent  objects  but both of them were dominated  by  a single  purpose which was political in its nature.   At  the base  of bath of these interpretations of the deed  lay  the submission  that the object to be attained by the trust  was political, and if so, it was not charitable. We  consider  that  there  is  considerable  force  in   the submission  of  learned  Counsel that  the  trust  has  been founded  with  a  view  to achieve  a  single  objective  or purpose,    viz.,   "’the   fulfilment    perpetually    and uninterruptedly" of "the object with which the late Lokmanya took  up  all  activities  after  he  took  charge  of   the newspapers  ’Kesari’ and ’Mabratha’." It might be  that  the activities  for which the newspapers were utilised after  he took  charge  of them disclosed more than purpose,  but  the common link between every such line of activity was that  it stemmed  from a political purpose, for the  newspapers  were made  to serve as the vehicle for achieving his  objectives. The question therefore as to the purpose of the trust  would have  to be resolved by examining the various activities  in which  he  himself  engaged and the  object  with  which  he engaged in them, but the latter is not the basis 638 upon  which  the  High Court has  proceeded  in  reaching  a finding  that the trust-deed disclosed a duality of  purpose one   of  which  the  learned  Judges  recognised  was   not charitable but the other was held to be so. The words in the second limb of the first clause referring to "the  spreading of  political education through the newspapers  and  thereby making people &live to their political rights" and  secondly "the  carrying  on  other  multifarious  public   activities conducive  to  the  national ideal"  were  really  meant  as illustrations of activities undertaken by the late  Lokmanya during his life-time as is manifest by the use of the  words "such  as" before the clause.  If the object with which  the Lokmanya  took up his activities after he assumed charge  of the newspapers was dominated by a political purpose and  the newspapers  were used by him to achieve that objective,  the illustrations of his activities set out in the clause  must be similarly construed.  But to this we shall revert later. This apart, there is one other way in which the matter might be  approached.  The learned Judges of the High  Court  have held  that  the object signified by the words  "carrying  on other  multifarious  public  activities  conducive  to   the national ideal" was much too vague to serve as an object  or purpose  of an enforceable trust, for besides the  vagueness involved in the description of the activity as "conducive to the  national  ideal  etc", there  is  a  further  vagueness introduced   by   the  words  "other   multifarious   public activities".   One  mode  of testing the  validity  of  this object  would  be  whether  one could  uphold  the  deed  as constituting  a valid enforceable charitable purpose  if  it had merely made provision for the trust-fund being  utilized for carrying’ on multifarious public activities conducive to the  national ideal etc." It is obvious that  this  question

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could  be  answered only in one way and that in,  favour  of holding that the trust was too vague to  639 be  valid.  If therefore the last portion of the clause  was left  out  of  account,  two  questions  would  have  to  be considered  (1) whether on a proper construction of cl.  (1) read  with  the rest of the deed, the object  sought  to  be achieved  is  or is not a single one, and  (2)  whether  the object  indicated  by  the  words  "spreading  of  political education  through the newspapers and thereby making  people alive  to  their  political rights" would  be  a  charitable purpose within the meaning of s. 9 of the Act ? If the  last part  of the clause (1) were out, as too vague.. the  object of  the Trust would read, to quote the relevant  words  "the fulfilment  perpetually  and  uninterruptedly  of  the  very object  with which he (the Lokmanya) took up all  activities after  he  took charge of the newspapers such  as  spreading political  education through- these newspapers  and  thereby making  people  alive to their political rights."  We  shall immediately  proceed  to deal with the import of  the  words ’,the very object with which he took up all activities after he  took charge of the newspapers", but before we do  so  we might  state that we have no hesitation in holding that  the words  of the clause we have just extracted indicate  but  a single  purpose,, viz., the fulfilment of the  objects  with which  Tilak took up all activities after he took charge  of the two newspapers. We  have  earlier  drawn attention to the  feature  that  no evidence was placed before the authorities under the Act  or before the Courts as to the object which the Lokmanya sought to  achieve  by the two newspapers Learned Counsel  for  the appellant invited our attention to the reported decision  of the Bombay High Court where certain writings and articles of the  late  Lokmanya  came  up for  consideration,  and  in particular  to the articles which formed the  subject-matter of  the  charges against the Lokmanya in   prosecutions  for sedition.      But if one were, confined to the these 640 they  must obviously  give us only a partial  and  truncated idea  of  his  activities and so are apt  to  afford  but  a distorted  picture  of  the objects  with    which  the  two newspapers   were  conducted.  We  therefore  examined   the literature bearing on the life and work of this great leader and  particularly  two  recent  books  on  the  topic  "Bala Gangadhar  Tilak by Parvate (1958) which was brought to  our attention  by Mr. Sanyal appearing for the  respondent,  and Lokmanya  Tilak  by Dhananjay Keer (September,  1959)".   In doing  so  we have confined our,selves to  the  facts  there stated  and  have  refrained from taking  into  account  the evaluation  by  the authors of Tilak’s activities  or  their comments on any particular views on public or social matters entertained by the subject of their biography. As  a  result of this examination we  gather  the  following facts which are of relevance to the point before us.  Tilak, though he was associated with the two newspapers from  their start  in  or about 1881, took over the  editorship  of  the Kesari  in 1887 and became the sole proprietor of  both  the papers by 1893 and was in charge of I heir conduct till  his death in 1920.  Tilak was a public figure who dominated  the political  firmament of the country for near three  decades. He was a rebel against political wrongs.  He was a  champion of  all  who were oppressed and conceived it as  his  sacred mission  to rouse the people to a sense of their wrongs  and of their strength in winning their salvation, for it was his firm   conviction   that  petty  tyranny  by   the   foreign

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bureaucracy  was  possible because of the ignorance  of  the people  and,  their apathy to their  condition.   His  ideas might be gleaned from his observation that people must fight for the vindication of their rights and that those who  were unmoved at the sight of injustice and the high handed policy of  the Government, should not be regarded as human  beings. The two newspapers were intended by Tilak 641 to be the mechanism by which the wrongs done to the  people should  be brought home to them and their conscience  roused to  a sense of the injustices and oppressions to which  they were  subjected.  In R., undertaking the  responsibility  of running  the  Kesari  and  the  Mahratha  it  was  a   clear indication  of his resolve to throw himself completely  into public  life  and  to  devote himself to  the  task  of  the political  education of the masses.  He wrote in the  Kesari about every public grievance and every public cause and this made  him the champion of popular causes and  amass  leader. The  two the Kesari and the Mahratha were in no  sense  mere newspapers.   They were primarily views-papers, vehicles  of public  opinion and the news they contained  were  carefully selected to be helpful to the views propagated in them Tilak looked upon Kesari as the chief vehicle for propagating  his views  as  he wanted them to be disseminated  as  widely  as possible.   The  objective  determined  its  style;  it  was direct, simple forthright.  The papers championed the  cause of  the  underdog and everywhere fought  against  injustice, contained  a  study  of public  complaints  and  grievances, exposed oppressive officers, criticised fearlessly and  made constructive    suggestions   for   the   reform   of    the administration  and  championed the peoples cause  in  every sense.    During  Tilak’s  days  Tilak  and  Kesari   became synonymous  terms.  The Kesari had been the citadel  of  the national   fight  and  remained  impregnable  even   through repressive  campaigns and became a national asset.   It  was Tilak’s confirmed view that the ills of the nation  demanded political  reforms and not immediate social reforms.   Tilak challenged  the right of the foreign bureaucracy to  sit  in legislative judgment on lndian society.  It was the view  of Tilak that respect must be paid to the prejudices of  people and that one must try to make the humblest of them feel that he was one of them.  Tilak was convinced 642 of  the  futility of appeals to people made in the  form  of speeches  and  resolutions  with their  eyes  fixed  towards Government  and realised that the Indian  National  Congress with which be was closely associated from 1889 would be able to ameliorate the condition of the people if the masses were attracted to it and their power harnessed to the chariot  of the  Congress.  It was the main role in his life to stir  up the  people against their poverty, degradation and  slavery. To  foster opposition to British rule, to bring people  into conflict  with Government and to make  Government  unpopular was  the  great  aim  of  Tilak’s  speeches,  writings,  and leadership.  The enthusiasm and vigour of the people bad  to be  utilized for keeping up their pride in the  achievements of  their ancestors and as a means of educating  the  common people.  He sought to rouse the pride of the people in their past  heroes  so as to unify them into one body  to  achieve political  liberation.  His plea was that people  should  be taught  what their rights were and how they could get  their grievances  redressed.   That was the way  to  increase  the influence  of  the  Congress.   He  taught  people  to   act fearlessly  though  peacefully and lawfully  and  get  their grievances  redressed,  for  the  principle  underlying  his

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philosophy  wag that foreign yoke could be over thrown  only when  people were awakened and discontented, when it is  not possible  for  a foreign Government to hold them  under  its sway.  Without attracting the attention of the people to the unjust state of affairs no political progress was  possible, nor reform in the administration.  From about 1903 Tilak was gradually  shifting  to  what the  Moderates  used  to  call Extremism, smouldering as he was at the apathy shown by  the Moderate  leaders  towards active  politics.   The  Congress which gave occasion for orators brandishing polished phrases and ended with prayers and petitions had grown sterile.   He was  coming  to realise that politics must cease to  be  the pastime of the old orators and  643 title  holders.   Though  he felt that  the  record  of  the Congress  left  no room for disappointment or  despair,  its triumph  lay  in  awakening the soul  of  the  nation.   The Moderates accepted British rule as a divine dispensation but the militant nationalists led by Tilak-refused to believe in the doctrine of divine dispensation.  After the partition of Bengal  in  1905 and the agitation which followed  it  Tilak wrote articles discussing the policy of boycott of  foreign, goods, and particularly of foreign cloth, and he  considered that  a boycott on a national scale was the  proper  remedy, but  its results depended upon actions and Lot  upon  words. Tilak  was then the spearhead of the Swadeshi movement,  but even here it was fired and inspired by a political  purpose, for he said:               "If  the Indian Government dissociates  itself               from   the  commercial  aspirations   of   the               British,  Nation,  then it will  be  time  for               Swadeshi  workers to consider the question  of               dissociating  their  movement  from  politics.               But  so  long  as politics  and  commerce  are               blended   together  in  the  policy   of   the               Government  of India, it will be a blender  to               dissociate Swadeshi movement from politics." And in the Kesari he declared that if it was unavoidable  to use  a  foreign  article, they  should  give  preference  to articles   produced  in  Asiatic  countries  and  the   next preference  should be given to other European countries  and America. It  was Tilak who made it the mission of his life to  arouse the  people against political slavery and foreign rule.   He resolved  to  organise the people under the  banner  of  the Congress  and to make it the real spokesman of  the  people. The  two newspapers served as the vehicle through  which  he aimed to achieve these objects.  Possibly nothing brings out *ore forcibly the purpose and aim of the 644 Lokmanya which animated his conduct of the newspapers than a self-appraisal  which  is  extracted  in  the  biography  by Parvate already referred to. A  controversy  arose in 1919 about Tilak’s  neglect  of  or apathy  to  social  reform and his  exclusive  attention  to political progress and there was an attack by Dr.  Paranjpye on  this  aspect of the matter in an article in  the  Bombay Chronicle reviewing Tilak’s sins of omission and commission. Tilak  published a rejoinder in which he reviewed his  whole career.  In the course of this letter Tilak said, "My  views on  political  and  social matters  are  well-known  to  the public.   The  charge  against me is that  my  activity  and propaganda  are  one-sided.   I  do  not  hold  that  social reconstruction   must  be  undertaken  prior  to   political emancipation.   I attach greater importance to the  latter."

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Speaking  of the Kesari he said, "It is true that I made  it an organ exclusively of political propaganda.  I do not deny it, but at the same time let me point out that the political awakening in Maharashtra since then is more the work of this paper  and  my party than Mr. Paranjpye and the men  of  his ilk." Before  concluding this part of the case it is necessary  to refer to an aspect of the matter arising out of our  summary of  the Lokmanya’s activities which he pursued  through  the two  newspapers.   It  would  be seen  that  he  was  wholly concerned  with  achieving the intimate association  of  the people  and their representatives in the administration  and governance  of  the  country, and if  possible,  the  entire elimination  of foreign rule altogether, and the  two  news- papers  were  utilised for educating and rousing  people  to achieve these.  What Tilak’s policy or activities would have been  after complete independence had been achieved and  the policy which he would have the papers pursue subsequently is an  interesting  question,  but one which  we  consider  not relevant,  645 for  the determination of the question before us.   What  we are  concerned  with is as regards the  object  which  Tilak sought  to  achieve by conducting these newspapers,  and  to perpetuate which the trust was founded. The  survey, though very inadequate of the public  life  and activity of the Lokmanya in particular relationship with the two  newspapers undoubtedly show that his purpose in  taking over and conducting the newspapers was clearly political, in the  sense  of seeking to achieve by means  of  rousing  the consciousness of the people to their condition, a  political awareness,  by  which adjustment of a   political  character would  be demanded and enforced by the persons  who  imbibed those truths or were influenced by such writings. The  next question to be- considered is whether a  political purpose,  i.e.,  for  educating people not  on  theories  of political or social sciences as a subject of academic study, but   for  moving  them  to  practical  action  to   achieve governmental  changes  is or is not  a  charitable  purpose. There  was  some debate before us as to the  import  of  the expression  "charitable"  and arguments  were  addressed  in particular as to the exact point of difference between,  the concept of charity under the English Law and that under  the Indian  Law.   No doubt, as pointed out by  Lord  Wright  in Chichester  Diocesan Fund & Board-of Finance  (Incorporated) v.  Simpons  (1)  the term "charity" has  not,  in  England, always  had  a  precise  connotation.   What  constituted  a charitable purpose has there been derived from the  preamble of the Act 43 Elizabeth 1 Ch.  IV (1601) which was’ taken to signify those purposes which would be held to be charitable. It  is  not’ necessary for us to set out  the  objects  enu- merated  in that preamble but it was always considered  that list  was not exhaustive though to decide whether a  purpose was in law charitable or (1)  (1944) A.C. 341, 353. 646 not, it has been the practice of the English Courts to refer to  that preamble.  In these decisions besides  the  objects there enumerated, others which by analogy were deemed to  be "within  the spirit and intended of that statute" have  been held  to  be  charitable in the  legal  sense.   Ever  since however the judgment of Lord Macnaghten in Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Pax v. Pemsel (1) the  expression ’charitable  purpose" has been understood to  comprise  four main  heads  :  (1) relief of poverty,  (2)  advancement  of

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education and learning, (3) advancement of religion, and (4) other  purpose,% beneficial to the community or  the  advan- cement of objects of general public utility.  As regards the last  clause, Lord Macnaghten expressed the view that  under English law there might be some purposes of general  utility which  might be charitable and some which might not be,  the true  test being whether the particular purpose  was  within the  spirit  and  intention of  the  statute  of  Elizabeth. Whether the concept of charity under Indian law is or is not wider  than what Lord Macnaghten considered to be the  scope of  charitable purpose in England does not really arise  for consideration  in the case before for us, we are  bound  by the  terms of s. 9 of the Act which has defined the  several categories into which a charity might fall. It was not the contention of the respondent that the  trust- deed constituted a charity under any other head than that of the  fourth  clause of s. 9 viz., ",the advancement  of  any other  object of general public utility." In saying so  what we desire to point out is that it was not the contention  of the   respondent  that  by  the  reference   to   "political education" in cl.  1 of the Trust-deed, the charity was  one for  the  advancement of "education" within s.  9  (2).   It would be seen that ultimately the question to be decided  is whether the achievement  647 of a political purpose, in the sense of arousing, in  people the  desire and instilling into them an imperative  need  to demand  changes in the structure of the  administration  and the  mechanism by which they are governed, could be said  to be the "advancement of an object of general public utility." Having  regard to the very limited nature and scope  of  the question  before  us  it is not necessary  to  consider  the precise points of the difference between the English law  as understood by Lord Macnaghten and that which finds place  in the Indian statutes dealing with the relevant topic.  We say this  because we have judgments--of the Privy Council  cons- truing  the  terms of s. 4 of the Indian Income-tax  Act  of 1922 in which enactment the purposes which are  comprehended within  the expression "’charitable" are defined in  exactly the  same  manner  as  we find in s. 9 of  the  Act  now  in question and where in particular, the. learned Judges had to consider the question whether the achievement of a political purpose,  as  we have explained earlier,  was  a  charitable purpose. Before however referring to the Privy Council it would be of advantage  if we refer briefly to the decisions  in  England which  have taken the view that if a purpose were  political it is not charitable i.e., it does not advance an object  of general public utility.  The earliest case to which we  need make  reference is the decision of Rowlatt, J.,  in  Commis- sioners of Inland Revenue v. The Temperance Council (1).  It arose  out  of  a  claim  by  the  Temperance:  Council  for exemption  from  payment  of income-tax in  respect  of  the income  and dividends derived by the Council, on the  ground that  the  Council was established for  charitable  purposes only.   The purpose of the Council was "by united action  to secure  legislative  and other temperance  reform."  Dealing with this claim the learned Judge said (1)  (1926) 10 Tax Cas. 748. 648               "The work of the Council, it was provided, was               to be a of strictly non-party character.  That               is a wholly irrelevant consideration.  When it               has been said that a political purpose is  not               a  charitable purpose, that conclusion is  not

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             relevant,  because political purposes  are  or               may be purposes mixed up with party  politics;               the  word  ’political’ does not mean  that  in               that connection at all." The  learned Judge went on to state that the object  of  the trust  being  to secure a certain line  of  legislation,  it would not be a charitable trust. Bonar Law Memorial Trust v. Commissioners of Inland  Revenue (1)  is the next case to which reference might  usefully  be made.   The  done under the trust was the Chairman,  on  the date  of  gift, of the central office  of  the  Conservative Party. and the fund was donated by an oral trust and a  deed was  executed  after the death of the donor  to  secure  the objectives  with  which the donor had made  the  gift.   The objects were, inter alia, to honour the memory of Bonar  Law (a former leader of the Conservative Party), "to preserve  a historical  building  from destruction and to use  it  as  a college for the education of persons in economics, political and  social  science, etc., with special  reference  to  the development  of the British Constitution, and in such  other subjects  as the governing body might deem  desirable."  The intention, of the governing body was to educate students  in political principles and to exclude propaganda in support of a  particular  party,  and students  were  admitted  to  the college without any reference to their political beliefs  or inclination.  It was, however conceded that the governors of the college and the members of the education committee  were wholly  composed  of members of the Conservative  Party  and that lectures were given on the conservative party (1)  (1933) 17 Tax Cas. 508. 649 Organisation  but not on Liberal or Socialist  organisation. The  question before the Court related to the claim of  this trust  for exemption under the Income Tax Act.  Finlay,  J., in  rejecting  the  claim of the  trust  to  the  exemption, observed               "It is necessary to ascertain exactly, as  far               one can, what the question to be decided  here               is.   It was suggested by Mr. Needham  that  a               trust   for  the  promotion  of   Conservative               principles  would be a good charitable  trust.               I  am  not  prepared  to  hold  that.   In  my               opinion, there is no authority. which has gone               as far as that.  It is true that Stirling, J.,               in  the case of Scoweroft (1) left the  matter               open,  but,  in  my opinion,  on  the  present               position  of  the authorities and also,  as  I               think,  on the principle of the thing,  it  is               impossible  to  hold  that a  trust  which  is               simply  a  trust for the  propagation  of  the               political principles of a particular party  is               a good charitable trust."               The  learned  Judge then extracted  a  passage               from  the  judgment of Russell, J., in  In  re               Tetly (2 reading:               "Subsidising  a newspaper for the pro.  motion               of  particular  political or  fiscal  opinions               would  be a, patriotic purpose in the eyes  of               those who considered that the triumph of those               opinions would be beneficial to the community.               It  would  not be an application funds  for  a               charitable purpose." Scowcrofes  case  which  is referred to by  Finlay,  J,.  is reported  in  [1898] 2 Ch. 638.  Under a will  a  particular property  was devised to be set apart "to be maintained  for

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the furtherance of Conservative principles and for religious and mental (1) [1898] 2 Ch. 638.   (2) (1923) 1 Ch. 258, 262. 650 improvement  and  to  be  kept  free  from  intoxicants  and dancing".  The case before the Court arose on an originating summons taken out ’by the trustees of the will to  determine the validity of the devise.  It was urged in support of  the summons,  by  Counsel  who  disputed  the  validity  of  the disposition  that  a  gift in  furtherance  of  Conservative principles wan not a good charitable gift and that as it was impossible to say how much to be devoted to the  advancement of  the  Conservative cause and how much  to  religious  and mental improvement, the purpose was vitiated and the  entire devise  was void.  On the other hand, it was the  contention on  behalf  of the Attorney-General that the bequest  for  a religious  purpose  was good and was not vitiated  by  being associated with or intended to promote any particular views, unless  such  views be illegal or immoral.  It  was  further urged  on his behalf that the gift before the Court was  not one  merely for the furtherance of  Conservative  principles but  for Conservative principles and religious,  and  mental improvement, i. e. for religious and mental improvement  in, connection with Conservative principles and that looking  at the  substance of the gift they were really and  principally for  the mental and moral improvement of the villagers,  and not  being  in,  validated  by  the  tinge  of  Conservative principles, were good and valid charitable gifts.  Stirling, J.,  accepted  this submission of the  Attorney  General  in support  of  the validity of the trust.  The  learned  Judge said:               "Whether or not a gift for the furtherance  of               Conservative  principles is a good  charitable               gift  is A question upon which I do not  think               it  necessary to express any opinion  in  this               case, because it seems to me that the  reading               which is suggested is not the true one, but               651               that  this  is  gift for  the  furtherance  of               Conservative  principles  and  religious   and               mental  improvement  in  combination.   It  is               either   a   gift  for  the   furtherance   of               Conservative  principles in such a way  as  to               advanced  religious and mental improvement               at   the  same  time,  or  a  gift for   the               furtherance    of   religious    and    mental               improvement  in accordance  with  Conservative               principles; and in either case the furtherance               of  religious and mental improvement is in  my               judgment,  an essential portion of the  gift..               It is, therefore a gift in one form or another               for religious and mental improvement, no doubt               in   combination  with  the   advancement   of               Conservative principles; but that  limitation,               it appears to me, is not sufficient to prevent               it  from  being a  perfectly  good  charitable               gift, as undoubtedly it would be if it were  a               gift  for  the furtherance  of  religious  and               mental improvement alone." In  re  Tetley (1), referred to by finlay J., in  Boner  Law Memorial Trust case (2), was concerned with the validity  of a  bequest under which the trustees were directed  to  apply property  "for such patriotic purposes or objects  and  such charitable  object or objects in the British Empire as  they in  their absolute discretion should select".  The Court  of

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appeal  affirming  a judgment of Russell, J.,  held  that  a patriotic  purpose might not necessarily be  charitable  and therefore  the bequest was void.  Dealing with the  head  of "Charity" relating to "trusts for purposes beneficial to the community" Barrington, L.J.,said.               "You  inquire what the divisions of  charities               are, and you come to the conclusion that there               is one miscellaneous set of chari-               (1) [1923] 1 Ch. 258, 262.               (2) (1933) 17 Tax.  Cas. 508.               652               ties which can be classed under that head; but               to  stateduce from that the notion that  every               purpose of general use to, the community  must               be  a charity is just about as logical  as  to               draw  from  a statement in the  report  of  an               insurance  society that ’persons insured  with               us   may  be  divided  into  men,  women   and               children’ the deduction that every man,  every               woman,  and  every child is  insured  in  that               society.   It seems to me, therefore, that  it               is  open to us to say, that merely  because  a               trust may be said to be for the general use of               or   for  some  purpose  beneficial   to   the               community  is  not  necessarily  confined   to               "charitable purposes’ in the legal  acceptable               of that term............ Expression ’patriotic               purposes’  even if it be confined to  purposes               beneficial  to the State, is  not  necessarily               confined  to charitable purposes, and  a  gift               for  "patriotic  purposes’  is  therefore   so               uncertain as to be void." The position is summarised in Halsbury’s Laws of England (1) thus:               "’A  trust  for the  attainment  of  political               objects   is  invalid,  not  because   it   is               illegal’-for   everyone  is  at   liberty   to               advocate  or  promote by any  lawful  means  a               change in the lawbut because the court has  no               means of judging whether a proposed change  in               the law or will not be for the public benefit,               and therefore cannot say that a gift to secure               the change is a charitable gift." The law, as stated here, is an extract from the judgment  of Lord ’Parker in Bowman v. Secular Society, Ltd.(2) (1)  3rd Edn., Vol. 4, para 523-the title being  contributed by Danckwerts 2) [1917] A. C. 406  442. 653 We  shall now turn to the decisions of the Privy Council  in appeals  from  India  which bear upon the  question  as  to, whether  a trust created for a political purpose or  with  a view  to attaining political objects could be, held to be  a charitable  trust  within  the meaning  of  the  words  "the advancement of an object of general public utility". in  the Trustees  of  the Tribune Press, Lahore v.  Commissioner  of Income-tax(1)  the  court was concerned with  the  claim  to exemption under s. 4 (3) of the Indian Income-tax Act which, as we have pointed out earlier, is for purposes relevant  in the  present context, identical with s. 9 of the  Act.   The exemption  was claimed by the Trustees of the Tribune  Press under  a  Trust which directed them "to  maintain  the  said Press and newspaper in an efficient condition keeping up the liberal  policy  of  the said  newspaper  and  devoting  the surplus     income     of     the     said     press     and

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newspaper.....................   in   improving   the   said newspaper  and  placing it on a footing of  permanency   It. might be mentioned that evidence was placed before the Privy Council  of  selected issues of the, newspaper  which  threw light  on  the  character and the, policy of  the  paper  in lifetime  of  the founder as explanatory  of  the  direction contained in the I words ",keeping up the liberal policy  of the  said newspaper".  The reference under s. 66(2)  of  the Income-tax  Act came before a Division Bench of  the  Lahore High  Court and as the learned Judges were divided in  their opinion,  the question was referred to full bench  of  three judges  and by a majority the learned Judges held  that  the income  of  the  trust  was not exempt.  It  was  from  this judgment that the trustees preferred the appeal to the Privy Council.  Sir George Rankin who delivered   the judgment  of the  Judicial  Committee first rejected  an  argument  which sought to sustain the charitable nature of the first by a (1)  [1939] L. A. 66.  I. A. 241. 654 contention  that  the  trust  might be  regarded  as  of  an educational   character,  the  submission  being  that   the establishment  and  maintenance of  an  efficient  newspaper catering to the needs of a populous district where was  need for such a paper fell within such a purpose.  The next point that  was urged had been that the property was held under  a trust  for ,the advancement of an object of  general  public utility".  The learned Judge pointed out that the  statutory law  in India had for a long number of years and in  several instances  defined "’charity" in the way which it  had  been found  in  Indian Income-tax Act with which they  were  con- cerned.   Two  of the learned Judges of the High  Court  had expressed an  opinion  that  on  the  question  whether  a particular object or purpose was of general public  utility, the  true  test  was  not what the  Court  considers  to  be beneficial  to  the Public,, but what the  testator  or  the author  of  the  Trust considered to be so.  This  view  was dissented from and it was pointed out if this were  accepted trusts might be established in perpetuity for the  promotion of  all  kinds of fantastic (though not  unlawful)  objects. The  Court had therefore a responsibility in the  matter  in coming  to a decision as to the object of the trust  and  to discover   whether  it  satisfied  the  statutory  test   of ,advancing general public utility."’ The Judicial  Committee expressed  its  assent  to the  view  that  an  eleemosynary element was not essential for a use being charitable and  so the  fact  that  the newspaper was not  given  free  to  its subscribers, but only sold them for a price did not  detract from  the  trust being charitable.  Sir George  Rankin  then dealt  with the main objection that was taken to  the  trust not  being  charitable and that was on the ground  that  the Tribune  newspaper was intended by its founder to  carry  on political  propaganda and was intended to be devoted to  the advocacy of particular legislative 655 measures considered by its founder to be measures of  reform and  it was this political character which  the  respondents contended  prevented  the  trust from being held  to  be  an "object of general public utility".  After referring to  the various English decisions to most of which we have ourselves referred, the learned Judge proceeded               "These  English decisions are in point ’in  so               far  only  as they illustrate  the  manner  in               which  political  objects, in the  wide  sense               which includes projects for legislation in the               interests  of  particular causes,  affect  the

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             question whether the Court can regard a  trust               as being one of general public utility." He pointed out that it was not suggested by the Commissioner of Income-tax that the newspaper  was intended to be a  mere vehicle of political propaganda but was to be an  instrument for  the  dissemination of news and for the  ventilation  of opinion  upon all matters of public interest,  and  recorded his  conclusion that questions of politics  and  legislation were discussed in the paper only as many other matters  were discussed and that it had not been made out that a political purpose   was  the  dominant  purpose  of  the  trust.    He summarised the position stating that the object of the paper might  fairly be described as "the object of  supplying  the Province  with an organ of educated public opinion and  that it  should  prima facie be held to be an object  of  general public  utility.  Having regard to the evidence before  them as  to  the  contents of the paper it was  not  a  newspaper intended for the promotion of particular political or fiscal opinions." The next case to which we desire to make a, reference is the decision in All India Spinner’s Association v.  Commissioner of Income-tax (1).  As (1)  (1944) L.R. 71 A.I. 159. 656 the cause title Itself would indicate, the point in  dispute also  related  to whether the Association  was  entitled  to exemption in respect of its income under s. 4 (3) (1) of the Income-tax Act.  The Commissioner of Income-tax who made the reference to the High Court under s. 66(2) of the Income-tax Act  of the question whether the income of  the  Association was  liable  to income-tax and to super-tax,  expressed  his opinion  that  the dominant purpose of the  Association  was political  because  of the intimate connection  between  the Association  and  the Indian National Congress  and  besides that the manner in which the Association carried on business was  in  no  way different from the activity  of  a  trading concern.  The High Court of Bombay answered the question  in favour  of  the Revenue.  The reason for  this  holding  was that,  though the object of the Association was "the  relief of  the poor", still the income which was being assessed  to tax was not derived from "property hold under a trust for  a religious or charitable purpose".  There was no property  as such from which the income was derived but the profits arose out  of the sum total of the activities of the  Association, i. e, out of the business carried on by it and the fact that one  of the objects was the relief of poor would not  render the  income derived exempt from tax.  Quite a different  and for  out purposes a More relevant ground on which  the  case for  revenue  was rested was the aim of the  association  to afford  relief to the Poor, was coupled with another  object of the trust which was the prevention of the importation of foreign cloth into India and, as the Association was created with  a  view  to assisting the All India  Congress  it  was contended  that  therefore it had a  political  object.   On appeal to the Judicial Committee, Lord Wright who  delivered the judgment of the Board observed 657               "They  hold  that  the  income  sought  to  be               assessed is income derived from property  hold               under a trust or other legal obligation  wholly               for       religious       or        charitable               purposes...   ...............   It   is    now               recognized   that  the  Indian  Act  must   be               construed  on its actual words and is  not  to               be,  governed  by  English  decisions  on  the

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             topic.   The English decisions on the  law  of               charities  are  not  based  on  definite   and               precise statutory provisions.  They have  been               developed  in  the course of more  than  three               centuries by the Chancery Courts.  The Act  of               43 Elizabeth (1601) contained in a preamble  a               list  of charitable objects which fell  within               the Act, and this was taken as a sort of chart               or scheme which the court adopted as a ground-               work for developing the law.  In doing so they               made  liberal  use of analogies, so  that  the               modern English law can only be ascertained  by               considering  a mass of  particular  decisions,               often difficult to reconcile The difference in               language   in   s.  4(3)   from   Macnaghten’s               classification and particularly the  inclusion               in the Indian Act of the word ’Public’ instead               of the word ’community’ is     of  importance.               The   Indian Act     gives     a   clear   and               succinct definitionwhich must be construed  according               toits  actual language and meaning.               English,  decisions have no binding  authority               on its construction, and though they may some-               times afford help or guidance, cannot  relieve               the Indian Courts from their responsibility of               applying  the  language  of  the  Act  to  the               particular  circumstances  that  emerge  under               conditions  of Indian life  The  statement  of               the  object  excludes any question  of  profit               making, and also excludes any ele-               658               ment of party politics.  Any participation  in               political propaganda would be ultra vires  The               real underlying object of the Association  was               to  benefit  the poor  agriculturists  in  the               villages,  specifically, at that time  of  the               year  when  they are not actively  engaged  in               agricultural    operations  ....  The  primary               object of the Association was thus the  relief               of  the poor There is good ground for  holding               that the purposes of the Association  included               the  advancement of other purposes of  general               public  utility There exact scope may  require               on other occasions very careful  consideration               Though the connection of the Association  with               the  Congress  was relied on  as  inconsistent               with  general public utility because it  might               be   for  the  advancement  primarily   of   a               particular  party,  it is  sufficiently  clear               that    the   Association’s   purposes    were               independent of, and were not affected by,  the               purposes or propaganda of Congress." On this reasoning the appeal of the Association was allowed. We consider that these two decisions of the Privy Council in so  for as they hold that a political purpose, in the  sense of   a  propaganda  for  the  achievement  of  a   political objective,  is not a charitable purpose, i. e., not one  for the  advancement  of  an object of  general  public  utility correctly interpret the Indian statute and the law in India. Whatever difference there might be between the definition of "charity"  and  "charitable  purpose" in  the  English  and’ Indian law, we consider that there is none so far as regards ,political purposes" in the sense in which we have indicated earlier.    In  this  context,   it  is   significant   that Chichester Diocesan Fund etc. v. Simposns (1) in which

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(1)  (1944) A.I. 341, 353. 659 Lord  Wright  speaking in the House of lords  expounded  the uncertainties  of  the  English law as  to  the  meaning  of "charity"   and  the  appeal  of  the  All  India   Spinners Association (1) before the Judicial Committee were heard  at about  the  same time,and in consequence the  view  of  Lord Wright  expressed  in the latter decision that  a  political purpose  is not an object of general public utility even  on the  wider  language of the Indian  statute  reinforces  our conclusion on the point.  Even though the concept of charity under  the Indian Law might be wider than as  understood  in England, particularly under the residuary head  "advancement of an object of general utility", we consider that it  would not  include  a "political purpose" in the  sense  indicated already. The latest case on the point to which we would like to refer is  a decision of Vaisey, J., in Be Hopkinson : Lloyds  Bank Ltd.  v.  Baker(2)  for the reason that  the  learned  Judge refers  to  all the earlier English cases to which  we  have already  adverted  as  also to the  decision  of  the  Privy Council  in the Tribunal case.  The purpose of the trust  as recited  in the bequest was the creation of "an  educational fund  to  be  utilized at the  absolute  discretion  of  the trustees  for  the  advancement  of  adult  education   with particular  reference to the following purpose (but  without limiting  their  discretion in applying the  fund  to  adult education),  that is to say, the education of men and  women of all classes on the lines of the Labour Party’s memorandum headed  " A Note on Education in the about  Party."  Vaisey, J.,  held  that  the  direction  to  the  trustees  to  have particular  reference to the memorandum of the Labour  Party dominated the whole trust, forming its overriding and essen- tial  purpose  which  rendered  the trust  as  one  for  the attainment of political objects and was not, (1) [1949] 1 All.  E.R. 346. (2) (1944) L. R. 71, I.A. 159. 660 therefore, charitable.  The learned Judge pointed out:               "Political propaganda masquerading, using  the               word  not in any sinister sense, as  education               is not charitable",               and went on to add               "The  principle  that  legitimate  and  proper               political  aims and ambitions are not  charit-               able  is far too well settled for me  at  this               stage to attempt to apart from or refine  upon               it.  I wish to make it clear that the  purpose               indicated  in this memorandum and the  purpose               indicated   by   reference  thereto   in   the               testator’s  will are lawful, legitimate,  and,               ’from the point of view of those who put  them               forward, wholly desirable and proper, but they               are  not  charitable.  The law has  been  laid               down with charity over a long period of  time,               and, if the trust is not charitable, it is one               which the court cannot uphold.  The reason for               that, I think, is partly indicated in what was               said, also by Russell J., in Re  Hummeltenberg               (1923 1 Ch. 237), viz., that, if the trust  is               one  which the court could not  administer  if               the    trustees   disclaimed   their    duties               thereunder it would be a trust which could not               be supported in law......................... The decision in Srowcroft, (4a) the learned Judge  observed,

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did  not impinge upon, or limit the effect of,  the  general proposition  to which he referred.  He concluded  by  saying that there could be no doubt that the testator’s object was, not  education  in the proper sense of that  word,  but  the furtherance of his political views and the better  equipping of those who make it their business to further them. We are clearly of the opinion that a "political purpose"  is not a charitable purpose as being one  661 "for  the advancement of any other object of general  public utility" within s. 9 (4) of the Act. To summarise the- position: (1)  The object for which ,The Kesari & Mahratta  Trust" was established was the achievement of a    single      purpose, viz.,  to  continue  in  perpetuity  the  activity  for  the fulfilment   of  which  Lokmanya  Tilak  took  up  the   two newspapers. (2)  The specification in cl. 1 of the Trust-deed that these activities  were  "directed to the  spreading  of  political education  through the newspapers and hereby  making  people alive  to their political rights" was intended  to  describe the  object of the Lokmanya in taking up the newspapers  and correctly  described the same, as seen from the public  life and  activities of Tilak, particularly in the matter of  his conduct of the two newspapers. (3)  The two newspapers were designed by the Lokmanya to  be the  vehicle for educating the mass of the population  to  a sense  of  the  grievances suffered by  them  under  foreign rulers,  with a view to rouse them to political  action  and demand  a  share in Government.  He was  a  full-time  poli- tician.   At  a  time  when  Indian  men  of  learning  were eulogising  British  rule  and the  masses  were  inert  and lethargic  and oblivious to their degradation  Lokmanya,  by his  propaganda  and leadership sought to  infuse  into  the minds  of  the  masses  selfrespect  and  courage.   By  his writings  in these papers, Tilak demonstrated to the  people that the foreign rule rested on no moral foundation and when he  made  people realise this, the  achievement  of  freedom became assured.  That is why Tilak has been aptly termed the father of India’s freedom struggle. (4)  The life mission of Lokmanya which he sought to achieve and  achieved through the two newspapers, and which  is  set out in the trust-deed as 662 the  object for which the trust was founded was therefore  a political purpose. (5)  A political purpose is not charitable under s. 9 of the Act and hence, the ’.trust was not required to be registered under  s.  18  of the Act, and the order  of  the  Assistant Charity Commissioner confirmed by the Charity  Commissioner, directing  the  Trust  to be registered  was  erroneous  and should have been set aside by the District Court of Poona in Miscellaneous Application No.325 of 1954. The  appeal  is  accordingly allowed and the  order  of  the Assistant  Charity  Commissioner directing the Trust  to  be registered  confirmed by the Charity Commissioner on  appeal is  set  aside.  The appellants will be  entitled  to  their costs in all the Courts. SUBBA  RAO,  J.-I have had the advantage  of  persuring  the judgment  prepared by Rajagopala Ayyanger, J., and I  regret my  inability to agree.  The facts are fully stated  in  the judgment  of my learned brother and I need not restate  them here,  except to the extend necessary for  appreciating  the question raised in this case. Bal  Gangadhar Tilak executed a will on April 5,  1918,  and

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died  on August 1, 1920.  On August 16, 1920, his  two  sons and the executor appointed by him under the will executed  a trust  deed,  Ex.  12, in respect of  two  newspapers  ’,The Kesari"  and  ,The  Mahratta",  and  the  property  and  the machinery  pertaining thereto.  The question is whether  the trust  created  under the said document is  a  public  trust within  the meaning of the Bombay Public Trusts  Act,  [950] Bombay  Act XXIX of 1950), hereinafter called the Act.   The material provisions of the Act read:  663               "Section  2.  (13)  ,public  trust’  means  an               express  or constructive trust for  a  public,               religious  or charitable purpose or  both  and               includes a temple, a math, a wakf, a  dharmada               or any other religious or charitable endowment               and a society formed either for a religious or               charitable purpose or for both and  registered               under the Societies Registration Act, 1860."               "’Section  9. For the purpose of this  Act,  a               charitable purpose includes-               (1)   relief of poverty or distress,               (2)   education,               (3)   medical relief, and               (4)   the  advancement of any other object  of               general public utility but does not include  a               purpose which relates-               (a)   exclusively to sports, or               (b)   exclusively  to  religious  teaching  or               worship." The  Bombay High Court held that the purposes of  the  trust were,   (1)  awakening  in  the  minds  of  the   people   a consciousness  of  their political rights by  spreading  the knowledge  of politico through the newspapers  "The  Kesari" and "The Mahraths", and (2) organizing various public  move- ments  calculated  to promote the national ideal;  and  held that the first was a charitable put-pose and the second  was not.  As the Charity Commissioner, Bombay, did not file  any appeal  questioning the finding of the Bombay High Court  in so  far  as  it  went  against  him,  I  shall  assume   the correctness  of  the said finding, and proceed  to  consider whether  the first purpose is also not a charitable  purpose as is contended before us on behalf of the appellants. 664 Before  doing  so, it would be convenient  to  consider  the scope of s. 9(4) of the Act, for it is agreed that the trust is  not covered by the other clauses of the section.  It  is common place to observe that where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it for the  words of the statute speak the intention of the Legislature.  When the words of a statute are unambiguous, it would be safe  to consider them without reference to cases.  The words of  cl. (4)  of s. 9 of the Act are of the widest amplitude and  are free from any ambiguity.  The key-words are ,general  public utility".   "General"  means pertaining to  a  whole  class; "Public"  means the body of the people at  large,  including any  class  of’  the  public;  "utility"  means  usefulness. Therefore,  the advancement of any object of  usefulness  or benefit  to  the  public  or a section  of  the  public,  as distinguished from an individual or group of individuals, is a  charitable ,purpose.  The clause excludes  expressly  two purposes,  namely,  a purpose which relates  exclusively  to sports and a purpose which relates exclusively to  religious teaching or worship, from the purposes mentioned in cl.  (4) indicating  thereby  that  all  objects  of  general  public utility,  except  those expressly  excluded  therefrom,  are

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included  in the general words used in cl. (4).  Whenever  a question arises whether a particular purpose is a charitable one  within the meaning of that clause, one has to  ask  the question whether its object is to benefit the public. Before  1  consider the English case-law  developed  in  the peculiar circumstances of that country, which is more likely to  obstruct  than to clear the path of construction  of  an Indian  statute, let me look at the terms of the trust  deed to  ascertain whether the purpose of it was one  of  general public utility as indicated above, 665 The relevant part of the trust deed reads:               "’This  trust deed is made as a means  to  the               fulfilment  perpetually  and   uninterruptedly               after the death of late Lokmanya Bal Gangadhar               Tilak of that very object of his with which he               took  up all activities, after he took  charge               of  the  newspapers  "The  Kesari"  and   "The               Mahratta",  such  as  of  spreading   national               education through those newspapers and thereby               making people alive to their political  rights               and  carrying  on  other  multifarious  public               activities  conducive to the’  national  ideal               etc. I  am omitting for my consideration the last clause  of  the trust  deed, namely, "carrying on other multifarious  public activities  conducive, to the national ideal etc.",  as  the High  Court  has  hold  that  clause  does  not  indicate  a charitable purpose and there is no appeal by the  respondent against  that finding.  I should not be understood  to  have expressed any view on the correctness of that finders.   The opening words show that the trust-deed was executed for "the fulfilment  perpetually  and uninterruptedly the  object  of late Bal Gangadhar Tilak." The adverbial phrase "perpetually and  uninterruptedly" indicates beyond any reasonable  doubt that the object was not a temporary one but was such that it should be carried on for ever.  This excludes any idea  that the  object was merely to replace the British Government  by an Indian Government, for, in that event, the object  would come  to an end with the achievement of  independence.   The object,  therefore,  must be something higher  than  a  mere change  of  political power from the British to  the  Indian hands.  The next part of the trust deed gives a clue to  the scope  of  the  object.  The  activities  mentioned  therein reflect the content of the object.  The activities mentioned are those 666 that Bal Gangadhar Tilak carried on after he took charge  of the  newspaper ’,The Kesari" and "The Mahratta." The  nature of  the activities is indicated and it is the  spreading  of national  education  through those  newspapers  and  thereby making  the  people alive to their  political  rights.   The words  "such aa" indicate that the said activity is not  ex- haustive  of the object of Bal Gangadhar Tilak, but is  only illustrative of the activities.  The question, therefore, is whether  the  activities,  such  as  spreading  of  national education  through  the newspapers and  thereby  making  the people  alive to their political rights, are  of  charitable nature within the meaning of s. 9 (4) of the Act.  It may be mentioned  that  learned counsel for the  appellants  argued that the words "’national education" do not correctly repre- sent  the expression in Marathi language and that  he  would like  us  to read in the place of "national  education"  the words  ,,political  education".   In  the  High  Court  this translation has been accepted as the correct, one and it  is

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not advisable or proper for this Court to allow the  counsel to  question  at  this stage the  correctness  of  the  said translation.   India is a multilingual country  and  appeals come  to this Court from different areas speaking  different languages.   The Judges of this Court do not understand  all the  languages.  In the circumstances ordinarily this  Court shall  accept  the  official  translation  as  correct;  The expression  "national education" excludes the idea that  the said  education  is intended to cover, or confined  to,  any particular  group.  A, nation can be educated  in  different ways  and  one of the ways is certainly by  spreading  ideas through  well  conducted newspapers.  While  "The  Mahratta" published in English may reach only the intelligentsia, "The Kesari"  published in Marathi may enlighten  the  uneducated people-I  am using this word in the limited sense of  people who are not educated in English- spread over the innumerable villages of the Marathi speaking area.  The nature 667 of  the education sought to be so imparted is  described  as one to make the people alive to their political rights.   To make  the people conscious of their political lights is  not the same thing as to indoctrinate them in the ideology of  a particular  political  party.  Political  rights  have  been defined in Corpus Juris, Vol. 49, p. 1076 thus.:               "’Those   which  may  be  exercised   in   the               formation or administration of the government;               the   power   to  participate,   directly   or               indirectly, in the establishment or management               of  the government; those rights which  belong               to  a  nation,  or  to a  citizen,  or  to  an               individual    member   of   a    nation,    so               distinguished from civil rights, namely, local               rights, of a citizen."               In  Cyclopedic Law Dictionary, 3rd  Edn.,  the               meaning of the exprsssion ’,,political rights"               is given as. follows:               "A  political right is a right exercisable  in               the   establishment   or   administration   of               government,  while  a civil right is  a  right               accorded  to every member of a distinct  comm-               unity  or nation with reference  to  property,               family  or marriage, and the like.   Political               rights  consist in the power  to  participate,               directly  or indirectly, in the  establishment               or management of government." Political  rights, therefore, are not rights  pertaining  to any  particular political party.  They are rights  of  every citizen irrespective of his party affiliations, which he  is entitled to exercise in- the formation or administration  of a  government.  In the context of a modern state,  education in political rights may include diverse aspects of it,  such as, political, economical social etc.  It is the fundamental of any good government of a State that the people  belonging to that state shall know their 668 political rights.  The importance of the said education  has no  relation  to  the  form  of  government  existing  at  a particular  time.  It is important both in a  self-governing State,  as well as in a colonial State.  Unless  the  people know their rights, they cannot work either for their freedom or  elect proper persons to represent them  after  attaining freedom.   No  education is more  important  than  political science,   for  not  only  good  government  but  also   the maintenance of independence, to a large extent, depends upon the  political consciousness of’ the people of a  particular

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State.   If  that be so, I find it impossible  to  say  that spreading  of national or even political education  to  make people conscious of their political rights is not an  object of general public utility within the meaning of s. 9 (4)  of the  Act.   It  is said that the activities  of  Tilak  were subversive in character and were directed to change the form of  government, that is, to replace the  foreign  government with a national government that his object was to break  law and,  therefore,  was not a charitable one.   This  argument does  great  injustice to Tilak, who was on all  accounts  a great  patriot  of his days.  No material  has  been  placed before  this  Courts  to characterise  him  as  a  political opportunist  or a person whose sole object was to wrest  the political  control from the British Government by any  means foul  or fair.  Indeed he has now become a  historic  figure and  in the absence of any material before us, I think I  am justified  in looking into some reputed book on the life  of Tilak. In Tahmankar’s "Lokamanya Tilak" the objects with which  the newspapers  ",The Kesari" in Marathi and "The  Mahratta"  in English were started are given thus at p. 26:               "’It was in order to lay the corner-stone of a               future   revolution   that   Tilak   and   his               co-workers decided to launch two  newspapers,               the Kesari, written in Marathi, and the               669               Mahratta  in  English.  The  prospectus,  pub-               lished   in  1880.............   I...   boldly               declared      that      kesari      would,deal               comprehensively  with political  and  economic               conditions  in  the country,  carry  objective               literary reviews of new works in Marathi,  and               would  particularly emphasize  and  spotlight,               the course of world events and politics."               In  the leading article of the first issue  of               Kesari  dated January 4, 1881, it was  stated,               referring to Britain, thus:               "In that country, through the powerful  medium               of  the Press, a vigilant eye is kept  on  the               public  conduct of every functionary from  the               highest to the lowest-from the Prime  Minister               to  the  pettiest  civil  servant  which   has               enabled  the  British to  enjoy  a  reasonable               guarantee  that  no case of  injustice  should               long remain concealed and unexposed." The  editor of the newspaper also declared his intention  to try  to  improve social conditions by  frankly  telling  the people what was evil and harmful in their way of life.   The same author defines briefly the object of the two newspapers thus at p. 27:               "Kesari  was  to cater for the needs  of  the’               mass  ignorant population, who have  generally               no  idea  of what passes around them  and  who               therefore  must  be give in the  knowledge  of               such topics as concern their everyday life  by               writings on literary, social, political, moral               and  economic subjects . The Mahratta, on  the               other  band,  kept in view the  more  advanced               portion  of  the community who require  to  be               provided    with   material    for    thinking               intelligently  on the important topics of  the               day’.  ’The tone and temper of Kesari were               670               democratic;  it aim was popular education  and               public  agitation.  The Mahratta was to  serve

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             as the authoritative organ of educated  public               opinion in Maharashtra.  It discussed  compre-               hensively every question of high politics, and               offered  its readers a selection of the  views               of foreign and Indian journals and  publicists               on the questions of the day." Though  Tilak was in the beginning closely  associated  with the papers, later on he took over the editorship of both the newspapers  and  became their sole proprietor.   The  author describes how the papers were mounded in the hands of Tilak, at p. 39:               "Kesari  was  produced not  to  entertain  the               people,  but to instruct and guide  them.   It               was a newspaper for the people and its purpose               was to make them think and act.  Tilak was  an               editor-philosopher  who had a message to  give               to  his readers and be gave it with  fire  and               imagination.  There was nothing meekly-mouthed               about his writing.  In a downright, frank  and               robust style week after week Tilak poured  out               his  soul  on  day-to-day  problems,  economic               questions,  philosophical  ideas,   historical               researches, literature and art." Tilak  was a great savant.  He lived and worked  when  India was  a servile country.  He had a great vision and that  was India  as  a  united,  strong,  prosperous,  civilized   and democratic country.  He was not a person embroiled in  party politics,  trying  to  build  up  a  political  career  for himself.   He lived, worked and died for a  national  cause. His  activities and ideals were mostly, though  not  wholly, reflected  in  the  two newspapers, "The  Kesari"  and  "The Mahratta",   two  leading  newspapers  of  the   day   which propagated  his  views  not  only  throughout  the   Marathi speaking part 671 of  the country but also in other parts thereof Through  his papers,  he gave information on various subjects,  literary, political, social, moral, economic, etc.  His papers created an  atmosphere  for constructive work in that  part  of  the country  and elsewhere, and supported many movements  calcu- lated to improve the conditions of the people.  Subjects  as varied  as  famine  relief,  prostitution,  swadesi,  plague relief,  Bengal  partition,  Home-rule  movement,   national integration, and such other political and social  movements, found powerful expression in the said newspapers.  In short, his  papers pleaded for the social, political, cultural  and economic  regeneration  of  the  country.   They  were   not confined  to the narrow ideal of just replacing the  foreign government  by  a national one, though it was  an  important step in the regeneration of the country. Can  the objects of this great man,  reflected,  propagated, and  pursued by the said papers, be characterized  as  those not in the general public interest ? To say that the  object of a trust for a village school, hospital or choultry is one of  general public utility and, to deny that character to  a trust  created for pursuing the objects of Tilak,  that  is, the regeneration of the country, is to make a mockery of the section.   What trust could be more in the interest  of  the public than that created to educate them in their  political rights so that they could know their rights, understand  and appreciate  the  problems of their country,  and  contribute their mite to its progress and prosperity ? It  is  said  that Tilak was a leader of  only  one  of  the parties  and  his activities were analogous to  those  of  a leader of a political party in England.  It is true that  in

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the  days of Tilak there were also patriotic  gentlemen  who preferred  to achieve independence by a circuitous and  slow path and there 672 were  also  selfseekers  who built up their  career  on  the sacrifices of their fellow citizens.  But then there were no political  parties in the sense they are in England and  are now  in  India.   Tilak  was  not  an  ordinary   politician indulging  in  party politics to build up his  career.   His lifetime  was spent in educating the people with a  view  to realise his vision.  To class him as a party politician with a view to import the English law in the construction of  the trust  deed  is, to say the least, to ignore  the  facts  of history and to belittle the great contribution made by Tilak in  the country’s cause.  His work must be evaluated not  on party but on a national level.  It is, therefore, clear that the  object of Tilak, after he tookover the newspapers,  was to work for the regeneration of the country, and he thought, and rightly too, that national education through  newspapers and  thereby making people alive to their  political  rights was  the most important item in the uplift of  the  country. The trust executed to perpetuate the said object is  clearly a trust for general public utility within the meaning of s. 9 (4) of the Act. But  it is said that the object are not of  public  utility, because  some  of  the English Judges-for whom  I  have  the greatest  respect said  that political  purposes  are  not charitable purposes.  Ordinarily I would have been  inclined to  drop any reference to English decisions had it not  been for  the copious citations at the Bar.  I would,  therefore, briefly  notice  the  decisions cited at  the  Bar  defining "charitable purposes" under the English law on the basis  of which  an  attempt is made to curtail  or  circumscribe  the scope  of cl.(4) of s. 9 of the Act.  In this connection  it is necessary to bear in mind the caution administered by the decisions  of highest authority when similar  attempts  were made to import English law in the matter of construction 673 of  In Indian statutes.  In.All India Spinners’  Association of  Mirzapur, Ahmedabad v. Commissioner of  Income-tax  (1), the Judicial Committee bad to consider the scope of s. 4 (3) (1)  of the Indian Income-tax Act.  In that  decision,  Lord Wright, speaking for the Board, observed:               "It is now recognized that the Indian Act must               be  construed on its actual words, and is  not               to  be  governed by English decisions  on  the               topic.   The English decisions on the  law  of               charities  are  not  based  on  definite   and               precise statutory provisions.  They have  been               developed  in  the course of more  than  three               centuries by the Chancery Courts." After  pointing  out that in the English  law  the  purposes beneficial to the community are charitable whereas under the Indian  statute  the  advancement of  any  other  object  of general public utility is a charitable purpose, proceeded to state:               "The difference in language, particularly  the               inclusion  in  the  Indian  Act  of  the  word               ’public’,  is of importance.  The  Indian  Act               gives  a clear and succinct  definition  which               must  be  construed according  to  its  actual               language and meaning.  English decisions  have               no binding authority on its construction,  and               though  they  may  sometimes  afford  help  or               guidance,  cannot  relieve the  Indian  Courts

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             from  their  responsibility  of  applying  the               language   of  the  Act  to   the   particular               circumstances that emerge under conditions  of               Indian life. The Judicial Committee again in Williams Trustees v..Revenue Commissioners (2) reiterated the same principle with greater emphasis. With  this background let me briefly notice the English  law on the subject with a view to (1) (1944) L.R. 71, I.A. 159,166,167. (2) [1948] 16 I.T.R. Supp.  L 41. 674 ascertain whether they would afford any help or guidance for construing the statutory provisions of the Act.  The English law of charity has grown round the Statute of Elizabeth  (43 Eliz. c. 4) and the preamble thereto read as follows :               "The relief of aged, impotent and poor  people               ; the maintenance of sick and maimed  soldiers               and  mariners ; the maintenance of schools  of               learning,   free  schools  and   scholars   in               universities  ; the repair of bridges,  ports,               ,havens,  causeways, churches,  sea-banks  and               highways;  the  education  and  preferment  of               orphans ; the relief, stock or maintenance’ of               houses  of correction ; the marriage of,  poor               maids; the supportation, aid and help of young               tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons decayed               ;  the  relief or redemption of  prisoners  or               captives  ;  the aid or ease of any  poor  in-               habitants  concerning payment of taxes  ;  the               setting out of soldiers." Sir  Samuel Romilly in his argument in Morice v.  Bishop  of Durham (1) attempted to classify the said objects under  the following heads "Relief of the indigent, the advancement  of learning, the advancement of religion,, and the advancement of  objects of general public utility." But Lord  Macnaghten in Commissioner for Special purpose of Income Pax v.   Pemsel (2)  did not adopt this classification but  instead  grouped the  purposes  which have been held  charitable  within  the language of the aforesaid; preamble under the following four heads : (1) relief of poverty ; (2) advancement of education ;  (3)  advancement  of religion ; and  (4)  other  purposes beneficial  to  the community not falling under any  of  the preceding heads.  It will be at once noticed that s. 9(4) of the  Act  accepted  the last head suggested  by  Sir  Samuel Romilly in preference to the fourth head enumerated by Lord (1) (1805) 10 Ves. 522, 532; 32 E.R. 947. (2) (1891) A.C. 531. 583. 675 Macnaghten which has been the basis for the decisions  which I will consider immediately.  The case law on the subject is immense:  it  is impossible to discover  any  common  thread passing  through  them.   But I shall  content  myself  with noticing  decisions  relating to trusts created  to  promote what  is broadly described as the advancement  of  political objects.  A brief summary of the English decisions shows not only  an  irreconcilable  conflict but also  the  danger  of importing  them  in the construction of an  Indian  statute. The  following purposes have been held to be  non-charitable purposes : (1)  To  secure  by  united  action  legislative  and  other temperance  reforms  :  vide  The  Commissioner8  of  Inland Revenue v. The Temperance Council of the Christian  Churches of England & Wales (1). (2)  To   subsidize  a  newspaper  for  the   promotion   of

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particular  political  or fiscal opinions  :  vide  National Provincial and Union Bank of England Ltd. v. Tetley (3)  To  honour  the memory of a great statesman,  a  former leader  of the Conservative Party to preserve  a  historical building from destruction and to use it as a college for the education  of  persons  in economics,  politics  and  social science,  etc. with special reference to the development  of the British Constitution, and in such other subjects as  the governing body by whom the Trust was administered might deem desirable  : vide Bonar Law Memorial Trust v.  Commissioners of Inland Revenue (3). The  following  purposes  have been held  to  be  charitable purposes : (1)  Financing a Bill before Parliament to (1) (1926) 10 Tax Cas, 748    (2) [1923] 1 Ch. 258. (3) (1033) 17 Tax Cas. 508. 676 establish a see at Birmingham vide In re VilliersWilkes (1). (2)  Combating vivisection partly by the repeal of a statute : vide In re Foveaux (3)  Maintenance  of village club and reading room  (,to  be used  for  the furtherance of  Conservative  principles  and religious  and mental improvement, and to be kept free  from intoxicants and dancing" : vide In re Scowcroft (a). (4)  For  the  benefit  of a  particular  place,  whether  a parish,  town,  or borough, a county, or a  country  :  vide Public Trustees v. Smith (4). In  Halsbury’s  Laws  of  England, 3rd  Edn.,  Vol.  4,  the following summary is found at p. 231 :               "The  promulgation of particular doctrines  or               principles  not  subversive  of  morality   or               otherwise pernicious and not in furtherance of               the principles of a particular political party               maybe  charitable, as, for  instance,  Conser-               vative  principles  combined with  mental  and               moral  improvement,  Socialism,  kindness   to               animals,  or  temperance,  or  extending   the               knowledge  of those doctrines in  the  various               branches of literature to which I have  turned               my  attention and pen, in order  to  ascertain               what appeared to be truth, and to teach it  to               those who would listen." A  cursory glance at the said illustrations would be  enough to   indicate  that  there  was  no   consistent   principle underlying  them; the decisions speak in  different  voices. Some decisions attempted to lay down certain principles, but no  sooner  were they laid down than they were given  up  by subsequent decisions in a search for others.  The following (1) (1895) 72 L.T. 323.  (2) (1895) 2 Ch. 501. (3) (1898) 2 Ch. 638.  (4) (1932) 1 Ch. 153. 677 principles  may  be called out from some  of  the  aforesaid decisions‘ (1)  A  trust is charitable only if it is within the  spirit and intendment of the preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth. (2)  Every   object  of  public  general  utility   is   not necessarily  charitable  : see Williams Trustees  v.  Inland Revenue Commissioner’s (1). (3)  A trust for changing the law of the country is not     charitable. (4)  As it is a maxim that the execution of a trust shall be under  the control of a court, it shall be of such a  nature that it can be under that control so that the administration of  it  can  be reviewed by the court: vide  Morice  v.  The Bishop of Durham(2). And (5) a gift would not be charitable if the purpose is  as

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vague  as  "dbaram", when it may be  employed  for  purposes which are not considered charitable. The  first  principle could not obviously be  applied  to  a case  under the  Act,  for it  has  not  expressly  or  by necessary  implication, invoked the preamble to the  Statute of  Elizabeth.   The  second principle  conflicts  with  the express provision of cl. (4) of s. 9 of the Act: while under the  English law some purposes, though undoubtedly  purposes of  public utility, were not considered to be such on  other considerations,   under  the  Act  such  division   is   not permissible,  as cl. (4) of s. 9 expressly makes every  such purpose  a charitable purpose.  The third principle has  not been consistently followed even in England; nor can I  fined any  reasonable  basis  for the same.  If  that  be  correct principle,  then no purpose, however demonstrably it may  be for the general public utility, can be (1)  (1948) 16 I.T.R. Suppl. 41. (2)  (1805) 10 Ves. 522, 532, 32 E.R. 947. 678 charitable  if to implement its purpose it is  necessary  to create  a  climate for changing the  existing  law.   Trusts created for educating the public on the evils of alcoholism, prostitution  and  other social evils, with a  view  to  put pressure  on  the  legislature to  bring  about  appropriate reforms  would cease to be charitable :  political  purposes may  be  brought  under this head, for  mostly,  though  not always, such purposes would be sought to be effectuated by a change in law.  But in my view, the mere fact that a  change of  law is involved in the process could not make a  purpose otherwise  charitable  a non-charitable one.  Nor  does  the fourth  principle  afford a correct test  for  a  charitable purpose.   It is true that the author’s declaration  that  a particular  gift  is  charitable  is  not  decisive  of  the question,  but  in the ultimate analysis the  court  has  to decide  whether the purpose or object is charitable or  not. I  do  not see any insurmountable difficulty  in  the  court coming to a conclusion one way or other whether a  political object is a charitable object, just like it would come to  a conclusion in the case of a gift for the propagation of  the tenets  of a particular religious sect.  Nor can it be  said that the court by deciding the character of a trust  created for  political purposes will be indulging in  politics.   If that be so, it can be said with equal justification that  in the  case of a religious trust a court by deciding the  said question would be supporting a particular religious sect  in preference to another.  The court does not take sides in the political  or  religious controversy, but  only  objectively looks  at the purpose to ascertain whether it is  charitable or  not  and  administers it, if called  upon,  through  the necessary  machinery.  The fifth principle is sought  to  be applied to a political purpose.  It is said that the express on  "polotical  purpose"  is  so vague  that  there  is  the possibility  of  the trust being applied  to  non-charitable purposes.   I  do not see how it can be posited  that  every political purpose is a  679 vague  purpose : it depends upon the facts of the case.   It is  for  the court to construe the trust deed in  each  case with  a view to ascertain whether the purpose, political  or otherwise, is vague or not.  If a gift for the benefit of  a place, whether a parish, town, brouoh, county or country  is charitable,  as has been held in the "locality cases", I  do not  see how a gift for the political uplift of the  country would  never be for a charitable purpose on the ground  that it  would be vague.  Nor can it be said as a proposition  of

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law  that the propagation of the principles of a  particular political  party would necessarily be not beneficial to  the community.  Suppose a country is backward or undeveloped and a   philanthropist   endows  property  for   propagating   a particular doctrine likely to bring about the welfare of the public  :  the  ideology  sought to  be  propagated  may  be labelled   according  to  the  doctrines  prevalent   in   a particular  country.   How can it be said as  an  inflexible rule  of law that a political purpose is riot beneficial  to the  community  ? It depends upon the facts  of  each  case. Tudor in his book on Charities, 5th Edn., p. 41, points  out that  "the  proposition that political  purposes  cannot  be charitable  is difficult to reconcile with  certain  decided cases".   Even some of the decisions of the English  courts, finding  the illogicality of such a doctrine,  attempted  to modify  it  by  stating that it is necessary,  in  order  to establish the validity of a charity, to show that the end is not  to  be attained mainly by political  means,  indicating thereby  that the dominant purpose shall not be a  political one.  The approach of the English Courts to this problem has been succinctly stated by Chitty, J., in Re Foveaux thus:               "The  method  employed  by  the  Court  is  to               consider  the enumeration of charities in  the               Statute of Elizabeth, hearing in mind that the               enumeration  is not exhaustive.   Institutions               whose objects are analogous to those               680               mentioned  in the Statute are admitted  to  be               charities;  and again, institutions which  are               analogous   to  those,  already  admitted   by               reported  decisions are held to be  charities.               The  pursuit  of  these  analogies   obviouslY               requires  caution and  circumspection.   After               all, the best that can be done is to  consider               each  case as it arises, upon its own  special               circumstances.’$ Though this statement appeared in the year 1895, a  scrutiny of  the  later decisions indicates that  the  same  approach continued to be adopted by the courts.  Tudor in his book on Charities, 5th Edn.,p.   38, describes the judicial approach to the problem thus :               "The  Courts have extended the class  outlined               in the preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth to               such an extent as to render it valueless as  a               basis  for  the classification  of  charitable               objects,  and  it  must be  admitted  that  no               analogous counterpart to many of the charities               enumerated   here   can  be  traced   in   the               preamble." To  summarize : English decisions are conflicting; there  is no  common thread passing through the variety  of  decision, starting from the preamble to the statute of Elizabeth,  and apparently relying upon the fourfold classification of  Lord Macnaghten,  English courts from time to time decided  cases which could not be sustained either on the illustrations  in the  preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth or the a  dalogies drawn  from them, or the classification of Lord  Macnaghten. The  decisions  conflict  with one another, and  it  is  not possible,  or  even advisable, to seek to get  any  guidance from the said decisions to construe, the clear provisions of the  Indian  statutes,  or, a document  executed  in  Indian statutes, or a document executed in India 681 under  circumstances totally different from those  obtaining in  England.  In India, the superstructure of  democracy  is

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sought to be built upon an illiterate basis.  If the country had to reach political maturity, no facet of education would be more important than that political science.  In  Trustees of the Tribune Press, Lahore v. Commissioner of  Income-tax, Punjab (1) the Judicial Committee held that a trust  created by  a testator by his will to the effect that  his  property "in  the stock and good will of the Tribune Press and  News. paper  in  Anarkali, Lahore," should vest permanently  in  a committee  of trustees whose duty it should be "to  maintain the  said  press and newspaper in  an  efficient  condition, keeping  up  the liberal policy of the  said  newspaper  and devoting the surplus income of the said press and  newspaper after  defraying all current expenses in improving the  said newspaper and placing it on a footing of permanency," was  a good  and valid trust.  It was held that the object  of  the newspaper  was  to  supply the Province  with  an  organ  of educated  public  opinion, which was an  object  of  general public  utility and accordingly the trust income was  exempt from taxation under sub-s. (3) of s. 4 of the Indian Income- tax Act, 1922.  The Judicial Committee took the case  before it  out  of  the scope of the  English  decisions  with  the following observations :               "But  their  Lordships,  having  before   them               material  which  shows the  character  of  the               newspaper  as it was in fact conducted in  the               testator’s  lifetime,  have  arrived  at   the               conclusion  that  questions  of  politics  and               legislation were discussed only as many  other               matters were in this paper discussed, and that               it  is not made out that a  political  purpose               was the dominant purpose of the trust." (1)  [1939] L.R. 66 I.A. 241, 256. On  the facts of the case before it, the Judicial  Committee came to the following conclusions :               "They  think that the object of the paper  may               fairly be described as the object of supplying               the Province with an organ of educated  public               opinion’  and  that it should prima  facie  be               held  to  be  an  object  of  general   public               utility".               Subsequent   remarks  show   the   distinction               between  party-politics and general  political               education :               "Having regard to the particular circumstances               of  the time, the directions of  the  testator               and  the- evidence as to the contents  of  the               paper before 1898, their Lordships think  that               the present case is nearer on its facts to  In               re Scowcroft (1) than it is to the case of the               Bonar  Law Memorial Trust (2), or to the  case               put  by Russell, J., in In re Tetley (3) of  a               newspaper  subsidized  for  the  promotion  of               particular political or fiscal opinions." This judgment was a clear attempt to sustain the validity of the trust, though constituted to educate the public  opinion involving  also the propagation of political  views,  having regard  to the wide definition of charitable  purpose  under the  Indian  Act.   In All India  Spinners’  Association  of Mirzapur,  Ahmedabad v. Commissioner of  Income-tax,  Bombay (4),  the  All India Congress Committee  by  its  resolution started  an  association for the purpose of  development  of band-spinning  by the use of handling.  The association  was run on a co-operative basis, that is, the surplus income was distributed only among the members : the Privy Council  held that  though  the  association was started  by  a  political

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party, the purpose of the association was a (1)  ( 1898) 2 Ch. 638. (1923) 1 Ch. 258. (2)  (1938) 17 Tax Cas. 508. (4)  (1944) L.P. 71 I.A. 159. 683 Charitable  one  within the meaning of the  Income-tax  Act. Lord Wright says               "The  statement  of the  object  excludes,  in               their  Lordship’s  opinion,  any  question  of               profit  making, and also excludes any  element               of party politics." Then adverting to the very wide words sub-s. (3)(1) of a.  4 of  the Income-tax Act, 1922, namely, " other purposes of  a general public utility " the Judicial Committee proceeded to observe:               " These last are very wide words.  Their exact               scope  may  require on  other  occasions  very               careful  considerations.........  Though   the               connection  in  one sense of  the  Association               with Congress was relied on as not  consistent               with  ’general  public utility  ’  because  it               might  be for the advancement primarily  of  a               particular party, it is sufficiently clear  in               this case that the Association’s purpose  were               independent of, and were not affected by,  the               purposes of propaganda of Congress.  "               Referring   to  the  English  decisions,   the               Judicial Committee observe-:               " The English cases there (Tribune Press  Case               (1))  cited do not turn on the words  ’general               public  utility,’  but  they  illustrate   how               courts  of  first  instance  in  England  have               actually  dealt with the particular  questions               there submitted to them." This decision lays down two principles, namely,(1) the words "  other purposes of general public utility" are  very  wide and the English decisions do not turn upon those words;  and (2) even on the assumption that the said decisions  applied, a  trust  does  not  cease to be  one   for  general  public utility, though it (1)  (1939) L.R. 66, 1. A. 241.256. 684 may be for the advancement primarily of a particular  party. if  the purposes were independent of and were  not  effected by,  the purposes or propaganda of that party.   This  case, while not deciding on the wide import of the Indian statute, made  a  distinction between ’a party’s propaganda  and  its party  politics  and its other objects.  In  Subash  Chandra Bose  v. Gordhandas Patel (1) a testator made four gifts  by his  will and provided that "the balance of my assets  after disposal  of the above mentioned four gifts is to be  handed over to Mr. Subhas Chandra Bose to be spent by him or by his nominee  or nominees according to his instructions  for  the political uplift of India and preferably for publicity  work on behalf of- India’s cause in other countries." The  Bombay High  Court held that the words "political uplift of  India" whether it denotes a general raising of the political status or  conditions  of India or the advancement of  a  political purpose  was too vague to be capable of enforcement  by  the Courts  and accordingly the trust was bad and  an  intestacy resulted  as  to the residue covered by  the  clause.   ’The decision,  therefore,  was based upon the principle  that  a charitable purpose could Dot be sustained when it was vague. But the observations of Beaumont, C.J., are instructive, and they are:

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             "However,  there the cases are, and if we  had               in this case a gift to India, or a gift to the               people  of  India, we would have  to  consider               Whether the principle of those cases should be               applied  in  India,  and if  so  whether  that               principle  which has been  gradually  extended               from  a  parish  to a country  should  now  be               extended to sub-continent," The further observations of the learned Chief (1)  I.L.R. 1940 Bom. 254, 278. 685 Justice at p. 279 indicate the reasons for the decision:               "  What  we have got here is a  gift  for  the               political  uplift  of India,  and  one  cannot               possibly  disregard the adjective  political’.               Assuming  that the Meaning of those  words  is               that for which Mr. Bose contends, i. e.,  that               they  denote  improvement  in  the   political               system of India, and therefore to that  extent               must be beneficial to India, the diffculty  is               that  the words are too  vague................               The  test must ultimately be whether,  if  the               Court be called upon to administer the  trust,               the  Court would be able to do so.   Here,  it               seems  to  me  impossible  for  the  Court  to               determine   what  is  embraced  in  the   term               political   uplift  of  India."   Citing   the               observations of Lord Parker, the learned Chief               Justice observed at p.281:               "A  trust  to advance a political  purpose  is               clearly bad on the ground given by Lord Parkar               in  Bowman  v. Secular Society Limited  (1),               that  a trust for the attainment of  political               objects is invalid, not because it is illegal,               but because the Court has no means of  judging               whether any proposed political change will  or                             will not be for the public welfare or benefit. " The  learned Chief Justice, therefore, might have held  that the  trust  was  charitable  if  he  had  Dot  come  to  the Conclusion that the purpose of "political uplift" was  vague and  a  court  was  not in a  position  to  know  whether  a particular political object would be or would not be for the public  welfare or benefit.  A division Bench of the  Bombay High  Court in re.  Lokamanya Tilak Jubilee  National  Trust Fund,  Bombay (2) had to consider a similar  question  under the Income-tax Act, 1922. (1) (1917 ) A.C. 406. (2) (1941) 43 Bom.  L.R. 1027. 686 There,  a trust was created for the following  objects:  (1) the   advancement  of  any  purpose  which  might   in   the uncontrolled  opinion of the managing committee be  national or  of  national importance for the inhabitants  of  British India, (2) the political advancement of India having for its goal  the  acquisition  of  complete  national  autonomy  or "swarajya",  (3)  the diffusion of political  education  and knowledge   as  to  the  political  affairs  of  India   and propagandist  work both in India as well as in any  part  of the world, and (4) any object which might conduce to any  of the  aforesaid  object.   The  Court  held  that  the  first mentioned  object went beyond the definition of  "charitable purposes" contained in s. 4 of the Income-tax Act in as much as  the  section of the purpose rested in  the  uncontrolled opinion  of  the managing committee, and  that,  the  second

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mentioned object also went too far, because it was really  a gift  for political purposes.  Beaumont C.J., who  delivered the leading judgment, noticed that the purpose, namely,  the advancement  of any other object of general  public  utility went  further than the definition of charity to  be  derived from  the English cases.  He observed that, if all the  pur- poses  in  the trust deed could be regarded  as  of  general public utility for the benefit of the inhabitants of English India,  then  the  trust would be, in his  opinion,  a  good charitable  trust.  But he could not decide that it was  so, because,  in  his  opinion, if the  attainment  of  national autonomy  might be regarded as a national  purpose  accepted generally  by,  and  for the good  of,  the  inhabitants  of British  India, there was a very keen divergence of  opinion as to the methods by which that national autonomy should  be attained   and,  therefore,  the  gift  was  for   political purposes.    Kania,  J.,  who  delivered  a   separate   but concurring judgment, came to the conclusion that the  second mentioned  object was preeminently a political  purpose  and fell within 687 the rule stated in the Tribune’s case (1).  If I may say so, with  respect,  the  decision  of  the  learned  Judges  was unconsciously  coloured  by the English decisions  based  on Party politics and those decisions had been wrongly  applied to  a  case  of national uplift of  the  country  which  was struggling for independence. The  trust now in question came under the judicial  scrutiny of the- Bombay High Court in connection with the  Income-tax Act, 1922.  The trustees there then contended that the trust was for a charitable purpose and was, therefore, not subject to  the  provisions of the Income-tax Act.  The  High  Court held  that cl. (1) of the trust deed could not be  construed as  constituting  a  charitable  purpose,  as  the  purposes mentioned  in  the said clause were too vague  and  wide  to constitute  charitable  purposes within the meaning  of  the Income tax Act- Beaumont, C.J, who deliverer the judgment of the Bench, observed:               "The   purpose   include   organising   public               movements, and even if you limit those general               words  by the words ’calculated to promote  of               national ideal’, it seems to me impossible  to               say  that  the promotion of  public  movements               calculated  in  the view of the  trusttees  to               promote the national ideal can be regarded               as necessarily of public utility."               The learned Chief Justice went on to observe:               " It seems to me clear that under clause I  of               this  trust-deed the whole of the  profits  of               the  newspapers could be applied for, any  one               of  the various objects specified and,  there-               fore  if  any  of those objects  do  not  fall               within the definition of a charitable  object,               then   the  clause  cannot  be   regarded   as               constituting               (1)   (1939) L.R. 66, I.A. 241, 256.               688               a charitable trust, and, as I have said, in my               view,  some  of  the  objects  of  the   trust               certainly   go   beyond  the   definition   of               charitable trust." The reason of the decision, therefore, was that some of  the objects  of the trust were charitable and others  were  not, and  as the whole of the profits of the newspapers could  be applied for non-charitable purpose, the trust was not valid.

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The High Court then did not decide whether the first purpose in the trust deed was charitable or not: that question falls to be decide in the present case. It is therefore, clear that the Indian decisions, though  to some  extent coloured by the English decisions,  appreciated the  distinction between the wide language of sub-s. (3)  of s. 4 of the Indian Income-tax Act and the fourth category of Lord  Macnaghten’s classification under the English  law  of charities.    But  I  find  it  difficult  to   accept   the observations made in the said judgments that a trust created for  the advancement of political objects would  necessarily cease to be one for a public charitable purpose.  In support of this proposition there is nothing except the doubtful and conflicting authority in England.  There is no justification to  curtail  the  wide words of  the  statute  by  importing foreign ideas developed in a different set up. In this context, a decision of the Supreme Court, of one  of the  States in America is rather instructive, viz., that  in Taylor  v.  Hoag  (1).  There, a trust  created  to  promote improvements in the structure and methods of government  was held  to be a charitable trust, although the purpose was  to secure radical changes in the "present" system.  Frazer, J., answers,  in my view effectively, all the objections  raised by  the  English  Courts  in holding  that  a  trust  for  a political purpose was void.  Adverting to the question  that the trust in (1)  (1922),21 A.L. R. 946, 949, 950. 689 that case involved a change in the existing law, the learned Judge observed:               "Must  it be held void because the  successful               attainment  of these objects would  involve  a               change in existing laws.  We would hesitate to               subscribe  to such doctrine, unless reason  or               authority compelled us to do so."               The learned Judge proceeded to state:               "  To  hold that an endeavour  to  procure  by               proper  means,  a  change in  a  law,  is,  in               "effect, to attempt to violate that law, would               discourage improvement in legislation and tend               to compel us to continue indefinitely to  live               under laws designed for an entirely  different               state  of  society.  Such view is  opposed  to               every  principle of our Government,  based  on               the  theory  that it is a Government  ,of  the               people,  by the people, and for  the  people,’               and fails to recognize the right of those  who               make   the  laws  to  change  them  at   their               pleasure,  when  circumstances  may  seem   to               require.   With  the wisdom  of  the  proposed               change  the  courts  are  not  concerned.   We               perform our duty in determining whether or not               the method adopted to make the change violates               established law.  In the present case we  find               no apparent intent to violate any law.  On the               contrary, the trust specifically requires  its               objects to be accomplished by lawful means." Now, let me consider some of the provisions of the Act which are  in direct conflict with some of the tests laid down  by the  English  decisions to ascertain whether  a  purpose  is charitable  or not.  The first is s. 9(4) which says that  a charitable  purpose  includes the advancement of  any  other object  of general public utility.  I have  already  pointed out 690

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the wide amplitude of these words.  Section 11 says:               " A public trust created for purposes some  of               which are charitable or religious and some are               not shall not be deemed to be void in  respect               to the ’Charitable or religious purpose,  only               on the ground that it is void with respect  to               the non-charitable or non-religious purpose. While in England if a trust was created for a charitable  or a non-chartiable purpose, the entire trust would be void, as the trustees could administer the trust exclusively for  the benefit  of non-charitable purposes, under s. 11 of the  Act the  law  is changed in regard to that matter.   Section  55 introduces  a cypres doctrine which is wider in  scope  than the doctrine is generally understood in that it enables  the court, inter alia, under certain circumstances, if it is not in  public  interest,  expedient,  practicable,   desirable, necessary  or  proper to carry out wholly or  partially  the original intention of the author of the public trust or  the object for which the public trust was created, to apply  the same  to  any other object.  The Act widens the scope  of  a charitable  purpose  as  understood  in  the  English   law, recognizes  the  validity of the trust though  the  purposes include both charitable and non-charitable, and enables  the court,  under certain circumstances, to divert the trust  to other charitable purposes not intended by the author of  the trust.   The  liberal  spirit adopted by the  Act  does  not permit  a  narrow  interpretation of  a  charitable  purpose accepted    by   the   English   courts   under    different circumstances. Let  me  now  summarize my views on  the  subject:  (1)  The English decisions are based upon a pragmatic approach to the problems  that  arose  before them,  having  regard  to  the historical  development  of  the law of  charities  in  that country;  691 there is no common thread discernible in the large volume of English decisions. (2) Under the Act, unlike in England, the advancement  of  the  object of  common  public  utility  is declared  to  be  a  charitable  purpose,  and  it  is   not permissible  to curtail its scope with reference to  English decisions.  (3)The  expression " object  of  general  public utility  "  is  very comprehensive  and  it  includes  every purpose,  whether political or otherwise, provided it is  an object of general public utility. The English decisions, therefore, afford no help to construe s. 9 of the Act to ascertain whether a purpose is charitable or not under the Indian law. For the reasons I have given, I hold, without any hesitation that  the  purpose  of the trust in the present  case  is  a charitable purpose within the meaning of s. 9 of the Act. Even,on that basis it is contended that a trust giving power to a trustee to spend the trust funds on charitable and non- charitable  objects is void and as the High Court held  that the second object of the trust was non-charitable the entire trust  must  fail.  This argument  ignores  the  distinction between  a  trust deed empowering a trustee to  spend  on  a charitable  object or a non-charitable object and  a  trust, deed  empowering him to spend on a charitable object  and  a non-oharitable  object.  In Halsbury’s Laws of England,  3rd Edn., Vol.4, at p.272, the following passage appears:               "  When  a testator give funds to  be  applied               partly  for objects which are  charitable  and               partly  for  objects  which  either  are   not               charitable  or fail, but does not specify  the               proportions in which the funds are to be  app-

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             lied for the different objects, the Court will               make an apportionment."               "  Again,  where a fund is given  for  several               objects,  some charitable and some  non-chari-               table   or  illegal,  there  being   a   clear               intention               692               to devote some part to the charitable objects,               if  it can be ascertained what are the  proper               proportions  to be attributed to  the  several               but if objects, the Court directs an inquiry,               from the nature of the gift it appears  impra-               cticable  to  fix the proportions,  the  Court               divides the fund equally between the different               objects." This  passage is supported by decisions relied upon  by  the author.   It is not necessary to discuss them in detail,  as the learned counsel for the appellant has not questioned the correctness  of the said proposition.  In this view,  it  is not  necessary  to  consider whether s. 11 of  the  Act  has retrospective operation.  Learned counsel for the  appellant attempted  to argue that s. 55 of the Act offends his  right of reversion to the property which is the subject-matter  of the trust.  The question of the validity of the said section does  not arise in the present case.  The only  question  is whether it is the duty of the trustees of the trust to  make an  application  for registration of the said trust.   As  I have  held  that,  the trust is a public  trust  within  the meaning  of s. 9 of the Act, under s. 18 thereof,  the  said trust  has  to be registered in manner  prescribed  therein. Questions such as the extent of the trust, the scope of  the doctrine of cypres, are all foreign to the present  inquiry. I do not propose to express any opinion on the same. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. By  COURT: In view of the majority opinion of the Court  the appeal  is  allowed and the Order of the  Assistant  Charity Commissioner directing the Trust to be registered- confirmed by  the  Charity Commissioner on appeal is set  aside.   The appellants  will  be  entitled to their  costs  in  all  the Courts. Appeal allowed.  693