24 April 1956
Supreme Court
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LAWRENCE JOACHIM JOSEPH D Vs THE STATE OF BOMBAY.

Bench: DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ),JAGANNADHADAS, B.,AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA,SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.,IMAM, SYED JAFFER
Case number: Appeal (crl.) 126 of 1955


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PETITIONER: LAWRENCE JOACHIM JOSEPH D’SOUZA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BOMBAY.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/04/1956

BENCH: JAGANNADHADAS, B. BENCH: JAGANNADHADAS, B. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ) AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. IMAM, SYED JAFFER

CITATION:  1956 AIR  531            1956 SCR  382

ACT:        Preventive   Detention-Espionage  activity-Grounds   whether        vague-Vagueness  due  to non-disclosure of facts  in  public        interest  Whether  vitiates  order-Claim  of  privilege-When        should be communicated-Mala fides.

HEADNOTE:        Appellant was detained under s. 3(1)(a)(i) of the Preventive        Detention  Act, Act IV of 1950 on the grounds that with  the        financial  help given by the Portuguese authorities  he  was        carrying  on  espionage  on their behalf with  the  help  of        underground   workers  and  that  he  was  also   collecting        intelligence  about the security arrangements on the  border        area  and  was  making such intelligence  available  to  the        Portuguese  authorities.  Appellant made no  application  to        the Government for further particulars.        Held,  that in these circumstances and having regard to  the        fact that what is alleged is espionage activity, the grounds        could not be considered to be vague.        In  answer to the objection in the writ  application  before        the  High Court that the grounds were not specific and  that        no  particular  of the alleged activities of  the  appellant        were  given  the Under Secretary to the  Government  in  his        affidavit   claimed  privilege  under  Art.  22(6)  of   the        Constitution.        Held,  that  the  right  of  the  detenue  to  be  furnished        particulars  is subject to the limitation under Art.  22(6).        Hence  even if the grounds are vague due to the reason  that        facts cannot be disclosed in the public interest, the  order        of  detention  cannot be challenged on the  ground  of  such        vagueness.        The  necessity  of  communicating  the  decision  to   claim        privilege under Art. 22(6) would arise only when the detenue        asks for parti-        383        culars.  In the absence of any such request by the  detenue,        the noncommunication of the decision cannot be hold to  have        hampered    his   constitutional   right   to    make    his        representation.

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      Mala fides must be made out against the detaining  authority        and not against the police.  The contention of mala fides is        untenable in the present case having regard to the nature of        the  grounds and to the nature of the activities imputed  to        the appellant.

JUDGMENT:        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 126  of        1955.        Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated        the  9th  August 1955 of the Bombay High Court  in  Criminal        Application No. 726 of 1955.        M.   R.  Parpia,  J.  B. Dadachanji and S.  N.  Andley,  for        the appellant.        M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, B. Sen and R. H.        Dhebar, for the respondent.        1956.  April 24.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by        JAGANNADHADAS J.-This is an appeal by special leave  against        the  judgment  of  the High Court of  Bombay  dismissing  an        application   made   to  it  under  article   226   of   the        Constitution.   These proceedings relate to the validity  of        an order of detention passed by the Government of Bombay  on        the 8th June, 1955, against the appellant before us, who  is        an Advocate of the High Court of Bombay having a standing of        about  thirty years.  He was in the Indian Air Force  as  an        emergency  Commissioned  Officer between 1943  to  1948  and        thereafter  on  extension for another four  years  until  he        attained  the  age  of  55.  It appears  that  he  was  also        interested in journalism and in public affairs.  On his  own        showing,  he was concerned over the political future of  Goa        and  "was opposed to any attempts at intimidation of  Indian        residents  of Goan origin by other political groups and  has        freely expressed these views in his journalistic  articles".        He  was arrested on the 9th June, 1955, and is in  detention        since then under the impugned order, which runs as follows:        384                          "No.  P. D. A. 1555A.                   Political and Services Department,                              Secretariat,                        Bombay, 8th June, 1955.                                O R D E R.        Whereas  the Government of Bombay is satisfied with  respect        to the person known as Shri Lawrence Joachim Joseph  DeSouza        of Bombay, that with a view to preventing him from acting in        any  manner prejudicial to the relations of India  with  the        Portuguese  Government and to the Security of India,  it  is        necessary to make the following Order:        Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by  sub-        clause (1) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 3  of        the  Preventive  Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV  of  1950)  the        Government of Bombay is pleased to direct that Shri Lawrence        Joachim Joseph DeSouza of Bombay, be detained.                                          By Order and in the name                                          of the Governor of Bombay.                                           Under Secretary to the                                           Government of Bombay.                                           Political and Services                                           Department".        In  pursuance of section 7 of the Preventive Detention  Act,        1950  (Act IV of 1950) (hereinafter referred to as the  Act)        the grounds of detention, also dated the 8th June, 1955, was        served  on  him  along with the  order  of  detention.   The        validity  of  the  order  is  challenged  on  the  following

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      contentions.        1.The  order of detention was mala fide.  It was passed  for        the ulterior purpose of preventing his freedom of speech and        freedom  of  professional  activity in the  sphere  of  Goan        affairs by reason of his known views in this behalf.        2.The detaining authority,in exercising its power, failed to        apply  its  mind  to  the  existence  or  otherwise  of  the        legitimate objects of detention.        3.   The grounds of detention are vague.        385        4.The  claim  of State that no particulars  of  the  grounds        could  be furnished in public interest is unsustainable  and        in any case mala fide.        The  last  two  have  been  urged  before  us  not  only  as        independent points but as reinforcing the first two.        The  challenge  to the validity of the order  based  on  the        attack of mala fides and non-application of the, mind of the        detaining  authority, have been urged before us  with  great        insistence.   We  have been taken elaborately into  what  is        claimed  to be the relevant previous background  of  events.        This  part  of  the argument  raises,  what  ultimately  are        questions  of fact which have been fully considered  by  the        High Court.  It is, therefore, enough to state, in its broad        outlines, the background, which is alleged as follows:        (1)(a)  There was a sudden search by the police on the  24th        August,   1954,  at  the  appellant’s  place   for   alleged        possession of illicit liquor.which, in fact, was not  found.        But  under the guise thereof the police seized  and  carried        away a mass of documents, papers and printed material of the        appellant as also a typewriter belonging to him.        (b)On  the same day, a search was carried out by the  police        also at his residence at Mahim but nothing was found.        (c)Immediately  following  the searches, the  appellant  was        taken  into  illegal police custody  and  interrogated,  and        physically assaulted, and threatened.  The above high-handed        action of the police, by way of search and seizure, was  the        subject  matter of challenge by the appellant by means of  a        writ  application  in  the High Court in  which  the  police        officers concerned filed affidavits virtually admitting  the        appellant’s allegations relating to seizure of papers,  etc.        The State itself could not support the said  highhandedness.        As  a result, the High Court directed on the  3rd  November,        1954,  the return forthwith of all the papers  and  articles        seized.   Notwithstanding  that  order,  the  materials   so        illegally  seized  were returned only on or about  the  21st        January, 1955.        (2)  When one Joaquim Carlos, a Portuguese soldier        386        attached  to  Goan  forces,  was arrested  on  a  charge  of        entering  Indian territory without the requisite  authority,        the  appellant rendered professional assistance to  him  and        obtained  an  order  of  release  on  bail  from  the  Chief        Presidency  Magistrate,  Bombay,  which was  foiled  by  the        police  by  removing  him  away  to  Sawantwadi  before  the        requisite  sureties could be obtained at Bombay.  The  trial        was hurried through and the said Carlos was convicted.   But        on  appeal,  filed  by the appellant,  before  the  Sessions        Judge,  the  conviction was set aside and  retrial  ordered.        These events happened between February to April, 1955.        (3)Between April, 1955 to June, 1955, there occurred certain        incidents which were inspired and instigated by the  members        of  the  Goan Action Committee who  were  agitating  against        Portuguese hold over Goa.  There was a raid on certain  pro-        Portuguese presses by some private persons, in the course of        which heavy damage was caused.  There was also an assault on

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      himself  (appellant) by a gang of persons of whom some  were        employees of the Goan Action Committee.  In respect of these        two  incidents  private complaints had been filed by  or  on        behalf of the affected persons.  The attitude and  behaviour        of  the police in respect of these complaints  were  clearly        indicative  of  their being in league with the  Goan  Action        Committee.        The  appellant’s counsel strongly urged that the bona  fides        of the detaining authority is to be judged with reference to        the above background of events and that viewed in that light        the  vagueness  of  the grounds and  the  belated  claim  of        privilege under article 22(6) of the Constitution strengthen        his  contention.  He also relied on what are urged as  being        certain  discrepancies  in  the  affidavits  of  the  Under-        Secretary and the Chief Secretary filed in the High Court in        these  proceedings.  It is strongly urged that the order  of        detention  was made without any real application of mind  by        the detaining authority, that the authority acted merely  at        the instance of the police who were in league with the  Goan        Action Committee, and that the police procured the detention        387        order  for  the purpose of suppressing the  freedom  of  the        appellant,  to  ventilate  his point of  view  on  the  Goan        politics and to take up professionally the cause of  persons        in  the position of Carlos.  We have been taken through  all        the  material  relating to the above  allegations  and  have        given  our consideration to the same.  It is enough  to  say        that  we are unable to see any reason for  disagreeing  with        the  conclusion  of the High Court to the  effect  that  the        material  is  not  enough to make  out  that  the  detaining        authority  was  acting otherwise than bona  fide.   We  also        agree with the view of the High Court that, what has got  to        be made out is not the want of bona fides on the part of the        police,  but  want  of  bona fides,  as  well  as  the  non-        application of mind, on the part of the detaining authority,        viz. the Government, which for this purpose must be taken to        be  different  from the police.  It is also clear  that  the        allegation  of  non-application  of mind  by  the  detaining        authority is without any basis, in view of the affidavit  of        the Chief Secretary.        The  further points that remain for consideration are  those        which  relate to the complaint of vagueness of  the  grounds        furnished  and  the  alleged unsustainable  claim  for  non-        disclosure under article 22(6) of the Constitution on behalf        of  the  detaining  authority,  to  get  over  the   alleged        vagueness.   To  appreciate the points thus  raised,  it  is        necessary  to  have an idea of the grounds of  detention  as        furnished.    They  are  to  be  found  from  the   relevant        communication to the detenue which is as follows:        "In pursuance of section 7 of the Preventive Detention  Act,        1950  (Act  IV  of 1950) you are hereby  informed  that  the        grounds  on  which a detention order has been  made  against        you,  by  the Government of Bombay under sub-clause  (1)  of        clause  (a) of subsection (1) of section 3 of the  said  Act        are  that: With the financial help given by  the  Portuguese        authorities  you are carrying on espionage on behalf of  the        Portuguese Government with the help of underground  workers.        You  are  also collecting intelligence  about  the  security        arrangements   on  the  border  area  and  you   make   such        intelligence available to the Portu-        388        guese authorities.  These activities which are being carried        on  by you with the object of causing further  deterioration        in  the relations between the Portuguese Government and  the        Indian  Government  over  the  question  of  Goan   National

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      Movement,  are prejudicial to the security of India  and  to        the relations of India with Portugal.        2.If  you  wish to make a representation against  the  order        under  which you are detained, you should address it to  the        Government   of   Bombay   and  forward   it   through   the        Superintendent, Arthur Road Prison, Bombay.        3.You  are  also informed that you have a right to  claim  a        personal  hearing  before the Advisory Board  and  that  you        should  communicate  to  Government of  Bombay  as  soon  as        possible your intention of exercising or not exercising that        right".        The objection by the appellant relating to this is contained        in paragraph 15(g) of his application before the High Court.        It is as follows:         "The  grounds  are not specific and no particulars  of  the        activities alleged to have been carried on by the petitioner        are given, viz. the particulars such as the length of period        for  which the petitioner is alleged to have carried on  the        so-called  espionage activities or the details of  financial        aid alleged to have been received by the petitioner from the        Portuguese authorities or the names of any of the  so-called        underground  workers alleged to be aiding the petitioner  or        any  details of intelligence alleged to have been  collected        by the petitioner or made available by him to the Portuguese        Government".        The answer thereto of the Under-Secretary to the  Government        of Bombay is in paragraph 12 of his affidavit dated the 25th        July, 1955, and is as follows:        "With  reference to paragraph 15, clause (g), I submit  that        it is not necessary to mention particulars of the  espionage        activities  carried on by the petitioner or the  details  of        the  financial  aid  received by him or  the  names  of  the        persons  aiding  the said petitioner.  It is not  in  public        interest  to disclose these details; nor is it necessary  to        mention these matters to afford        389        the   petitioner   reasonable   opportunity   to   make    a        representation"        Now  the  question as to whether the grounds  furnished  are        vague  or  not,  is ultimately a question  that  has  to  be        determined  on a consideration of the circumstances of  each        case,  as  was  pointed out by this court in  the  State  of        Bombay  v.  Atma  Ram Sridhar  Vaidya(1)  in  the  following        passage:        "The  contention  that the grounds are vague  requires  some        clarification......................  If the ground which  is        supplied  is incapable of being understood or  defined  with        sufficient  certainty  it can be called vague.   It  is  not        possible to state affirmatively more on the question of what        is  vague.  It must vary according to the  circumstances  of        each  case......................  If on reading  the  ground        furnished  it is capable of being  intelligently  understood        and is sufficiently definite to furnish materials to  enable        the  detained  person to make a representation  against  the        order of detention it cannot be called vague".        In the present case, the detenue has been intimated why,  in        the  opinion  of  the  Government  the  activities  of   the        appellant  are  considered prejudicial to  the  security  of        India and to the relations of India with Portugal.  They are        the following:        1.With  the  financial  help  given  by  the   Portuguese        authorities,  he is carrying on espionage on behalf  of  the        Portuguese Government with the help of underground workers.        2.He   is   collecting  intelligence  about   the   security        arrangements on the border area and making such intelligence

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      available to the Portuguese authorities.        3.He  is  carrying on these activities with  the  object  of        causing  further deterioration in the relations between  the        Portuguese  Government  and the Indian Government  over  the        question of the Goan National Movement.        It  is  true that these allegations are not as  precise  and        specific  as might have been desired.  But having regard  to        the nature of the alleged activities of the appellant, it is        not  unlikely that no more could be gathered  or  furnished.        In this context it is relevant        (1)  [1951] S.C.R. 167,184.        51        390        to notice that the appellant himself does not appear to have        felt  that the grounds furnished were so vague as to  hamper        him  in  his right to make a  representation  under  article        22(5) and section 7 of the Act.  It does not appear that  he        applied to the Government to be supplied with particulars of        the  grounds  furnished to him.  Such a right  to  call  for        particulars has been recognised in the case in the State  of        Bombay  v.  Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya(1) as flowing  from  his        constitutional right to be afforded a reasonable opportunity        to make a representation to the Board.  In that case it  has        been  stated  that  "if the grounds are  not  sufficient  to        enable   the   detenue  to  make   a   representation,   the        detenue............  if  he likes, may ask  for  particulars        which  would  enable him to make the  representation".   The        fact  that be bad made no such application  for  particulars        is,  therefore, a circumstance which may well be taken  into        consideration,  in  deciding  whether  the  grounds  can  be        considered to be vague. In  the  circumstances  and  having        regard to thefact  that  what  is  alleged  is   espionage        activity ata   time  when  relations  between  the   two        Governments on the affairs of Goa were somewhat delicate, we        are inclined to think, with the High Court, that the grounds        cannot be considered to be vague.        Assuming however that the grounds furnished in this case are        open  to  the challenge of vagueness, the  further  question        which  arises  is  whether  the validity  of  the  order  of        detention can be sustained by reason of the claim, in public        interest,  of  non-disclosure of facts made  by  the  Under-        Secretary  to  the  Government of Bombay  by  means  of  his        affidavit filed in the High Court.  Now it has been held  in        Atma  Ram  Sridhar Vaidya’s case(1) by the majority  of  the        Court,  that  the constitutional right of  a  detenue  under        article 22(5) comprises two distinct components.        1.The right to be furnished grounds of detention as  soon        as may be; and        2.The  right to be afforded the earliest  opportunity  of        making a representation against his detention        (1) [1951] S.C.R. 167,184.        391        which   implies,   the  right  to  be   furnished   adequate        particulars of the grounds of detention, to enable a  proper        representation being made.        These  rights involve corresponding obligations on the  part        of  the detaining authority.  It follows that the  authority        is  under a constitutional obligation to furnish  reasonably        definite  grounds, as well as adequate particulars then  and        there, or shortly thereafter.  But the right of the  detenue        to  be furnished particulars, is subject to  the  limitation        under  article 22(6) whereby disclosure of facts  considered        to  be  against public interest cannot be required.   It  is        however  to be observed that under article 22(6)  the  facts        which  cannot be required to be disclosed are  those  "which

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      such  authority considers to be against public  interest  to        disclose".   Hence  it follows that both the  obligation  to        furnish  particulars  and the duty to consider  whether  the        disclosure  of any facts involved therein is against  public        interest, are vested in the detaining authority, not in  any        other.   It  was accordingly attempted to be argued  in  the        High  Court  that the claim of non-disclosure  made  in  the        affidavit  of the Under-Secretary indicated a  decision  for        nondisclosure,  by the Under-Secretary himself and that  too        at the time of filing the affidavit.  On this assumption  it        was contended that the claim for non-disclosure was invalid.        The High Court, however, on a consideration of the material,        felt satisfied that what was stated in the affidavit related        to the decision of the detaining authority itself, taken  at        the time.  The learned Judges expressed their conclusion  as        follows:        "There  is  nothing  in the affidavit of  Mr.  Bambawala  to        suggest  that  it  is now that the  detaining  authority  is        claiming  privilege or applying its mind to the question  of        privilege..........................  The  meaning  is  clear        that  at no time it was in public interest to  disclose  the        details  referred  to  in the particular  paragraph  of  the        affidavit and there is nothing to suggest that this question        was  not considered by the detaining authority at  the  time        when the grounds were furnished".        No argument has been addressed to us how this con-        392        elusion is incorrect.  But what has been urged before us  is        that  the decision not to disclose the facts as well as  the        ambit of the non-disclosure must be clearly communicated  to        the detenue at the time when the grounds are furnished.   It        is  urged that if the detenue is furnished  information,  at        least  to that extent, it will enable him to present to  the        Advisory   Board  his  difficulties  in  making   a   proper        representation  and to convey to it a request for  obtaining        the requisite particulars from the State under section 10 of        the Act for their own information and consideration.  We are        unable to imply any such obligation under article 22(5)  and        (6).   The  necessity for such a communication  would  arise        only  if the detenue, feeling the grounds to be vague,  asks        for particulars.  An obligation to communicate the  decision        not  to  disclose  facts considered  prejudicial  to  public        interest  may well be implied in such a situation.   But  in        the  absence  of any such request by the detenue,  the  non-        communication  of  the  decision  cannot  be  held  to  have        hampered  his constitutional right of representation and  an        obligation  to  communicate  cannot  be  implied  in   these        circumstances.   In  the present case there is no  merit  in        this  contention.  If the appellant bad exercised his  right        to  ask  for particulars, at the time,  from  the  detaining        authority,  there  can be no doubt that he would  have  been        furnished then the very information which has been  supplied        in paragraph 12 of the Under-Secretary’s affidavit in answer        to  para  15(g) of the appellant’s petition, both  of  which        have been already set out above.        A  faint  suggestion  has been made in  the  course  of  the        arguments  before  us  that the  decision  not  to  disclose        particulars is mala fide and that such mala fides has to  be        imputed in a case where no particulars are at all furnished.        It  is  suggested  that  the power  not  to  disclose  facts        considered against public interest cannot be so exercised as        to nullify the constitutional right of the detenue for being        afforded  a  proper opportunity of representation.   Such  a        contention  as  to the mala fide exercise of  the  power  is        untenable in the present case having regard to the nature of

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      the        393        grounds  on which the detention is based and the  nature  of        activities   imputed  therein  to  the  appellant.   It   is        unnecessary,  therefore,  to  deal  in  this  case  with   a        theoretical contention as-to whether or not article 22(6) of        the  Constitution overrides the constitutional right  to  be        furnished  particulars under article 22(5) to the extent  of        denying  all particulars and leaving the grounds  absolutely        vague.        All the contentions raised before us fail and this appeal is        dismissed.