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PETITIONER: LALJI HARIDAS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/02/1964

BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) SARKAR, A.K. WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1964 AIR 1154            1964 SCR  (6) 700  CITATOR INFO :  R          1969 SC 724  (20)  RF         1971 SC  44  (32,33,37)  D          1988 SC2267  (32)

ACT: Income Tax-False evidence in the proceedings before  Income- tax Officer-For the purpose of s. 195(1)(b) Code of Criminal Procedure the proceedings if proceedings in a  court-whether Complaint  has to be made by the  Income-tax  Officer-Indian Income-tax  Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), s. 37-Code  of  Criminal Procedure,  1898 (Act 5 of 1898), s. 195(1)(b)-Indian  Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), ss. 193, 228.

HEADNOTE: The appellant filed a criminal complaint against  respondent No. 2 alleging that he had committed an offence under s. 193 of  the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by giving false evidence  in certain  proceedings before the Income-tax Officer under  s. 37  of  the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.  Respondent  No.  2 raised  a preliminary objection that the learned  Magistrate could not take cognizance of the said complaint, because the proceedings  in  which he was alleged to have made  a  false statement on oath were proceedings before a court within the meaning  of s. 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal  Procedure, 1898, and since no complaint in writing had been made by the court  of  the  Income-tax  Officer  the  provision  of   s. 195(1)(b)  created  a  bar against  the  competence  of  the appellant’s complaint.  On the rejection of this preliminary objection  respondent  No. 2 preferred a  criminal  revision application  before  the Bombay High  Court  impleading  the State  of  Maharashtra as respondent No. 1. The  High  Court allowed  the revision application.  Thereupon the  appellant appealed  to this Court on a certificate issued  under  Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. The  short  question  before  this  court  was  whether  the proceedings before an Income-tax Officer under s. 37 of  the Income-tax  Act can be said to be a proceeding in any  court within  the  meaning  of  s.  195(1)(b)  Code  of   Criminal Procedure.

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Held  (per P. B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., K. N. Wanchoo and  N. Rajagopala  Ayyangar JJ.) (i) While the  Income-tax  Officer exercises  his  powers  under s. 37(1),  (2)  and  (3),  the proceedings  held  by him are judicial proceedings  for  the purposes  of ss. 193, 196 and 228 Indian Penal Code and  the false statement alleged to have been made by respondent  No. 2 was Made in a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193, Indian Penal Code. (ii)It  is  not necessary to decide  the  general  question whether  the  Income-tax Officer is a Court or  not  for  s. 37(4) of the Income-tax                             701 Act  makes  the proceedings before the  Income-tax  Officer, judicial proceedings for the purposes of s. 193 Indian Penal Code  and  these  judicial proceedings must  be  treated  as proceedings  in  any court for the purpose of  s.  195(1)(b) Code  of  Criminal Procedure.  The High Court was  right  in allowing  the  revision application on the ground  that  the condition  precedent  prescribed  by s.  195(1)(b)  Code  of Criminal  Procedure  had  not  been  complied  with  as   no complaint has been filed by the Income-tax Officer. Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] 2  S.C.R. 850  and  Puran Chand Maneklal, in re: I.L.R. 38  Bom.  642, distinguished. Per  Sarkar  and  Das Gupta JJ. (dissenting)  (i)  From  the nature  of  functions under the various  provisions  of  the Income-tax Act it is clear that the Income-tax Officer is  a part  and parcel of the executive organ of the  State.   The fact that for carrying out some of these executive functions he  will have the powers as are vested in a court under  the Code  of  Civil Procedure will not make him a  limb  of  the judicial  organ.  Neither does the fact that he is a  quasi- judicial authority make him a court. (ii)In Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Lakshmi Chand. [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R.  242 this court has held that the Income-tax  Officer is not a Tribunal and therefore it is obvious that he cannot be a court. (iii)To  say  that the legislature in providing  in  s. 37(4) of the   Indian  Income-tax  Act  that  a   proceeding before the specifiedauthority      shall  be deemed  to be a judicial proceeding within the meaningof  s. 193  and s. 228 Indian Penal Code intended also to say that suchauthority shall be deemed to be a court within the meaning of s. 195Code of   Criminal   Procedure   would  be  to  impute   to   the legislature anintention      of  which  it  itself  had  no knowledge. (iv)The  words  used  in s. 37(4)  of  the  Income-tax  Act furnishes  no  reason to alter the legal  position  that  is inescapable  on  a  consideration of the  functions  of  the Income-tax Officer that he is not a court within the meaning of s. 195 Code of Criminal Procedure. Jagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1963] 2  S.C.R. 850,  Punamchand Manaklal, re: I.L.R. 38 Bom. 642, State  v. Nemchatid  Pesvir,  57  Bom.   L.R,  1056,  Indochina  Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. The Additional Collector of  Customs, [1964] 6 S.C.R. 394, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 141  of 1962. Appeal  from the judgment and order dated January 30,  1962, of  the Bombay High Court in Criminal  Revision  Application No. 1142 of 1960.

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S.V.  Gupte,  Additional Solicitor-General, J.  B.  Dada- chanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant. 702 S.   K. Kapur and R. H. Dhebar., for respondent No. 1. S.   T.  Desai,  J.  L.   Jain  and  V.  J.  Merchant,   for respondent No. 2. February  7,  1964.  The Judgment  of  Gajendragadkar  C.J., Wanchoo  and  Rajagopala  Ayyangar  JJ.  was  delivered   by Gajendragadkar C.J. The dissenting opinion of Sarkar and Das Gupta JJ. was delivered by Das Gupta J. GAJENDRAGADKAR  C.J.-The short question of law which  arises for  our  decision  in the present  appeal  is  whether  the proceeding before an Income-tax Officer under section 37  of the   Indian  Income-tax  Act,  1922  (No.   XI   of   1922) (hereinafter called the Act) can be said to be a  proceeding in any court within the meaning of s. 195(1)(b) of the  Code of  Criminal Procedure.  This question arises in  this  way. The  appellant  Lalji  Haridas and respondent  No.  2  Mulii Maniial  Kamdar  are businessmen and they  carry  oil  their business  in  Jamnagar and Bombay respectively.   They  have known  each  other for several years past in the  course  of their  ordinary  business  activities.   In  the  income-tax assessment  proceedings of the appellant for the  assessment years 1949-50 and 1950-51, respondent No. 2 gave evidence on oath before the Income-tax Officer, Ward A, Jamnagar on  the 4th December, 1958.  In his evidence he denied that he had a son  named Nihal Chand and that he had done any business  in the name of M/s.  Nihal Chand & Co. at Jamnagar.   According to  the  appellant, the said statements were  false  to  the knowledge  of  respondent  No. 2 and were  made  by  him  to mislead the Income-tax Officer and to avoid the incidence of income-tax  on  himself.  As a re. sult of  the  said  false statements, the appellant was heavily taxed. On  the 24th November, 1959, the appellant filed a  criminal complaint against respondent No. 2 under section 193 of  the Indian  Penal Code (No. 452/S of 1959) in the Court  of  the Presidency  Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanades,  Bombay.  At the hearing of the said complaint, respondent No. 2 raised a preliminary objection that the learned Magistrate could  not take cognizance of the said complaint, because the                             703 proceedings  in  which he was alleged to have made  a  false statement on oath were proceedings before a Court within the meaning of s. 195 (1) (b) Cr.  P.C., and since no  complaint in  writing  had been made by the Court  of  the  Income-tax Officer  before which the said proceedings  were  conducted, the provisions of s. 1 95 (1) (b) created a bar against  the competence of the appellant’s complaint.  The learned Presi- dency Magistrate held that the Income-tax Officer was not  a Court  within the meaning of s. 195(1) (b), Cr.   P.C.,  and so,   he  rejected  the  preliminary  objection  raised   by respondent No. 2. Against  the  said decision of  the  Presidency  Magistrate, respondent  No. 2 preferred a Criminal Revision  Application (No. 1142 of 1960) before the Bombay High Court.  The  State of Maharashtra was impleaded as respondent No. 1 to the said Revision  Application.   A Division Bench of the  said  High Court  reversed the conclusion of the Presidency  Magistrate and held that the Income-tax Officer was a Court within  the meaning  of s. 195(1) (b), Cr.  P.C., and so, it upheld  the preliminary  objection  raised by respondent No. 2.  In  the result, the complaint filed by the appellant was ordered  to be dismissed.  The appellant then applied for and obtained a certificate from the Bombay High Court under Art. 134(1) (c) of the Constitution and it is with the said certificate that

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he  has brought the present appeal before us.  That  is  how the  narrow  question which arises for our decision  in  the present appeal is whether the proceedings before an  Income- tax Officer are proceedings in any Court under s. 195(1)(b), Cr.   P.C. The question thus raised is undoubtedly  a  short one,  but  its decision is not easy, because  the  arguments urged  in  support of the two respective  constructions  are fairly balanced and the task of preferring one  construction to the other presents some difficulty. The proceedings before the Income-tax Officer during  which, according  to the appellant, respondent No. 2 made  a  false statement on oath, were held by the Income-tax Officer under s.  37 of the Act.  Section 37(1) deals with the  powers  of Income-tax  authorities and provides, inter alia,  that  the Income-tax  Officer shall, for the purposes of the Act  have the  same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code  of Civil  Procedure, 1908 (No.  V of 1908), when trying a  suit in 704 respect  of  the matters specified by clauses  (a)  to  (d). Section  37(2) confers upon the Income-tax  Officer  certain additional  powers  which can be exercised  subject  to  any rules  made  in that behalf, provided the  said  Officer  is specially authorised by the Commissioner in that behalf, and in  exercising these powers, the provisions of the  Code  of Criminal Procedure 1898 relating to searches apply.  Section 37(3)  deals with the question of impounding  and  retaining any  books of account or other documents.  That takes us  to s.  37(4)  which is relevant for our purpose;  this  section provides  that any proceeding before any authority  referred to  in  this  section  shall be  deemed  to  be  a  judicial proceeding  within the meaning of sections 193 and 228,  and for  the purposes of section 196 of the Indian  Penal  Code. It is thus clear that while the Income-tax Officer exercises his powers under s. 37(1), (2) and (3) the proceedings  held by  him  arc judicial proceedings for the  purposes  of  the three  sections of the Indian Penal Code mentioned  in  sub- section  (4).   Therefore, the question as  to  whether  the false statement alleged to have been made by respondent  No. 2  was  made by him at any stage of  a  judicial  proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 I.P.C., must be answered in the affirmative.   That is the plain effect of s. 37(4)  of  the Act. Section  193  of the Indian Penai Code. with  which  we  are directly  concerned  in  the  present  appeal  provides  for punishment  for  intentionally giving  false  evidence.   It consists  of  two parts; the first part deals,  inter  alia, with  false evidence intentionally given in any stage  of  a judicial  proceeding, and prescribes that the  person  found guilty  of  having given such false evidence in  a  judicial proceeding  shall  be punished with imprisonment  of  either description for a term which may extend to seven years,  and shall  also  be liable lo fine; the second part  deals  with cases  where false evidence has been intentionally given  in any  other case, and it prescribes the maximum  sentence  of three  years as well as fine.  In other words, if the  false evidence  has  been  intentionally  given  in  any  judicial proceeding, the sentence awardable is higher than that where false  evidence is intentionally given in proceedings  which are  not judicial.  There are three explanations to s.  193. Expln.  I provides that a trial before a Court-martial is  a judicial proceeding; expln. 2 lays down that an investi-                             705 gation directed by law preliminary to a proceeding before  a Court  of  Justice,  is a stage of  a  judicial  proceeding,

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though that investigation may not take place before a  Court of  Justice;  this  explanation  takes  in,  for   instance, committal  proceedings.   Under expln. 3,  an  investigation directed  by  a  Court ,of Justice  according  to  law,  and conducted  under the authority of a Court of Justice,  is  a stage  of a judicial proceeding, though  that  investigation may  not  take  place  before  a  Court  of  Justice.   This explanation  covers  enquiries before  officers  deputed  by Courts  of Justice to ascertain, for instance, on  the  spot the  boundaries of land.  It would thus be seen that  having provided  for a higher sentence in regard to the offence  of giving false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, the  three  explanations  of  s.  193  include  within   the expression  "judicial proceeding" certain proceedings  which on a strict construction of the said expression may not have been  included  under it.  For the purpose  of  the  present appeal,  however, the only point to notice at this stage  is that  s.  37(4)  of the Act makes  a  proceeding  before  an Income-tax Officer, held under the said section, a  judicial proceeding for the purposes of s. 193, I.P.C. and that means that  if  an offence of giving false evidence is  proved  to have  been committed by a person in a proceeding before  the Income-tax  Officer,  he  would be  liable  for  the  higher sentence awardable under the first part of section 193. That  takes  us  to  section 195 of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure.  It is well-known that s. 195 provides for an ex- ception  to  the ordinary rule that any person  can  make  a complaint in respect of the commission of an offence triable under  the  Cr.  P. C. Section 4(h) of this Code  defines  a "complaint"  as  meaning the allegation made  orally  or  in writing  to a Magistrate, with a view to his  taking  action under the Code, that some person, whether known or  unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include the report of a police officer.  This definition shows that any person can make a complaint in respect of the commission of an offence. Section 190 requires that the Magistrate to whom a complaint has been made should take cognizance of the said  complaint, subject  to the provisions of the said section.   Thus,  the general rule is that any person can make a complaint, and s. 195 provides for an exception.  Section 195(1) 134-159 S.C.-45 706 (b)with which we are concerned, provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under the sections therein mentioned, when such offence is alleged to have been committed  in,  or  in relation to, any  proceeding  in  any Court, except the complaint in writing of such Court, or  of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate, amongst the  sections mentioned are sections 193 and 228 I.P.C.  The effect of these provisions is that if an offence is  alleged to have been committed either under s. 193 or s. 228 I.P.C., and  it  appears  that the said  offence  was  committed  in relation  to any proceeding in any Court, it is only if  the said Court, or the Court to which it is subordinate, makes a complaint  in that behalf that cognizance will be  taken  of the  said  complaint.  A person cannot make a  complaint  in respect  of  the alleged commission of any of  the  offences specified in s. 195(1)(b); that is its plain effect. Section  195(2)  which was added in 1923  when  the  earlier section  195  was substantially amended,  provides  that  in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) the term "Court"  in- cludes  a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but it does  not include a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Regis- tration  Act,  1877.   It is unnecessary to  deal  with  the effect of this provision, because, as will presently  appear

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we  do not propose to base our decision on the  ground  that the  Income-tax Officer is a Revenue Court under  this  sub- section.   The  only  point  of interest  to  which  we  may incidentally  refer  is  that  this  sub-section  gives   an inclusive,  though not an exhaustive, definition  and  takes within  its purview not only Civil and Criminal Courts,  but also  Revenue  Courts, while excluding a Registrar  or  Sub- Registrar under the Indian Registration Act. In  dealing with the question which has been raised  in  the present appeal what we are required to determine is  whether a proceeding before an Income-tax Officer which by virtue of the  operation of s.37(4) of the Act, must be held to  be  a judicial proceeding under s. 193, I.P.C. is a proceeding  in any Court under s. 195.  Cr.  P. C. Section 193 makes a dis- tinction between offences committed in any judicial proceed- ing  and those committed in proceedings other than  judicial proceedings, whereas s. 195(1)(b), Cr.  P. C. does not refer to judicial proceedings as such, but mentions proceedings in 707 any Court.  That is why the controversy between the  parties in  the  present appeal lies within a very  narrow  compass. Can  it  be  said that the proceeding which  is  a  judicial proceeding  under  s.  193, I.P.C., must be  held  to  be  a proceeding  in any Court under s. 195(1)(b), Cr.  P. C.?  It is on this aspect of the dispute that the arguments on  both sides are fairly balanced. In dealing with this question, it is unnecessary to consider what would have been the position of the Income-tax  Officer acting under s. 37(1), (2) and (3), and what would have been the  character of the proceedings taken before him  if  sub- section  (4) had not been enacted.  In Jagannath  Prasad  v. The  State  of Uttar Pradesh(1), it has been  held  by  this Court that the Sales-tax Officer functioning under the  U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (No. 15 of 1948) was not a Court  within the  meaning  of  s.  195, Cr.  P.C., and  so,  it  was  not necessary for him to make a complaint for the prosecution of any person against whom it was alleged that he had committed an  offence,under s. 471 I.P.C. This decision would tend  to indicate  that  in  the absence of s. 37(4)  it  would  have become necessary to hold that the Income-tax Officer  acting under  s. 37(1), (2) and (3), would not be a Court under  s. 195,  Cr.  P.C., and in that sense the provisions of s.  195 could  not  have  been  attracted.   This  position  is  not disputed by Mr. Desai who appears for respondent No. 2. He, however, contends that the provisions of s. 37(4)  which have  been  inserted  in  the  Act  in  1956  make  all  the difference, and according to him, this sub-section was added in  order to make s. 195 (1) (b), Cr.  P. C., applicable  to the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer.  On the other hand,  the  Additional  Solicitor-General  has   strenuously argued that the purpose which the legislature had in mind in inserting  sub-section (4) in s. 37 was merely to  make  the proceedings   before   the   Income-tax   Officer   judicial proceedings within the meaning of s. 193, I.P.C., and not to make  s. 195 (1) (b), Cr. P. C. applicable to them.  If  the intention   of  the  legislature  had  been  to   take   the proceedings   before  the  Income-tax  Officer  within   the mischief  of  the  said  section  of  the  Cr.   P.C.,   the legislature would have expressly said so in terms.  The (1)  [1953]2 S.C.R. 850 708 omission to refer to the relevant provision of the Cr.  P.C. in  s.  37(4)  is not accidental, but  deliberate,  and  so, though  the proceeding before the Income-tax Officer may  be and  has  to be regarded as a judicial proceeding  under  s.

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193,  I.P.C., it cannot be said to be a proceeding before  a Court, because the Income-tax Officer is not a Court. In support of his argument, the Additional Solicitor General has  referred us to several statutes where  the  legislative intention to extend the provisions of s. 195, Cr.  P.C.,  to specific  proceedings  has  been carried out  by  making  an express  provision in that behalf.  Section 23 of the  Work- men’s  Compensation Act, 1923 (No. 8 of 1923) provides  that the Commissioner shall have all the powers of a Civil  Court for the purposes therein indicated, and by an amendment made in 1929, it further lays down that the Commissioner shall be deemed  to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of  s.  195 and  Chapter  35  of the Code of  Criminal  Procedure.   The argument is that where the legislature wanted to extend  the provisions  of s. 195, Cr.  P.C. to the  proceedings  before the Commissioner held under the Workmen’s Compensation  Act, it  thought  it  necessary to make a  specific  and  express provision in that behalf.. A similar provision is  contained in s. 18 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (No. 4 of  1936). In  the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (No. 14 of 1947),  the position  is  similar to that in the case of  the  Workmen’s Compensation  Act; section 11(4) confers on the  authorities therein  specified powers as are vested in a Civil Court  in respect  of  the matter mentioned therein.   In  1950,  sub- section (8) was added to section II by which it was provided that every Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be Civil Court for the purposes of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  This scheme also shows, says the Additional Solicitor-General, that where the legislature wants to make any Tribunal or authority a Court, it  uses  express and appropriate language in  that  behalf. Section  45 of the Administration of Evacuee  Property  Act, 1950  (No.  31 of 1950) likewise confers powers of  a  Civil Court   on  the  Custodian  and  expressly  adds  that   the proceedings  before  him  shall be  deemed  to  be  judicial proceedings  within the meaning of sections 193 and  228  of the Indian Penal Code, and the Custodian shall be deemed 709 to be a Court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482  of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  The same provision is  made by s. 17 of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act. 1951 (Act 64  of  1951),  as well as by section 26  of  the  Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (No.  44 of 1954). On  the other hand, s. 51 of the ministrator-General’s  Act, 1913  (No.  3  of 1913) provides that  whoever,  during  any examination authorised by this Act, makes a false  statement on oath knowingly, he shall be deemed to have  intentionally given false evidence in a stage of a judicial proceeding The argument  is  that in this case, the legislature  wanted  to equate the proceedings under this Act with judicial proceed- ings  under s. 193, I.P.C., and did not intend to make  sec- tion 195, Cr.  P.C., applicable to them, because it does not make  the authority under this Act a Court, or does not,  in terms, extend the provisions of the said section to the pro- ceedings  held before such an authority.  The  same  comment has  been  made on the provisions of s. 171A(4) of  the  Sea Customs  Act,  1878 (No. 8 of 1878).   Thus  presented,  the argument  is no doubt attractive and cannot be  rejected  as without any substance. The  expression "judicial proceeding" is not defined in  the Indian  Penal Code, but we have the definition of  the  said expression  under  s.,  4(m) of  the  Cr.   Procedure  Code. Section  4(m) provides that "judicial  proceeding"  includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may  be

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legally  taken  on  oath.  The  expression  "Court"  is  not defined either by the Cr.  P.C. or the I.P.C. though  ’Court of  Justice’  is  defined by s. 20 of  the  latter  Code  as denoting  a Judge who is empowered by law to act  judicially alone, or a body of Judges which is empowered by law to  act judicially  as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges  is acting judicially.  Section 3 of the Evidence Act defines  a "Court"  as  including all Judges and  Magistrates  and  all persons  except the Arbitrators legally authorised  to  take evidence.   Prima facie, there is some force in the  conten- tion  that  it would not be reasonable  to  predicate  about every ,judicial proceeding that it is a proceeding before  a Court,  and  so, it is open to the appellant  to  urge  that though the proceeding before an Income-tax Officer may be  a judicial 710 proceeding  under s. 193, I.P.C., it would not  follow  that the  said judicial proceeding is a proceeding in a Court  as required by s. 195(i)(b), Cr.  P.C. It  is somewhat remarkable that though section 193,  I.P.C., refers  to  a judicial proceeding, section  195,  Cr.   P.C. refers  to  a  proceeding in any Court; it does  not  say  a judicial  proceeding in any Court.  Mr. Desai contends  that reading  section  193  I.P.C. and s.  195(1)(b)  Cr.   P.C., together.  it  would  not  be  unreasonable  to  hold   that proceedings  which are judicial under the former, should  be taken to be proceedings in any Court under the latter.   The whole basis of providing for a higher sentence in regard  to offences  committed  at any stage of a  judicial  proceeding appears  to be that the legislature took the view  that  the said  offences  were more serious in character, and  so,  it distinguished  the  said  offences  from  similar   offences committed  at any stage of other proceedings.  The  argument is that while providing for a higher sentence in respect  of this  more serious class of offences committed at any  stage of judicial proceedings, the legislature intended that there should be a safeguard in respect of complaint as regards the said   offences  and  that  safeguard  is  provided  by   s. 195(1)(b),  Cr.P.C.  In  other words, an  offence  which  is treated  as more serious by the first paragraph of  s.  193, I.P.C. because it is an offence committed during the  course of  a  judicial proceeding should be held to be  an  offence committed in any proceeding in any Court for the purpose  of s.  195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. On this argument, it is  necessary  to consider  whether the Income-tax Officer is a Court or  not, for,  in  substance, the contention is that as  soon  as  s. 37(4)  of  the Act was enacted, the  proceedings  before  an Income-tax  Officer  became  judicial  proceedings  for  the purpose  of s. 193, I.P.C. and since they are classed  under the  first paragraph of the said section, they  attract  the protection of s. 195(1)(b), Cr.P.C. In our opinion, there is considerable  force in this argument, and, on the whole.  we are  inclined  to prefer the construction suggested  by  Mr. Desai  to that pressed before us by the  learned  Additional Solicitor-General. It  is  true, the Additional  Solicitor-General  has  mainly relied  upon the relevant provisions of several statutes  in support of his construction and in so far as it appears that                             711 certain  provisions  in some of the said statutes  in  terms extend  the  application  of  s.  195,  Cr.   P.C.  to   the proceedings to which they relate, the argument does  receive support, but we hesitate to hold that the omission to  refer to  s.  195(1)  (b),  Cr.  P.C.  in  s.  37(4)  of  the  Act necessarily  means that the intention of the legislature  in

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enacting  s.  37(4) was merely and solely to provide  for  a higher  sentence  in  regard to the offence  under  s.  193, I.P.C. if it was committed in proceedings before the Income- tax  Officer.   It  is plain that if  the  argument  of  the Additional  Solicitor-General is accepted, the result  would be  that  a complaint like the present can be  made  by  any person  and  if the offence alleged is proved,  the  accused would  be liable to receive hi-her penalty  awardable  under the first paragraph of s. 193, I.P.C. without the  safeguard correspondingly provided by s. 195(1)(b), Cr.  P.C. Could it have  been  the intention of the legislature in  making  the offence  committed during the course of a proceeding  before an  Income-tax  Officer  more serious  without  affording  a corresponding  safeguard in respect of the complaints  which -can  be made in that behalf?  We are inclined to hold  that the  answer to this question must be in the negative.   That is  why  after careful consideration. we have  come  to  the conclusion  that  the view taken by the  Bombay  High  Court should  be  upheld though for  different  reasons.   Section 37(4)  ,of the Act makes the proceedings before the  Income- tax  Officer  judicial proceedings under s. 193  I.P.C.  and these judicial proceedings must be treated as proceedings in any  Court for the purpose of s. 195(1)(b), Cr.  P.C.  That. we  think,  would  really carry out  the  intention  of  the legislature in enacting s. 37(4) of the Act. In this connection. there is another consideration which has weighed in our minds.  We have already noticed that s. 37(4) makes the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer judicial proceedings within the meaning of s. 228 I.P.C. When we turn to the latter section, we notice that the said section deals with   the  offence  of  intentionally  causing  insult   or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial  proceed- ing.  It is obvious that the offence with which s. 228 deals is an offence committed against a public servant sitting  in a judicial proceeding.  This section is one of the  sections mentioned in s. 195(1)(b), Cr.  P.C., and so. any  complaint in 712 respect of the offence alleged to have been committed  under s.  228,  I.P.C. has to be made by the  Court  in  question. There can be little doubt that if a person offers an  insult to  a  public servant sitting in a judicial  proceeding,  or causes.  interruption to him while he is so sitting  at  any stage  of  the  judicial proceeding, the  complaint  has  to proceed from the public servant himself; that is the  effect of  s.  195(1)(b) Cr. P.C. Before s. 37(4) of  the  Act  was enacted,  an  insult  given  to  an  Income-tax  Officer  or interruption  caused  to  his  proceedings  whilst  he   was conducting  his proceedings, would not have amounted  to  an offence   under  s.  228,  I.P.C.  Section  37(4)  makes   a proceeding before the Income-tax Officer a proceeding  under s. 228 I.P.C. and thus, an interruption in his  proceedings, or  an insult given to him, has now become punishable  under the  said  section.   Could it have  been  intended  by  the legislature  in  enacting s. 37(4) that  whereas  an  insult offered   to   a  public  servant  acting   judicially,   or interruption  caused  in his proceedings would  normally  be cognizable only on the complaint of the public servant  him- self,  the  same  offence, if committed in  respect  of  the proceedings   before  an  Income-tax  Officer,   should   be cognizable at the complaint of a private party?  The anomaly which  would  result if the construction  suggested  by  the Additional   Solicitor-General  is  accepted,  is,  in   our opinion, so glaring that the alternative contention urged by Mr.  Desai and upheld by the Bombay High Court which  avoids

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the  said  anomaly appears to be more  reasonable  and  more consistent with the true intention of the legislature.  That is  why  we  are  not prepared  to  accept  the  appellant’s argument  that  the  Bombay  High  Court  was  in  error  in dismissing  his complaint on the ground that  the  condition precedent prescribed by s. 195(1) (b)   Cr.  P.C.  had   not been complied with as no complaint had  been  filed  by  the Income-tax Officer. It  appears  that In re: Punam Chand  Maneklal(1)  the  Full Bench  of the Bombay High Court had taken the view  that  an Income-tax  Collector is a Revenue Court within the  meaning of  that term as used in clauses (b) and (c) of s. 195,  Cr. P  C.,  1898.  Scott, C. J. who spoke for  the  Full  Bench, observed that it could not be contended that the  Income-tax Collector  was  a  Civil  or  Criminal  Court,  and  so,  he addressed himself (1)  I.L.R. 38 Bom. 642. 713 to the narrow question as to whether he was a Revenue Court. Dealing  with the question on that footing, he examined  the functions of the Income-tax Collector under Act 11 of  1886, and  held  that  he was a Revenue Court.   He  rejected  the contention  that he could be treated as a Registrar or  Sub- Registrar  under the Registration Act, and so, he  found  no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that he was a Revenue Court.   The  Bombay  High Court in  the  present  case  has substantially based itself on this decision in reversing the conclusion  of the Presidency Magistrate and directing  that the  complaint filed by the appellant should  be  dismissed. It is unnecessary to consider whether the view taken by  the Full Bench in re: Punam Chand Maneklal(1) is right,  because the  relevant  provisions of the Income-tax  Act  have  been subsequently  modified in 1922 and different  considerations have  now assumed importance.  It is no longer  possible  to hold  that the Income-tax Officer is a Revenue  Court,  and, indeed, that has not been the contention raised before us by Mr. Desai. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. DAS  GUPTA,  J.-Is an Income-tax Officer  under  the  Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, a court within the meaning of cl.  (b) in  sub-section  (1)  of  s. 195 of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure?   That is the short but difficult  question  that arises  in this appeal against a decision of the High  Court of  Judicature  at  Bombay.   On  November  24,  1949,   the appellant  filed a complaint in the Court of the  Presidency Magistrate, Bombay, alleging that when the respondent  Mulji Manilal Kamdar was examined on commission by the  Income-tax Officer,  Jamnagar Circle, Jamnagar, he gave  answers  which were  false  to his knowledge.  He prayed for the  issue  of process  against the said Mulji Manilal Kamdar, so  that  he might  be  dealt with according to law.   An  objection  was raised by the accused that in the absence of a complaint  by the  Income-tax Officer before whom the false statement  was alleged  to have been made the Magistrate was debarred  from taking cognizance of the case.  This contention was based on a submission that the Income-tax Officer was a court  within the meaning of s. 195(1)(b).  This objection was rejected by the Presidency Magistrate. (1)  I.L.R. 38 Boni. 642. 714 The  High Court of Bombay was moved against  the  Presidency Magistrate’s order.  But considering itself bound by a  Full Bench   decision  of  the  Court  in  in   re:   Punainchand Manieklal(1)  and  the later decision in State  v.  Nemchand Peshvir  (2) the High Court held that an income-tax  Officer

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when holding proceedings under s. 23 of the Income-tax  Act, 1922  is  a Revenue Court within the meaning of cl.  (b)  in sub-section (1) of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The  correctness  of  the High Court’s  view  is  challenged before   us  by  the  complainant  on  the  strength  of   a certificate granted by the High Court finder Art. 134(1) (c) of the Constitution. Section  195(1)(b)  is one of the group of sections  in  the Code  of Criminal Procedure which have laid down  exceptions to   the  general  rule  of  criminal  law   that   criminal proceedings can be instituted in a court by any person.   To this  rule s. 195 along with ss. 196, 196A, 197, 197A,  198, 198A,  and 199 provide exceptions.  Section 195 mentions  in its first sub-section a number of offences of which no court shall take cognizance except on the complaint in writing  of the  persons  as indicated.  Three classes of  offences  are dealt  with  in  three cls. (a), (b) and (c)  of  this  sub- section.   Section 195(1)(a) deals with offences  punishable under  ss. 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code and  provides that  no Court shall take cognizance of any of these  except on the complaint in writing "of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is  subordinate." Section  195(1)(b) deals with offences punishable under  ss. 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209,  210, 211  and  228  and provides that when any  such  offence  is alleged  to  have been committed in or in  relation  to  any proceeding  in any court, no court shall take cognizance  of it except on the complaint in writing of such Court or  some other  court  to which such court is  subordinate.   Section 195(1)(c) deals with offences punishable under ss. 463, 471, 475  and  476  and provides that when any  such  offence  is alleged to have been committed by a party to any  proceeding in any court in respect of any document produced (1)  I.L.R. 38 Bom. 642. (2) 57 Bom.   L.R. 1056. 715 or given in evidence in such proceeding, no court shall take cognizance of the same except on the complaint in writing of such  court,  or  some other court to which  such  court  is subordinate. The second sub-section of s. 195 runs thus               "In  clauses (b) and (c) of  sub-section  (1),               the term "court" includes a Civil, Revenue  or               Criminal   Court,  but  does  not  include   a               Registrar,  or SubRegistrar, under the  Indian               Registration Act, 1877.  " In this appeal we are concerned directly with cl. (b) of  s. 195(1).   The  appellant’s complaint before  the  Magistrate alleged  the  commission of an offence under s. 193  of  the Indian  Penal Code in the course of the examination on  oath by  the  Income-taxx  Officer,  Ward  A,  Jamnagar   Circle, Jamnagar.  The examination itself took place in relation  to assessment proceedings against the complainant for the years 1949-50, and 1950-51.  If the Income-tax Officer is a  Court it necessarily follows that the Magistrate was not  entitled to  take cognizance of this offence except on the  complaint of the Income-tax Officer.  That is how the question whether the  Income-tax  Officer  is  a Court or  not  falls  to  be considered. Section 5 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, mentions six  classes of Income-tax Authorities for ;the purposes of the Act,  The primary function of an Income-tax Officer is the  assessment of  income that is chargeable to tax under s. 3 of  the  Act and  the determination of the tax payable on it.  He has  to perform  other functions under the Act that  are  subsidiary

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and  ancillary  to this main function.  Under s. 5  (7)  the Income-tax  Officers  are  subordinate to  the  Director  of Inspection,   the   Commissioner  of  Income-tax   and   the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax within whose jurisdiction  they perform their functions.  Under  s.  5(8) they have to observe and follow the orders, instructions and directions of the Central Board of Revenue.  Chapter III  of the Act in its several sections state what heads of  income- profits  and  gains shall be chargeable  to  income-tax  and indicates the duties which the Income-tax Officer 716 has  to  perform  for the purpose of his  main  function  of assessing  the chargeable income.  For instance,  deductions under  s. 7 (2) (iia) in respect of conveyance owned by  the assessee   or   used  by  him  for  the   purpose   of   his employment"shall  be such sum as the Income-tax Officer  may estimate,........"The   allowances  permissible   under   s. 10(2)(i)  "shall be such sum as the Income-tax  Officer  may determine";  the allowances under s. 10 (2) (ix) also  shall be such sum in respect of loans made in the ordinary  course of  business  as the Income-tax Officer may estimate  to  be irrecoverable.   Again, the allowances mentioned in cl.  (a) and  cl.  (b)  of s. 10(4) (a) cannot be  made  "if  in  the opinion  of  the Income-tax Officer any  such  allowance  is excessive or unreasonable." The proviso to s. 10(5) requires -the  Income-tax  Officer to satisfy himself  in  the  cases dealt with there whether the main purpose of the transfer of assets  was  the reduction of liability  to  income-tax  and provides  that where he is so satisfied the actual  cost  of the  assets shall be such amount as the  Income-tax  Officer may determine.  Other sections showing the different matters in  which the Income-tax Officer has to be satisfied  or  to form an opinion for the purpose of assessment are ss. 12(a), 13 and 17.  Chapter IV of the Act,which lays down the proce- dure to be followed in making the assessment, imposes  inter alia  the duty of calling for returns of income (s. 22);  of making  assessment  of the Income and to determine  the  sum payable  by  the  assessee  (s. 23);  the  power  to  assess Companies  to super-tax (s. 23A); the power to  make  provi- sional assessment in advance of regular assessment (s. 23B). It  is obvious however that for carrying out  these  several functions  properly  it  is  necessary  for  the  Income-tax Officer  to examine documents and persons.  Power  for  this purpose are conferred on the Income-tax Officer (and certain other  Income-tax  Authorities) in s. 37 of  the  Act.   The first subsection of s. 3 7 runs thus :-               "The  Income-tax Officer, Appellate  Assistant               Commissioner and Appellate Tribunal shall, for               the purposes of this Act, have the same powers               as  are  vested in a court under the  Code  of               Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908)                                    717               when trying a suit in respect of the following               matters, namely :-               (a)   discovery and inspection.               (b)   enforcing the attendance of any  person,               including  any officer of a  banking  company,               and examining him on oath,               (c)   compelling  the production of  books  of               account and other documents; and               (d)   issuing summons." The  second  subsection  empowers  any  Income-tax   Officer specially authorised by the Commissioner to enter and search any building and seize books of account and other documents. Under  the  third  sub-section the  Income-tax  Officer  may

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impound  or retain the books of account and other  documents after  following certain procedure.  The fourth  sub-section of  this  section which does not confer any powers  but  has been relied on strongly by the respondent will be dealt with in full detail later in this judgment. From the brief summary of the Income-tax Officer’s functions given above it is clear that he is a part and parcel of  the executive  organ of the State.  The fact that  for  carrying out  some  of  these executive functions he  will  have  the powers  as  are vested in a court under the  Code  of  Civil Procedure  has not the effect of converting him into a  limb ,of  the  judicial  organ.  It has been held that  he  is  a quasi judicial authority.  That is not sufficient however to make  him a court.  Before we can call him a court, he  must be  shown to be a part of the judicial organ of  the  State. Leaving  out for later consideration the effect of s.  37(4) it is clear that an Income-tax Officer is not a court. We  have not thought it necessary to refer to  the  numerous decisions  of the High Courts in India, of this Court or  of the  Privy Council in which the question of what is a  court has been considered.  We have considered this unnecessary in view especially of the fact that most of these were  noticed in a recent decision of this Court in Jagannath 718 Prosad  v.  State  of Uttar Pradesh(1)  where  the  question whether  a Sales Tax Officer was a court or not  within  the meaning  of  s. 195(2) of the Criminal  Procedure  Code  was considered.   This Court held that the Sales Tax Officer  is not  a  Court within the meaning of that section.   All  the reasons  set out in this judgment which Kapur  J.  delivered for  the Court are applicable to the case of the  Income-tax Officer  and  if the reasoning in that case is taken  to  be correct,  as it must be, ;the Income-tax Officer  also  must be,  held to be not a court-unless any different  conclusion is. justified from the provisions of s. 37(4) of the Act. It  will  not  be out of place to  mention  here  what  them Constitution Bench of this Court said in Jaswant Sugar Mills v.  Lakshmi Chand(2) as regards the nature of the  functions of  Income-tax  Officers.   The  question  for  the  court’s decision  in  that case was whether a  Conciliation  Officer under  cl. 29 of the Government Order under ss. 3 and  8  of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act was a "Tribunal" within the meaning  of Art. 136 of the Constitution and the Court  held that it was not such a tribunal.  As illustrations of  other authorities  whose primary function is  administrative  even though  they  have  the  duty to  act  judicially,  Shah  J. speaking for the Court said :-               "The  duty to act judicially imposed  upon  an               authority  by  statute  does  not  necessarily               clothe  the authority with the judicial  power               of   the   State.   Even   administrative   or               executive  authorities are often by virtue  of               their constitution, required to act judicially               in dealing with question affecting the  rights               of  citizens.   Boards  of  Revenue,   Customs               Authorities,   Motor   Vehicles   Authorities,               Income-tax   and   Sales  Tax   Officers   are               illustrations    prima    facie    of     such               administrative authorities, who though under a               duty to act judicially, either by the  express               provisions  of the statutes constituting  them               or  by the rules framed thereunder or  by  the               implication  either  of the  statutes  or  the               powers conferred upon them are               (1) [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 242.

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             (2) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 850.               719               still  not delegates of the judicial power  of               the   State.    Their  primary   function   is               administrative and not judicial." It  is true that the question whether an Income-tax  Officer was  a court or a tribunal was not directly for decision  in jaswant Sugar Mills’ case(1).  It is clear however that as a part of the reasoning which the court applied for coming  to the  conclusion  that  the Conciliation  Officer  is  not  a Tribunal  this  Court  was of  opinion  that  an  Income-tax Officer  is also not a "Tribunal".  Obviously, if it is  not even a Tribunal it cannot be a court. It  is  not  seriously disputed by Mr.  Desai  who  appeared before  us for the respondent that looking at the  functions of an Income-tax Officer it is not possible to say that  the Income-tax  Officer is a court specially after this  Court’s decision  in  Jagannath Prasad’s case(’,)  mentioned  above. His  main  contention  is that even  though  the  Income-tax Officer was not originally a court within the meaning of  s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the deeming provision in  s. 37(4) has made him a court.  Section 37(4) runs  thus :-               "Any proceeding before any authority  referred               to  in  this section shall be deemed to  be  a               judicial proceeding within the meaning of  ss.               193 and 228, and for the purposes of s. 196 of               the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." The authorities mentioned in the section are the  Income-tax Officer,  the  Appellate  Assistant  Commissioner  and   the Appellate Tribunal.  The direct effect of subsection 4 of s. 37  therefore  is  that  proceedings  before  an  Income-tax Officer "shall be deemed to be a judicial proceedings within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 and for the purposes of  s. 196 of the Indian Penal Code.  As we read the section it  at once leaps to the eye that there is no mention in this of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  In introducing  this deeming provision in 1956 (1)  [1963] Supp.  1 S.C.R. 242. (2) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 850. 720 Parliament did not think it necessary to extend the  deeming provision for the purpose of s. 195.  If Parliament intended this provision to produce the consequence that the  authori- ties  in the section should be deemed to be a  court  within the meaning of s. 195 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is reasonable to expect that Parliament would have  added the  words  "and shall be deemed to be a  court  within  the meaning of s. 195 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure", or "shall  be deemed to be a court for the purpose of s.195  of the Code of Criminal Procedure" or some similar Phraseology. The  omission  to  use  any  such  words  is  all  the  more remarkable  when we notice that on several occasions  before 1956  Parliament  had  in expressing  an  intention  that  a particular authority should be a court for the purpose of s. 195 added express words to give effect to that intention. Thus,  in  the Payment of Wages Act, which  was  enacted  in 1936,  s.  18 after stating that every  authority  appointed under  sub-s.  (1) of s. 15 shall have all the powers  of  a civil  court under the Code of Civil Procedure  for  certain purposes, proceeded to say that "every such authority  shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of s. 195 and Chapter  XXXV  of  the Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  1898." Again,  in  s. 23 of the Workmen’s  Compensation  Act  which confers  on the Commissioner for workmen’s Compensation  all

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the  powers  of  a  civil court  under  the  Code  of  Civil Procedure, 1908 the legislature added in 1929 the  following words:-"and  the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a  civil court  for  all the purposes of s. 195 and of  Chapter  XXXV of,the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure, 1898".   It  is  worth noticing  also  that in several  other  statutes  parliament after  stating that certain proceeding shall be  a  judicial proceeding  within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228  of  the Indian Penal Code proceeded to say that for certain purposes it shall also be deemed to be a court.  The Evacuee property Act of 1950 after stating that the enquiry by the  custodian shall  be  deemed  to be a judicial  proceeding  within  the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code,  goes on  to say "and the Custodian shall be deemed to be a  court within  the  meaning  of  ss. 480 and 482  of  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure, 1898".  Another instance of similar 721 legislation is to be found in s. 17 of the Evacuee  Interest (Separation)  Act,  195  1, which  after  stating  that  any proceeding  before  the competent officer or  the  appellate officer  shall be judicial proceeding within the meaning  of s.  193  and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code adds  "and  the competent  Officer or the appellate officer shall be  deemed to be a civil court within the meaning of s. 480 and s.  482 of  the  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898".   The  Displaced Persons’  (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act,  1954  uses exactly similar words in s. 26.  That section first  confers on every officer appointed under the Act the same powers  in respect  of certain specified matter,-, for the  purpose  of making  any enquiry or hearing any appeal under the  Act  as are  vested  in  a  Civil court  under  the  Code  of  Civil Procedure and then proceeds thus "any proceeding before  any such  officer  shall be deemed to be a  judicial  proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian  Penal Code  and every such Officer shall be deemed to be  a  civil court  within the meaning of s. 480 and 482 of the  Code  of Criminal   Procedure,  1898."  Similarly,   the   Industrial Disputes  Act,  1947 after providing in sub-section  (3)  of section  11 that every enquiry or investigation by a  Board, Court,  Labour Court.  Tribunal or National Tribunal,  shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning  of s.  193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code adds  in  sub-s. (8)  of  the same section the provision that  "every  Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil  court  for the purposes of s. 480 and s. 482  of  the Code  of  Criminal Procedure, 1892."  This  sub-section  was added in 1950. In  clear contrast with these are the statutes  which  after saying that certain proceedings shall be judicial proceeding refrain from adding that the authority will be deemed to  be a court.  One such statute is the Sea Customs Act, which  in s.  171A(4) lays down that every enquiry under that  section shall  be  deemed  to be a judicial  proceeding  within  the meaning  of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal  Code  and stops  there.   A  somewhat  similar  provision,  though  in different  phraseology, appears in s. 51 of the  Administra- tor-General’s  Act,  (111 of 1913) which  runs  thus:134-159 S.C.-46 722               "Whoever, during any examination authorised by               this Act, makes upon oath a statement which is               false and which he either knows or believes to               be false or does not believe to be true, shall               be  deemed to have intentionally  given  false               evidence in a stage of a judicial proceeding."

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The  learned  Solicitor-General, who appealed before  us  on behalf  of the appellant, strongly urged that if the  inten- tion  of the legislature had ever been that  the  Income-tax Officer  or other authorities mentioned in s. 37  should  be deemed  to be a court for the purpose of s. 195 of the  Code of  Criminal Procedure it would have taken care  to  express that  intention in clear phraseology.  In any  case,  argues learned counsel, when in 1956 the old section 37 was  wholly recast  the Parliament which at least then had before  it  a well  established  pattern  of  legislative  forms  in   the numerous   statutes  mentioned  above.  for  expressing   an intention  that an authority shall be deemed to be  a  court for the purpose of s. 195 or any other provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there could be no conceivable  reason for  the  failure to follow that pattern.  In  our  opinion, there is considerable force in this argument. On  behalf of the accused-respondent Mr. Desai suggets  that the  words actually used, viz., "that proceeding before  the authority shall be a judicial proceeding within the  meaning of  s.  193  and s. 228 of the Indian Penal  Code"  were  by themselves  sufficient to give effect to an  intention  that authority  shall  also be deemed to be a  court  within  the meaning  of  s.  195  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure According  to  the learned Counsel,  a  judicial  proceeding with. in the meaning of s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code  can only be before a court.  For this proposition we can find no support either in principle or authority.  It seems clear to us on the contrary ;that proceedings before tribunals  which are quasi judicial and not a court may well be considered to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of s. 193 of  the Indian  Penal Code.  Though the words "judicial  proceeding" have been used in numerous sections of the Indian 723 Penal  Code, it has not defined the words, though the  words court of justice" as also the words "a judge" have been  de- fined.   The  Code of Criminal Procedure in which  also  the phrase "judicial proceeding" occurs in several sections  has ,defined  it in s. 4(m) thus: "Judicial proceeding  includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may  be legally  taken on oath".  This definition of  judicial  pro- ceeding  was  included in the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure, 1898, from the very beginning.  The fact that for all  these years since 1898 Parliament has not thought fit to give  any definition of the words "judicial proceeding" in the  Indian Penal Code is some justification for thinking that the words "judicial  proceeding" in the Indian Penal Code may  reason- ably  be  held to have the same meaning as in  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure.  In other words, it would be  reasonable to  think  that  in  the Indian Penal  Code  also  the  word "judicial  proceeding"  has been used to include  "any  pro- ceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken  on oath." That would bring within the meaning of  the words   "judicial  proceeding  before  many   quasi-judicial authorities  which are not courts, e.g., a ,Customs  Officer or a Sales Tax Officer. It  is  unnecessary for our present purpose  to  attempt  an exact definition of the words "judicial proceeding" as  used in s. 193 or in any other section of the Indian Penal  Code. Even  without any such definition however it  appears  clear that  the  phrase "judicial proceeding’ is  wide  enough  to include  not only proceedings before courts but  proceedings before  certain other tribunals.  It is pertinent  to  point out that if a proceeding before any other authority except a court could not be a judicial proceeding within the  meaning of  s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code, it would not have  been

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-necessary for Parliament in the Evacuee Property Act, 1950, in  the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1950, and in  the Displaced  Persons’ (Compensation and  Rehabilitation)  Act, 1954, to add, after laying down that the proceedings  before certain authorities shall be judicial proceedings within the meaning  of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal  Code  the further words, that "the authority shall be, deemed to be  a civil court" for certain purposes of the Code of Criminal 724 Procedure.   It  is especially interesting to note  in  this connection  the provisions of s. 11(3) and s. 11(8)  of  the Industrial  Disputes Act to which we have already  referred. Under  s.  11(3)  as originally  enacted  every  enquiry  or investigation by a Board, Court or Tribunal shall be  deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s.  228 of the Indian Penal Code.  When Parliament added  to this section sub-section (8) what was enacted was that every tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purpose of s. 480 and s. 482, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.   After the  amendment by the Act 36 of 1956 the concluding  portion of s. 11 (3) ran thus :-"Every enquiry or investigation by a Board,  Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or  National  Tribunal shall  be  deemed  to be a judicial  proceeding  within  the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code."  The same  Act  substituted  in s. 8  the  words  "Labour  Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal" for the words "Tribunal".  In spite   of   the  fact  however  that   every   enquiry   or investigation  by a Board has to be deemed to be a  judicial proceeding  within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228  of  the Indian  Penal Code Parliament refrained from saying  that  a Board  shall  also  be deemed to be a civil  court  for  the purpose  of  s.  480  and s. 482 of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure.   This emphasises the fact that  the  legislature did not think that the necessary effect of legislating  that a  proceeding  before an authority shall be deemed to  be  a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s.  228 of the Indian Penal Code would be that authority shall  also be deemed to be a court.  To say now that the legislature in providing  in s. 37(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act  that  a proceeding before the specified authorities shall be  deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s.  228 of the Indian Penal Code, intended also to say  that such  authority  shall be deemed to be a  court  within  the meaning of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be to impute to the legislature an intention of which it itself had no knowledge. Learned  counsel  for the accused-respondent then  drew  our attention  to the use of the words "judicial proceeding"  in s. 476 and s. 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure                             725 and  argued that in these sections the words "judicial  pro- ceeding"  have  been used as equivalent to proceeding  in  a court.   That may well be so.  Section 476 lays down  proce- dure in cases mentioned in s. 195(1)(b) and (c) of  offences that  appear to have been committed in or in relation  to  a proceeding  in a court.  It was quite correct  therefore  to refer  to such proceeding in a later part of the section  as judicial  proceeding.  Section 479A lays down the  procedure in  certain  cases of offences of giving false  evidence  in civil, revenue or criminal courts and necessarily speaks  of the  proceeding before those courts as judicial  proceeding. It  is difficult to see how the use of the  words  "judicial proceeding"  in these sections support the  contention  that "judicial  proceeding"  can only be a  proceeding  before  a court.  There can be no doubt that every proceeding before a

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court  is  a  "judicial proceeding".   It  does  not  follow however  that  every  judicial proceeding  is  a  proceeding before a court. Mr.  Desai drew a grim picture of what would happen  if  the authority  a  proceeding  before which was deemed  to  be  a judicial  proceeding  within the meaning of s.  228  of  the Indian  Penal  Code was not at the same  time  considered  a court  within the meaning of s. 195.  He rightly points  out that  one consequence will be that if any person offers  any insult or causes any obstruction to a public servant when he is sitting in any such judicial proceeding and thus  commits an offence under s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code it will  be possible  for  persons  other than the  public  servants  to institute a criminal case for such offence.  This, says  the learned counsel, would be a very undesirable thing.  We fail to see why this should be considered to be undesirable.  But assuming this is so, that is not to our mind a consideration which   should  compel  us  to  give  the  words   "judicial proceeding" a meaning which they do not bear. It  may be mentioned here, as already stated, that under  s. 171A(4) of the Sea Customs Act, 1874, every enquiry before a Custom Officer "shall be deemed to be a judicial  proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the 726 Indian  Penal  Code".  In spite of  this,  the  Constitution Bench  of  this Court held in its recent decision  in  Indo- China   Steam  Navigation,  Co.   Ltd.  v.  The   Additional Collector of customs(1) that a Customs Officer is not even a Tribunal.   After  discussig several previous  decisions  of this  Court  Gajendragadkar  C.J., speaking  for  the  Court observed thus:-               "The result therefore is that it is no  longer               open to doubt that the Customs Officer is  not               a court’ or tribunal." It  is  difficult to see how if the presence  of  the  words "shall  be  deemed to be a judicial  proceeding  within  the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code" in s. 171A(4)  have not the effect of making a Customs  Officer  a court  or  a tribunal, the presence of similar words  in  s. 37(4) in the Indian Income-tax Act, can have that effect. In our opinion, the words used in s. 37(4) of the Income-tax Act  furnish no reason to alter the legal position  that  is inescapable  on  a  consideration of the  functions  of  the Income-tax Officer that he is not a court within the meaning of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We  would  therefore allow the appeal, set aside  the  order passed  by  the High Court and direct  that  the  Presidency Magistrate,  Bombay,  should  now dispose  of  the  case  in accordance with law.                            ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority, this  appeal fails and is dismissed. (1)  [1964] 6 S.C.R. 594,  727