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PETITIONER: LAKSHMI RATTAN ENGINEERING WORKS LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ASSTT.  COMMR.  SALES TAX, KANPUR & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/09/1967

BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1968 AIR  488            1968 SCR  (1) 505  CITATOR INFO :  R          1970 SC1093  (10)  F          1970 SC1384  (4)  D          1972 SC 401  (4,5)  RF         1979 SC1725  (40)  R          1992 SC2277  (39,41)

ACT: U.P.  Sales-Tax  Act (U.P. 15 of 1948)  S.  9-Memorandum  of appeal-Challan  showing  deposit of tax,  if  necessary-U.P. Salestax  Rules, 1948, r. 66(2)-Constitution of India,  Art. 136-Special leave to appeal-Other remedies not  exhausted-If can be given.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant-assessee filed a memorandum of appeal to  the Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, stating therein that  the amount  of  admitted  tax had been paid  and  forfeited  the statement by an affidavit.  Before the hearing, he  produced a  certificate from the Sales-Tax Officer that the  tax  had been  paid.   The  Assistant  Commissioner  relying  on  the Allahabad High Court’s decision in Swastika Tannery,  Jaimau v. Commissioner of Sales-tax, U.P. rejected as defective the memorandum of appeal, holding that it was not accompanied by the  challan showing the deposit of admitted tax under s.  9 of  the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948 and r. 66  of  the U.P.  Sales-tax  Rules.   Against this  order  the  assessee directly filed special leave to appeal to this Court without exhausting  the remedies of revision and reference  provided in the Act.  This Court granted Special Leave and; HELD:The appeal must be allowed. (i) By the word "entertain" in-the proviso to s. 9 is  meant the first occasion on which the Court take up the matter for consideration.   It may be at the admission stage or  if  by the  rules of that Tribunal, the appeals  are  automatically admitted, it will be the time of hearing of the appeal.  But on the first occasion when the court takes up the matter for consideration, satisfactory proof must be presented that the tax  was paid within the period of limitation available  for the appeal.  Rule 66(2) lays down one uncontestable mode  of proof  which  the Court will always accept but it  does  not exclude   the   operation  of  the  proviso   when   equally

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satisfactory proof is made available to the officer  hearing the  appeal  and it is proved to his satisfaction  that  the payment of the tax has been duly made and in time.  [512E-F; 513E-G] In  the present case, when the Assistant  Commissioner  took tip  the  appeal for consideration, satisfactory  proof  was available in the shape of a certificate. Swastika  Tannery  of Jaimau v. Commissioner  of  Sales-tax, U.P. Lucknow, (1963) 14 S.T.C. 518, disapproved. Kundan Lal v. Jagannath Sharma, A.I.R. 1962 All. 547;  Dhoom Chand  Jain v. Chaman Lal Gupta and Anr.  A.I.R.  1962  All. 42:  Haji Rahim Bux & Sons & Ors. v. Firm Samiullah &  Sons, A.I.R. 1963 All. 320, approved. (ii)  Though this Court would not ordinarily  grant  special leave  to appeal against an order when other  remedies  were available and had not been exhausted, there is no inflexible rule  that this Court will never entertain such  an  appeal. It  would have been futile in this case for the assessee  to have  gone to the court of revision which was bound  by  the decision  in  Swastika Tannery of Jaimau  v.Commissioner  of Sales-tax, U.P. and it would have been equally 506 futile to have gone to -the High Court on a reference.   The matter  was more easily disposed of by giving special  leave in this Court and this was one of those extra-ordinary cases in  which  the ends of justice would be  better  served,  by avoiding  a  circuity  of action and by  dealing  with  this matter in this Court directly. [513H-514C]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1283 of 1967. Appeal  by  special leave from the Order  dated  April  2/3, 1967,  of the Court of Assistant Commissioner (Judicial)  1, Sales  Tax,  Kanpur Range, Kanpur in Appeal  No.  D.F.78  of 1966. J.   P.  Goyal and Sobhag Mal Jain, for the appellant. O.   P. Rana, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, J. This is an appeal by special leave  against an  order  2/3 April, 1967, of  the  Assistant  Commissioner (Judicial)  1, Sales Tax, Kanpur Range, Kanpur by which  the Assistant Commissioner rejected as defective the  memorandum of  appeal  filed  by  the  present  appellant  against  the assessment  order  passed  by the Sales  Tax  Officer  (S-1) Kanpur.    The   defect,   according   to   the    Assistant Commissioner,  was that the memorandum of appeal (which  had been  filed  well within time) was not  accompanied  by  the challan  showing the deposit of admitted tax under s.  9  of the  Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948.  The  appellant  did not file an application for revision and did not also invite a  reference to the High Court of Allahabad but came  direct to  this Court by special leave which was granted by  us  on August 23, 1967.  At the first hearing of the petition,  the State of Uttar Pradesh represented by Mr. O.P. Rana objected to  the  grant  of  special  leave  inasmuch  as  the  other provisions  under which remedy could be obtained  under  the Sales-tax Act had been bypassed.  At that time, we overruled the  objection and in the course of this judgment, we  shall briefly  indicate the reasons which had then prevailed  with us. The  facts  of the case are as follows:  The  appellant  had declared his turnover for the year 1964-65 at Rs. 3,70,941.7 P.  on  which  the admitted tax under the Act  came  to  Rs.

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11,135,58p.   The Sales-tax authorities,  however,  assessed his turnover at Rs. 30 lakhs on which tax was calculated  at Rs.   90.000.  The  appellant  appealed  to  the   Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) 1, Sales-tax, Kanpur Range,  Kanpur. His  appeal  was  filed  on  May  16,  1966,  the  order  of assessment  and the demand notice having been served on  him on  April 16, 1966.  The appeal was therefore  filed  within time.  Section 9 of the Act provides that no appeal  against an ,assessment shall be entertained unless it is accompanied by  satisfactory proof of the payment of the amount  of  tax admitted  by the appellant to be due or of such  instalments thereof  as may have become payable.  As is stated  earlier, the admitted tax came to 507 Rs.  11,135.58  P.  The appellant was  required  under  this provisions of law to give satisfactory proof, at the time of the  entertainment  of the appeal, that this  tax  was  duly paid.   It  appears that the appellant had  paid  a  greater portion of the tax even before the assessment order had been made,  and a balance of Rs. 99.99 P. was due from  him  from the  amount of admitted tax.  This amount was  deposited  on April  26, 1966 before the appeal was filed by him.  He  did not however present any proof of such deposit, because there is  a  dispute in the case whether the  assessee  bad  shown proof  of it to the mumarim or not.  As the finding is  that he had not shown it we shall proceed on the assumption  that the  assessee  had not furnished proof at the  time  of  the filing of the appeal that the balance of tax had been  paid, It is on this premise that the present appeal has  proceeded before  us.   On August 16, 1966 the  assessee  addressed  a letter to the Sales-tax Officer and asked for a  certificate of payment of tax and this certificate having been furnished he  filed  it  on  January 24,  1967  before  the  Assistant Commissioner.   He  also, as a matter of  abundant  caution, filed an application for condonation of delay under s.  9(6) of the Act read with s. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act.  The order  against  which the present appeal  has  been  brought before us was made on 2/3 April, 1967 and the appeal of  the assessee  was  rejected,.  because in  the  opinion  of  the Assistant  Commissioner s. 9 of the Act read with  r.  66(2) had  not  been complied with since no proof had  been  given along  with the memorandum of appeal that the tax  had  been paid.   Simultaneously, the application for  condonation  of delay  was also dismissed.  Against this order the  assessee has filed the present appeal. The  short question in this case is whether having made  the deposit even before the appeal was filed and well within the period of limitation, the assessee could be deprived of  his right of appeal under s. 9 of the Act.  Alternatively, it is to  be  considered whether the proof of the payment  of  the admitted  tax had to accompany the memorandum of  appeal  as required  by r. 66(2) and on failure to furnish such  proof, the  appeal  itself became incompetent.  In support  of  his order the Assistant Commissioner relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Swastika Tannery of  Jaimau v. Commissioner- of Sales-tax, U.P. Lucknow(1) in which  the learned  Chief  Justice of that Court  and  another  learned Judge  have laid down that the proof of payment must  be  as required  by  the rules and, therefore.  the  memorandum  of appeal  ouaht  to  be accompanied  by  the  Challan  showing payment  of  tax  before  the  appeal  can  be  said  to  be competent.  We shall refer to that ruling presently. in this appeal, learned counsel for the assessee has  relied upon  a  number of authorities in which  the  interpretation runs

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(1)  (1963) 14 S.T.C. 518. 508 counter  to the decision of the learned Chief  Justice  just adverted to and had contended that s. 9 of the Act does  not create   the  bar  which  the  ruling  and   the   Assistant Commissioner’s  reliance on that ruling has created  in  the way of the appeal.  His contention is   that if satisfactory proof is given before the appeal is heard or at   any   rate before it is admitted, the requirement of law under s. 9  is satisfied and that it is not always incumbent to produce a challan   with   the   memorandum  of   appeal,   r.   66(2) notwithstanding.   It is this point which has given rise  to the great controversy before us and the matter was argued at great length both at the time of grant of special leave  and today. To consider the matter, we may begin by quoting s. 9 of  the Act.  Section 9 which gives the power of appeal provides  as follows:               (1) Any dealer objecting to an order  allowing               ’or  refusing  an  application  for  exemption               certificate  under cl. (b) of sub-section  (1)               of s. 4 or to an order refusing an application               under s. .30 or to an order imposing a penalty               under  s. 15-A or to an assessment made  under               s.  7, 7-A, 7-B, 18 or 21, may within 30  days               from  the date of service of the copy  of  the               order or notice of assessment, as the case may               be,  appeal  to  such  authority  as  may   be               prescribed;               Provided that no appeal against an  assessment               shall be entertained unless it is  accompanied               by  satisfactory proof of the payment  of  the               amount of tax admitted by the appellant to  be               due,  or  of such instalments thereof  as  may               have become payable: Under  s.  24 of the Act power has been conferred  upon  the State  ,"Government to make rules to carry out the  purposes of  the  Act and in particular, to provide for  all  matters expressly required or allowed by this Act to be  prescribed. Under  sub-s. (4) of that section, it is provided  that  all rules  made  under  the section shall be  published  in  the Gazette  and  upon  such  publication,  shall  have   effect immediately as if enacted in the Act and under the 5th  sub- section,  it is further provided that all rules  made  under the  Act  shall  be  laid  for  fourteen  days  before   the Legislature  as  soon as possible after they  are  made  and shall  be subject to such modifications as  the  Legislature may  make during the session in which ..they are  so  -laid. In  exercise of this power, the State Government has  framed the  U.P. Sales-tax Rules, 1948.  Rules 66 and 67  of  these rules  bear, among others, upon appeals.  Sub-r. 1 of r.  66 provides  for the content of the appeal by stating what  the memorandum  of appeal shall specify in relation to the  name and address of the appellant etc.  We are not concerned with it.  Sub-r. 509 2 then states that "the memorandum of appeal shall be accom- panied by......... a challan showing deposit in the Treasury of  the tax admitted by the appellant to be due or  of  such instalments  thereof as might have become payable." Rule  67 days  down how the appeals have to be presented.   Sub-r.  1 provides that the memorandum of appeal shall be presented by the appellant or his lawyer or duly authorised agent to  the Assistant   Commissioner  (Judicial)  or  may  be  sent   by registered     post    addressed    to     the     Assistant

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Commissioner,(Judicial).Sub-r-2   provides   that   if   the memorandum of appealis in order. the Assistant Commissioner, (Judicial) shall admitit and on admission. the Reader of the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) shall endorse thereon  the date of its presentation and shall register it in a book  to be  known as Register of Appeals.  The third  sub-rule  says that if the memorandum of appeal is not in order. it may  be rejected or returned after the necessary endorsement on  its back about the presentation and return to the applicant  for correction and representation within the time to be fixed by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) or be amended then and there.   Lastly  sub-r. 4 provides that on admission  of  an appeal.  the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) shall  fix  a date for hearing of the appeal and may send for the record,. if necessary. The  contention of counsel for the assessee is that  he  had fully  complied with the requirements of s. 9  although  not strictly  as  laid down in r. 66 which he  characterised  as directory.   The  contention on the other side is  that  the rule  lays  down  the only manner  of  compliance  with  the provisions  of  the Section and in support Counsel  for  the State refers to the provisions of s. 24(4) and (5) in  which it  is stated that the rules on being framed become part  of the  Statute. From this, counsel for the State  infers  that there is no other modeof compliance except the one stated in the rules and as in thiscase that mode of compliance was not followed, the appeal is rightly considered to be incompetent and  properly rejected. This in main represents the  essence of the controversy between the parties. To  begin  with it must be noticed that the  proviso  merely requires that the appeal shall not be entertained unless  it is  accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of  the amount  of  tax  admitted by the appellant  to  be  due.   A question  thus  arises  what  is the  meaning  of  the  word ’entertained’ in this context?  Does it mean that no  appeal shall  be received or filed or does it mean that  no  appeal shall   be  admitted  or  heard  and  disposed   of   unless satisfactory proof is available’  The dictionary meaning  of the  word  ’entertain’  was brought to  our  notice  by  the parties, and both sides agreed that it means either "to deal with  or admit to consideration".  We are also of  the  same opinion.  The question, therefore, is at what stage can  the appeal  be  said to be entertained for the  purpose  of  the appllication of the proviso?  Is it 510 entertained when it is tiled or is it ’entertained’ when  it is  admitted  and  the date is fixed for hearing  or  is  it finally  ’entertained’  when it is heard  and  disposed  of? Numerous  cases exist in the -law reports in which the  word ’entertained’  or  similar  cognate  expressions  have  been interpreted by the courts.  Some of them from the  Allahabad High  Court  itself have been brought to our notice  and  we shall deal with them in due course.  For the present we must say  that if the legislature intended that the word  -’file’ or  ’receive’  was to be used, there was  no  difficulty  in using  those  words.   In some of the  statutes  which  were brought  to our .notice such expressions have in  fact  been used.   For example. under Order 41. rule I of the  Code  of Civil Procedure it is stated ’that a memorandum shall not be filed  or presented unless it is accompanied etc.; in s.  17 of  the Small Causes Courts Act, the expression is  ’at  the time  of  presenting the application’.  In sec.  6  .of  the Court Fees Act, the words are ’file’ or ’shall be received’. It would appear from this that the legislature was not at  a loss  for words if it had wanted to express itself  in  such

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forceful  manner  as  is now suggested by  counsel  for  the State.   It has used the word ’e entertain’ and it  must  be accepted that it has used it advisedly.  This word has  come in  for examination in some of the cases of  -the  Allahabad High Court and we shall now refer to them. In Kundan Lal v. Jagannath Sharma(1) the Court was concerned with Order 21, rule 90, of the Code of Civil Procedure which bad  been  amended by the High Court by  changing  the  pro- visions  of  the  original Code.  The  changed  rule  is  as follows:               "Provided that no application to set aside the               sale shall be entertained:               (a)  upon  any ground which should  have  been               taken  by the applicant on or before the  date               on which the sale proclamation was drawn up:               (b) Unless the applicant deposits such  amount               not exceeding 12 1/2 " of the sum realised  by               the  sale  or furnishes such security  as  the               court  may in its discretion fix, except  when               for  reasons to be recorded it dispenses  with               the requirements of this clause........." The  word ’entertain’ is explained by a Divisional Bench  of the  Allahabad High Court as denoting the point of  time  at which  an application to set aside the sale is heard by  the court.   The expression ’entertain’, it is stated. does  not mean.  the  same thing as the filing of the  application  or admission  of the application by the court.  A similar  view was  again  taken in Dhoom Chand Jain v. Chamanlal  Gupta  & Anr.(2) in which the learned Chief (1)  A.I.R. 1962 All. 547. (2)  A.LR. 1962 AU. 543. 511 Justice Desai and Mr. Justice Dwivedi gave the same  meaning to the expression ’entertain’.  It is observed by Dwivedi J. that  the  word  ’entertain’ in its  application  bears  the meaning ’admitting to consideration’, and therefore when the court  cannot refuse to take an application which is  backed by  deposit  or  security, it cannot  refuse  judicially  to consider it.  In a single bench decision of the same  court- reported in Bawan Ram & Anr. v. Kunj Beharilal(1) one of  us (Bhargava,  J.)  bad to consider the same rule.   There  the deposit  had not been made within the period  of  limitation and  the  question  had  arisen  whether  the  court   could entertain  the application or not.  It was decided that  the application  could  not be entertained because  proviso  (b) debarred  the court from  entertaining an  objection  unless the  requirement  of  depositing the  amount  or  furnishing security  was complied with within the time prescribed.   In that case the word ’entertain’ is not interpreted but it  is held   that  the  Court  cannot  proceed  to  consider   the application  in the absence of deposit made within the  time allowed  by  law.   This case turned on the  fact  that  the deposit  was made out of time.  In yet another case  of  the Allahabad  High Court reported in Haji Rahim Bux & Sons  and Ors. v. Firm Samiullah & Sons(2) a division bench consisting of  Cheif  Justice  Desai  and  Mr.  Justice  S.  D.   Singh interpreted  the words of 0. 21, r. 90, by saying  that  the word ’entertain’ meant not"receive’ or ’accept’ but ’proceed to consider on merits’ or ’adjudicate upon’. In our opinion these cases have taken a correct view of  the word  ’entertain’ which according to dictionary  also  means ’admit  to consideration’.  It would therefore  appear  that the  direction to the court in the proviso to s. 9  is  that the  court  shall not proceed to admit to  consideration  an appeal which is not accompanied by satisfactory proof of the

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payment of the admitted tax.  This will be when the case  is taken up by the court for, the first time.  In the  decision on  which  the Assistant Commissioner  relied,  the  learned Chief Justice (Desai C.J.) holds that the words ’accompanied by’  showed  that something tangible had  to  accompany  the memorandum of appeal.  If the memorandum of appeal had to be accompanied by satisfactory proof, it had to be in the shape of  something  tangible,  because no  intangible  thing  can accompany a document like the memorandum of appeal.  In  our opinion, making ’an appeal’ the equivalent of the memorandum of  appeal  is not sound.  Even under 0. 41 of the  Code  of Civil Procedure. the expressions "appeal" and "memorandum of appeal"  are  used  to  denote  two  distinct  things.    In Wharton’s  Law Lexicon, the word "appeal" is defined as  the judicial  examination of the decisions by a hi-her Court  of the  decision  of  an inferior court.   The  appeal  is  the judicial examination; the memorandum of appeal contains  the rounds on which the judicial examination is invited. (1)  A.I.R. 1961 All. 42. (2)   A.I.R. 1963 All. 326. 512 For purposes of limitation and for purposes of the rules  of the Court it is required that a written memorandum of appeal shall   be   filed.   When  the  proviso   speaks   of   the entertainment  of the appeal, it means that the appeal  such as  was filed will not be admitted to  consideration  unless there  is satisfactory proof available of the making of  the deposit of admitted tax. Now  the complicating factor is the existence of  the  rule, and here, the divergence of submission arises on whether the rules can be regarded as mandatory or merely directory.   It is quite obvious that the section as it stands only requires that  at the time of the consideration of the appeal,  There should be satisfactory proof that the admitted tax has  been deposited.  It only says that no appeal shall be entertained unless  accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment  of the tax.  This satisfactory proof may take any form; in fact in  the present case satisfactory proof was tendered in  the shape  of a certificate from the Sales-tax Officer that  the admitted tax had been deposited and well within time.  Under section 9 and its proviso as they stand, it is quite obvious that ’entertainment’ means the point of time when the appeal is  being considered.  There was thus satisfactory proof  in the  present  case.   No  doubt,  proof  was  not   tendered following the method required by the rules but the  question is  whether  the  rules can make  the  section  narrower  by prescribing  a particular mode.  The section is general;  it provides  that the court should accept  satisfactory  proof. The  rule  requires that the memorandum of appeal  shall  be accompanied by the challan showing payment of tax.  The rule lays  down one uncontestable mode of proof which  the  Court will always accept but it does not exclude the operation  of the   proviso  when  equally  satisfactory  proof  is   made available to the officer hearing the appeal and it is proved to  his  satisfaction that the payment of the tax  has  been duly  made  and  in time.  In this sense, the  rule  can  be regarded as directory since it lays down one of those  modes which  will  be unquestioned for its  validity.   The  other modes of proof are not necessarily shut out. It  is  to  be remembered that all rules  of  procedure  are intended to advance justice and not to defeat it.  Here  the right of appeal has been made subservient to the payment  of the admitted tax.  If the admitted tax is paid and there  is proof  available that it has been so paid, there  exists  no reason  to  create  a second impediment in the  way  of  the

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appeal.   No doubt, rule makes it easy for the  assessee  to bring satisfactory proof in an uncontestable manner, but the provision  of  the  rule is not to the  exclusion  of  other satisfactory modes of proof.  Suppose for instance that  the I challan was lost and the time for the filing of the appeal was  expiring, could or could not the person  concerned  say that  he  had the certificate but had lost it  and  that  he would  produce  a copy of the challan from the  Treasury  or obtain a certificate from the 513 Treasury  Officer.   Could he not obtain from the  bank  the discharged  cheque by which the amount of  tax           was deposited   by  him  and  produce  it  as   the   discharged counterfoil  of payment.  All those modes of proof  will  be equally,  irrefutable.  In the -present case the,,  assessee had in his petition of appeal ’stated that the amount of tax had  been  paid  and  had fortified  the  ’Statement  by  an affidavit.   Before the hearing he produced,  a  certificate from  the.  Sales-tax Officer that the tax had,  been  paid. The   Assistant   Commissioner  ought  therefore   to   have proceeded:  with  the appeal because it was  accompanied  by satisfactory  proof  of,; the payment of the tax.   To  hold otherwise  would put a premium upon a technicality which  we do not see  will advance the case either for the -collection of  the  tax or,, for the: administration of  justice.,  The rule,  as  we have stated, indicate& what :is the  best  and easiest   method  of  achieving  satisfactory  proof.    The certificate from the Sales-tax Officer, however, is as  good proof  as  the  challan  from  the  Treasury  and  if   such certificate was produced at the admission of the appeal, how the  memorandum of appeal can be said to be defective  under the  section as it stands.  In these circumstances, we  hold that the rule is merely directory and indicates only one  of the modes of satisfactory proof. The  distinction made by the learned Chief  Justice  between the tangible and intangible objects does not in our  opinion fall  for consideration in the present case.  If  one  holds that  by ’entertainment’ is meant the time of  admission  of the appeal, satisfactory proof may be furnished at the  time of  admission of the appeal.  We are of opinion that by  the word  "entertain" here is meant the first occasion on  which the court takes up the matter for consideration.  It may  be at  the admission stage or if by the rules of that  Tribunal the appeals are automatically admitted, it will be the  time of  hearing of the appeal.  But on the first  occasion  when the   court   takes  up  the   matter   for   consideration, satisfactory  proof must be presented that the tax was  paid within  the period by limitation available for the  appeal., In the present case when the Assistant Commissioner took  up the   appeal  for  consideration,  satisfactory  proof   was available in the shape of a certificate which even today  is not  denied.  In our opinion the Assistant Commissioner  was wrong in declining to consider the appeal in the presence of such uncontestable proof. It  remains  to  point out why we did not  insist  upon  the assessee exhausting his other remedies under the Act  before coming  to  this Court.  It was made to appear  to  us  that there  is a right of revision and right of reference to  the High  Court’ in all such cases and that this remedy was  not resorted  to  by the assessee before making a  petition  for special leave in this Court.  We were taken through a number of  cases in which it has been laid down by this Court  that this Court will not ordinarily grant special leave to appeal against an order when other remedies are available and L/JN)6 SCI No-7

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514 have  not been exhausted.  But there is no  inflexible  rule that ’this Court will never entertain an appeal and numerous instances  have occurred in, this Court where  such  appeals have  been  admitted.  It would have been ,futile  in  this. case  for  the  assessee to have gone  to  the  -court-,  of revision  which  was bound by the ruling of  :the  Allahabad High,  Court  reported  in  Swastika  Tannery  of  Jaimau  v Commissioner of . Sales-tax U.P. Lucknow (1’)  and’ it would have  been equally futile to, have. gone to the High  Court; on  a reference.  The matter was more easily disposed of  by giving  special  leave in this Court and we  therefore  felt that this was one of those extraordinary cases, in which the ends  of  justice  would be better  served,  by  avoiding  a circuity  of action and by dealing with this matter in  this Court  directly.   It  is for this reason  that  we  granted special  leave  to appeal.  The appeal  shall  therefore  be allowed  and the appeal shall be remitted to  the  Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) 1, Sales Tax, Kanpur Range,  Kanpur, for  disposal  in accordance with law.  There  shall  be  no order as to costs. Y.P.                    Appeal allowed and remitted. (1) (1963) 14 S.T.C. 518. 515