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PETITIONER: LAKSHMI NARAIN AGARWAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, U.P. & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/09/1967

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. SHAH, J.C. SHELAT, J.M.

CITATION:  1968 AIR  410            1968 SCR  (1) 635

ACT: Motor  Vehicles Act (4 of 1939), ss. 47(3) and  64A-Regional Transport  Authority if should consider  representations  of existing operator before passing order under s.  47(3)-Order under s. 47(3) if revisable under s. 64A. Constitution of India, 1950, Art, 136--Discretion under.

HEADNOTE: The Regional Transport Authority, by an order under s. 47(3) of  the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, fixed the number of  stage carriages, by increasing their number on a particular route. The  appellant,  an  existing  operator,  filed  a  revision against  that order to the State Transport Authority,  under s.  64A,  but  the State Transport  Authority  held  that  a revision  did  not  lie.  The appellant then  filed  a  writ petition in the High Court and the High Court dismissed  it, holding  that:  (1)  at  the stage  of  s.  47(3),  existing operators  were  not entitled to be heard  by  the  Regional Transport Authority, and (2) since the order of the Regional Transport Authority was good on merits, it was not necessary to  decide  whether a revision lay to  the  State  Transport Authority. In appeal to this Court, HELD:     (1)  Unlike  s.  47(1),  s.  47(3)  does  not  say expressly  that  representations could be made  by  existing operators and others.  The expression in s. 47(3) that  ’the Regional  Transport  Authority  may, having  regard  to  the matters  mentioned  in  sub-s. (1)’,  only  means  that  the Authority shall have regard to the matters mentioned in sub- cls. (a) to (f) of s. 47(1) and has nothing to do the  right of making representations. [638F-H] (2)  But whether or not an existing operator has an  implied right to be heard before an order under s. 47(3) is made  he can  be  aggrieved  by  an order  made  under  that  section increasing  or  decreasing  the number  of  stage  carriages depending  on  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  and   has therefore  a  right  of  revision under  s.  64A,  the  only condition  for  filing a revision being that  it  should  be against  an order made by the Regional  Transport  Authority against which no appeal lies. [639C-D, F-H] Abdul Mateen v. Ram Kailash Pandey, [1963] 3 S.C.R. 523, re-

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ferred to. (3)  Since  a revision could be filed under s.  64A  against the  order  under s. 47(3) the aggrieved operator  need  not approach  the Regional Transport Authority first  to  review its order. [640B-C] (4)  The High Court should have directed the State Transport Authority  to  dispose of on merits  the  revision  petition against  the  order under s. 47(3), and not  gone  into  its merits  itself, but, in view of the time that  lapsed  since the  order was passed (five years, during which  the  demand for  stage carriages must have increased), this Court  would not interfere in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 136. [640C-E] 636

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 636 of 1967. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment all  order  dated November 11. 1966 of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench in Writ Petition No. 226 of 1963. S.   T.  Desai,  J.  P.  Goyal, D. N.  Jha  and  G.  S.  the appellant. Sarjoo Prashad and O. P. Rana, for the respondents. Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri,  J. This appeal by special leave is directed  against the judgment, dated November 11, 1966, of the Division Bench of  tile Allahabad High Court dismissing the  writ  petition filed  by tile appellant seeking to quash tile order of  the State  Transport  Authority. dated March 20/21.  1963.   The State  Transport  Authority had by this order  rejected  the appellant’s  revision petition against the decision  of  the Regional  Transport  Authority oil the ground  that  a  mere decision  of the Regional Transport Authority  limiting  the number  of  stage  carriages under S.  47(3)  of  the  Motor Vehicles  Act, 1939 (IV of 1939) hereinafter referred to  as the  Act  could not form the subject matter  of  a  revision application’.   It was of the view that "when  the  Regional Transport  Authority  actually  proceeds  to  fill  Lip  the vacancies, which it has decided to create, then the  persons whose  interests would be adversely affected, would  have  a right  of  representation  before  the  Regional   Transport Authority,  and  in the case of their  representation  being rejected by the Regional Transport Authority the will have a right of appeal before the State Transport Appellate Tribunal." The High Court was of the view that an existing operator had no  say in the matter of determination of the strength on  a route  under  sub-s.  (3)  of s. 47,  and,  it  was  in  the discretion of the Regional Transport Authority to  determine the  strength on a route, after considering various  matters enumerated in cls. (a) to (f) of  sub-s. (1) of S. 47.   The High  Court further observed that is the order passed  under S. 47(3), to revise which the appellant had  filed         a revision  tinder s. 64-A, was a good order and did not  call for  any interference, it did not consider it  necessary  to decide whether a revision lay against such an order under s. 64-A of the Act. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. S. T. Desai, con- tends that an order under S. 47(3) of the Act, whether it is quasijudicial  or administrative, does affect  the  existing operators  on  the route and their representations  must  be considered  by  the  Regional  Transport  Authority   before passing an order tinder s. 47(3). He further submits that  a

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revision  lay under S. 64-A of the Act and the  same  should not have been dismissed on the ground that no revision lay. 637 The relevant statutory provisions are s. 47 and s. 64-A,  of the Act, and read thus;               "47.    Procedure   of   Regional    Transport               Authority in considering application for stage               carriage permit:-               (1)   A  Regional Transport Authority  shall,               in  considering  an application  for  a  stage               carriage permit, have regard to the  following               matters, namely:---               (a)   the interests of the public generally’,               (b)   the advantages to the public of the set-               vice  to be provided, including the saving  of               time  likely  to be effected thereby  and  any               convenience  arising from journeys  not  being               broken;               (c)   the   adequacy   of   other    passenger               transport  services  operating  or  likely  to               operate in the near future, whether by road or               other means, between the places to be served;               (d)   the  benefit to any particular  locality               or  localities  likely to be afforded  by  the               service;               (e)   the operation by the applicant of  other               transport services. including those in respect               of which applications from him for permits are               pending;               (f)   the  condition of the roads included  in               the proposed route or area;               and  shall  also take into  consideration  any               representations   made  by   persons   already               providing  passengers transport facilities  by               any means along or near the proposed route  or               area.  or  by  any  association   representing               persons  interested in the provision  of  road               transport facilities recognised in this behalf               by  the  State  Government, or  by  any  local               authority  or  police authority  within  whose               jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or               area lies:               Provided that other conditions being equal, an               application for a stage carriage permit from a               co-operative  society registered or deemed  to               have  been registered under any  enactment  in               force for the time being shall, as far as  may               be, be given preference over applications from               individual owners.               (2)   A  Regional  Transport  Authority  shall               refuse to grant a stage carriage permit if  it               appears from any time table furnished that the               provisions  of this Act relating to the  speed               at which vehicles may be driven are likely  to               be contravened:               638               provided   that   before   such   refusal   an               opportunity shall be given to the applicant to               amend  the time table so as to conform to  the               said provisions.               (3)   A  Regional  Transport  Authority   may,               having  regard  to the matters,  mentioned  in               sub-section  (1),  limit the number  of  stage               carriages  generally or of any specified  type               for  which  stage  carriage  permits  may   be

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             granted in the region or in any specified area               or on any specified route within the region."               "64-A.     Revision---The   State    Transport               Authority may, either on its own motion or  on               an application made to it, call for the record               of any case in which an order has been made by               a Regional Transport Authority and in which no               appeal  lies, and if it appears to  the  State               Transport Authority that the order made by the               Regional  Transport Authority is  improper  or               illegal,  the  State Transport  Authority  may               pass such order in relation to the case as  it               deems fit:               Provided  that the State  Transport  Authority               shall  not  entertain any application  from  a               person  aggrieved  by an order of  a  Regional               Transport Authority, unless the application is               made  within thirty days from the date of  the               order:               Provided  further  that  the  State  Transport               Authority  shall not pass an order under  this               section  prejudicial  to  any  person  without               giving  him a reasonable opportunity of  being               heard." It  would  be  noticed that sub-s. (3) of  s.  47  does  not expressly  say  whether any representations can be  made  by persons   already  providing  transport  facilities  or   by associations   representing   persons  interested   in   the provision  of  the  transport facilities  or  by  any  local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction  the route  or  area  lies.  This is expressly  mentioned  in  s. 47(1).   The  learned counsel contends that  the  expression "matters  mentioned in sub-section (1)" occurring in  sub-s. (3)  refers back not only to matters mentioned  in  sub-cls. (a)  to  (f) to sub-s. (1) in S. 47 but also  the  right  of representation  mentioned in sub-s. (1).  We are  unable  to accept this line of reasoning as being sound.  Even under s. 47(1), the Regional Transport Authority can only have regard to  the matters mentioned in sub-cls. (a) to (f), and  those matters  may  be  brought  to the  notice  of  the  Regional Transport  Authority by representations.  It could not  have been  the  intention  that  representations  would   contain matters  which  the Regional Transport Authority  could  not take into consideration under s. 47(1).  This is not to  say that the matters mentioned in 639      sub-cls. (a) to (f) are exhaustive, but this point does not  arise  and  we  need  not  say  anything  as  to  this. Therefore,  this  line  of reasoning  does  not  assist  the appellant. This  Court  in Abdul Mateen v. Ram Kailash  Pandey(1)  held that  "where  a limit has been fixed under s. 47(3)  by  the Regional  Transport  Authority,  and  thereafter  the   said authority  proceeds  to consider  applications  for  permits under  s.  48  read  with  s.  57,  the  Regional  Transport Authority must confine the number of permits issued by it to those  limits and on an appeal or revision by  an  aggrieved person, the Appellate Authority or the Revisional  Authority must equally be confined to the issue of permits within  the limits  fixed under s. 47(3)".  But this Court did not  feel it  necessary to decide whether under s. 64-A,  inserted  by Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act No. 100 of 1956, it was  open to  the  State Transport Authority to vary a  general  order passed under s. 47(3).  If we look at the section, it  would be  noticed  that s. 64-A is very wide in  terms;  the  only

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condition necessary for filing a revision is that it  should be against an order made by the Regional Transport Authority and against which no appeal lies.  The word "order" is wide, and  there is no doubt that an order made under s. 47(3)  is an  order within s. 64-A because, as held by this  Court  in Abdul Mateen v. Ram Kailash Pandey (1) it binds the Regional Transport  Authority  and the State Transport  Authority  in dealing  with applications under s. 48. read with s. 57,  of the Act. Mr.  Sarjoo Prasad, the learned counsel for the State,  con- tends  that no revision lies at the instance of an  existing operator  because he cannot be called an  aggrieved  person, and secondly, that even if a revision lies, the appellant is not entitled to any relief on the facts of this case,  under Art.  136 of the Constitution, because the  appellant  never approached  the  Regional Transport Authority in  the  first instance.   We are unable to say that no  existing  operator can be aggrieved by an order made under s. 47(3), increasing or decreasing the number of stage carriages; it would depend on  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.   In   a particular case it may be to his advantage and he then would not  file a revision against it, but if he files a  revision when an order  made  under  s. 47(3) is prejudicial  to  his interests,  there is no ground for denying him the right  to approach the revisional authority and seeking its order.  An order  under s. 47(3) affects the future working on a  route and  we  are  of  the view that such  an  order  would  have repercussion  on  the  working of  the  existing  operators, whether  for their good or not.  The High Court,  as  stated above,  was  of  the  view that at the  stage  of  s.  47(3) existing operators would- not be entitled to be heard by the Regional (1) [1963] 3 S.C.R. 523. 640 Transport  Authority. But assuming that it is so, this  does no  affect the right of revision conferred by s.  64-A.   We need  not  in this case decide whether it  is  implied  that existing  operators  would be entitled to be  heard  by  the Regional Transport Authority before an order under s.  47(3) is made. The learned counsel for the respondent further contends that a decision under s. 47(3) is a tentative decision and can be revised.   But  assuming  that  it can  be  revised  by  the Regional Transport Authority, till the order is in operation it  is binding on everybody and if a revision can  be  filed against  the  order under s. 64-A,  the  aggrieved  operator cannot  be  compelled  to approach  the  Regional  Transport Authority  first to revise its order.  ’This argument, in  a way, concedes that an operator can be a person aggrieved  by an order under s. 47(3). The learned counsel for the appellant contends that if it is held  that  a revision lies under s. 64-A against  an  order passed  under  s.  47(3) of the  Act,  the  State  Transport Authority should be directed to hear the revision on merits. He  says  that the High Court had no right to  go  into  the merits  of  the  order itself.  Ordinarily  what  Mr.  Desai contends  is correct, but here the facts are that the  order under s. 47(3) was passed as long ago as November. 17. 1962. During  the  last five years demand for stage  carriages  on this route would have, in the ordinary course, increased  by now. and  further  it has not been shown that  the  Regional Transport Authority has made any glaring mistake. For  the  aforesaid reasons. in  exercising  our  discretion under  Art.  136  of the Constitution we  consider  that  we should  not  interfere  with the order passed  by  the  High

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Court.  In  the result the appeal fails  and  is  dismissed. Under the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. V.P.S.                                   Appeal dismissed. 641