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PETITIONER: LACHMAN SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KIRPA SINGH & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/04/1987

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) SINGH, K.N. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 1616            1987 SCR  (2) 933  1987 SCC  (2) 547        JT 1987 (2)   175  1987 SCALE  (1)808

ACT:     Hindu  Succession  Act, 1956--ss.  3(j)  &  15(1)--Hindu female-Dying  intestate--Whether her ’step-son’ entitled  to claim share in her property simultaneously with her ’son’. Words & Phrases-- ’Son--’Step-son’--Meaning of.

HEADNOTE:     Battan Singh had two wives, namely, Mahan Kaur and  Khem Kaur. Mahan Kaur died during his lifetime after giving birth to  two sons, Lachman Singh (petitioner) and  Gurdas  Singh. Gurdas  Singh pre-deceased Battan Singh leaving  behind  his widow Gurbax Kaur and his son Amarjit Singh. Respondent  No. 1, Kirpa Singh is the son of the Battan Singh and Khem Kaur. Battan Singh died intestate after the Hindu Succession  Act, 1956 came into force and his property devolved on his  heirs including  his  second wife Khem Kaur. On her  death,  Kirpa Singh claimed her entire property on the ground that he  was her  only son. Lachman Singh, Amarjit Singh and Gurbax  Kaur claimed that Kirpa Singh was entitled to only 1/3rd share in the  property  of Khem Kaur, Lachman Singh was  entitled  to 1/3rd share and Amarjit Singh was entitled to the  remaining 1/3rd share.     Kirpa  Singh  filed a suit for declaration that  he  was entitled  to  the  entire property belonging  to  Khem  Kaur against  Lachman Singh, Amarjit Singh and Gurbax  Kaur.  The trial  Court decreed the suit. The appeals filed by  Lachman Singh  before the Additional District Judge and in the  High Court were dismissed. Dismissing the Special Leave Petition,     HELD:  1.  Ordinarily  laws of  succession  to  property follow the natural inclinations of men and women. [938C-D]     2. The list of heirs in s. 15(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is enumerated having regard to the current notions about the propinquity 934 or nearness of relationship. The words ’son’ and  ’step-son’ are not defined in the Act. [938C-D]     3.  Under the Act, a son of a female by her  first  mar- riage will not succeed to the estate of her ’second husband’ on his dying intestate. In the case of a woman it is natural

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that  a  step son, that is, the son of her  husband  by  his another wife is a step away from the son who has come out of her own womb. But under the Act a step-son of a female dying intestate  is  an  heir and that is so  because  the  family headed by a male is considered as a social unit. If a  step- son does not fail within the scope of the expression  ’sons’ in cl. (a) of s. 15(1) of the Act, he is sure to fail  under cl. (b) thereof being an heir of the husband. [938D-F]     4.  The  word ’sons’ in cl. (a) of s. 15(1) of  the  Act includes: (i) sons born out of the womb of a female by  same husband or by different husbands including illegitimate sons too in view of s. 3(j) of the Act, and (ii) adopted sons who are deemed to be sons for purposes of inheritance. [938F-G]     5.  Under the Hindu law as it stood prior to the  coming into force of the Act, a step-son, i.e. a son of the husband of  a female by another wife did not simultaneously  succeed to  the stridhana of the female on her dying  intestate.  In that  case the the son born out of her womb  had  precedence over  a step-son. Parliament would have made express  provi- sion  in the Act if it intended that there should be such  a radical departure from the past. [938G-H; 939A]     6.  The word ’sons’ in cl. (a) of s. 15(1) of  Act  does not  include  ’step-sons’  and that step-sons  fail  in  the category of the heirs of the husband referred to in cl.  (b) thereof. [939A-B]     Mallappa  Fakirappa Sanna Nagashetti and Others v.  Shi- vappa and another, A.I.R. 1962 Mysore 140; Rama Ananda Patii v.  Appa Bhima Redekar and Others, A.I.R. 1969  Bombay  205; Gumam  Singh v. Smt. Ass Kaur and Others, A.I.R. 1977 P &  H 103  and  Smt.  Kishori Bala Mondal v.  Tribhanga  Mondal  & Others, A.I.R. 1980 Calcutta 334 approved.     Ram  Katori v. Prakash Nati L.L.R., [1968]  1  Allahabad 697, overruled.     7. The rule of devolution in s. 15 of the Act applies to all kinds of properties left behind by a female Hindu except those dealt with by cls. (a) and (b) of s. 15(2) which  make a distinction as regards the property 935 inherited by her from her parents and the property inherited from  her  husband or father-in-law and that  too  when  she leaves  no sons and daughters (including children of  prede- ceased sons and daughters). [941B-C]     8. When once a property becomes the absolute property of a  female  Hindu  it shall devolve  first  on  her  children (including children of the predeceased sons and daughter) as provided  in s. 15(1)(a) of the Act and then on other  heirs subject only to the limited change introduced in s. 15(2) of the  Act.  The step-sons or step-daughters will come  in  as heirs  only under cl. (b) ors. 15(1) or under cl. (b) or  s. 15(2) of the Act. [941E-F]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Special  Leave  Petition (Civil) No. 2730 of 1987.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  8.12.1986  of  the Punjab and Haryana High Court in R.S.A No. 1773 of 1986 (0 & M). K.G. Bhagat and Sunil K. Jain for the Appellants. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     VENKATARAMIAH,  J. The short question which  arises  for consideration  in this case is whether under the  provisions of  the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred  to as  ’the  Act’) a step-son of a female  dying  intestate  is

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entitled  to  claim a share in her  property  simultaneously with her son. In other words the question involved is wheth- er  the  word  ’sons’ in clause (a) of  sub-section  (1)  of section 15 of the Act includes ’step-sons’ also.     The  facts involved in this Special Leave  Petition  are thus. One Battan Singh who was also known as Badan Singh had two wives, namely, Mahan Kaur and Khem Kaur. Mahan Kaur died during his life time after giving birth to two sons  Lachman Singh (petitioner) and Gurdas Singh from the loins of Battan Singh.  Respondent  No. 1 Kirpa Singh is the son  of  Battan Singh and Khem Kaur. Gurdas Singh died during the life  time of Battan Singh leaving behind his widow Gurbux Kaur and his son Amarjit Singh. Battan Singh died intestate after the Act came  into force. On his death his property devolved on  his heirs including his second wife Khem Kaur in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Thereafter Khem Kaur died. On her death  dispute arose between her son Kirpa Singh on the  one side and Lachman Singh, Amarjit Singh and Gurbux Kaur on the other.  Kirpa Singh claimed the entire property left  behind by Khem Kaur on the ground 936 that he was the only son of Khem Kaur. Lachman Singh,  Amar- jit  Singh  and  Gurbux Kaur claimed that  Kirpa  Singh  was entitled  to  only one-third share in the property  of  Khem Kaur,  Lachman  Singh was entitled to  one-third  share  and Amarjit Singh, who was the son of Gurdas Singh, was entitled to  the remaining one-third share. Both the  parties  relied upon  clause  (a) of section 15(1) of the Act.  While  Kirpa Singh contended that the word ’sons’ in section 15(1)(a)  of the Act meant only sons born of the body of the Hindu female dying intestate the others contended that the word ’sons’ in that  clause  included stepsons also. In view of  the  above dispute  Kirpa  Singh filed a suit on the file of  the  Sub- Judge 1st Class, Nakodar in the District of Jalandhar  inter alia  for a declaration that he was entitled to  the  entire property  belonging  to  Khem Kaur  against  Lachman  Singh, Amarjit  Singh and Gurbux Kaur who contested the  suit.  The trial  court vide its judgment dated February 18,  1984  de- creed  the suit declaring that Kirpa Singh was  entitled  to the property belonging to Khem Kaur. Lachman Singh preferred an  appeal against the decree of the trial court  in  R.C.A. No.  202 of 1985 on the file of the learned Additional  Dis- trict Judge, Jalandhar. That appeal was dismissed on  Febru- ary  19,  1986. The second appeal filed by him  against  the judgment  of  the Additional District Judge,  Jalandhar,  in R.S.A.  No.  1773 of 1986 on the file of the High  Court  of Punjab & Haryana was also dismissed in limine on December 8, 1986.  Aggrieved by the judgment of the High  Court  Lachman Singh has filed this petition for special leave under  Arti- cle 136 of the Constitution of India.     Section 15 of the Act, which is relevant for purposes of this case, reads thus:               "15(1).  The property of a female Hindu  dying               intestate shall devolve according to the rules               set out in section 16--                         (a)  firstly,  upon  the  sons   and               daughters  (including  the  children  of   any               predeceased son or daughter) and the husband;               (b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;               (c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;               (d)  fourthly, upon the heirs of  the  father;               and               (e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.               937                         (2)  Notwithstanding  anything  con-

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             tained in sub-section ( 1 ),--                        (a)  any  property  inherited  by   a               female  Hindu from her father or mother  shall               devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter               of the deceased (including the children of any               predeceased  son  or daughter)  not  upon  the               other heirs referred to in sub-section (1)  in               the  order  specified therein,  but  upon  the               heirs of the father; and                        (b)  any  property  inherited  by   a               female  Hindu  from her husband  or  from  her               father-in-law shall devolve, in the absence of               any son or daughter of the deceased (including               the children of any predeceased son or  daugh-               ter)  not upon the other heirs referred to  in               sub-section (1) in the order specified  there-               in, but upon the heirs of the husband. Section  15 of the Act deals with the general rules of  suc- cession  in  the case of female Hindus. Sub-section  (1)  of section  15  provides that the property of  a  female  Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the rules set out in  section 16 of the Act firstly, upon the sons and  daugh- ters  (including  the  children of any  predeceased  son  or daughter)  and the husband; secondly, upon the heirs of  the husband; thirdly, upon the mother and father; fourthly, upon the  heirs of the father; and lastly, upon the heirs of  the mother. Sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act arises  for consideration only when a female Hindu dies intestate  leav- ing property without leaving behind her any son or  daughter (including the children of any predeceased son or  daughter) and  in  that event any property inherited by her  from  her father  or  mother shall devolve not upon  the  other  heirs referred  to in sub-section (1) of section 15 of the Act  in the order specified therein but upon the heirs of the father and  any property inherited by her from her husband or  from her  father-in-law  shall devolve not upon the  other  heirs referred  to in sub-section (1) of section 15 in  the  order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the husband, Rule 1 of  section  16 provides that among the heirs  specified  in sub-section  (1)  of section 15 those in one entry  shah  be preferred to those in the succeeding entry and those includ- ed  in the same entry shall take simultaneously. It  is  not necessary to refer to rule (2) and Rule (3) of section 16 of the Act for purposes of this ease.     The  only  question which is to be  determined  here  is whether the expression ’sons’ in clause (2) of section 15(1) of the Act includes 938 step-sons also, ie., sons of the husband of the deceased  by another  wife.  In order to decide it, it  is  necessary  to refer to some of the provisions of the Act. Section 3(j)  of the  Act defines ’related’ as related by legitimate  kinship but  the proviso thereto states that  illegitimate  children shall  be  deemed to be related to their mother and  to  one another, and their legitimate descendants shall be deemed to be  related  to them and to one another and  that  any  word expressing  relationship  or denoting a  relative  shall  be construed  accordingly. Section 6 and section 7 of  the  Act respectively deal with devolution of interest in coparcenary property  and  devolution of interest in the property  of  a tarwad, tavazhi, kutumba, kavaru and illom. Sections 8 to 13 of the Act deal with rules of succession to the property  of a male Hindu dying intestate. We are concerned in this  case with  the  rules of succession to the property of  a  female Hindu  dying  intestate. Sections 15 and 16 of the  Act  are

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material  for our purpose. Ordinarily laws of succession  to property  follow the natural inclinations of men and  women. The list of heirs in section 15(1) of the Act is  enumerated having  regard to the current notions about  propinquity  or nearness of relationship. The words ’son’ and ’stop-son’ are not  defined in the Act. According to Collins  English  Dic- tionary a ’son’ means a male offspring and ’step son’  means a son of one’s husband or wife by a former union. Under  the Act a son of a female by her first marriage will not succeed to  the estate of her ’second husband’ on his  dying  intes- tate. In the case of a woman it is natural that a step  son, that  is,  the son of her husband by his another wife  is  a step away from the son who has come out of her own womb. But under  the Act a step-son of a female dying intestate is  an heir  and that is so because the family headed by a male  is considered  as  a social unit. If a step-son does  not  fall within  the scope of the expression ’sons’ in clause (a)  of section  15(1) of the Act, he is sure to fall  under  clause (b) thereof being an heir of the husband. The word ’sons’ in clause  (a)  of section 15(1) of the Act includes  (i)  sons born  out of the womb of a female by the same husband or  by different  husbands including illegitimate sons too in  view of  section  3(j) of the Act and (ii) adopted sons  who  are deemed  to be sons for purposes of inheritance. Children  of any  predeceased  son or adopted son also  fall  within  the meaning  of  the expression ’sons’. If Parliament  had  felt that  the  word ’sons’ should include  ’step-sons’  also  it would have said so in express terms. We should remember that under  the  Hindu law as it stood prior to the  coming  into force of the Act, a step-son, i.e., a son of the husband  of a  female by another wife did not simultaneously succeed  to the stridhana of the female on her dying intestate. In  that case  the  son born out of her womb had  precedence  over  a step-son.  Parliament would have made express  provision  in the Act if it intended that there 939 should be such a redical departure from the past. We are  of the view that the word ’sons’ in clause (a) of section 15(1) of  the Act does not include ’step-sons’ and that  step-sons fall in the category of the heirs of the husband referred to in clause (b) thereof.     The  decision  of the Mysore (Karnataka) High  Court  in Mallappa  Fakirappa Sanna Nagashetti and Others v.  Shivappa and another, A.I.R. 1962 Mysore 140; takes the view which we have  expressed  above.  According to the  decision  of  the Bombay High Court in Rama Ananda Patil v. Appa Bhima Redekar and  Others, A.I.R. 1969 Bombay 205 the emphasis  in  clause (a)  of section 15(1) of the Act is on the aspect  that  the sons or the daughters are of her own body and not so much on the  husband  who was responsible for their birth  and  that therefore children of a female though by different  husbands inherit her estate simultaneously. The High Court of  Punjab and Haryana has in Gumam Singh v. Smt. Ass Kaur and  Others, A.I.R.  1977  P & H 103 following the  observations  in  the decisions of the Mysore and Bombay High Courts, referred  to above, held that the word ’sons’ in section 15(1)(a) of  the Act does not include a ’step-son’. The High Court of Calcut- ta has also taken the same view in Smt. Kishori Bala  Mondal v. Tribhanga Mondal & Others, A.I.R. 1980 Calcutta 334.     It  is  true that the Allahabad High Court has  taken  a contrary view in Ram Katori v. Prakash Wati, I.L.R. 1968 (1) Allahabad 697. In that case the facts were however  slightly different,  but the point involved was almost the same.  The facts  of the case were as follows. One Chandu Lal had  mar- ried  a woman. She died during the life time of  Chandu  Lal

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leaving  behind  her a daughter by  Ram  Katori.  Thereafter Chandu  Lal married a second woman by name Ram Kali  through whom he got a daughter by name Prakashwati. Chandu Lal  died in 1920 and on his death Ram Kali being his widow  succeeded to  his  estate as a limited owner. After  the  coming  into force  of  the Act in 1956 her limited estate  ripened  into absolute estate and she became the full owner of the  estate inherited by her from her husband. Ram Kali died thereafter. On  her death Ram Katori, the daughter of Chandu Lal by  his first wife contended that she was entitled to succeed simul- taneously  with Prakashwati to the estate of Ram Kali  which originally belonged to her father and claimed one-half share in  it. Her claim was resisted by Prakashwati  stating  that the word ’daughters’ in section 15(1)(a) of the Act did  not include  ’step-daughters’  and that Ram  Katori  would  fall under the category of the heirs of the husband and would  be entitled to succeed either under clause (b) of section 15(1) or under clause (b) of section 15(2) of the Act and that too in the absence of 940 sons and daughters of Ram kali (including children of prede- ceased  sons  and daughters). It was  further  contended  by Prakashwati that the fact that the property in question  had formerly belonged to the husband of Ram Kali did not  matter at all because Ram Kali had left behind her who was a daugh- ter  of  her  own body entitled  to  succeed  under  section 15(1)(a),  and that Ram Katori being a  step-daughter  could not claim under section 15(1)(a) of the Act. The High  Court of  Allahabad  felt  that there was  a  distinction  between clause  (a)  of  section 15(1) and clauses (a)  and  (b)  of section 15(2) of the Act in that whereas in section 15(1)(a) the  words ’sons and daughters’ were unqualified, the  words ’son  or daughter’ in clauses (a) and (b) of  section  15(2) were qualified by the words ’of the deceased’ and  therefore conclusion was irresistible that the unqualified words ’sons and daughters’ in section 15(1)(a) of the Act indicated that they  included also the children of her husband  by  another wife. The High Court also appears to have been moved by  the consideration  that the opposite construction would be  pat- ently  unfair to the children by her husband’s another  wife since they would be deprived of their share in the  property which  originally  belonged to their father.  We  feel  that neither  of  these reasons is correct. The words  ’sons  and daughters  .....  and the husband’ in clause (a) of  section 25(1) only mean ’sons and daughters ......  and the husband’ of the deceased. They cannot be ’sons and daughters   ...... and  the husband’ of any body else. All relatives  named  in the  different clauses in sub-section (1) of section  15  of the  Act  are those who are related to the deceased  in  the manner specified therein. They are sons, daughters, husband, heirs of the husband, mother and father, heirs of the father and  heirs  of the mother of the deceased. The  use  of  the words  ’of  the  deceased’ following ’son  or  daughter’  in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of section 15 of  the Act  makes no difference. The words ’son or daughter of  the deceased  (including the children of any predeceased son  or daughter)’  in clauses (a) and (b) of section 15(2)  of  the Act  refer to the entire body of heirs failing under  clause (a)  of  section 15(1) of the Act except the  husband.  What clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of section 15 of  the Act do is that they make a distinction between devolution of the  property  inherited by a female Hindu  dying  intestate from  her father or mother on the one hand and the  property inherited by her from her husband and from her father-in-law on  the other. In the absence of any son or daughter of  the

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deceased  (including the children of any predeceased son  or daughter),  in  a case failing under clause (a)  of  section 15(2) of the Act the property devolves upon the heirs of the father  of the deceased and in a case falling  under  clause (b)  of section 15(2) of the Act the property devolves  upon the heirs of the husband of the 941 deceased. The distinction made by the High Court of  Allaha- bad  on  the ground of the absence or the  presence  of  the words  ’of the deceased’ in sub-section (1) and  sub-section (2)  of section 15 of the Act appears to be  hyper-technical and the High Court has tried to make a distinction where  it does  not  actually exist. The second reason,  namely,  that exclusion  of ’step-sons’ and ’step-daughters’  from  clause (a)  of  section 15(1) of the Act would be  unfair  as  they would  thereby  be deprived of a share in  the  property  of their father is again not well-founded. The rule of  devolu- tion  in  section  15 of the Act applies  to  all  kinds  of properties left behind by a female Hindu except those  dealt with  by clauses (a) and (b) of section 15(2) which  make  a distinction  as regards the property inherited by  her  from her  parents and the property inherited from her husband  or father-in-law  and  that  too when she leaves  no  sons  and daughters (including children of predeceased sons and daugh- ters).  If  the  construction placed by the  High  Court  of Allahabad is accepted then the property earned by the female Hindu herself or purchased or acquired by her would  devolve on step-sons and stepdaughters also along with her sons  and daughters.  Is  it just and proper to  construe  that  under clause  (a)  of section 15(1) of the Act  her  stepsons  and step-daughters,  i.e.,  children of the husband  by  another wife will be entitled to a share along with her own children when  the  Act does not expressly says so? We do  not  think that  the  view  expressed by the High  Court  of  Allahabad represents the true intent of the law. When once a  property becomes  the  absolute property of a female Hindu  it  shall devolve  first on her children (including children  of  the’ predeceased  son  and  daughter)  as  provided  in   section 15(1)(a) of the Act and then on other heirs subject only  to the  limited change introduced in section 15(2) of the  Act. The  step-sons or step-daughters will come in as heirs  only under  clause  (b) of section 15(1) or under clause  (b)  of section  15(2) of the Act. We do not, therefore, agree  with the reasons given by the Allahabad High Court in support  of its decision. We disagree with this decision.     In  the  circumstances, we hold that the High  Court  of Punjab  and Haryana against whose decision this petition  is filed was right in affirming the decree passed in favour  of Kirpal Singh, Respondent No. 1 herein. The Special Leave Petition is, therefore, dismissed. A.P.J.                                              Petition dismissed. 942