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PETITIONER: LACHHMAN DASS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SANTOKH SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/05/1995

BENCH: FAIZAN UDDIN (J) BENCH: FAIZAN UDDIN (J) ANAND, A.S. (J)

CITATION:  1995 SCC  (4) 201        JT 1995 (7)   437  1995 SCALE  (3)704

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                   THE 12TH DAY OF MAY,1995 Present:           Hon’ble Dr.Justice A.S.Anand           Hon’ble Mr.Justice Faizan Uddin Mr.Sarwa Mitter, (Mr.Sujit Bhattacharya,) Adv. for M/s. Mitter & Mitter Co., for the appellant Mr.K.G.Bhagat, Mr.Kamal Baid, Ms.Kusum Choudhary, Advs. for the Respondent                            J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION                     CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5752 OF 1995          (Arising out of SLP (C) No.20025 of 1991) Lachhman Dass                                 .....Appellant versus Santokh Singh                                .....Respondent                            J U D G M E N T Faizan Uddin, J.      1.    Leave granted.      2.    This appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India  has been  directed against the judgment dated 19th February, 1991, passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of  Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Revision No.1076 of 1987 reversing the judgment and order of eviction passed against  the tenant-respondent  herein  by  the  Rent Controlling Authority,  Karnal in Rent Case Nos.41/2 of 1984 (21/2 of  1982) and  affirmed by  the  Appellate  Authority, Karnal in  Rent Appeal  No.1 of  1986 decided on 11th March, 1987.      3.    The  present appellant  brought the  suit seeking the eviction  of his tenant, the respondent herein, from the House No.372,  situated in  Ward No.7,  Sadar Bazar,  Karnal consisting of  two rooms,  one varandah  and kitchen  and an open courtyard on the grounds set out hereunder :-

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    I     THAT the respondent was a defaulter in respect of      payment of  arrears of  rent from 1-8-1979 to 31-7-1982      at the  rate of Rs.20/- per month amounting to Rs.720/-      and House Tax to Rs.90/-:      II    THAT  the respondent had started tethering cattle      and putting  dung cakes  on walls  of demised  premises      diminishing its value and utility;      III   THAT  the respondent  had ceased  to  occupy  the      tenanted  premises   for  more   than  a  year  without      reasonable cause and;      IV     THAT   the  respondent-tenant  has  shifted  his      residence to  his own residential House No.351/7, Sadar      Bazar, Karnal  having purchased in the name of his wife      which is  reasonably sufficient  for  himself  and  his      family members. It may  be pointed out here that the afore-mentioned grounds of eviction  fall under  Sections 13(2)  (1),  13(2)  (iii), 13(2)(v) and 13(3)(a) (iv) respectively of the Haryana Urban (Control  of  Rent  and  Eviction)  Act,  1973  [hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’].      4.    The respondent-tenant contested the said eviction proceedings by  controverting the material averments made by the appellant-landlord.  The respondent, inter-alia, pleaded that the  appellant was  not the  only owner and landlord of the suit  premises and,  therefore, he  was not competent to file the  suit for his eviction. He pleaded that the arrears of rent  were duly tendered by him. He also pleaded that the house purchased  by his wife consists of two small rooms and that since  he has strained relations with his wife, she was living separate from him. He further pleaded that he and his married son  and his  children and  the wife  of his son are living in  the house  in dispute  and on  these pleadings he made a prayer for the dismissal of the eviction suit.      5.    The  Rent Controller  after framing the necessary issues and  recording  the  parties  evidence  came  to  the conclusion  that   the  appellant  alone  was  competent  to initiate  eviction   proceedings  and   since  the   tenant- respondent had  paid the  arrears of  rent,  house  tax  and interest on  18-1-1983, therefore,  the ground  is  eviction under Section  13(2)(1) of  the Act  became non-existent. As regards the  second ground,  the Rent  Controller found that there was  no cogent and reliable evidence to prove that the respondent had  committed any  act diminishing  the value or the utility  of the  suit premises.  As regard the third and fourth grounds  mentioned above,  the Rent  Controller on  a minute and  detailed discussion  of the  parties evidence on record, took  the view that the respondent-tenant had ceased to occupy  the demised  premises for  a continuous period of more than  four months  without any reasonable cause and had in fact  shifted his residence with his wife and children in September, 1981  in House  No.351, Ward  No.7, Sadar  Bazar, Karnal which  he had  purchased in  the name of his wife and the same  is reasonably sufficient for his requirements. The Rent Controller,  therefore, passed  an order of eviction of the  respondent   from  the  suit  premises  on  the  ground contained in  Section 13(2)(v)  and 13(3)(a)(iv) of the Act. The respondent-tenant  challenged the said finding in appeal under  Section   15(2)  of  the  Act  before  the  Appellate Authority. The  Appellate Authority  re-examined the  entire evidence  and   the  material   on  record  and  after  such reassessment of  evidence affirmed  the conclusions recorded by the  Rent Controller and, therefore, dismissed the appeal filed by  the respondent, maintaining the order of eviction. The respondent-tenant  then prefarred  Civil Revision  under sub-section (6)  of Section  15 of  the Act  before the High

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Court of  Punjab and Haryana and the learned Single Judge by the impugned  judgment set  aside the concurrent findings of the two  courts below by holding that it was not established that the  respondent-tenant has acquired or is in possession of reasonably  sufficient accommodation  which  renders  him liable to be evicted from the demised premises.      6.     Learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  landlord- appellant strenuously urged that the learned Single Judge of the High  Court committed  a  grave  and  serious  error  in interferring with the well reasoned judgment and findings of fact  recorded   by  the   two  courts  below  after  proper appreciation of evidence on record and took contrary view on extraneous facts  and circumstances by ignoring the relevant evidence and  material on  record which  has  resulted  into miscarriage  of   justice.  The   learned  counsel  for  the appellant submitted  that there  is  cogent  and  convincing evidence indicating  that the  respondent had shifted to new residential house  which he  had acquired in the name of his wife and  had  absolutely  ceased  to  occupy  the  tenanted premises in  question. It  was urged that the learned Single Judge totally  ignored the  fact that  respondent-tenant had come forward  with a  false defence  that  he  had  strained relations with  his  wife  and,  therefore,  he  was  living separate in the demised premises with his son and his family while his wife was living separate from him in House No.351, which defence has been found to be entirely false by the two courts below  on  a  thorough  marshalling  of  evidence  on record. It was also urged that the learned Single Judge made out a  case for  respondent-tenant that his family consisted of about  14 persons  and, therefore,  the house acquired by him was not reasonably sufficient for the whole family which is against the evidence on record. After hearing the learned counsel for  the parties  and on  perusal of the judgment of the  High  Court  as  well  as  the  judgments  of  the  two subordinate courts and other material on record we find that there is  much substance  in the store-mentioned submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant.      7.     The   first  question   that  arises   for   our consideration is  whether the  learned Single  Judge of  the High Court  was justified  in re-assessing  the value of the evidence and  substitute his  own conclusions  in respect of the concurrent  findings of  fact recorded by the two courts below, in  exercise of  his revisional  powers vested in the High Court  under Section  15(6) of  the Act. In the present case as  discussed earlier  the Rent  Controller passed  the order of  eviction against  the  respondent  on  the  ground mentioned under  Section 13  of the  Act against  which  the respondent preferred  an appeal  under  sub-section  (2)  of Section 15  of the  Act and the Appellate Authority affirmed the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. Here it may be  noted that  the Act does not provide a second appeal against  the   order  passed  in  appeal  by  the  Appellate Authority under  sub-section (2)  of Section  15.  The  Act, however,  under  sub-section  (6)  of  Section  15  makes  a provision for  revision to  the High Court against any order passed  or  proceedings  taken  under  the  Act.  Thus,  the Legislature has  provided for  a single  appeal against  the order passed  by  the  Rent  Controlling  Authority  and  no further  appeal   has  been  provided  under  the  Act.  The Legislature has, however, made a provision for discretionary remedy of  revision which is indicative of the fact that the Legislature has  created two  jurisdictions  different  from each other in scope and content in the form of an appeal and revision. That being so the two jurisdictions - one under an appeal and the other under revision cannot be said to be one

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and the  same but  distinct and  different in  the ambit and scope. Precisely  stated, an  appeal is  a continuation of a suit or proceedings wherein the entire proceedings are again left open  for consideration  by the  appellate  authorities which has  the power  to review the entire evidence subject, of course,  to the  prescribed statutory limitations. But in the  case   of  revision   whatever  powers  the  revisional authority  may  have,  it  has  no  power  to  reassess  and reaporeciate  the  evidence  unless  the  statute  expressly confers on it that power. That limitation is implicit in the concept of  revision. In  this view  of the  matter  we  are supported by a decision of this Court in State of Kerala vs. K.M. Charia Abdullah and Co. [1965 (1) SCR 601 at 604 ].      8.    This  Court in  the case  of Hari Shankar vs. Rao Girdhari Lal  Chowdhury [  1962 Suppl (1) SCR 933 = AIR 1963 SC 698  ] had  an  occasion  to  consider  the  question  of distinction  between   an  appeal   and   a   revision   and Hidayatullah, J.  (as he  then was  ) speaking for the Court observed at page 939 of the report as follows :-           "The distinction between an appeal and revision is      a real  one. A right to appeal carries with it right of      re-hearing on  law as  well as fact, unless the statute      conferring the right to appeal limits the re-hearing in      some way  as we  find has  been done  in second  appeal      arising under the Code of Civil Procedure. The power to      hear a  revision is generally given to a superior court      so that  it may  satisfy, itself that a particular case      has been decided according to law."      9.    In  the case  of State  of Kerala vs. K.M. Charia Abdulla &  Co. [1965  (1) SCR  601] this Court expressed the view that  when the Legislature confers a right to appeal in one case  and a discretionary remedy of revision in another, it may be deemed to have created two jurisdictions different in scope  and content.  Again in  the case  of Neta  Ram and others vs.  Jivan Lal  and another  [  AIR  1963  SC  499  ] Hidayatullah, J.  (as he  then was)  speaking for  the Court observed that  the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court do not  include the  power to  reverse concurrent  findings, without showing how those findings are erroneous.      10.   In the present case sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the  Act confers  revisional power  on the High Court for the purpose of satisfying itself with regard to the legality or propriety  of an  order or proceeding taken under the Act and empowers  the High  Court to pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit. The High Court will be justified in interfering  with the  order in revision if it finds that the order of the appellate authority suffers from a material impropriety or  illegality. From  the use  of the expression "Legality  or   propriety  of  such  order  or  proceedings" occurring in  sub-section (6)  of Section  15 of the Act, it appears that no doubt the revisional power of the High Court under the  Act is  wider than the power under Section 115 of the  Code   of  Civil   Procedure  which   is  confined   to jurisdiction, but  it is  also not  so wide  as  to  embrace within its fold all the attributes and characteristics of an appeal and  disturb a  concurrent finding  of fact  properly arrived at without recording a finding that such conclusions are  perverse  or  based  on  no  evidence  or  based  on  a superficial and  perfunctory approach.  If  the  High  Court proceeds to  interfere with such concurrent findings of fact ignoring the  aforementioned well  recognised principles, it would amount  to equating  the revisional powers of the High Court as  powers of  a regular  appeal frustrating  the fine distinction between  an appeal and a revision. That being so unless the  High Court  comes to  the  conclusion  that  the

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concurrent findings  recorded by  the two  courts below  are wholly perverse  and erroneous which manifestly appear to be unjust there  should be no interference. In the present case the  two   courts  below   have  thoroughly   examined   and appreciated  the   parties  evidence  and  have  recorded  a definite finding,  entirely based  on the evidence on record that the  respondent-tenant has ceased to occupy the demised premises since  after  September  1981  and  had,  in  fact, alongwith his  wife and  family started  living in the House No.351, Ward  No.7, Karnal,  having been  acquired by him in the name of his wife.      11.   It  may be  noticed that the learned Single Judge has himself stated in the impugned judgment that it is not a matter of  dispute that  both the  accommodations  i.e.  the demised premises  and the  house  acquired  by  the  tenant- respondent, in  the name  of his  wife, both have almost the same capacity,  yet the  learned Single  Judge took the view that the house acquired by the respondent was not reasonably sufficient for  his requirements.  If both  the  houses  are almost of  the same  capacity it  is difficult to accept the finding that  the house  acquired by  the  respondent  is  a reasonably  not   sufficient  for   his  requirements.   The observation  of   the  learned   Single   Judge   that   the respondent’s family  consists of about 14 persons is neither here nor  there, as admittedly, all those 14 persons are not living at  Karnal with  the respondent and, particularly, in the demised  premises  or  in  the  house  acquired  by  the respondent. The  learned Single  Judge has  himself  further observed in the impugned judgment that "though it is also in evidence that  some of the sons are either posted or working outside Karnal  yet it  is patent that they keep on visiting the petitioner." Thus, the learned Single Judge included the occasional visitors of the respondent also to be the members of the  family which  by no  stretch of imagination could be accepted  to   be  a  sound  reasoning,  to  set  aside  the concurrent findings  of fact.  It is  also not  the case  of respondent-tenant that  14 persons  of his family are living with him  in the house. On the contrary from the evidence it is clear that at the most the respondent’s family consist of six members  including his  wife who have been living in the demised premises  and all  of them have shifted in the house acquired by  the respondent  in the  name of  his wife. This fact  is   sufficiently  established   from  the   oral  and documentary evidence  on record. But surprisingly enough the learned Single  Judge ignored  this part of the evidence and disturbed concurrent findings for no good reasons, resulting into miscarriage of justice.      12.   In the facts and circumstances discussed above we are satisfied  that there  were no  reasons muchless  cogent reasons for  the learned  Single Judge to interfere with the findings  of   fact  recorded   by  the  two  courts  below. Consequently we set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High  Court and  restore the  orders of  the two  courts below with costs of Rs.1000/-.