IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2876 OF 2001

Kusum Devi        ......Appellant

vs.

Mohan Lal (dead) by L.Rs.,       ......Respondent

J U D G M E N T

B.N. AGRAWAL, J.

1. The appellant – landlady filed a suit for eviction of respondent-tenant from the

suit premises under Section 12 (1)(a),(c),(e), (g)  and (o) of the  Madhya Pradesh

Accommodation  Control  Act,  1961  [hereinafter  referred  to  as  `the  Act’].

Decreeing  the  suit,  the  trial  court  directed  the  respondent  to  deliver  vacant

possession of the suit premises to the appellant and to pay the unpaid rental of Rs.

1080/- to her within one month.  Being aggrieved, the respondent filed an appeal

in the Court of IIIrd Additional District Judge, Damoh.   Dismissing the appeal,

the  first   appellate  court  held  that  the  appellant  was  entitled  to  get  vacant

possession of the suit premises from the respondent only under clauses (e) and (g)

of sub-section (1) of Section 12  of the Act.  Aggrieved thereby, the respondent

filed an appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.  The High Court, by

the impugned judgment, following the judgment in the case of Smt. Parmeshwari

Devi vs.  Thakur Nathu Singh, 1998 (1) MPJR 462, a decision of  the same High

Court – while allowing the appeal and setting aside the decrees of eviction granted

by  both the courts below  under clauses (e) and (g) of  Section 12(1) of the Act,

held that no decree could be passed if  the grounds enumerated  under clauses (e)

and (g) are taken together in a suit for eviction as both the claims could not be

held to be bona fide.  Hence, this appeal by special leave.  

2. Briefly  put,  the  facts  are  that  the  appellant  herein  purchased  a  two-storied

building, namely, Ward No. 1, Damoh, by a registered Sale Deed dated 13.6.1986

from one Mahindra Raja Jain and respondent herein, who was inducted as tenant

by the ex-owner Mahindra Raja Jain in the first floor of the said house and was

residing in the suit premises at the time of its purchase by the appellant, became

tenant of the appellant.  Since the respondent had not paid rent since 1979, the

right to recover the same was assigned to the appellant by the ex-owner.  Failure

of the respondent to pay rental resulted in a notice being sent by the appellant on

29th August, 1986, but despite that respondent did not pay rental to the appellant.

On 20th July, 1987, appellant filed a suit for eviction against the respondent on

grounds, inter alia, of bona fide need for residential purpose under Section 12(1)

(e) and for carrying out repairs in the suit premises as it had become unsafe for

human  habitation  under  Section  12(1)(g),  which  repairs,  according  to  the

appellant,  could not be carried out until the suit premises were vacated by the

respondent.  It was stated that since - at the time of purchase - the accommodation

available with the appellant on the ground floor was inadequate, the appellant

had to hire a room in the same locality for the purpose of keeping the household

goods. It was further stated that keeping in view the large family of the appellant

consisting of  a retired husband,  five married daughters,  who keep visiting her

regularly, and marriageable sons, the appellant and his family was facing acute

shortage of residential accommodation.  

3. The respondent contested the said suit and filed a written statement, denying the

title of the appellant as well as the grounds on which his eviction from the suit

premises was sought, stating as follows:-

“Since the year 1953-54, I am a tenant in the suit house.  I had taken this house on rent from Sunder Lal Jain......The plaintiff used

to  live  in  the  ground  floor  portion  of  the  house  along  with  her husband and one child and the remaining members of the family had been married. The Plaintiff had taken on rent some rooms in Asati Dharmashala.  Mohinder Raja is the son of Sunder Lal Jain, who used to live in London.  This house has been sold by Mohinder Raja to the Plaintiff.....Kusum Devi had sent me notice before the Nalish...I had never given any rent to Kusum Devi....This is true to suggest that in the year 1965 I came to know that Mohinder Raja is the son of Sunder Lal Vaidya Raj....I indicated this as the wrong statement because I did not know that he had any right over the suit property.   When  Mohinder  Raja  went  away  after  executing  the registry of the suit house only then I came to know that Mohinder Raja was the owner of the suit house.  I came to know after going through the notice that Mohinder Raja was the owner of the suit house.   This is true to suggest that on 13.6.86 the registry of the suit house  had  been  executed...  The  suit  house  was  constructed  in 1948...This is true to suggest that on the first floor, where my latrine is located, to its side Basant Khanwilker’s house is situated.  The walls of the suit house side where Basant Khanwilkar is living...are in bad condition.   The bricks of that side have been washed away. This is true to suggest that there one crack has been formed in the roof of the house.  This crack is just above the partition.   This is true to suggest that the son of the plaintiff who used to live with her in the suit house has reached the age of marriage.  The elder son of the Plaintiff has been married.  He used to pay visit to plaintiff’s place.  All the five daughters of the plaintiff have been married and they also used to visit the plaintiff’s place.  This is true to suggest that the husband of the plaintiff is a retired postmaster.”    

As stated above, the trial court, after  considering the pleadings of  both the parties

and analyzing  the evidence led, decreed the suit of the appellant-plaintiff on all the

grounds  taken  in  the  suit  and  directed  the  respondent-tenant  to  deliver  vacant

possession of the suit premises to the appellant within one month.  The said judgment

of the trial court was unsuccessfully challenged by the respondent by filing an appeal

before the first appellate court in relation to grounds enumerated under clauses (e)

and (g).   Being aggrieved, the respondent carried the matter – by way of Second

Appeal - to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which, while reversing the judgment

of  the  first  appellate  court,  held  that  no  decree  could  be  granted  if  the  grounds

enumerated under clauses (e) and (g) are taken together in a suit for eviction as both

the claims could not be held to be bona fide.  In so holding, the High Court followed

the judgment in the case of   Smt. Parmeshwari Devi [supra].

4. Shri H.L.Agrawal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant,

submitted that both the courts below having concurrently found the requirement

of suit premises by the appellant bona fide for the purpose of residence under

Section 12 (1) (e) and for carrying out repairs under Section 12 (1) (g) as the

accommodation had become unsafe/unfit for human habitation,  it was not open

to the High Court to go into the question whether both the grounds for eviction

under  Section 12 (1) (e) and Section 12 (1) (g) could be taken together or not.  The

High Court, therefore, has committed a grave error by going into that question

and holding that if grounds for eviction under Section 12 (1)(e) and 12 (1) (g) are

raised together, both the claims could not be held to be bona fide and no decree

could be granted  at the same time.   

5. On the other hand, Shri Sakesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the respondent, has submitted that by the impugned judgment, the High Court

has rightly set aside the decree of both the courts below granted under Section 12

(1)(e)  and  Section  12(1)(g)  as  both  the  grounds,  being  contradictory  to  and

destructive of each other,  could not be taken together in a suit for eviction.    

6. Before considering the rival submissions of both the parties, it would be useful to

refer to the relevant provisions of the Act, which are set out hereunder: -

“Section 12: Restriction on eviction of tenants:- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:  (e) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bonafide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the  landlord  or  such  person  has  no  other  reasonably  suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned; (g) that the accommodation has become unsafe, or unfit for human habitation and is required bonafide by the landlord for carrying out repairs  which  cannot  be  carried  out  without  the  accommodation being vacated;”

According  to  clause  (e),  a  landlord  can  file  a  suit  for  eviction  of  tenant  if  the

accommodation  let  for  residential  purpose  is  required  bona  fide  by  him  for

occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family if he is the

owner thereof,  provided the landlord has no other reasonably  suitable  residential

accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned.    Under

clause (g), what is required to be established by a landlord seeking eviction is that the

accommodation has become unsafe, or unfit for human habitation and is bona fide

required by him for the purpose of carrying out repairs, etc., and that such repairs

cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated. Therefore, in a suit

for eviction under Section 12(1)e) and Section 12(1)(g), what the court is required to

see  is  the  bona  fide requirement  of  the  landlord;  under  the  former  clause   for

occupation of the landlord or any member of his family and under the latter,  for the

purpose of carrying out repairs.  

7. There are provisions in the Act that provide sufficient protection to the tenants

against whom decree of eviction is granted under clauses (e) and (g).  Section 17 of

the Act provides that a landlord on recovery of possession of any accommodation

from the tenant in pursuance of order made under clauses (e) or (f) shall  not,

except with the permission of the Rent Controlling Authority, re-let  whole or any

part  of  the  accommodation  so  recovered  within  two  years  from  the  date  of

obtaining  such  possession.   It  further  provides  that  failure  of  the  landlord  to

occupy the premises so recovered within two months of obtaining the possession

or, after occupation within two months, if it is re-let, within two years from the

date of  obtaining  such possession,  to any person other than the evicted tenant

without  obtaining  the  permission  of  the  Rent  Controlling  Authority  or  is

transferred to any other  person for reasons  which  do not  appear to the Rent

Controlling Authority to be bona fide, the Rent Controlling Authority may, on

application made to it in this behalf by such evicted tenant, direct the landlord to

put  the  tenant  in  possession  or  pay  him  such  compensation  as  the  Rent

Controlling Authority thinks fit.   

8. Section 18 of the Act provides that the court while granting decree on the grounds

specified in clause (g) or (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 12, shall ascertain from

the tenant whether he would like to be placed in occupation of the accommodation

or part thereof from which he is to be evicted and on his so electing, shall record

the fact of the election in the order specifying the date on or before which he shall

deliver possession so as to enable the landlord to commence the work of repairs or

building  or  re-building,  as  the  case  may be,  and on the  tenant  delivering  the

possession within the date specified, the landlord shall, within one month of the

completion of such work, place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation or

part  thereof.   It  further provides that  on failure  of  the  landlord,  after having

obtained  possession  of  the  premises  within  the  date  specified  in  the  order,  to

commence the work of repairs,  etc.,  within one month of the specified date or

complete the work in a reasonable time or after completion of the work, to place

the tenant in occupation of the premises, the Court may, on application made to it

in this behalf by the evicted tenant within the prescribed time, order the landlord

to place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof or to pay

to the tenant such compensation as the court thinks fit.     

9. As stated above, what is to be ascertained by the court in a suit for eviction under

clauses (e) and (g) is the bona fide requirement of the landlord; under clause (e)

for own occupation and under clause (g) for carrying out repairs, etc. in the suit

premises. If, on the basis of the pleadings and evidence led, the court is satisfied

that the landlord has established his bona fide requirement of the suit premises

for his own occupation or for any member of his family under clause (e), it may

order eviction of tenant under the said clause. Once such a decree is passed, the

landlord, by grant of such decree in his favour, gets a right to either move to the

building so vacated without or after making repairs, alterations, additions, etc.

10.  In the case on hand, both the courts below concurrently found that the appellant

required  the  premises  for  her  own  use  and,  therefore,  granted  a  decree  for

eviction under Section 12(1)(e).  We have been taken through the pleadings and

the evidence led in both the courts  below and find that,  while  arriving  at  the

finding of bona fide requirement of the suit premises by the appellant, both the

courts below very carefully considered the pleadings of the parties and analyzed

the evidence on record.  In fact, the respondent himself, in his written statement,

spoke about the factum of large family of the appellant and her having taken on

rent  some  accommodation  in  the  locality  for  keeping  household  goods.   The

relevant portion of the written statement of the respondent is reproduced below:-

“The plaintiff used to live in the ground floor portion of the house along with her husband and one child and the remaining members of the family  had been married.  The Plaintiff  had taken on rent some rooms in Asati Dharmashala.   This is true to suggest that the son of the plaintiff who used to live with her in the suit house has reached the age of marriage.  The elder son of the Plaintiff has been married.   He  used  to  pay  visit  to  plaintiff’s  place.   All  the  five daughters of the plaintiff have been married and they also used to visit the plaintiff’s place.  This is true to suggest that the husband of the plaintiff is a retired postmaster....”.    

We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the findings concurrently recorded by

both the courts below on the aspect of bona fide requirement of the suit premises by

the appellant for her use under Section 12(1)(e).  In our view, the trial court as well as

the first appellate court have rightly come to the conclusion that the requirement of

suit premises by the appellant was bona fide and granted decree under clause (e).

11. Having held that the present case is one where the appellant has established her

bona fide requirement of the suit premises for residential purpose under clause

(e), we now turn to the grounds raised by the appellant under clause (g) i.e., that

the accommodation having  become unsafe  or  unfit  for  human habitation,  she

bona fide required the same for carrying out repairs, etc., and that such repairs

could  not  be  carried  out  without  the  accommodation  being  vacated.  Both  the

courts  below  have  relied  upon  the  statements  of  Puran  Chand  [PW.2],

Khemchand Asati  [PW.3],  Bhagawati  Prasad [PW.4],  C.K. Shrivastava [PW.5]

and Mohinder Raja Jain [PW.6] and            Exhibit P-6. All these witnesses in

their  depositions  have  categorically  stated  that  the  suit  premises  were  in  a

dilapidated condition, that there were cracks on the walls and that the building,

being very old, has become quite weak. PW.5 – Shri C.K. Srivastava, an official of

the Public  Works Department,  in his deposition has  stated that the suit house

needed  special  repairs  and  that  the  repairs  could  not  be  carried  out  without

getting the house vacated.  Exhibit P.6 is a notice dated 16.9.87 sent by one Mr.

Khanwilker, whose house is next to the appellant, stating that the suit premises

were in rundown condition, which was posing a danger to the safety of life and

property. Even the respondent in his written statement has admitted about the

dilapidated  condition  of  the  suit  building,  the  relevant  portion  of  which  is  as

under:-

“The suit  house was constructed in 1948...This  is true to suggest that on the first floor, where my latrine is located, to its side Basant Khanwilker’s  house is  situated.   The walls  of the suit  house side where  Basant  Khanwilkar  is  living...are  in  bad condition.    The bricks of that side have been washed away.   This is true to suggest that there one crack has been formed in the roof of the house.  This crack is just above the partition.”    

On the basis of the statements of PWs. 2 to 6 and Exhibit P-6 as also the written

statement of the respondent, both the courts below were quite justified in arriving at

a finding  that  the appellant  has  succeeded in proving her bona fide requirement

under Section 12 (1)(g) as well and accordingly granted a decree for eviction against

the respondent on that ground as well.  

12.This  brings  us  to  the  question  whether  in  a  suit  for  eviction  the  grounds

enumerated under clauses (e) and (g) of Section 12 (1) can be raised together by a

landlord.  As stated above, the High Court, by the impugned judgment, following

Smt.  Parmeshwari  Devi [supra],  held  that  no  decree  could  be  granted  if  the

grounds enumerated under clauses (e) and (g) are taken together in a suit  for

eviction as both the claims could not be held to be bona fide.    

13.In Smt.Parmeshwari Devi [supra], plaintiff filed a suit for eviction of defendant

on the grounds enumerated under clauses (e) and (h) of sub-section (1) of Section

12 of the Act.  While the trial court granted a decree of eviction under clause (h),

but not under clause (e), the first appellate court, on appeal being preferred by

the defendant challenging grant of eviction decree under clause (h) and on cross

objection  being  filed  by  the  plaintiff  seeking  decree  under  clause  (e)  as  well,

dismissed the appeal filed by the defendant and allowed the cross objection filed

by the plaintiff and granted decree of eviction under clause (e) as well. On appeal

being preferred by the defendant, the High Court, while allowing the appeal and

setting aside decrees of eviction granted by the trial court and the first appellate

court under clauses (e) and (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act, observed

as under: -

“…this  court  is  of  the view that  no  difficulty  would  arise  if  the respondent  had  approached  the  court  without  asserting  that  he wanted to reconstruct the house or demolish it, provided he required the  accommodation  for  his  residence.  In  the  case  of  Ramniklal Pitamabardas Mehta vs.  Indradaman Amratlal  Sheth,  AIR  1964 SC 1676 it was held that once it is proved that landlord required the house bona fide, it  did not matter if he occupied the house after reconstructing or demolishing it. Therefore, we take it that it is well established that once the bona fide requirement under section 12 (1) (e)  of  the  Act  is  proved  together  with  other  ingredients  of  that Section,  it  would  not  be  of  any  consequence  whether  the accommodation is occupied as such or the house is reconstructed or demolished as such or the house is reconstructed or demolished for the purpose of residence, but the landlord could not let it out within two years of obtaining possession unless conditions mentioned in Section  17  are  satisfied.  ….the  court  has  no  option  to  say  that respondent  could  not  have  pleaded  bona  fide  requirement  for residence  as  well  as  bona  fide  requirement  for  reconstruction simultaneously.  Both the pleas destroy each other. It is true that under Order VII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure alternative reliefs are permitted. It is also well established that alternative and inconsistent claims have been permitted by courts subject to rider that law permits a court to do so.”

The High Court further observed as under: -

“this court is of the view that the plea of the respondent/landlord that he required the suit house bona fide for the residence of himself and that of the members of his family cannot stand together with the plea of the landlord that he required the suit house bona fide for reconstruction.   On  the  contrary,  the  requirement  of  bona  fide reconstruction of the suit house cannot be pleaded simultaneously with the plea of bona fide requirement for persona residence.   Both the pleas are mutually destructive of each other and the very fact that they were pleaded together shows that none  of them are bona fide….the landlord can take only one of pleas so that it be bona fide. The moment he chooses the second with the first both destroy each other”  

14.There  is  no  provision  in  the  Act  preventing  a  landlord  from raising  grounds

enumerated under clauses (e) and (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act

together in a suit for eviction.  In a given case like the present one, raising both the

grounds  together,  what  the  court  is   required  to  see  is  whether  the  bona fide

requirement of the landlord to occupy the premises for his own occupation  has

been proved or not.  Once the bona fide requirement under clause (e) is held to

have been proved, the mere fact of having simultaneously pleaded in the plaint

that the suit premises, having become unsafe or unfit for human habitation, are

bona  fide  required  for  carrying  out  repairs,  which  could  not  be  carried  out

without the premises being vacated, does not affect the bona fide requirement of a

landlord under clause (e).  Therefore, once bona fide requirement of a landlord

for own occupation stands established and a decree for eviction is granted under

the relevant provision, it is well within the right of the landlord to either move to

the building without or after carrying out repairs.  

15.In Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta vs. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth, AIR 1964 SC

1676, a decision of a 3-judge Bench of this Court, referred in Smt. Parmeshwari

Devi [supra],  respondent-plaintiff  filed  a  suit  for  ejectment  of  the  defendant-

tenant from the suit premises on the grounds of bona fide requirement for own

occupation under clause (g), which is analogous to clause (e) in the case on hand,

and for making additions, alterations and necessary changes in the suit premises,

it being in dilapidated condition, under clause (hh)  of sub-section (1) of Section 13

of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, which is

more or less similar to clause (g) in the case on hand.  Finding that the respondent

bona fide required the premises for his own occupation, the trial court decreed

the suit on both the grounds.   Agreeing with the views of the trial court, the first

appellate  court  dismissed  the  appeal  preferred  by  the  defendant-tenant.  The

defendant -tenant then preferred a revision before the High Court, which was also

dismissed.   On appeal  by  special  leave  being preferred to this  Court,  the sole

question that arose before this  Court was whether the case of the respondent-

plaintiff fell within the provisions of Section 13(1)(g) or Section 13(1)(hh) of the

said Act.  After having answered the question that the case of the respondent-

plaintiff fell within the provisions of Section 13(1)(g),  this Court observed at page

1678 as under: -

“....we agree with the courts below that the respondent’s case falls under cl.  g when he bona fide requires the premises for his  own occupation.  The mere fact that he intends  to make alterations in the  house  either  on  account  of  his  sweet  will  or  on  account  of absolute necessity in view of the condition of the house, does not affect  the  question  of  his  requiring  the  house  bona  fide  and reasonably  for  his  occupation,  when he  has  proved his  need for occupying the house.   There is  no such prohibition  either in the language of cl. g or in any other provision of the act to the effect that  the  landlord  must  occupy  the  house  for  residence  without making any alterations in it. There could not be any logical reason for it.”

After so observing, this court held at page 1679 as under: -

“we are therefore of opinion that once the landlord establishes that he bona fide requires the premises for his occupation, he is entitled to recover possession of it from tenant in view of the provisions of sub-cl. g of Section 13 (1) irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the premises without making any alteration to them or after making the necessary alterations.”    

16.There is a long line of decisions wherein, in identical situations, the principle laid

down in Ramniklal [supra] has been reiterated by this Court.  

17.In  P.S. Pareed Kaka & Ors. vs.  Shafee Ahmed Saheb, (2004) 3 SCR 412, a 2-

Judge Bench of this Court, while interpreting clauses (h) and (j) of sub-section 1

of  Section  21  of  the  Karnataka  Rent  Control  Act,  1961,  which  clauses  are

analogous to clauses (e) and (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act in the

present case, held, at page 419, as under: -

“…the trial court has miserably failed to consider whether the need as put forth is bona fide, reasonable or not. The High Court on re- appreciation of evidence, came to the conclusion that the need is bona  fide  and  the  building  required  demolition  and reconstruction….it is in evidence that the premises is very old and the building therein is dilapidated and portions of the building have also collapsed.  It is also in evidence that the rear outhouse building has already collapsed. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the said need is not bona fide or unreasonable.   It is not for the tenant  to  suggest  that  there  is  no  need  to  demolish  the  existing building and construct the new building.  The landlord is entitled to make  use  of  his  property  for  any  reasonable  purpose.   If  the landlord chooses to use it for residential purpose, the tenant cannot say that he should not do so.”

It was further held at page 420 as under:-

“Law is well settled on this aspect.  Even if the building is in a good condition, if it is not suitable for the requirement of the landlord, he can  always  demolish  even  a  good  building  and  put  up  a  new building  to  suit  his  requirements.   It  is  not  necessary  for  the landlord to prove that the condition of the building is such that it require  immediate  demolition  particularly  when  the  premises  is required  by  the  landlord.   Therefore,  it  has  to  be  held  that  the finding of the trial court cannot be sustained and the High Court on re-appreciation of the evidence, rightly so, held that the landlord has established that his need for all the four petition schedule premises is bona fide and reasonable.”    

18.In  Modern Tailoring Hall vs.  H.S.  Venkusa  and Ors.,  (1997)  5  SCC 315,  this

Court was dealing with a case in which the landlord had sought eviction of the

tenant under clauses (h) and (j) of  sub-section 1 of Section 21 of the Karnataka

Rent Control Act,1986, which correspond to clauses (e) and (g) in the present case.

While dismissing the appeal of the tenant and declining to take a view   contrary

to one expressed in Ramniklal [supra], this Court, at page 317,  held as under:-

“….The  ground  of  eviction  given  in  the  two  provisions  being mutually  exclusive  have  flowing  therefrom  separate  individual rights and obligations and they cannot be permitted to overlap so as to confer on the court the discretion of employing one provision over the  other.   An  application  of  the  landlord,  if  not  falling  under Section 21 (1) (h),  would on its own,  merit  dismissal.   The court cannot  treat it  in its  discretion as one under Section 21(1)(j)  and order an unwanted eviction.  The distinction qualitatively has to be maintained.   We therefore, decline to take a view to the contrary, even if it be possible, than the one taken by the high court based as it is on the decision of this court in Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta vs. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth.”  

19.In Radhey Shyam & Ors. Vs. Kalyan Mal, (1984) 4 SCC 447, this Court followed

Ramniklal [supra]  and  while  dismissing  appeal  of  the  tenant,  at  page  449

observed as under: -

“a case more or less similar on facts had come up before this Court in  Ramniklal  Pitambardas  Mehta v.  Indradaman Amratlal  Sheth which  arose  from  proceedings  taken  under  the  Bombay  Rents, Hotel and Lodging House, Rates Control Act 57 of 1947. There the eviction was sought under Section 13 (1)(g) and 13 (1) (hh) of that Act.  Section 13 (1) (g) of that Act corresponds to section 12 (1) (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act and Section 13 (1)(hh) of that Act corresponds to Section 12 (1)(g), namely, that the building is required for effecting either repairs or alterations.  This court has observed in that case that once the landlord establishes that  he bona fide requires the premises for his  occupation, he is entitled  to  recover  possession  of  it  from  the  tenant  under  the provisions of sub-clause (g) of Section 13 (1) irrespective of the fact whether  he  would  occupy  the  premises  without  making  any alterations or after making the necessary alterations….’.    

After so observing, it was held at page 449 as under: -

“Though  the  facts  of  that  case  are  slightly  different  in  that  the requirement  was  for  occupation  after  making  some  alterations whereas  in  the  present  case  the  requirement  is  for  locating  the landlord’s  factory  after  demolishing  and  re-constructing  the building, the principle deducible from that decision would apply to the facts of even these cases We agree with Mr. U.R. Lalit, learned counsel  for  the  respondent  landlord  that  the  order  of  eviction  is based mainly under Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act and that from the mere fact that Section 12(1)(h) also is added would not make the order of eviction only one under Section 12(1)(h) of the Act  and Section 18 of the Act will not be attracted.”

20.We may now notice some more decisions wherein also clauses akin to clauses (e)

and (g) were interpreted in the way they have been in  Ramniklal [supra]  and

other decisions referred to above.

21. In Matthew James Mckenna &  Anr. Vs. Porter Motors Ltd.,  (1956)

AC 688,  while  construing  clauses  (h)  and  (m)  of  sub-section  (1)  of

Section 24 of Tenancy Act, 1948 of New Zealand,  and  dismissing the

appeal of the appellant-tenant, the Privy Council held as under:-

“…….. The real question turns on the meaning of “his or their own occupation.” Apart from paragraph (m) there would be no doubt that a landlord required demised premises for his own occupation although he was intending for  the purposes of his  occupation to make substantial alterations, or put up a wholly new building. The difficulty arises from the existence of paragraph (m). Is that to be construed  as  covering  all  demolition  or  reconstructions  cases, including those where the landlord will remain in occupation, or do the words of paragraph (h) limit its operation.  

Their Lordships are of the opinion that  its  scope is  so limited. This gives their natural meaning to the words “for his or their  own  occupation”  while  leaving  a  scope  for  paragraph  (m), which accords with the distinction plainly drawn by paragraphs (g) and  (h)  between  landlords  who  require  to  relet  or  resell  and landlords who require to occupy. ……..”

22.In Betty’s Cafes Ltd. Vs. Phillips Furnishing Stores Ltd., (1959) AC 20, the House

of Lords,  while dismissing  appeal of the tenant, whose eviction was sought by the

landlord under clauses (f) and (g) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, held that

the fact that the landlords might intend to occupy the rebuilt premises themselves

did not deprive them of the right to possession under paragraph (f), since they

could satisfy its conditions; such a deprivation was not implied in it when read

with paragraph (g).

23.In  Krishna Das Nandy  vs.  Bidhan Chandra Roy, AIR 1959 Calcutta 181, a 2-

Judge Bench of  the Calcutta High Court,  while  answering a question whether

bona fide requirement for own occupation of a landlord would include building or

re-building  of  the suit  premises  so as to  make the  premises livable  as  per  his

requirement, observed at pages 188-189 as under:-

“The plaintiff’s case is that he requires the disputed premises for building  and/or  re-building  for  his  own  occupation  or,  in  other words,  that  he  requires  it  for  his  own  occupation  and,  for  that purpose, he will build and/or re-build it…..Where the requirement is for building and re-building, that must be for purposes other than the landlord’s own occupation and where the requirement is for the landlord’s own occupation, no question of building and re-building should arise; or, to put it straight, if the landlord’s case is that he requires the premises for building and re-building, he cannot claim to occupy it himself and if his case be that he requires it for his own occupation, he must occupy it as it is and must on his own showing or admission, it will not be fit for his own occupation unless built and/or rebuilt, his case of requirement for his own occupation must fail under the statute.”    

After so observing, the Court held at page 189 as under:-

“…occupation of the premises for purposes of building and/or rebuilding in order to make it fit for one’s own occupation would be part of such occupation”.

24.In  Smt. Rohinibai vs.  Vishnumurthy, 1980 (1) ILR 340, a 2-Judge Bench of the

Karnataka High Court, in an identical situation,  held at pages 344-345 as under:-

“It is no doubt true that there could not be an order of eviction both under clauses (h) and (j) of Section 21 (1) of the Act.   This is clear from not only the wording of clauses (h) and (j) of Section 21 (1) of the Act, but also provisions of Sections 25 to 28 of the Act.  Under clause (h) an order of eviction could be made only for the purposes of bona fide use and occupation of the premises by the landlord. However, as pointed out in the aforesaid decisions, the clause does not require that a landlord after securing an order of eviction of tenant from a premises should occupy it as it existed on the date of eviction.  There is no restriction on the landlord to have alteration or  to  have  new  construction  after  demolishing  the  premises  as existed on the date of eviction….In the nature of things the scope of clause  (h)  is  entirely  different  from  clause  (j).   Therefore,  there could not be an order of eviction on both the grounds specified in clauses (h) and (j).  It is for this reason , they are mutually exclusive but  this  does  not  mean  that  a  landlord  seeking  eviction  on  the grounds  mentioned  in  clause  (h)  cannot  plead  that  he  wants  to occupy the premises after demolition and reconstruction, and that by taking such a plea the case goes outside the scope of clause (h) and falls under clause (j).”  

25. In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that in a case where eviction has been

sought  both  on  the  grounds  of  bona  fide  requirement  by  the  landlord  for

occupation of the premises for himself or any member of his family, as required

under Section 12(1)(e) of  the Act and for carrying out repairs,  as enumerated

under  Section  12(1)(g)  of  the  Act,   the court  is  required to  consider  both  the

grounds on merits,  as  they are mutually exclusive,  but not destructive of  each

other.   In case decree for eviction is passed only under clause (e), the landlord

would be entitled to move into the premises without or after making any repairs

and the provisions of Section 17 of the Act would apply.  But if the same is passed

under clause (g) alone, the provisions of Section 18 would apply.  However, in case

decree is passed under clauses (e) and (g) both, in that eventuality, the same shall

be deemed to have been passed mainly under clause (e), as such the provisions of

Section 17 of the Act would alone apply and not Section 18 thereof.   

26. In the case on hand, the trial court as well as the first appellate court, having

found the  requirements of suit premises by the landlady under clauses (e) and (g)

proved, rightly granted decree for eviction under both the clauses. In our view,

High Court was not justified in setting aside the said decrees by following the

judgment in the case of Smt. Parmeshwari Devi [supra] as law laid down therein

runs contrary to the principles laid down by this Court in the case of Ramniklal

Pitambardas Mehta [supra] and other decisions referred to above.

27. In the result, the appeal is allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court is set

aside  and  the  same  rendered  by  first  appellate  court  confirming  decree  for

eviction is restored.  The respondents are granted six months’ time to vacate the

suit premises on furnishing usual undertaking to this Court within eight weeks

from today. There shall be no order as to costs.

..………………..J.

[B.N. AGRAWAL]

..………………J. [G.S. SINGHVI]

8th April, 2009. NEW DELHI.