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PETITIONER: KUSHESHWAR DUBEY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/09/1988

BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH BENCH: MISRA RANGNATH VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)

CITATION:  1988 AIR 2118            1988 SCR  Supl. (2) 821  1988 SCC  (4) 319        JT 1988 (3)   576  1988 SCALE  (2)641

ACT:     Disciplinary  and  criminal  proceedings--Holding   of-- Simultaneously--Whether legal bar--Not advisable to evolve a hard and fast rule valid for all cases.

HEADNOTE:     The  appellant,  an employee of Respondent  No.  1,  was subjected  to  disciplinary proceedings as also  a  criminal prosecution   simultaneously  on  the  allegation  that   he physically assaulted a supervising officer. He filed a civil action in the trial court asking for injunction against  the disciplinary action pending criminal trial. The trial  court stayed  further proceedings in the disciplinary action  till disposal  of  the criminal case. In  appeal,  the  appellate court affirmed the aforesaid order. However, the High  Court allowed  the Revision Application of the Respondent and  set aside the impugned order on the ground that there is no  bar for an employer to proceed with the departmental  proceeding with regard to the same allegation for which a criminal case is pending.     Allowing the appeal to this Court,     HELD:  l.  The order of the High Court is  vacated  and that  of the trial court as affirmed in appeal is  restored. The  criminal action and the disciplinary  proceedings  were grounded  upon  the  same set  of  facts.  The  disciplinary proceedings  should have been stayed and the High Court  was not  right  in interfering with the trial court’s  order  of injunction which had been affirmed in appeal. [826A-B]     2(i) While there could be no legal bar for  simultaneous proceedings  being taken, yet, there may be cases  where  it would  be  appropriate  to  defer  disciplinary  proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case. In the latter  class of cases it would be open to the delinquent-employee to seek such an order of stay or injunction from the court. [825E-F]     2(ii)  Whether,  in  the facts and  circumstances  of  a particular  case,  there  should  or  should  not  be   such simultaneity of the proceedings would then receive  judicial consideration  and  the  Court  will  decide  in  the  given circumstances  of  a  particular  case  as  to  whether  the                                                   PG NO 821                                                   PG NO 822

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disciplinary  proceedings  should  be  interdicted,  pending criminal trial. [825F-G]     The  Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal  Bhan, [1960]  3 SCR 227; Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v.  Its  Workmen, [1964] 7 SCR 555 and Jung Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari, [1969] 1 SCR 134, relied upon.     Rama  P. C. v. Superintendent of Police, Kolar  &  Anr., AIR 1967 54 Mysore 220; Ali Mohd. & Ors. v. Chairman T.A.  & C. Udhampur, [1981] 2 SLR 225; Moulindra Singh v. The Deputy Commissioner  &  Ors., [1973] LIC 6 1564;  Shaikh  Kasim  v. Superintendent  of  Post Office, Chingletut, AIR  1965  Mad. 502; Khusi Ram v. Union of India, [1974] LIC 553 and Project Manager, ONGC v. Lal Chand Wazir Chand Chandna, [1982] 1 SLR 654, referred to.     3. It is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast, straight-jacket formula valid for all cases and of general application without regard to the particularities of the individual-situation.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal  No.  3129of 1988     From the Judgment and Order dated 7.7.1987 of the  Patna High Court in Civil Revision No. 128 of 1987 (R).     R.K.  Jain,  Rakesh  K. Khanna and R.P.  Singh  for  the Appellant.     R.N. Sachthey and Anip Sachthey for the Respondents.     The following Order of the Court was delivered:                            ORDER     Special leave granted.     The appellant is an employee in the Balihari Colliery of the  Respondent  No.  1  and  in  1986  was  working  as  an electrical  helper.  On the allegation  that  he  physically assaulted a supervising officer by name S.K. Mandal, he  was subjected  to  disciplinary proceedings as also  a  criminal prosecution.  Since the disciplinary proceeding as also  the criminal  trial  were taken  simultaneously,  the  appellant filed  a  civil  action in the court of  Munsif  at  Dhanbad asking  for  injunction  against  the  disciplinary   action                                                   PG NO 823 pending  criminal  trial. On 6.12.1986, the Munsif  made  an order staying further proceedings in the disciplinary action till  disposal  of  the criminal case.  The  appeal  of  the Respondent  No.  1 against the order of learned  Munsif  was dismissed  on  31st  March, 1987, by  the  appellate  court. Thereupon  the Respondent No. 1 moved the High Court in  its revisional  jurisdiction. The High Court by its order  dated 7.7.1987 held: "First  information report was lodged against  the  opposite party  (appellant)  and  the same  was  pending  before  the competent  court.  Meanwhile the  petitioners  (respondents) started departmental proceeding against the opposite  party. The  opposite party filed a suit before the trial court  for declaration  that  appointment of the  Enquiry  Officer  was illegal and for restraining the petitioners permanently from continuing  with  the  departmental  proceeding  during  the pendency of the criminal case. That was allowed by the trial court and confirmed by the lower court. There is no bar  for an employer to proceed with the departmental proceeding with regard  to the same allegation for which a criminal case  is pending.     I  am, therefore, of the opinion that the  courts  below were wrong in granting injunction in favour of the  opposite

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party.     In the result, this application is allowed and the order impugned is set aside."     According  to  Mr.  Jain for the  appellant,  the  legal position settled by this Court supported the stand that  the disciplinary action had to be stayed till the criminal  case was  over. He relied upon the decisions in The  Delhi  Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, [1960] 3 SCR 227  and Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [1964l 7 SCR 555. He also  referred  in  the  course of  his  submission  to  the decisions  of  different  High  Courts  in  support  of  his propositions. Two cases out of the several ones of the  High Courts  he  relied  upon are Khusi Ram v.  Union  of  India, [1974] LIC 553 and Project Manager, ONGC v. Lal Chand  Wazir Chand Chandna, [1982] 1 SLR 654. Pathak CJ., as he then was, In  the Himachal case indicated that fair play required  the postponing  of  the  criminal trial and Thakkar  J.  as  our learned brother then was in the Gujarat case had also  taken a similar view.                                                   PG NO 824     We  would  like  to  point  out  that  there  are   also authorities in support of the position that there is nothing wrong in parallel proceedings being taken--one by way of the disciplinary proceeding and the other in the criminal court. Reference  may  be made to decision of this  Court  in  Jang Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari, [1969] I SCR 134 and some decisions of High Courts such as Rama P.C. v. Superintendent of Police, Kolar & Anr., AIR 1967 54 Mysore 220; Ali Mohd. & Ors.  v.  Chairman  T.A. & C. Udhampur, [1981]  2  SLR  225; Moulindra  Singh v. The Deputy Commissioner &  Ors.,  [1973] LIC  6  l564 and Shaikh Kasim v.  Superintendent  of  Police Office, Chingletut, AIR 1965    Mad. 502.     Mr.  Jain contended that we should settle the law  in  a straight  jacket formula as judicial opinion appeared to  be conflicting. We do not propose to hazard such a step as that would create greater hardship and individual situations  may not  be available to be met and thereby injustice is  likely to ensue.     In the Delhi Cloth & General Mills’ case (supra), it was pointed out by this Court:      "It  is true that very often employers  stay  enquiries pending  the decision of the criminal trial courts and  that is  fair;  but  we cannot say  that  principles  of  natural justice require that an employer must wait for the  decision at  least of the criminal trial court before  taking  action against  an employee. In Shri Bimal Kanta Mukherjee v.  M/s. News man‘s Printing Works, [l956l LAC 188, this was the view taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. We may, however, add that if the case is of a grave nature or involves  questions of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be  advisable for  the employer to await the decision of the trial  court, so that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced .... " .     In  Tata  Oil Mills’ case (supra),  Gajendragadkar,  CJ, spoke for a three Judge Bench thus:     "There  is  yet  another  point  which  remains  to   be considered.  The Industrial Tribunal appears to  have  taken the  view that since criminal proceedings had  been  started against  Raghavan,  the domestic enquiry  should  have  been stayed  pending  the  final disposal of  the  said  criminal                                                   PG NO 825 proceedings.  As this Court has held in the Delhi Cloth  and General  Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, it is desirable that  if the  incident  giving  rise to a  charge  framed  against  a workman  in a domestic enquiry is being tried in a  criminal

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court,  the   employer,  should stay  the  domestic  enquiry pending the final disposal of the criminal case .....".     In Jang Bahadur’s case (supra) this Court said:     "The  issue in the disciplinary proceedings  is  whether the  employee  is  guilty  of the charges  on  which  it  is proposed  to  take action against him. The  same  issue  may arise for decision in a civil or criminal proceeding pending in  a court. But the pendency of the court  proceeding  does not  bar  the taking of disciplinary action.  The  power  of taking such action is vested in the disciplinary  authority. The  civil  or  criminal  court  has  no  such  power.   The initiation  and continuation of disciplinary proceedings  in good  faith is not calculated to obstruct or interfere  with the  course of justice in the pending court proceeding.  The employee is free to move the court for an order  restraining the  continuance  of  the disciplinary  proceedings.  If  he obtains a stay order, a wilful violation of the order  would of  course amount to contempt of court. In the absence of  a stay  order the disciplinary authority is free  to  exercise its lawful powers.     The view expressed in the three cases of this Court seem to  support the position that while there could be no  legal bar for simultaneous proceedings being taken. yet, there may be cases where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings  awaiting disposal of the criminal case  In  the latter  class of cases it would be open to  the  delinquent- employee  to seek such an order of stay or  injunction  from the  Court.  Whether  in the facts and  circumstances  of  a particular   case  there  should  or  should  not  be   such simultaneity of the proceedings would then receive  judicial consideration  and  the  Court  will  decide  in  the  given circumstances  of  a  particular  case  as  to  whether  the disciplinary  proceedings  should  be  interdicted,  pending criminal trial As we have already stated that it is  neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast,  straight- jacket   formula  valid  for  all  cases  and   of   general application  without  regard to the particularities  of  the individual-situation. For the disposal of the present  case, we  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  say,  anything  more, particularly  when we do not intend to lay down any  general guideline.                                                   PG NO 826     In  the  instant  case,  the  criminal  action  and  the disciplinary  proceedings are grounded upon the same set  of facts. We are of the view that the disciplinary  proceedings should have been stayed and the High Court was not right  in interfering with the trial court’s order of injunction which had been affirmed in appeal.     The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is vacated and that of the trial court as affirmed in appeal is restored. The appellant shall be entitled to costs.  Hearing fee is assessed at Rs.2,000.     We  would like to point out that for the first  time  in this   Court,  the  enquiry  report  in   the   disciplinary proceedings  was  produced.  We  express  no  view  about it. M.L.A.                                       Appeal allowed.