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PETITIONER: KUNDULA BALA SUBRAHMANYAM AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/03/1993

BENCH: ANAND, A.S. (J) BENCH: ANAND, A.S. (J) SINGH N.P. (J)

CITATION:  1993 SCR  (2) 666        1993 SCC  (2) 684  JT 1993 (2)   559        1993 SCALE  (2)214

ACT: Evidence    Act    1872:    Section    3--Appreciation    of evidence--Criminal   trial--Case  based  on   circumstantial evidence--Proof--Court’s       duty      to       scrutinize evidence--Motive, oral dying declarations, medical evidence, conduct  of  accused  immediately and  after  the  evidence, absconding  of  accused--Whether prosecution  proved  beyond reasonable doubt. Evidence  Act, 1872:  Section  32--Dying  declaration--proof of--Acceptance   by   Court  when--More   than   two   dying declarations--Trustworthy test--Court’s duty. The   Dowry  Prohibition  Act,  1961:  Object  and   purpose of--Cases relating to harassment, torture, abetted  suicides and dowry deaths of young brides--Causes--Solutions to  such situations--Court’s role what to be.

HEADNOTE: The  prosecution  case was that on 23.8.1981  between  12-30 1.00 p.m., on hearing screams and cry of the deceased,  aged about  18  years, P.W.2 alongwith her father  PW3,  and  PW4 rushed to the house of the appellant They saw the father  of appellant  No. 1 (father-in-law of the  deceased)  alongwith the husband and mother-in-law of the deceased hurriedly com- ing  out of the kitchen while the deceased was lying on  the floor engulfed in flames. As  the appellant No. 1, did not respond to the  request  of PW2  to  give  her something to  extinguish  the  fire,  PW2 requested  the father of the appellant No. 1 to give a  bed- sheet or blanket while the father of the appellant No. 1 was passing on a bed sheet to PW2, the appellant No. 2  (mother- in-law of the deceased) objected.  In the meanwhile PW2 took the  bed  sheet from the father of the appellant No.  1  and tried  to extinguish the fire.  The deceased asked  PW2  for some water.  PW3 removed the burning petticoat from the body of  the  deceased to save her from further  burning.   While doing  so he also received some burn injuries.   PW2  poured water into the deceased’s mouth and enquired from her as  to what had happened. 667 The  deceased  told PW2 that her mother-in- law  had  poured kerosene over her and her husband had set fire to her.   The deceased asked for more water, which was again given to  her

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by PW2.  The deceased’s statement made to PW2 was  overheard by  PW3  PW5 and some others who also reached  the  spot  on hearing her cries. PW5  went away to inform the matenal uncle of  the  deceased with  one Ramakrishna on his motor cycle.  There  PW5  found PW1,  the  brother of the deceased and  informed  about  the burning  of  the  deceased and also what he  had  heard  the deceased telling PW2. PW1  reached the house of the appellant with Ramakrishna  on his motor cycle.  He saw a number of persons including PWs 2 and  3 gathered there.  The deceased was lying on the  floor and  she  had no clothes on her.  PWl noticed that  she  had received  burn  injuries from her breasts downwards  to  her legs.  On seeing her plight, PWl started crying and  hitting his  head against a piller.  When the deceased  noticed  PW1 had  come, she asked PW2 to bring her brother  inside.   PW2 went out and brought PWI to the kitchen.  The deceased  took the palm of her brother, PWl into her own palms and told him to  tell  mother and father that  her  mother-in-law  poured kerosene  on  her  and her husband set  her  or  fire.   She requested  him  that he should not fight,  "anyhow  she  was dying." She also told PWl to take back the cash given to her and  to divide it amongst her sisters in equal share and  to get them married to nice persons.  The appellant No. 1,  the husband of the deceased came inside the kitchen with  folded hands  and begged her for forgiveness saying that  he  would not  repeat what he had done.  PWI got wild and caught  hold of  the  neck of the appellant No. 1. FIW2  and  PW3  rushed towards them and released the appellant No. 1 from the  hold of PW1.  They sent PWI to another uncle’s house and told the uncle  to take care of PW1.  When PWI returned to the  house of  the  deceased after one hour he saw that  PW6,  a  local Doctor,  was  giving first-aid to the deceased and  she  was lying  on a cot in the verandah.  PW6 advised at about  3.30 p.m. to remove the deceased to the Government Hospital.  The deceased  was  brought to the hospital at about  5  p.m.  At about  5.30  p.m., PW9, a doctor examined the  deceased  and declared her dead. PWl  along  with  his  uncle went  to  the  Police  Station, adjacent  to the hospital and lodged the FIR.  A case  under section 302 IPC was registered 668 and police investigation was started. Both  the  appellants  were not found in  the  village  when search for them was made by the investigating officer.   The appellant No. 1 surrendered in the Court on 10.11.1981 while the appellant No. 2 surrendered in the Court on 7.12.1981. The  Trial  Court  held that there was  no  motive  for  the appellant to commit the crime; that the evidence of PWs 2 to 4  could not be relied upon; that PW1 had made  improvements in  his statements recorded at the trial and, therefore  the oral  dying-  declaration made to him could  not  be  relied upon.  The Trial Court also held that there was  unexplained delay  in lodging report with the policy.  It acquitted  the appellants, holding that the case was one of suicide and not of murder. The  State filed appeal in the High Court.  The  High  Court held  that  the chain of the established  circumstances  was complete and the circumstances were sufficient to  establish that the appellants alone had committed the crime of  murder of  the  deceased.   The  High  Court  convicted  both   the appellants  for  the offence under section  302/34  IPC  and sentenced each one of them to imprisonment for life. Hence  this appeal before this Court under section  2(a)  of the   Supreme  Court  (Enlargement  of  Criminal   Appellate

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Jurisdiction) Act, 1970. The  appellants  contended that since the  Trial  Court  had acquitted  the appellants, the High Court was not  justified in  recording  an  order  or  conviction,  as  the  findings recorded  by  the  Trial  Court could  not  be  said  to  be perverse;  that  the dying declarations were not  worthy  of reliance and the motive was feeble and not established; that the  surrendering of the appellants themselves in the  court on  10.11.1981 and 7.12.1981 itself was enough to show  that they  had  no guilty-conscious and the prosecution  was  not justified in relying upon this conduct as an adverse conduct against  the  appellants; and that since all  neighbors  had become  hostile,  out  of fear the appellants  did  not  act either  to  put off the fire or remove the deceased  to  the hospital. The  respondent-State  submitted that the  findings  of  the Trial Court were not only conjectural but also perverse  and the evidence of the wit- 669 nesses  was  disbelieved on mere surmises;  that  the  Trial Court  did,not properly discuss the two  dying  declarations made  by the deceased and since the dying declarations  have been proved by reliable evidence, these by themselves  could form  the  basis of conviction of the appellants;  that  the High  Court  after a careful appraisal of the  evidence  had rightly  set  aside the judgment of the  Trial  Court  which suffered  from  illegality  as well as  manifest  error  and perversity,,  and that the prosecution had  established  the case  against the appellants beyond every  reasonable  doubt and their appeal deserved to be dismissed. Dismissing the appeal, this Court, HELD:1.01. In a case based on circumstantial  evidence, the  settled  law is that the circumstances from  which  the conclusion  of  guilt is drawn should be  fully  proved  and these circumstances must be conclusive in nature.  Moreover, all  the  established circumstances should be  complete  and there should be no gap in the chain of evidence.  The proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused alone and totally inconsistent with his  innocence.   The courts have, therefore,  the  duty  to carefully  scrutinize  the  evidence  and  deal  with   each circumstance carefully and thereafter find whether the chain of  the established circumstances is complete or not  before passing an order of conviction. [679 E-F] 1.02.In  a  case based on  circumstantial  evidence,  motive assumes   great   significance  as  its  existence   is   an enlightening  factor in a process of presumptive  reasoning. The motive in this case is alleged to be the greed of dowry. [679 H] 1.03.The  evidence led by the prosecution to establish,  the existence   of  motive  is  wholly  reliable  and  is   also consistent.   The prosecution has  successfully  established that  the  appellants had strong and  compelling  motive  to commit the crime because of her parents not agreeing to  get the  land registered in the name of the first appellant  and their insistence to have the land registered in the name  of their   own  daughter  instead.   The  motive,   has,   been conclusively established by the prosecution. [682 D] 1.04.Both  the dying declarations are oral.  They  have been  made  to friends and to the brother  of  the  deceased respectively.   In  view of the close  relationship  of  the witnesses to whom the oral dying declarations were 670 made,  it  becomes  necessary for  the  court  to  carefully scruitinize and appreciate the evidence of the witnesses  to

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the dying declarations- [683.  B] 1.05.PW1 is the brother of the deceased and therefore a very close relation, but mere relationship cannot be a ground  to discard  his  testimony,  if it is  otherwise  found  to  be reliable and trustworthy.  In the natural course of  events, the  deceased who was on the verge of her death  would  have conveyed to her near and dear ones the circumstances leading to  her receiving the burn injuries.  PW1 has given  a  very consistent  statement  and has reproduced the words  of  the deceased  clearly and truthfully.  Nothing has been  brought out  in the cross examination to discredit his testimony  at all. [683 C-D] 1.6.Despite  searching  cross-examination of both  PW2  and PW3, nothing has been brought out in their cross-examination to  discredit  them or doubt their veracity at  all.   After carefully  analysing their evidence, it is found that PWs  2 and  3 as witnesses worthy of credence and  trustworthy.[684 F] 1.07.From  the  evidence of PWs 1,2 and 3,  both  the  dying declarations are provedto have been made by the  deceased. They are the statements made by thedeceased and  relate to  the circumstances leading to her death. Both  the  dying declarations  are consistent with each other and  appear  to have  been  made  by the deceased  voluntarily  and  in  the natural  course of events.  They have a ring of truth  about them. [684 G] 1.08The   medical   evidence,   fully   corroborates    the prosecution case and lendssupport    to    the     dying declaration and more particularly the manner inwhich  the deceased had been set on fire.[686 D] 1.09.The normal human conduct of any person finding  someone engulfed  in flames would be to make all efforts to put  off the  flames and. save the life of the person.   Though,  the appellants were the closest relations of the deceased,  they did not do anything of the kind.  They rendered no first-aid to  the  deceased.   Their  conduct  at  the  time  of   the occurrence,  therefore, clearly points towards  their  guilt and  is inconsistent with their innocence.   The  appellants did  not even accompany the deceased to the hospital in  the matador van.  Had the husband not been a party to the crime, one would have expected that he would be the first person to take steps to remove the deceased to the hospital and  leave no stone unturned 671 to  save  her life.  An innocent mother-in- law  would  have also  done  the same, even if she had no love  or  emotional feelings  for her daughter-in-law.  Neither the husband  nor the  mother-in-law of the deceased took any steps to  remove the deceased to the hospital let alone accompany her to  the hospital.   This  conduct also is  inconsistent  with  their innocence and consistent only with the hypothesis, as stated by the deceased in her dying declarations, that the  mother- in-law had poured kerosene on her while her husband had  lit fire and put her on flames. [686 H, 687 A-D] 1.10.The  prosecution  has, thus,  successfully  established that the conduct ofboth the appellants both at the time  of the occurrence and immediatelythereafter is  consistent only with the hypothesis-of the guilt of the appellants  and inconsistent with their innocence. [688 B] 1.11.Absconding by itself may not be a positive circumstance consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the  accused because it is not unknown that even innocent persons may run away  for fear of being falsely involved in a criminal  case and  arrested  by  the police, but coupled  with  the  other circumstances,  the  absconding of  the  appellants  assumes

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Importance   and   significance.    The   prosecution    has successfully  established this circumstance also to  connect the appellants with the crime. [688 E-F] 1.12.The  prosecution has successfully established  all  the circumstances   appearing  in  the  evidence   against   the appellants  by clear, cogent and reliable evidence  and  the chain  of the established circumstances is complete and  has no  gaps  whatsoever and the same  conclusively  establishes that the appellants and appellants alone committed the crime of  murdering the deceased on the fateful day in the  manner suggested   by   the  prosecution.   All   the   established circumstances  are consistent only with the hypothesis  that it was the appellants alone who committed the crime and  the circumstances  are  inconsistent with any  hypothesis  other than their guilt. [688 G-H, 687 A] 2.01.Under Section 32, when a statement Is made by a person, as  to the cause of death or as to any of the  circumstances which  result In his death, in cases in which the  cause  of that  person’s death comes into question, such a  statement, oral or in writing, made by the deceased to the witness is a relevant fact and is admissible in evidence.  The  statement made by the deceased, called the dying declaration, falls in that  category  provided it has been made  by  the  deceased while in a lit mental condition. [684 H, 685 A-B] 672 2.02.A dying declaration made by person on the verge of  his death  has  a special sanctity as at that solemn  moment,  a person  is  most unlikely to make any untrue  statement  The shadow of impending death is by itself the guarantee of  the truth  of the statement made by the deceased  regarding  the causes  or  circumstances  leading to his  death.   A  dying declaration,  therefore, enjoys almost a sacrosanct  status, as a piece of evidence, coming as it does from the mouth  of the deceased victim.  Once the statement of the dying person and  the  evidence of the witnesses testifying to  the  same passes  the  test  of careful scrutiny  of  the  courts,  it becomes  a very important and a reliable piece  of  evidence and if the court is satisfied that the dying declaration  is true   and   free  from  any  embelishment  such   a   dying declaration,  by  itself, can be  sufficient  for  recording conviction  even without looking for any  coroboration.   If there  are more than one dying declarations, then the  court has  also to scrutinise all the dying declarations  to  find out  if  each  one  of  these  passes  the  test  of   being trustworthy.   The Court must further find out  whether  the different dying declarations are consistent with each  other in  material particulars before accepting and  relying  upon the same. [685 C-E] 2.03.Both  the dying declarations are consistent  with  each other  in  all  material facts and  particulars.   That  the deceased was in a proper mental condition to make the  dying declaration  or  that they were voluntary has  neither  been doubted by the defence in the course of cross-examination of the  witnesses nor even in the course of arguments  both  in the  High  Court  and before this  Court.   Both  the  dying declarations  have passed the test of credit worthiness  and they suffer from no infirmity whatsoever. [685 F-G] 2.04.The  prosecution  has successfully established  a  very crucial  piece of circumstantial evidence in the  case  that the  deceased  had voluntarily made the  dying  declarations implicating  both, the appellants and disclosing the  manner in which she had been put on fire shortly before her  death. This  circumstance, therefore, has been established  by  the prosecution  beyond  every  reasonable doubt  by  clear  and

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cogent evidence. [685 G-H] 3.01.There  has been an alarming increase in cases  relating to harassment, torture, abetted suicides and dowry deaths of young  innocent brides.  This growing cult of  violence  and exploitation  of the young brides, though keeps  on  sending shock  waves to the civilised society whenever  it  happens, continues  unabated.   There is a constant  erosion  of  the basic 673 human  values of tolerance and the spirit of "live  and  let live’.   Lack of education and economic dependence of  women have encouraged the greedy perpetrators of the crime.  It is the woman who plays a pivotal role in this crime against the younger  woman,  as in this case, with  the  husband  either acting as a mute spectator or even an active participant  in the   crime,   in  utter  disregard   of   his   matrimonial obligations. [689 C-D] 3.02.Awakening  of the collective consciousness is the  need of the day.  Change of heart and attitude is what is needed. If  man were to regain his harmony with others  and  replace hatred,  greed, selfishness and anger by mutual love,  trust and understanding and if woman were to receive education and become  economically  independent, the possibility  of  this pernicious social evil dying a natural death may not  remain a dream only. [690-D] 3.03.The legislature, realising the gravity of the situation has amended the laws and provided for stringent  punishments in such case and even permitted the raising of  presumptions against  the  accused in cases of unnatural  deaths  of  the brides within the first seven years of their marriage.  [690 H] 3.04.The  Dowry Prohibition Act was enacted in 1961 and  has been  amended  from time to time, but this piece  of  social legislation,  keeping  in view the growing  menance  of  the social  evil,  also  does not appear  to  have  served  much purpose  as  dowry seekers are hardly brought  to  book  and convictions recorded are rather few. [691 A] 3.05.Laws are not enough to combat the evil.  A wider social movement of educating women of their rights, to conquer  the menace,  is what is needed more particularly in rural  areas where  women are still largely uneducated and less aware  of their  rights and fall an easy prey to  their  exploitation. [691 B] 3.06.The  role  of courts, under the  circumstances  assumes greater importance and it is expected that the courts  would deal  with  such cases in a more realistic  manner  and  not allow  the  criminals  to escape on  account  of  procedural technicalities  or insignificant lacune in the  evidence  as otherwise the criminals would receive encouragement and  the victims  of crime would be totally discouraged by the  crime going  unpunished.  The courts are expected to be  sensitive in cases involving crime against women. [691 C] 674 State (Delhi Administration) v. Lavnan & Ors., Crl.  Appeals 93 and 94 of 1984 decided on 23.9.1985, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 629  of 1985. From  the Judgment and Order dated 25.6.1985 of  the  Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 637 of 1983. K.Madhava  Reddy,  A. Subba Rao and A.D.N.  Rao  for  the Appellants.

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G. Prabhakar for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR.ANAND,  J.  The curse of dowry has  claimed  yet  another victim.   Kundula  Bala  Subrahmanyam, the  husband  of  the deceased-Kundula   Koti  Nagbani  and  his  mother   Kundula Annapurna  (mother-in-law of the deceased) have  filed  this appeal under Section 2(a) of the Supreme Court  (Enlargement of  Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Act, 1970  against  the judgment  of  the High Court of Andhra  Pradesh,  Hyderabad, dated  25.6.1985,  setting aside the judgment  of  acquittal passed  by  the Sessions Judge, East Godavari  Division  and convicting both the appellants for an offence under  Section 302/34   IPC   and  sentencing  each  of  them   to   suffer imprisonment for life. On 23rd of August, 1981, between 12.30.1.00 p.m. on  hearing screams  and cry of deceased-Kundula Koti Nagbani,  at  that time  aged  about  18 years,  Pulapa  Lakshmi  PW2,  Vempati Paparao  PW3 and Vempati Radha PW4, rushed to the  house  of the  appellant and found both the appellants along with  the father  of appellant No. 1 (father-in-law of  the  deceased) hurriedly  coming out of the kitchen while the deceased  was lying   on  the  floor  engulfed  in  flames.   Since,   the appellants or the father-in-law of the deceased were  making no attempts to put off the flames, PW2 asked appellant No. 1 to give her something so that she could extinguish the fire. He,  however,  did not respond.  She  then  requested  first appellant’s father to give something to her so that the fire could be put off.  The father of appellant No. 1 enquired if he should get a bucket of water.  PW2, thereupon,  requested him to give either a bed-sheet or a blanket.  The father  of appellant  No. 1 then brought out a bed sheet (Bontha)  from the cot and 675 as  he was passing it on, to PW2, the mother-in-law  of  the deceased, appellant No. 2, told her husband not to give  the bontha to PW2.  PW2, in the meanwhile, took the bontha  from the  father of the first appellant and tried  to  extinguish the  fire.   The deceased turned her side.  She  was  alive. The deceased asked PW2 for some water.  Since, the petticoat of the deceased was burning, PW3, the father of PW2, who had also  rushed  along with her to the house of  the  appellant broke  the thread of the petticoat to save her from  further burning and threw away the burning garments In the  process, he also received some burn injuries.  PW2 poured water  into the  mouth of the deceased and enquired from her as to  what had happened.  The deceased told her that "her mother-in-law had poured kerosene over her and her husband had set fire to her".   The deceased again felt thirsty and asked  for  more water  which  was  again given to her  by  PW2.   The  above statement  made by the deceased to PW2 was overheard by  PW3 and some others, who had also reached on hearing the  cries. Vempati Nagabhushanam PW5, another immediate neighbor of the appellants  living  only about 2 yards away also  heard  the cries  of  the  deceased  and rushed to  the  house  of  the appellant.  He noticed PW3 was pulling out the petticoat  of the  deceased while PW2 was attempting to  extinguish  fire. He saw PW2 pouring water into the mouth of the deceased.  He also  heard the statement made by the deceased to PW2  about the manner in which she had been set on fire.  PW5 thereupon went  away to inform the maternal uncle of the  deceased  at Malakapalli.  On the way, he met one Ramakrishna coming on a motor-cycle  and at his request Ramakrishna gave him a  ride to Malakapalli.  On reaching the house of the maternal uncle of  the  deceased, they found the brother  of  the  deceased Vempati Sreerama Krishna Sreeram PWl was also present there.

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He conveyed to them the information regarding the burning of the deceased and also what he had heard the deceased telling PW2.   Ramarao and PWl then went on the same  motorcycle  to Dharmavaram.  PWl reached the house of the appellant and saw a  number of persons including PWs 2 and 3  gathered  there. The deceased was lying on the floor and at that time she had no  clothes on her.  He noticed that she had  received  burn injuries from her breasts downwards to her legs.  On  seeing her plight, PW1 started crying and hitting his head  against a pillar.  When the deceased noticed that PW1 had come,  she asked  PW2  to call her brother PWl inside.   PW2  thereupon went  out and brought PW1 to the kitchen where the  deceased took  the  palm of PWl into her own palms and  told  him  in Hindi "please tell mother and father as I am 676 telling you.  My mother-in- law poured kerosene on me and my husband  set fire.  You tell father and mother  about  this. Don’t fight.  Anyhow I am dying." She also told her  brother PW1 to take back the cash given to her and divide it amongst the sisters in equal share and get them married off to  nice persons.  At this juncture, the first appellant, husband  of the  deceased came inside the kitchen and with folded  hands begged the deceased for forgiveness saying that he would not repeat  what he had done and therefore he may  be  pardoned. PWl  got  wild  and caught hold of the  neck  of  the  first appellant.  PW2 and PW3 rushed towards them and released the first appellant from the hold of PW1 and sent PWl to another uncle’s  house and told the uncle that since PWl was  in  an agitated  mood he should take care of him.  Within an  hour, however,  PWl went back to the house of the deceased and  by that  time, a local Doctor PW6, Dr. R.  Radha  krishnamurthy had arrived at the house and was giving first-aid to her and she  was lying on a cot in the verandah.  PW6 at about  3.30 p.m.  advised the removal of the deceased to the  Government Hospital at Kovvur.  A matador van was secured and at  about 4.30  p.m.  PW1, Ramarao, his maternal uncle,  the  wife  of Ramarao  and some other neighbors took the deceased  to  the Government  Hospital at Kovvur in the matador  van  reaching there   at  about  5  p.m.  At  about  5.30  p.m.,  Dr.   K. Parameswaradas  PW9 examined the deceased and  declared  her dead.   PWl  thereupon went to the police station  which  is adjacent to the hospital alongwith his uncle and lodged  the report Ex.P4 with the Head Constable Md.  Navabjani PW12.  A case  under section 302 IPC was registered  and  information was  sent  to Inspector of Police G. Scendavce Rao  PW14  on telephone.   After  collecting  a  copy  of  the  FIR,  PW14 proceeded to the Government Hospital and from there went  to the  scene of occurrence.  He seized M.0’s 1 to 3, drew  the site plan of the scene of occurrence and examined PWs 1 to 5 and   PW9  at  Dharmavaram.   He  also  held   the   inquest proceedings  from 6.30 a.m. to 8.30 a.m. on August  24  1981 and  after getting the postmortem conducted handed over  the dead-body  to  the  family  of the  deceased.   PW9  Dr.  K. Parameswaradas  who conducted the postmortem examination  in his report Ex.Pl8 noted extensive burns to the extent of 90% on the body of the deceased and opined that the deceased had died  due to the extensive burns all over the body and  that the  injuries  were  sufficient in the  ordinary  course  of nature  to  cause  death.   During  the  investigation,  the investigating officer made a request for the preservation of viscera  of  the  deceased  so that it  could  be  sent  for chemical examination, as according to the state- 677 ment  of PW6, the deceased had allegedly told him  that  she had  consumed dettol to commit suicide and since  she  could

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not  bear the pain she had set herself on fire.  The  report of  the chemical examiner Ex.Pl6, however, revealed that  no poison  was detected and that the death had been caused  due to  extensive  burns.  Further investigation into  the  case was,  carried out by Md.  Baduruddin PW15, Inspector of  the Crime  Branch.  During the investigation, the father of  the deceased Venkataramana handed over letters Exs.Pl-P3 to  the investigating   officer.   Both  the  appellants  had   made themselves  scarce  and were not found in the  village  when search for them was made by the investigating officer.   The first appellant surrendered in the court on 10.11.1981 while the  second  appellant surrendered in the court  on  7th  of December, 1981. After the investigation was over, challan was filed and both the  appellants  were  sent up for trial  in  the  Court  of Sessions Judge East Godavari Division at Rajahmundry. At  the  trial, the prosecution inter alia relied  upon  the following circumstances with a view to connect the appellant with the crime:-               (1) Motive;               (2)   Two  dying declarations made to PW2  and               to PW1;               (3)   Medical Evidence;               (4)   Conduct of the appellant immediately and               after the occurrence;               (5)   Absconding of the appellants. The  appellants  when  examined under  Section  313  of  the Criminal Procedure Code denied their involvement and  stated the  case  to be a false one.  They,  however,  produced  no defence. The  learned  Trial  Court did not  accept  the  prosecution version and held that there was no motive for the  appellant to  commit the crime; that the evidence of PWs 2 to 4  could not  be relied upon; that PWI had made improvements  in  his statements  recorded at the trial and, therefore,  the  oral dying declaration made to him could not be relied upon.  The Trial court also held that there had been unexplained  delay in  lodging report with the police.  The Trial Court  placed reliance on the testimony of hostile 678 witness  PW6 and held that the case was one of  suicide  and not  of  murder.  On those findings,  the  learned  Sessions Judge acquitted both the appellants. On  an appeal, filed by the State, a Division Bench  of  the High  Court of Andhra Pradesh set aside the judgment of  the learned Sessions Judge and convicted both the appellants for an  offence  under  Section 302/34 IPC.   Speaking  for  the Division  Bench, K. Ramaswamy J. (as His Lordship then  was) found no hesitation to hold PWl as a witness of truth and  a wholly reliable witness and also opined that the evidence of ’PWs  2  and  3 was trustworthy  and  reliable.   The  dying declarations made by the deceased to PW2 and subsequently to PWl were believed and relied upon.  It was held that  report Ex.P4  had been given by PWl immediately after the  deceased was  declared dead by the Doctor and therefore there was  no delay  much  less unexplained delay in lodging  the  report. While  dealing  with the conduct of the  appellant,  it  was opined  that  their  conduct  was  inconsistent  with  their innocence  and  consistent  only with  the  hypothesis  that appellant no. 2 had committed the act of pouring kerosene on the deceased and appellant No. 1 had lit fire.  With  regard to the existence of motive, it was held that the  appellants were actuated with a motive to do away with the life of  the deceased for not getting the land registered in the name  of the first appellant.  Finally, the High Court found that the

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chain of the established circumstances was complete and  the circumstances  were sufficient to conclusive establish  that the  appellants and the appellants alone had  committed  the crime  of murder of the deceased.  The High Court held  that the consideration of evidence on record and the reasoning of the  Trial  Court was most unsatisfactory and could  not  be sustained and therefore set aside the order of acquittal and convicted both the appellants for the offence under  Section 302/34  IPC and sentenced each one of them  to  imprisonment for life. Appearing  for the appellants before us, Mr.  Madhav  Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel urged that since the Trial  Court had  acquitted  the  appellants,  the  High  Court  was  not justified  in  recording  an  order  of  conviction  as  the findings recorded by the Trial Court could not be said to be perverse.   It was argued that the dying  declarations  were not  worthy  of reliance and the motive was feeble  and  not established.     Learned   counsel   submitted   that    the surrendering  of the appellants themselves in the  court  on 10.11.1981 and 7.12.1981 itself was enough to show that they had no 679 guilty  conscious and the prosecution was not  justified  in relying  upon the conduct as an adverse conduct against  the appellants.  While explaining the conduct of the  appellants at  the time of and after the occurrence, he submitted  that since  all  neighbors had become hostile, out  of  fear  the appellants did not act either to put off the fire or  remove the deceased to the hospital. In  reply,  learned counsel for the State  argued  that  the findings  of the Trial Court were not only  conjectural  but also  perverse  and  the  evidence  of  the  witnesses   was disbelieved  on  mere surmises.  It was submitted  that  the Trial   Court  did  not  property  discuss  the  two   dying declarations  mad  by  the  deceased  and  since  the  dying declarations have been proved by reliable evidence, those by themselves  could  form  the  basis  of  conviction  of  the appellants.  It was then submitted that the High Court after a  careful appraisal of the evidence had rightly  set  aside the  judgment  of  the  Trial  Court  which  suffered   from illegality  as  well  as  manifest  error  and   perversity. Learned   counsel   submitted  that  the   prosecution   had established  the  case against the appellants  beyond  every reasonable doubt and their appeals deserve to be dismissed. Admittedly,  there is no eye-witness in the case.  The  case is  sought  to  be  established  by  the  prosecution   from circumstantial evidence.  In a case based on circumstantial, evidence,  the  settled law is that  the  circumstance  from which  the  conclusion  of guilt is drawn  should  be  fully proved an these circumstances must be conclusive in  nature. Moreover,  all  the  established  circumstances  should   be complete  and  there  should  be no  gap  in  the  chain  of evidence.  The proved circumstances must be consistent  only wit  the  hypothesis of the guilt of the accused  alone  and totally  inconsistent wit his innocence.  The  courts  have, therefore, the duty to carefully scrutinize the evidence and deal  with  each circumstance carefully and  thereafter  fin whether  the  chain  of  the  established  circumstances  is complete or no before passing an order of conviction.  It is in the light of the above principles that we shall deal with various circumstances relied upon by the prosecution. (1)Motive:  In  a case based on  circumstantial  evidence, motive  as  sums great significance as its existence  is  an enlightening  factor  in process of  presumptive  reasoning. The motive in this case is alleged to be the greed of dowry.

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680 On  18.5.1979,  marriage  between  the  appellant  and   the deceased  was solemnised.  The deceased aged about 18  years was  prosecuting  her Intermediate course of study  at  that time.   She  was  the eldest of the  five  children  of  one Vempati Venkataramana, who at the relevant time was  working as an Assistant Engineer with the Railways at Gorakhpur.  At the  time of the marriage, the parents of the  deceased  had agreed to give Rs. 50,000 in cash, 50 sovereigns of gold and two  acres of land as dowry.  The cash was paid at the  time of the marriage itself alongwith 15 sovereigns of gold.  The parents  of the deceased had promised to give the  remaining 35  gold  sovereigns  and  get  the  land  also   registered subsequently,  though the possession of the  land  measuring about  3.70  acres  was given to the appellant  No.  1.  The mother-in-law  of  the  deceased and her  husband  had  been pressurising  the deceased all along to bring the  remaining sovereigns  and also to get the land registered in the  name of the first appellant.  She conveyed it to her mother  PW7. While  the  parents of the deceased agreed to get  the  land registered in the name of the deceased, the first  appellant and  his parents were insisting that the land should be  got registered in his name and not in the name of the  deceased. Since that desire was not fulfilled, the deceased was  being continuously  harassed and ill-treated.  A strick vigil  was kept on her at the house of her in-laws and she was not even allowed to meet anybody nor were the neighbors permitted  to come and meet or talk to her.  She was being prevented  from writing letters to her family also, but stealthy, she  wrote letters  Exs.Pl-3  and got them posted through  a  neighbor. The  contents  of  those letters are  rather  revealing  and expose  the extent of the harassment to which  the  deceased was being subjected to by her mother-in-law and her husband. After seeing the contents of the letters and with a view  to find out the cause of her distress, PW1, her brother went to Dharmavaram  on  August  22,  1981,  to  the  house  of  the deceased.  The deceased, however, was so terrorised that she could  not speak to him freely.  She was surrounded  by  her husband  and her mother-in-law, who did not talk to  PWl  at all  to show their indifference.  From the evidence  of  the prosecution witnesses and particularly that of the mother of the   deceased  PW7,  the  immediate  provocation  was   the insistence of the appellants that the land be got registered in  the  name  of the husband and  the  reluctance’  of  the parents of the deceased to do so and instead their desire to get  it  registered in the name of the deceased.   The  oral evidence  led  by the prosecution in this behalf  is  wholly consistent.  In her letter Ex.P2, the 681 deceased  had  clearly mentioned that she  was  getting  her letters  posted through PW4.  She requested her  sisters  to write  letters to her in Hindi so that her in-laws, who  did not  know Hindi, could not know what was being written.   In one  of  her letters, a part of which was addressed  to  her sister, she wrote:               ".......I  am  not going to  anybody’s  house.               One  day I went to the house of  sister-in-law               Radha  to deliver the letter secretly.   Their               mood was changed on account of going to  their               house.   That is why I stopped going." Do  not               mention even a single word in your letter that               I have been writing to you.  Ask mother not to               worry.  On hearing about your results write  a               letter without fail.  If I get an  opportunity               I will definitely write a letter..."

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             In her letter Ex.P1 to her father, she wrote:               Father I am feeling much bore here because  no               one  come to our house nor I am allowed to  go               their  house Please always write letters.   So               that  I  may  be  satisfied  in  seeing   your               letters.   If  I may not give  reply  to  your               letter  then  you please don’t mind  it.   You               know  here’s conditions.  Rest is O.K.  Father               you also take care of your health."               In  the  same  letter  while  addressing   her               sisters, she wrote:               The lock is opened.  I am writing this  letter               secretly.  In reply do not write that you have               received  the letter.  If you write like  that               these people will become more angry               She also wrote to her sister:               not at house and there is no watch over me.  I               am getting the letters posted through  sister-               in-law  Radha  secretly.   You  write  letters               mostly  in  Hindi only so that  even  if  they               chanced to fall in the hands of any one,  they               cannot understand The  tenor of her letters disclose the distressing state  of affairs at the house 682 of her-in-laws.  These letters coupled with the evidence  of her  mother go to show how the deceased was being  tormented and  harassed.   It is indeed a shame and pity  that  within just two years of her marriage, her dream of a happy married life  was  shattered  and  she found  herself  almost  as  a prisoner and ’a frightened chicken’ who had to write letters to  her parents and sisters ’secretly’ for the fear that  if her  in- laws came to know they would "become  more  angry’. She  had to request her sisters to reply to her  letters  in Hindi so that "even if they chanced to fall in the hands  of anyone,  they cannot understand".  One can only imagine  the plight  of this young bride and the sadistic  behavior  born out  of  greed for dowry of her husband  and  mother-in-law. Not having been able to get the land registered in the  name of  the first appellant appears to have frustrated  them  to the extent of murdering the young wife. The  evidence  led  by  the  prosecution  to  establish  the existence   of  motive  is  wholly  reliable  and  is   also consistent.   The prosecution has  successfully  established that  the  appellants had strong and  compelling  motive  to commit the crime because of her parents not agreeing to  get the  land registered in the name of the first appellant  and their insistence to have the land registered in the name  of their   own  daughter  instead.   The  motive,   has,   been conclusively  established by the prosecution and we have  no hesitation  to  hold that the prosecution has  succeeded  in establishing  the  existence  of the  motive  for  both  the appellants  to commit the crime conclusively and  positively and  we  agree with the finding of the High  Court  in  that behalf. 2.Dying  Declarations: The next piece  of  circumstantial evidence  relied  upon  by the  prosecution  are  two  dying declarations  made  by  the  deceased.   According  to   the prosecution case, the deceased made the first dying declara- tion before PW2 when she after hearing her cries came to the house  and  found  both the appellants  and  the  father  of appellant  No. 1 coming out of the kitchen and the  deceased lying  on the floor engulfed in flames.  According  to  PW2, the  deceased  told her that her mother- in-law  had  poured kerosene  on her and her husband had set her on fire.   This

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statement  was  also heard by PW3 & PW5.  The  second  dying declaration  was  made by the deceased to her  brother  PW1, after  he was called by her to the kitchen.   The  deceased, according  to the prosecution case, on meeting her  brother, took the palm of PWl into her own palms and inter-alia  told to  him that "her mother-in-law poured kerosene on  her  and her  husband  set fire to her".  The statement made  by  the deceased to 683 PW1  was in Hindi.  Both the statements, as  noticed  above, relate  to  the circumstances leading to the  cause  of  her death,  as according to the medical evidence,  the  deceased died of 90% burn injuries.  Both the dying declarations  are oral.  They have been made to friends and to the brother  of the   deceased   respectively.   In  view   of   the   close relationship  of  the  witnesses  to  whom  the  oral  dying declarations  were  made,  it becomes necessary  for  us  to carefully  scrutinize  and appreciate the  evidence  of  the witnesses to the dying declaration. We have already adverted to the evidence of these  witnesses (PW1,  PW2,  PW3)  while  narrating  the  prosecution  case. Indeed,  PWl is the brother of the deceased and therefore  a very  close  relation,  but mere relationship  cannot  be  a ground to discard his testimony, if it is otherwise found to be  reliable  and  trustworthy.  In the  natural  course  of events, the deceased who was on the verge of her death would have  conveyed to her near and dear ones  the  circumstances leading to her receiving the burn injuries.  PW1 has given a very  consistent statement and has reproduced the  words  of the  deceased  clearly  and truthfully.   Nothing  has  been brought  out  in  the cross  examination  to  discredit  his testimony  at  all.  He had at the earliest  point  of  time disclosed  as  to what the deceased had told  to  him.   The discrepancy   pointed  out  by  learned  counsel   for   the appellants  as to whether the dying declaration was made  to him  by  his  sister when she was lying on the  cot  in  the verandah, as stated in FIR Ex.P4, or while she was lying  on the floor of the kitchen, is of an insignificant nature  and could be either out of confusion or the gap of time  between the making of the two statements.  Moreover, PW1 was not  at all  cross-examined on the alleged discrepancy when he  gave evidence  in  Court.  No explanation whatsoever  was  sought from him about the so called discrepancy.  PW1, the  brother of  the deceased appears to us to be a truthful witness  and his  testimony has impressed us.  He did not  implicate  the father of the appellant and gave evidence only about what he was  actually told by his sister.  From our appreciation  of the evidence of PW1, we agree with the view expressed by the High Court that "considering the case from all  perspectives we  have  no hesitation to hold that P.W.1 is a  witness  of truth  worthy of acceptance and so he is wholly  a  reliable witness.  Ex.P4 is a voluntary statement given by P.W.1  and it lends corroboration to the evidence of P.W.1." Coming now to the evidence of PWs2 and 3. The substratum  of their evidence with regard to the dying declaration is  that while that they were 684 in  the kitchen of their own house, taking tea,  they  heard the  cry of a lady and rushed to the house of the  deceased, being  her close neighbors.  They saw the deceased  engulfed in  flames sprawled on the floor of the kitchen.  They  also saw  both the appellants as well as the father of  appellant No.  1  coming  out of the kitchen  to  the  verandah.   The distance  between the house of PWs2 and 3 from the house  of appellant is only 2 yards.  After PW2 took a bontha from the

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father-in-law of the deceased, to the annoyance of appellant No. 2, with a view to extinguish the fire, the deceased,  on enquiry by the witness as to what had happened told her that ’my  mother-in-law poured kerosene on me and my husband  set me on fire".  The deceased had not implicated her father-in- law,  though he was also present there’ PW3, father of  PW2, had assisted PW2 to extinguish the flames and it was he  who broke the string of the petticoat of the deceased and  threw it away.  In the process PW3 himself suffered burn injuries. His  injuries  were examined by the Doctor and found  to  be caused  by fire.  The Trial Court doubted the  testimony  of PW3  on the ground that he had made some improvement in  his evidence  in  court  when he stated that he  had  heard  the deceased  screaming and saying that she was "being  killed". He  had not stated so in his statement recorded  during  the investigation.    This,  in  our  opinion,  is   hardly   an improvement of any consequence because both in his statement in court as well as the one recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC he  has deposed that it was on hearing the ’screams’ of  the deceased that he and his daughter rushed to the house of the decased.   In  any event the so called improvement  was  not sufficient  to  discard his  testimony.   Despite  searching cross-examination of both these witnesses, nothing has  been brought out in their cross-examination to discredit them  or doubt  their  veracity at all.   After  carefully  analysing their  evidence, we find PWs 2 and 3 as witnesses worthy  of credence and trustworthy. From  the  evidence  of  PWs 1, 2  and  3,  both  the  dying declarations  are proved to have been made by the  deceased. They  are the statements made by the deceased and relate  to the  circumstances  leading to her death.   Both  the  dying declarations  are consistent with each other and  appear  to have  been  made  by the deceased  voluntarily  and  in  the natural  course of events.  They have a ring of truth  about them. Section  32(1)  of the Evidence Act is an exception  to  the general  rule  that  hearsay  evidence  is  not   admissible evidence and unless evidence is tested by cross-examination, it is not credit-worthy.  Under Section 32, when 685 a statement is made by a person, as to the cause of death or as to any of the circumstances which result in his death, in cases  in which the cause of that person’s death comes  into question, such a statement, oral or in writing, made by  the deceased to the witness is a relevant fact and is admissible in evidence.  The statement made by the deceased, called the dying  declaration, falls in that category provided  it  has been  made by the deceased while in a fit mental  condition. A dying declaration made by person on the verge of his death has a special sanctity as at that solemn moment, a person is most  unlikely to make any untrue statement.  The shadow  of impending  death is by itself the guarantee of the truth  of the  statement made by the deceased regarding the causes  or circumstances  leading to his death.  A  dying  declaration, therefore, enjoys almost a sacrosanct status, as a piece  of evidence,  coming as it does from the mouth of the  deceased victim.   Once  the statement of the dying  person  and  the evidence of the witnesses testifying to the same passes  the test  of careful scrutiny of the courts, it becomes  a  very important and a reliable piece of evidence and if the  court is  satisfied  that the dying declaration is true  and  free from any embellishment such a dying declaration, by  itself, can  be  sufficient for recording  conviction  even  without looking  for any corroboration.  If there are more than  one dying  declarations, then the court has also  to  scrutinise

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all the dying declarations to find out if each one of  these passes  the  test  of being  trustworthy.   The  Court  must further  find out whether the different  dying  declarations are  consistent  with  each other  in  material  particulars before accepting and relying upon the same.  Having read the evidence of PWs 1-3 with great care and attention, we are of the  view that their testimony is based on intrinsic  truth. Both  the dying declarations are consistent with each  other in  all material facts and particulars.  That  the  deceased was  in  a  proper  mental  condition  to  make  the   dying declaration  or  that they were voluntary has  neither  been doubted by the defence in the course of cross-examination of the  witnesses nor even in the course of arguments  both  in the  High Court and before us.  Both the dying  declarations have  passed  the test of creditworthiness and  they  suffer from   no  infirmity  whatsoever.   We  have  therefore   no hesitation  to  hold that the prosecution  has  successfully established a very crucial piece of circumstantial  evidence in the case that the deceased had voluntarily made the dying declarations implicating both the appellants and  disclosing the manner in which she had been put on fire shortly  before her   death.    This  circumstance,  therefore,   has   been established by the prosecution beyond every reasonable 686 doubt by clear and cogent evidence. 3.Medical Evidence: The next circumstance relied upon  by the  prosecution  is  the medical evidence  which  has  been provided  by  the testimony of Dr. Parameswaradas  PW9.   He deposed  that  the deceased had died of 90% burns  and  that kerosene smell was emitting from the deadbody.  According to the report of the chemical examiner, no poison was found  in the  viscera.  The chemical examiner’s report, coupled  with the  other evidence on record belies the suggestion made  by the  defence during the cross-examination of some  witnesses that  with a view to commit suicide, the deceased had  drunk dettol  and when she could not bear the pain on  account  of consumption  of dettol, she herself poured kerosene  oil  on herself and set herself on fire.  Rightly, this defence case was not pursued before us with any amount of seriousness  by the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants..  The   medical evidence, therefore fully corroborates the prosecution  case and  lends  support  to  the  dying  declaration  and   more particularly  the manner in which the deceased had been  set on fire. 4.  Conduct  of  the appellant immediately   and  after  the evidence: The  conduct of the appellants, son and mother, both at  the time  when  the  deceased lay burning on the  floor  of  the kitchen  and  afterwards  till she  succumbed  to  the  burn injuries  is  the  next  circumstance  relied  upon  by  the prosecution to connect the appellants with the crime. From the testimony of PWs 2, 3 and 4, who are the  immediate neighbors of the appellant and the deceased, they had  heard the cry of the deceased and rushed to her house.  PWs 2  and 3  found  the  deceased lying on the floor  of  the  kitchen engulfed in flames while both the appellants and  father-in- law  of the deceased were coming out of the kitchen  in  the verandah.   None of the two appellants or the  father-in-law made any attempt whatsoever to extinguish the fire and  save the deceased.  The raised no alarm.  They stood there as  if waiting  for her death, rather than make any effort to  save her.    Their  conduct,  thus,  runs  consistent  with   the hypothesis  of their guilt and betrays that of  an  innocent persons.   In their statements under Section 313 of Cr.   PC they did not deny their presence in the house at the time of

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the  occurrence, but denied their involvement in the  crime. The  normal  human  conduct of any  person  finding  someone engulfed  in flames would be to make all efforts to put  off the  flames  and save the life of the person.   Though,  the appellants were the closest relations 687 of the deceased, they did not do anything of the kind.   Let alone making any effort to extinguish the fire, according to PW2 when the father-in-law of the deceased, at her  request, was  giving  her  the  bontha  to  extinguish  the   flames, appellant no. 2, the mother-in-law of the deceased, objected to  the same.  This conduct speaks volumes about the  extent of  hatred  which the mother-in-law  exhibited  towards  her daughter-in-law.    They  rendered  no  first-aid   to   the deceased.   Their  conduct at the time  of  the  occurrence, therefore,  clearly  points  towards  their  guilt  and   is inconsistent  with their ingnocence the appellants  did  not even  accompany the deceased to the hospital in the  matador van.   Had  the husband not been a party to the  crime,  one would  have  expected that he would be the first  person  to take steps to remove the deceased to the hospital and  leave no stone unturned to save her life.  An innocent  mother-in- law  would have also done the same, even if she had no  love or emotional feelings for her daughter-in-law.  Neither  the husband nor the mother-in-law of the deceased took any steps to remove the deceased to the hospital, let alone  accompany her to the hospital.  This conduct also is inconsistent with their innocence and consistent only with the hypothesis,  as stated  by the deceased in her dying declarations, that  the mother-in-law  had poured kerosene on her while her  husband had lit fire and put her on flames.  Mr. Reddy, the  learned senior  counsel appearing for the appellants submitted  that since the neighbors and other relations of the deceased  had almost taken over the house and the person of the  daughter- in-law,  the appellants were afraid of being beaten  and  as such  they  rendered no aid to the deceased needs  a  notice only  to  be rejected.  No suggestion  whatsoever  on  these lines was made to any of the witnesses and in any event such an  explanation betrays common sense.  Since,  the  deceased had admittedly suffered burn injuries in the kitchen of  her house, there was an obligation on the part of the appellants and  the  father-in-law of the deceased, who  have  admitted their  presence in the house at the time of  occurrence,  to explain  the circumstances leading to the deceased dying  of 90%  burn injuries.  None has been offered.  The  theory  of suicide  was put up only as an argument of  despair.   While discussing  the motive and the dying declarations,  we  have come to the conclusion that the deceased died as a result of the designed move on the part of both the appellants to  put an  end  to her life and she did not commit suicide  as  was sought  to  be  suggested during  cross-examination  by  the defence  to  some witnesses.  The theory of suicide  has  no legs  to stand upon.  The conduct of the appellants who  did not try to extinguish the fire or 688 render any first-aid to her, also totally betrays the theory of suicide and we agree with the High Court that the  theory as  set  up  by the appellants  is  highly  unbelievable  or acceptable.    The  prosecution  has,   thus,   successfully established that the conduct of both the appellants both  at the  time  of the occurrence and immediately  thereafter  is consistent  only  with the hypothesis of the  guilt  of  the appellants and inconsistent with their innoncence. 5)   Absconding.   Prosecution  has  also  relied  upon  the circumstances  of the absconding of the appellants to  prove

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its case. A closer link with the conduct of the appellants both at the time  of the occurrence and immediately thereafter  is  also the   circumstance  relating  to  their   absconding.    Md. Badruddin  PW15, the investigating officer, deposed that  he had  taken  up  the investigation of  the  case  and  having examined PWsl-4 had caused search to be made for the accused but  they were not found in the village and despite  search, they  could  not  be traced.  Appellant  No.  1  surrendered before  the  court  on  10.11.1981  while  appellant  No.  2 surrundered in the court on 7.12.1981. No explanation, worth the  name,  much less a satisfactory  explanation  has  been furnished  by  the appellants about their absence  from  the village  till they surrendered in the court in the  face  of such a gruesome ’tragedy’.  Indeed, absconding by itself may not  be  a positive circumstance consistent  only  with  the hypothesis of guilt of the accused because it is not unknown that  even innocent persons may run away for fear  of  being falsely  involved  in a criminal case and  arrested  by  the police,  but coupled with the other circumstances  which  we have  discussed  above,  the absconding  of  the  appellants assumes  importance and significance.  The  prosecution  has successfully  established this circumstance also to  connect the appellants with the crime- In  view  of  the above discussion  and  our  appraisal  and analysis of-the evidence on record, we have no hesitation to hold  that the.prosecution has successfully established  all the  circumstances  appearing in the, evidence  against  the appellants  by clear, cogent and reliable evidence  and  the chain  of the established circumstances is complete and  has no  gaps  whatsoever and the same  conclusively  establishes that the appellants and appellants alone committed the crime of  murdering the deceased on the fateful day in the  manner suggested   by   the  prosecution.   All   the   established circumstances  are consistent only with the hypothesis  that it was the appellants alone 689 who   committed.the   crime  And   the   circumstances   are inconsistent with any hypothesis other than their guilt.  It is  most  unfortunate that the husband of the  deceased  not only failed to perform his duties and obligations as husband to  protect  and take care of his wife as per  the  marriage vows and instead joined his mother in the most degrading and cold blooded murder of the young innocent bride. Of  late  there  has  been an  alarming  increase  in  cases relating to harassment, torture, abetted suicides and  dowry deaths  of  young  innocent brides.  This  growing  cult  of violence and exploitation of the young brides, though  keeps on sending shock waves to the civilised society whenever  it happens, continues unabated.  There is a constant erosion of the basic human values of tolerance and the spirit of  "live and let live’.  Lack of education and economic dependence of women have encouraged the greedy perpetrators of the  crime. It is more disturbing and sad that in most of such  reported cases it is the woman who plays a pivotal role in this crime against the younger woman, as in this case, with the husband either  acting  as  a  mute  spectator  or  even  an  active participant  in  the  crime,  in  utter  disregard  of   his matrimonial obligations.  In many cases, it has been noticed that  the  husband,  even after marriage,  continues  to  be ’Mamma’s  baby  and the umbilical cord appears not  to  have been cut even at that stage.  We are here tempted to  recall the  observations of R.N. Mishra, J. (as His  Lordship  then was)  in State (Delhi Administration) v. Laxman & Ors.   Cr. Appeals  93  and  94 of 1984  decided  on  23.9.1985,  while

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dealing with a bride burning case.  It was observed:               "Marriage, according to the community to which               parties belong, is sacramental and is believed               to   have  been  ordained  in   heaven.    The               religious  rites  performed  at  the  marriage               altar  clearly indicate that the  man  accepts               the  woman as his better-half by assuring  her               protection  as  guardian,  ensuring  food  and               necessaries   of   life   as   the   provider,               guaranteeing companionship as the mate and  by               resolving  that the pleasures and  sorrows  in               the  pursuit of life shall be shared with  her               and Dharma shall be observed.  If this be  the               concept  marriage, there would be no scope  to               look for worldly considerations,  particularly               dowry.  When a girl is transplanted  from  her               natural setting into               690               an alien family, the care expected is bound to               be  more than in the case of a  plant.   Plant               has  fife  but the girl has a  more  developed               one.  Human emotions are unknown to the  plant               life.   In  the growing years in  the  natural               setting  the girl- now a bride-has formed  her               own  habits,  gathered  her  own  impressions,               developed her own aptitudes and got used to  a               way of life.  In the new setting some of these               have  to  be  accepted and  some  she  has  to               surrender.  This process of adaptation is  not               and cannot be one-sided.  Give and take,  live               and  let live, are the ways of life  and  when               the  bride is received in the new  family  she               must have a feeling of welcome and by the fond               bonds   of  love  and  affection,  grace   and               generosity, attachment and consideration  that               she may receive in the family of the  husband,               she will get into a new mould; the mould which               would last for her life.  She has to get  used               to  a new set of relationships  one type  with               the husband, another with the  parents-in-law,               a  different one with the other superiors  and               yet  a different one with the younger ones  in               the family.  For this she would require loving               guidance.  The elders in the family, including               the  mother-in-law, are expected to  show  her               the  way.   The  husband has  to  stand  as  a               mountain  of support ready to protect her  and               espouse  her cause where she is on  the  right               and  equally  ready  to cover  her  either  by               pulling  her  up or protecting  her  willingly               taking  the responsibility on to himself  when               she  is  At fault.  The process has  to  be  a               natural one and there has to be exhibition  of               cooperation  and willingness from every  side.               Otherwise how would the transplant succeed?" Awakening of the collective consciousness is the need of the day.  Change of heart and, attittide is what is needed.   If man  were  to  regain his harmony with  others  and  replace hatred,  greed, selfishness and anger by mutual love,  trust and understanding and if woman were to receive education and become  economically  independent, the possibility  of  this pernicious social evit dying a natural death may not  remain a dream only.  The legislature, realising the gravity of the situation  has amended the laws and provided  for  stringent punishments in such cases and even permitted the raising  of

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presumptions against an accused in cases of unnatural deaths of 691 the brides within the first seven years of their  marriage., The  Dowry Prohibition Act was enacted in 1961 and has  been amended  from  time  to  time, but  this  piece  of  soicial legislation,  keeping  in view the growing  menance  of  the social evil also does not appear to have served much purpose as dowry seekers are hardly brought to book and  convictions recorded are rather few.  Laws are not enough to combat  the evil.   A wider social movement of educating women of  their rights,  to  conquer  the menance, is what  is  needed  more particularly  in rural areas where women are  still  largely uneducated  and less aware of their rights and fall an  easy prey  to their exploitation.  The role of courts, under  the circumstances assumes greater importance and-it is  expected that  the  courts  would  deal with such  cases  in  a  more realistic  manner and not allow the criminals to  escape  on account   of  procedural  technicalities  or   insignificant lacunas  in  the evidence as otherwise the  criminals  would receive  encouragement  and the victims of  crime  would  be totally  discouraged  by the crime  going  unpunished.   The courts are expected to be sensitive in cases involving crime against  women.  The verdict of acquittal made by the  Trial Court  in  this cast is an apt illustration of the  lack  of sensitivity on the part of the Trial Court.  It recorded the verdict  of acquittal on mere surmises and  conjectures  and disregarded  the  evidence  of  the  witnesses  for   wholly insufficient  and  insignificant reasons.   It  ignored  the vital  factors of the case without even properly  discussing the same. The  High  Court  was,  therefore,  perfectly  justified  in convicting   the  appellants  for  the  offence  of   murder punishable  under  Section 302 readwith Section 34  IPC  and sentencing each one of them to suffer imprisonment for life. We uphold the conviction and sentence of the appellants  for the  offence  under  Section 302/34 IPC  and  dismiss  their appeal.  The appellants were directed to be released on bail by  this Court on 30.3.1989. Their bail bonds are  cancelled and  they are directed to be taken in to custody  to  suffer the remaining period of their sentence. V.P.R. Appeal dismissed. 692