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PETITIONER: KUMBHA MAWJI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/04/1953

BENCH: JAGANNADHADAS, B. BENCH: JAGANNADHADAS, B. MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND BOSE, VIVIAN

CITATION:  1953 AIR  313            1953 SCR  878  CITATOR INFO :  E          1970 SC 189  (5)  E          1981 SC2075  (22)

ACT: Indian Arbitration Act (II of 1940), ss. 14 (2), 31 (3)  and (4)   --Filing  of  award--Umpire  handing  over  award   to parties--Filing    in   Court   by    party--Necessity    of authorisation  of arbitrator, or umpire--Award filed in  two Courts--Exclusive  jurisdiction of Court in which award  was filed    earlier--Filing   award   after   arbitration    is complete--Applicability  of  s. 31(4)  ---In  a  reference", meaning of.

HEADNOTE: The  mere filing of award in Court by a party to it  without the  authority  of  the  arbitrator  or  umpire  is  not   a sufficient compliance with the terms of s. 14 of the  Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, nor can it be inferred from the  mere handing over of the original award by the umpire to both the parties that be authorised them to file the same in Court on his  behalf ; that authority has to be specifically  alleged and proved. The  phrase  "in a reference" in s. 31, sub-s. (4),  of  the Indian  Arbitration  Act, 1940, is comprehensive  enough  to cover  an  application first made after the  arbitration  is completed and a final award made, and the sub-section  vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Court in which an  application for  filing an award has been first made under s. 14 of  the Act. The respondent who was a party to an award filed an applica- tion before the Subordinate Judge of Gauhati under s. 14 (2) of  the  Indian Arbitration Act, on the 10th  August,  1949, praying that the umpire may be directed to file the award in Court and upon this notice was issued to the umpire to  file the  award  in  Court  before 24th  August,  1949.   As  the original  award  had been handed over to  the  parties,  the umpire sent by post on the 18th August, 1949, a copy of  the award  signed by him.  The Court directed the respondent  to file  the original award in Court and he did so on  the  3rd September, 1949.  Meanwhile the appellant’s solicitors  sent to  the Registrar of the Calcutta High Court Original  Side,

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on the 17th August, 1949, the original award for being filed in Court and the award was filed on the 29th August:  Held, that, as the umpire had, on the direction of the Sub- ordinate Judge of Gauhati sent a copy of the award signed.by him  to  the  Court on the 18th August,  1949,  the  earlier filing  for the purposes of s. 31(3) of the Arbitration  Act was in the Gauhati Court and not in the Calcutta High Court, though the original award was filed by the respondent in the Gauhati Court only after the appellant’s solicitor had  sent the award for filing to the 879 Calcutta High Court.  In the circumstances the Gauhati Court alone  had jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing  of  the dispute under s. 31 of the Act. Judgment of the Calcutta.  High Court affirmed.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos.  133  and 134 of 1952. Appeals  from  the  Judgment  and  Decree  dated  the   23rd February, 1951, of the High Court of Judicature at  Calcutta (Harries  C.J.  and Bannerjee J.) in Appeal No. 44  of  1950 arising out of the Judgment and Decree dated the 16th day of December,  1949,  of the said High Court (Sinha J.)  in  its Ordinary  Original Civil Jurisdiction in Award Case No.  208 of 1949. N.   C. Chatterjee (Amiya Kumar Mukherjea, with him)   for the appellant. C.   K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (G.  N.  Joshi and Jindra Lal, with him) for the respondent. 1953.  April 16.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNADHA  DAS  J.-On  the  28th  of  January,  1948,   the appellant, Khumba Mawji, entered into an agreement with  the respondent,  the  Dominion  of India (as  it  then  was)  to manufacture  and supply, to the Bengal Assam Railway,  stone boulders and ballast from Chutiapara quarry.  The  agreement was  entered  into at Calcutta, though the work  was  to  be carried  out in Assam.  It was a term of the agreement  that if  any differences arose between the parties, they were  to be  referred  to the arbitration of two persons, one  to  be nominated by each side, and that if the arbitrators were not able to agree, the matter was to be decided by an umpire  to be  nominated by both the arbitrators.  Differences  having, in fact, arisen, the dispute was referred to two arbitrators and  on their disagreement the matter went up to an  umpire, one  Mr. P. C. Chowdhury.  The umpire made two awards on  or about  the 20th of July, 1949, in favour of  the  appellant. By one of them he directed a sum of Rs. 3,67,000 to be  paid by the respondent to the 880 appellant  on  or  before the 19th  of  August,  1949,  with interest  thereafter  at  6 per cent per annum  in  case  of default.  By the other he directed a sum of Rs. 83,000 to be similarly  paid by the respondent to the appellant.   He  is said to have made over each of the two awards, in  original, to  each of the parties.  On the 10th of August,  1949,  the respondent  filed  an  application under  section  14,  sub- section (2), of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, before the court  of the Subordinate Judge of Gauhati in Assam  praying that  the umpire, Mr. Chowdhury, might be directed  to  file both the awards in court so that the petitioner might get an opportunity   for  filing  objections  thereto.    On   this application  notice  was issued to the umpire  to  file  the

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awards into that court before the 24th of August 1949.   The umpire  sent  a  letter  dated 18th  August,  1949,  to  the Subordinate  Judge, which is as follows with copies  of  the awards:- "Dear Sir, With  reference to your notice in money suit No. 63 of  1949 requiring  me to submit the awards made by me in  the  above mentioned  dispute on 20th July, 1949, I beg to submit  that the  two awards were made and signed by me in -the  presence of the parties and handed over to me on 20th July, 1949.  As directed  by  you I am sending herewith copies of  the  same signed  by me.  On the back of each of these  copies  occurs the receipt of the parties to the awards." On  receipt thereof, the Subordinate Judge made an order  on 24th August, 1949, in the following terms :- "Notice  on the umpire served.  Seen his  report  forwarding copies of the award of which the originals are said to  have been  made over to the parties.  Applicant to file his  copy on 3rd September, 1949". On  the  3rd of September, 1949, the  respondent  filed  the awards  which were handed over to it by the umpire, and  the matter was being proceeded with by issue of further  notices and  filing  of objections in the court of  the  Subordinate Judge, Gauhati. 881 Meanwhile on the 17th of August 1949, i.e., a week after the respondent made its first application in the Gauhati  court, the  appellant’s solicitors, Messrs.  Mukherjee and  Biswas, sent  a letter to the Registrar of the High Court,  Original Side, as follows: "  On  behalf  of our client Mr. Kumbha  Mowjee  we  beg  to enclose  herewith two original Awards duly stamped and  both dated,  20th  July,  1949, for the respective  sums  of  Rs. 3,67,000 and Rs. 83,000 duly signed by the Umpire Mr. P.  C. Chaudhury for filing. Please  therefore  direct the office to file  the  said  two Awards  and  to  issue notices in  respect  thereof  expedi- tiously." After  some correspondence between the Deputy Registrar  and the  solicitors calling for some further papers, the  Deputy Registrar  informed the solicitors by his letter  dated  the 29th  August, 1949, that the award had been filed and  asked the  solicitors to take out from the court and serve on  the parties  concerned  the statutory notice fixing a  date  for judgment upon the said award by the Commercial Judge of  the court.  Notices were thereupon issued to both the parties in the following terms: "To 1.   Kumbha Mawji. 2.   The Dominion of India represented by the Assam Railway. Take  notice that the Award of the Umpire appointed  in  the matter of the above Arbitration Agreement had been,filed  on the 29th day of August, 1949, and that the Court hearing the commercial causes will proceed to pronounce judgment on such award on 7th day of November, 1949. Dated the 29th day of August, 1949." This  notice  was  served on the respondent on  the  2nd  of September,   1949.   Thus  in  respect  of   these   awards, proceedings were initiated purporting to be under section 14 (2) of the Indian Arbitration Act simultaneously both in the court of the Subordinate Judge 114 882 of  Gauhati in Assam as well as on the Original Side of  the High Court at Calcutta.

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The appellant in answer to the notice issued by the  Gauhati court on 3rd September, 1949, appeared before that court  on 28th  October, 1949, and obtained adjournments from time  to time  until 10th December, 1949.  On that date  the  Gauhati court  rejected his prayer for any further  adjournment  and fixed  20th  January,’  1950,  for  an  ex  parte   hearing. Meanwhile, the respondent after receiving the notice  issued to  him  by the Calcutta High Court filed, on  the  24th  of November,  1949,  an affidavit dated the 15th  of  November, 1949,  stating  his objections to the  jurisdiction  of  the Calcutta  Court and to the validity of the awards.   On  the same  date  a counter affidavit thereto dated  the  19th  of November,  1949, was filed on behalf of the  appellant.   On these  affidavits the matter was taken up for  consideration by  the Commercial Judge of the Calcutta High Court  on  the 16th  of -December, 1949.  The learned Judge  overruled  the objections of the respondent, and passed judgment on the two awards.   On  appeal  therefrom by  the  respondent  to  the Division Bench, the learned Judges reversed the judgment  of the  single Judge.  They held that there had been no  proper application  under section 14(2) of the  Indian  Arbitration Act,   before   the  High  Court  of  Calcutta,   and   that consequently that Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter. Before  the learned single Judge of the High Court the  main objection  taken  and  set  out  in  paragraph  14  of   the respondent’s  affidavit dated the 15th of November 1949  was as follows: "  I submit further that inasmuch as the application of  the Dominion  of  India  under  section 14  (2)  of  the  Indian Arbitration  Act was made as aforesaid to the said Court  at Gauhati before the award was filed in this Hon’ble Court  by Kumbha Mawji, the Court at Gauhati alone has jurisdiction." Under section 31 (1) of the Indian Arbitration Act an  award may woe filed in any court having jurisdiction in the matter to which the reference relates.  The 883 reference  in  this case arose out of a contract  which,  as already  stated, was entered into at Calcutta and had to  be performed  in Assam.  Thus the Gauhati court as well as  the Calcutta  High  Court admittedly had jurisdiction  over  the subject-matter of the reference.  The point taken,  however, on  behalf of the respondent in their objections  was  that, having regard to section 31, sub-section (4) of the Act  and to  the  fact  that an application under  section  14,  sub- section (2) for a direction to the umpire to file the  award was  made to the Gauhati court as early as the 10th  August, that court was seized of the matter from that date, and that therefore  any application under section 14 OD a later  date to  another  court, though otherwise competent,  was  barred under  section  31,  sub-section (4).   This  was  the  main question  that  was  seriously pressed  before  the  learned single Judge.  But the learned Judge was of the opinion that section 31 (4) related only to applications made during  the pendency   of  a  reference  to  arbitration  and   not   to applications made subsequent to the making of an award.   He thought that in respect of applications for filing an  award the exclusive jurisdiction was determined with reference  to the  question as to which was the competent court  in  which the  award was, in fact, first filed under section 14,  sub- section  (2) (as distinct from when the application for  the filing of the award was first presented).  In this view, the learned Judge held on the facts that the award must be taken to have been filed earlier in the Calcutta court and not  in the  Gauhati court.  He accordingly held that  the  Calcutta

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High  Court  had  exclusive jurisdiction  having  regard  to section  31  (3), and hence proceeded to  judgement  on  the award, the respondent not having filed any objections before him in time. On appeal, the learned Judges considered it unnecessary  for them  to dispose of the case on either of the above  grounds considered  by the single Judge, and held that on the  facts it was quite clear that there had been no due filing of  the award  at  all in the Calcutta court under  section  14  (2) inasmuch as the awards 884 which  were  claimed  to  have  been  duly  filed  were,  in fact,not  filed  by the umpire; nor was it shown  that  they were filed under his authority.  On this limited ground they reversed  the  decision  of the  learned  single  Judge  and vacated  the judgment given in favour of   the appellant  on the basis of the two awards.  Hence these two appeals to us. On  the,  facts  stated  above  three  questions  arise  for consideration: (1)  Whether  the appellant had the authority of the  umpire to  file  the awards on his behalf into court  in  terms  of section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act ; (2)  Whether in view of subsection (3) of section 31 of  the Act  it  can  be  said that the awards  were  filed  in  the Calcutta High Court earlier than in the Gauhati court; and (3)  Whether the scope of section 31, sub-section (4) of the Act  is  limited to applications under the  Act  during  the pendency of the arbitration proceedings only. As  regards the first question, section 14, sub-section  (2) provides that, "  the  arbitrators or umpire shall, at the request  of  any party  to the arbitration agreement or any  person  claiming under  such  party or if so directed by the court  and  upon payment  of  the  fees and charges due  in  respect  of  the arbitration and award and of the costs and charges of filing the  award cause the award or a signed copy of it,  together with any depositions or documents which may have been  taken and proved before them, to be,filed in court, and the  court shall thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing  of the award." This  section  clearly  implies that where the  award  or  a signed  copy thereof is in fact filed into court by a  party he  should  have the authority of the umpire for  doing  so. This  is, at any rate, the assumption on which the  question has  been dealt with in the High Court, and it has not  been contended before us that the filing of the award into  court by a party himself 885 though  without the authority of the umpire to do so on  his behalf,  is  sufficient compliance with the  terms  of  this section.   The learned Judges of the High Court were of  the opinion  that  the authority of the  umpire  empowering  the appellant  to  file the original awards into  Court  on  his behalf  has not been made out on the evidence in  the  case. The  argument  stressed before us is that in para 7  of  the affidavit dated the 19th of November, 1949, filed on  behalf of the appellant in the High Court on the 24th of  November, 1949,  it is stated that " On or about the 21st July,  1949, the  said Umpire made over the said original award  to  this deponent  for filing." It is urged that this is an  averment of the requisite authority from the umpire, and it is point- ed out that this assertion has not been contradicted on  the other  side  by  any  reply  affidavit.   It  is   contended therefore that the filing was valid.  The learned Judges  in coming  to  the  contrary conclusion relied  on  two  facts,

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namely,  that the umpire in his letter to the Gauhati  court dated  18th August, 1949, when sending copies of the  awards in  compliance with the notice issued to him by  that  court merely  stated  that he handed over the awards to  both  the parties,  but did not say that he authorised any of them  to file the same into court on his behalf.  The learned  Judges were  also  of the opinion that the umpire as  a  person  of commonsense  could not be supposed to have  authorised  both the parties to file the awards into Court on his behalf.  We are  inclined  to agree with this reasoning.  Where,  as  in this  case, the originals are said to have been handed  over to  both  the parties, it cannot be assumed  that  the  mere handing  over of the awards to the parties  necessarily  im- plies  the  authority of the umpire to file  the  same  into court on his behalf.  That authority has to be  specifically alleged  and proved.  In the present case the  statement  in the  affidavit relied on by learned counsel before us is  no more  than  ail assertion that the umpire  handed  over  the original awards to the appellant for filing, but there is no allegation  that they were so handed over to him for  filing on behalf of the umpire. 886 The umpire may not have been aware that the awards should be filed into court only by himself or under his authority. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the question of the authorisation of the umpire for the filing of the  award by  the appellant was one that was not raised at all  as  an objection before the learned single Judge of the High Court, and that such an objection should not have been taken notice of  for the first time on appeal.  It is no doubt true  that neither the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent  nor the  judgment of the learned single Judge gives any  indica- tion  of  this  question having been  raised  in  the  first court,.   Indeed, the learned Judges on appeal recognise  it when  they  say  towards the  concluding  portion  of  their judgment as follows: "  It  does not appear that the point on  which  the  appeal succeeds  was argued in the court below.  But it is a  point of  law  and  no  objection  was  taken  before  us  by  the respondent to the appellant taking the point before us ". Though  it  is somewhat difficult to see  how  the  question raised can be said to be a pure question of law, it is quite clear from the above extract that no objection was taken  by the  respondent to the point being raised.  It has not  been suggested before us that this statement in the judgment  was in  any way erroneous.  Appellant’s counsel argued  that  if the learned Judges on appeal felt inclined to dispose of the case  on this point alone, they should have called upon  the umpire  to  clarify  whether or not the  appellant  had  his authority,  or  given an opportunity for production  of  his affidavit  in  support of the  authority.   Learned  counsel presses that an. opportunity should now be allowed.  It does not appear, however that it is either necessary or desirable at  this  stage and after this lapse of time to  allow  this matter to go back for that purpose.  Because, apart from the question  of  mere want of proof of authority, it  is  clear that  in a case of this kind and on the facts above  stated, it was 887 incumbent on the appellant to allege categorically that,  in terms of sub-section (2) of section 4, he had the  requisite authority  of  the umpire.  That allegation is  wanting  not only -in the affidavit dated the 19th of November, 1949, but what  is more important is that when the awards  were  filed into court on the 17th of August, 1949, by the solicitors on

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behalf of the appellant with a letter which might be treated as the initial application to the court, there is not a word to  suggest  that  the awards were  being  filed  under  the authority  of the umpire.  The letter contained only a  bald statement  that the two original awards duly signed  by  the umpire were enclosed therewith for filing, with a request to direct  the  office  to file the two  awards  and  to  issue notices   in  respect  thereof  expeditiously.    In   those circumstances,   there  has  been  clearly   no   sufficient compliance with the terms of section 14, sub-section (2)  of the  Act  to  constitute the filing of  the  awards  by  the appellant’s solicitors the filing thereof by the umpire. As  regards the second question, namely, as to whether  with reference  to  the terms of section 31, subsection  (3)  the awards  should  be held to have been filed  earlier  in  the Calcutta  court -or in the Gauhati court, the view taken  by the  learned  Commercial Judge was that the  filing  in  the Calcutta court must be taken to have been earlier.  For  the purpose  of  the consideration of this question  it  may  be assumed  that filing was under the authority of the  umpire. The learned Judge was of the opinion that the filing of  the awards in the Gauhati court must be taken to have been  made on the 3rd September when in pursuance of the prior order of the  Subordinate Judge dated 24th August, 1949, the  present respondent  filed into court the original awards  with  him. In  coming to this conclusion the learned Judge ignored  the fact that on 18th August, 1949, the umpire   in response  to the notice previously issued to him     forwarded   to   the court signed copies of the awards  and that the same were in that  court on or before 24th August, 1949.  This seems,  in terms, to 888 be sufficient compliance with the provisions- of section 14, sub-section  (2) which only requires that on the  directions of  the court the original award or the copy thereof  should be  caused by the umpire to be filed into it.   The  learned Judge  stated that he was not aware whether the copies  sent to  the  Subordinate Judge were signed copies or  not.   The learned Judge failed unfortunately to notice that the umpire himself  in  his  letter dated  18th  August,  1949,  stated clearly as follows: "As directed by you I am sending herewith copies of the same (awards) signed by me". The  learned Judge was also inclined to think that the  mere forwarding  of the awards does not amount to the  filing  of them.   Here  again, the learned Judge has  overlooked  that under  section 14, sub-section (2) the actual filing by  the umpire  is not essential, but that it is sufficient  if  the umpire  causes the awards to be filed.  It is not  suggested that  sending by post in compliance with the notice  is  not such "causing". It  appears  to us therefore clear that the  filing  of  the awards in the Gauhati court must be taken to be on the  24th of August, 1949.  So far as the Calcutta court is concerned, though no doubt the awards were, put into that court by  the appellant’s solicitors on the 17th August, 1949, it  appears clearly  from the notice issued by the Registrar  dated  the 30th of August, 1949, that the awards were treated as  filed only on the 29th day of August, 1949.  Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the  respondent’s affidavit filed in the Calcutta  court  on 24th of November, 1949, contain categorical assertions  that so far as the Gauhati court is concerned, the copies of  the awards were filed by the umpire on the 24th of August, 1949, while  as  regards the Calcutta High Court the  awards  were filed  on the 29th of August, 1949.  These  assertions  have

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not  been  contradicted on behalf of the  appellant  in  the counter-affidavit filed on the same day.  From these  facts, it  is  clear that the earlier filing for  the  purposes  of section  31(3)  is  in  the Gauhati court  and  not  in  the Calcutta court as held by the learned single Judge under  an erroneous  impression  as  to the facts.   We  may  as  well mention At this stage that 889 it  was not suggested before us that for legal purposes  the filing  of  the awards in the Calcutta High  Court  (on  the assumption  of existence of authority in the  appellant  for such  filing  on behalf of the umpire) is not  the  29th  of August,  1949, but only the 10th of August when  the  letter was  sent by the solicitors to the Registrar  enclosing  the awards.   We  mention  this  because  it  appears  from  the judgment  of the Division Bench of the Calcutta  High  Court that  some  such point was raised there, but before  us  the contrary  was  assumed.  We are accordingly of  the  opinion that  even if the authority of the umpire for the filing  of the award into court on his behalf by the appellant is to be taken  for  granted, it was in the Gauhati  court  that  the awards  must be taken to have been filed earlier.   On  this ground, therefore, we are inclined to hold that the  Gauhati court  alone  has jurisdiction under section 31 (3)  of  the Act. The  third  question  which  remains  for  consideration  is whether  sub-section  (4)  of  section  31  of  the   Indian Arbitration  Act  of  1940  applies  only  where  the  first application  under  the Act was made during  the  course  of pendency  of  a reference to arbitration or also to  a  case like  the present one where such first application  is  made after the completion of the arbitration and on the making of an  award.  As already stated, the learned Judges on  appeal did not deal with this question.  The trial Judge,  however, considered  the  matter, and held that the  above  provision related only to an application made during the pendency of a reference to arbitration.  In the view of the learned Judge, "  In order to attract sub-section (4) an  application  must have been made during the pendency of the reference, and  if such  an application had been made, all  other  applications arising out of that reference (whether made in the reference or not) must be made in that court". Apparently,  the  learned Judge construed the phrase  "in  a reference  " in section 31, sub-section (4), as meaning  "in the course of a reference", and that is also the 115 900 contention before us of the counsel for the appellant, which requires closer examination. Section  31 of the Indian Arbitration Act of 1940 is in  the following terms: " (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, an award may be filed  in  any Court having jurisdiction in  the  matter  to which the reference relates. (2)Notwithstanding  anything contained in any other law  for the  time being in force and save as otherwise  provided  in this  Act, all questions regarding the validity,  effect  or existence  of an award or an arbitration  agreement  between the parties to the agreement or persons claiming under  them shall  be decided by the Court in which the award under  the agreement has been, or may be, filed, and by no other Court. (3)All  applications  regarding the conduct  of  arbitration proceedings  or  otherwise arising out of  such  proceedings shall be made to the Court where the award has been, or  may be, filed, and to no other Court.

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(4)Notwithstanding  anything contained elsewherein this  Act or  in any other law for the time being in force,  where  in any reference an application under the Act has been made  in a  Court competent to entertain it, that Court  alone  shall have  jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and  all subsequent  applications arising out of that  reference  and the arbitration proceedings shall be made in that Court  and in no other Court". Sub-section  (1)  relates  to the question  as  to  where  a completed  award has to be filed, and prescribes  the  local jurisdiction  for that purpose.  Sub-section (2) deals  with the ambit of the exercise of that jurisdiction, and declares it  to be exclusive by saying that "all questions  regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or arbitration agreement  between the parties to the agreement  or  persons claiming  under them shall be decided by the Court in  which the award under the agreement has been, or may be, filed and by no other Court".  Sub-section (3) is intended to provide 891 that  all applications regarding the conduct of  arbitration proceedings or otherwise arising out of such proceedings are to  be  made only in one court, and lays  on  the  concerned party the obligation to do so.  Then comes sub-section  (4), the  object of which apparently is to go further  than  sub- section  (3),  that  is, not merely  casting  on  the  party concerned  an  obligation to file all  applications  in  one court   but   vesting  exclusive   jurisdiction   for   such applications in the court in which the first application has been already made. Thus  it will be seen on a comprehensive view of section  31 that while the first sub-section determines the jurisdiction of  the  court in which an award can be  filed,  subsections (2),  (3)  and (4) are intended to  make  that  jurisdiction effective  in  three different ways, (1) by vesting  in  one court the authority to deal with all questions regarding the validity, effect or existence of an award or an  arbitration agreement,  (2)  by  casting on the  persons  concerned  the obligation to file all applications regarding the conduct of arbitration  proceedings  or otherwise arising out  of  such proceedings  in  one  court, and (3)  by  vesting  exclusive jurisdiction  in  the court in which the  first  application relating to the matter is filed.  The context, therefore, of subsection  (4) would seem to indicate that the  sub-section was not meant to be confined to applications made during the pendency  of an arbitration.  The necessity for  clothing  a single court with effective and exclusive jurisdiction,  and to  bring  about by the combined operation  of  these  three provisions the avoidance of conflict and scramble is equally essential whether the question arises during the pendency of the  arbitration  or after the arbitration is  completed  or before   the   arbitration  is  commenced.   There   is   no conceivable reason why the Legislature should have  intended to  confine the operation of subsection (4) only  to  appli- cations made during the pendency of an arbitration, if as is contended, the phrase " in any reference " is to be taken as meaning " in the course of a reference ". It  may  be  noticed that the  Arbitration  Act  deals  with arbitration of three different categories: (1) arbitration 892 without intervention of the court, dealt with in sections  3 to  19  comprising  Chapter IT;  (2)  arbitration  with  the intervention  of  a  court where there is  no  suit  pending provided in section 20 which is a separate Chapter III;  and (3)  arbitration  in suits dealt with in sections 21  to  25 comprising  Chapter  IV.  The jurisdiction  as  regards  the

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latter  two  classes of arbitrations in respect  of  certain matters is provided in the very provisions relating to those two  classes  of  arbitrations, that is,  section  20,  sub- section  (1) and section 21.  Sub-section (1) of section  31 appears  to  refer  only  to  the  first  class.   It   may, therefore, have been, plausibly, suggested that sub-sections (2),  (3)  and (4) refer only to this class.   But  no  such position  was taken up before us.  Indeed, having regard  to the wide language employed in these sub-sections it has been assumed  that  sub-sections  (2) and  (3)  cover  all  three classes in all their stages.  If so, is there any sufficient reason  to  think that sub-section (4) was meant to  have  a very restricted operation ? On the view of this  sub-section suggested  for the appellant, not only would an  application made  after the award was pronounced be excluded  from  sub- section  (4)  but  also  an  application  made  before   the commencement of the arbitration, i.e., for the filing of  an agreement  of reference and for a direction  thereupon.   It must  be remembered that section 31 is one of the  group  of sections  headed " General " which by virtue of  section  26 are  applicable to all arbitrations.  Unless  therefore  the wording in sub-section (4) of section 31 is so compelling as to  confine  the scope thereof to  applications  during  the pendency of an arbitration, such a limited construction must be rejected. As   already  stated,  the  entire  basis  of  the   limited construction  is  the  meaning  of  the  phrase  "  in   any reference"   used  in  subsection (4) as meaning  "  in  the course of any reference ". But such a connotation thereof is not in any ordinary sense compelling.  The preposition "  in "  is used in various contexts and is capable  of  conveying various shades of meaning.  In the Oxford English Dictionary one of the shades of meaning of this preposition is 893 "Expressing reference or relation to something; in reference or  regard  to ; in the case of, in the matter,  affair,  or province of. Used  especially with the sphere, or department in  relation or   reference   to  which  an  attribute  or   quality   is predicated". In  the  context  of  section 31,  sub-section  (4),  it  is reasonable to think that the phrase "in any references means "  in  the  matter of a reference ".  The  word  "reference" having   been   defined  in  the  Act   as   "reference   to arbitration", the phrase "in a reference" would mean "in the matter  of  a reference to arbitration".  The phrase  "in  a reference" is, therefore, comprehensive enough to cover also an application first made after the arbitration is completed and  a final award is made, and in our opinion that  is  the correct  construction  thereof  in  the  context.   We  are, therefore,  of  the opinion that section 31 (4)  would  vest exclusive jurisdiction in the court in which an  application for  the,  filing  of an award has  been  first  made  under section 14 of the Act. It  is  undisputed that the application  by  the  respondent Union of India was made before the Gauhati court on the 10th August, 1949, and the earliest move by the appellant  before the Calcutta court was on the 17th August, 1949.  Oil  these facts  and on the view of the interpretation of  section.31, sub-section (4), which we are inclined to take, it is  clear that the Gauhati court only has the jurisdiction and not the Calcutta High Court as regards the present dispute. In the result, the two appeals must be dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed. Agent for the appellant: Sukumar Ghose.

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Agent for the respondent: G. H. Rajadhyaksha. 894