10 March 1992
Supreme Court
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KUMAR PADMA PRASAD Vs UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

Bench: KULDIP SINGH (J)
Case number: Transfer Petition (Civil) 101 of 1991


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PETITIONER: KUMAR PADMA PRASAD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/03/1992

BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) SAWANT, P.B. KASLIWAL, N.M. (J)

CITATION:  1992 AIR 1213            1992 SCR  (2) 109  1992 SCC  (2) 428        JT 1992 (2)   247  1992 SCALE  (1)581

ACT:      Constitution of India, 1950 :      Articles  50, 136, 139A, 217(2), 233, 236(b),  237-High Court   Judge-Appointment-Necessary   qualifications-Whether Supreme  Court/High Court can exercise jurisdiction  on  the ground that the incumbent does not fulfill qualifications as required by Article 217.      ‘Judicial Office’-Concept of-Explained.      Government of Mizoram Notification CS/MZ/APPT/79  dated 23.6.1979-Assistant  to Deputy Commissioner appointed  under Rules  8,9 and 15 of 1937-Rules for regulation of  procedure of  officers to administer justice in Lushi Hills.  1937-Rs. 8,915-Assistant   to  Dy.   Commissioner-Exercising   powers analogous  to  those of a judicial  Magistrate  First  Class under   Code  of Criminal Procedure,  1973-Whether  holds  a judicial office.      Independence of judiciary-Necessity for.      Administration  of  justice-  Whether  High  Court  can assume  jurisdiction on judicial side to probe  into  matter purely  of  administrative  nature  and  exclusively  within purview of Chief Justice.      Words and Phrases      "Judicial Office", "Judicial service"-Interpretation of.

HEADNOTE:      The  Governor of Mizoram, by a letter dated  5.5  1990, addressed  to  the  Chief Justice  of  Gauhati  High  Court, recommended the name of respondent no. 9 for appointment  as a  Judge of the High Court.  The bio-data enclosed with  the said letter indicated that respondent no. 9, after passing L L.B.,  joined the Government of Assam in Law Department   in 1966  as  a Gazetted Officer.  He worked on  various  posts, under  the   Government of Mizoram and Assam, such  as,  Law Officer  in  Finance Department, Under  Secretary,  Law  and Judicial, Registrar Firms, Deputy                                                        110 Secretary law & Judicial and Deputy Legal Remembrancer.   In 1985  he was appointed as Legal Remembrancer  and  Secretary Law and Judicial.  He worked as D.C. (Judicial) in 1987.  He also worked as Member/Presiding Officer/Chairman of  certain

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Tribunals/Committees.    The  bio  data  described  him   as belonging  to Mizoram Judicial Service.  The  Chief  Justice forwarded  the  papers to the Minister of  Law  and  Justice Government  of  India.  The Union law  Minister,  the  Chief Justice  of  India,  the Prime Minister  of  India  and  the President    of    India   on   their    respective    turns cleared/approved  the  name  of respondent  no.  9  for  the appointment.   The warrant of appointment was signed by  the President  of  India  on  15.10.1991  and  the  Notification appointing respondent no. 9 as a Judge of Gauhati High Court was issued on 25.10.1991.      The petitioner filed a writ petition before the Gauhati High Court on October 23, 1991 challenging the selection  of respondent  no. 9 for appointment as a Judge of the  Gauhati High Court on the ground that he was not qualified for  such an  appointment.   The High Court passed  an  interim  order holding  that it was doubtful if respondent no. 9  possessed qualifications  as  a  provided under  Article  217(2),  and directed that the warrant of appointment of respondent No. 9 issued by the President of  India should not be given effect to. Respondent No.9 was also restrained from subscribing his oath  or  affirmation  in  terms  of  Article  219  of   the Constitution.      Before  the writ petition was filed by the  petitioner, the  Mizoram  Bench of Gauhati High Court  suo-motu  assumed jurisdiction  under Article 226 of the Constitution  and  by its  order  dated  20.11.1990 directed to  register  a  case against respondent no. 9 in respect of anomalies in purchase of  law  books  for the High  Court.   The  Chief  Minister, Mizoram by letter dated 7.10.1991 conveyed to; the Union law Minister  that  a  vigilance  case  was  instituted  against respondent  no.9.  The  letter dated 8.10.1991 addressed  by Chief Justice, Gauhati High court to the Union Law  Minister did  not  indicate about any such case.   The  Law  Minister ignored the letter of the Chief Minister. Later on the State Government  by a wireless message dated  2.11.1991  informed the   Department  of  Justice,  Government  of  India   that respondent no.9 had been placed under suspension in view  of the case pending against him in the High Court.      Respondent  No.9 filed a special leave petition  and  a writ petition                                                       111 before this Court. Two transfer petitions, one by respondent no.9  and  the  other by the  petitioner,  were  also  filed seeking transfer to this Court of the writ petition filed by the petitioner in Gauhati High Court. Consequently the  said writ  Petition  was  transferred to and was  heard  by  this Court.      It was contended by the petitioner that the appointment of  respondent no.9 as a High Court Judge was  violative  of Article 217(2) of the Constitution as he did not fulfill the qualifications prescribed therein inasmuch as he neither had been  an  Advocate of a High Court nor had he  ever  held  a judicial  officer;  and  that  by  virtue  of   respondent’s appointment  as Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner  during the  year  1979  in  addition to his  own  duties  as  Under Secretary,  Law  and Judicial, he did not hold  a   Judicial Office   as  envisaged  under  Article  217(2)(a)   of   the Constitution.      Allowing   the   transferred  writ  petition   of   the petitioner, this Court,      HELD:  1. The High Court Judges are appointed from  two sources, member of the Bar and from amongst the persons  who have  held  "judicial office" for not less than  ten  years. Even a subordinate judicial officer manning a court inferior

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to the District Judge can be appointed as a Judge of a  High Court. [p.131E]      2.1  Expression "Judicial office" has not been  defined under   the  Constitution,  nevertheless,  it  has   to   be interpreted in consonance with the scheme of Chapters V  and VI  of part VI of the Constitution and has to be  given  the meaning  in  the  context of the  concept  of  judiciary  as enshrined therein.  It would be logical and consistent  with the  Consistent  with  the  Constitutional  scheme  to  read "judicial office" under Article 217 (2)(a) to mean an office within  the  judicial service of the  State.  [pp.127D;132E, 133F]      Statesman  (Private) Ltd. v. H.R. Dev & Ors., [1968]  3 SCR 614, referred to.      2.2 Holder of "judicial office" under Article 217(2)(a) means  the  person  who exercise  only  judicial  functions, determines  causes  interprets and renders  decisions  in  a judicial  capacity.  He must belong to the judicial  service which  as  a  class is free from  executive-control  and  is disciplined   to   uphold   the   dignity,   integrity   and independence of judiciary.  The expression "judicial office" in  the  said  Article means an office which is  a  part  of judicial   service  as defined under Article 236(b)  of  the Constitution. [pp.131G-H; 132A, F-G]                                                         112      2.3 Article 236 (b) defines "judicial service" to  mean District Judges and Judges subordinate thereto.  Appointment of  District Judges under Articles 233(2) can only  be  from the  judicial service of the State as defined under  Article 236(b). [pp.127 EF; 131D]      Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.,  [1967] 1 SCR 77, followed.      2.4  Ordinarily  the District Judges who  are  superior members   of  the  judicial  service  are   considered   for appointment   as   Judges  of   the  High  Court   but   the constitution-makers  wanted  to hold-out  a  possibility  of elevation  as  a  Judge of High  Court  to  the  Subordinate Judges,   so   as  to  infuse  amongst  them  a   sense   of responsibility and an incentive  for maintaining  efficiency and it was with that objective that the expression "judicial office"   has  been  used  in  Article  217(2)(a)   of   the Constitution. [p.132E-F]      2.5 In order to qualify for appointment as a Judge of a High  Court  under Article 217(2)(a) a person  must  hold  a "Judicial  Office"   which must be a part  of  the  judicial service of the State. [p.133F-G]      2.6  The expression "judicial office" in generic  sense may  include  wide variety of offices  which  are  connected with the administration of justice in one way or the  other. Although  under the criminal Procedure Code, 1973 powers  of Judicial  Magistrate  can  be conferred on  any  person  who holds  or  has  held nay office  under  the  Government  and officers  holding  various posts  under  the  executive  are often   vested  with  the  Magisterial-powers  to   meet   a particular  situation, yet the constitution framers did  not provide a source of appointment to the high office of a High Court Judge from amongst the holders of a "judicial office". [p.131F-G]      2.7  A person-who is holding a judicial office  in  the generic sense and is not a member of the judicial service of the State-is not eligible to be appointed as District Judge. When a person is not eligible to be appointed as a  District Judge  it would be mockery of the Constitution to hold  that he  is eligible to be appointed as a Judge of a High  Court. The Constitutional-scheme is clear. [p.132B-D]

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    3.1 The independence of judiciary is part of the  basic structure  of the Constitution.  To achieve  this  objective there has to be separation of                                                         113 judiciary   from   the  executive.   The  framers   of   the Constitution did not and could not have meant by a "judicial office" which did not exist independently and the duties  or part of the duties of which could be conferred on any person whether  trained  or not in the administration  of  justice. The  Directive Principles as enshrined in Article 50 of  the Constitution, give a mandate that the State shall take steps to  separate  the judiciary from the executive  which  means that  there shall be a separate judicial service free  from the executive control.  Chapters V and VI in part VI of  the Constitution  provide  for the High Courts  and  subordinate courts  in the State. The scheme under the Constitution  for establishing  an independent judiciary is very  clear.   The Constitution-scheme, therefore, only permits members of  the judicial  service as constituted in terms of Article  236(b) of  the  Constitution  to  be considered  for  the  post  of District    judge    and   that   of    the    High    Court Judge.[pp.132D;143D; 144C-D]      3.2 The Word"judicial office" in Article 217(2) means a subsisting office with a substantive  position which has  an existence independent from its holder. [p.143E]      Smt. Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana, [1969] 3 SCC 268 and Great Western Railway Company v. Bater, 8 Tax  Cases 231, referred to.            3.3  The judicial service in a State is  distinct and  separate  from the other service under  the  executive. The  members  of the judicial  service  perform  exclusively judicial    functions   and   are   responsible   for    the administration of justice in the State.  Magistrates who are not  appointed to the judicial service of the State  can  be brought  into the judicial service by way of a  notification under  Article 237 of the Constitution of India.   Till  the time  there  is separation of judiciary  or  a  notification under  Article  237 of the Constitution of India  is  issued there  is no question of considering the executive  officers or  even  Magistrates for appointment to the post of District Judge  or  a  High Court Judge  even  though  the  executive officers  or Magistrates concerned have the adornment  of  a judicial office. [pp.128A;145C-E]      3.4 The office of the Assistant to Deputy Commissioner, held by respondent No. 9 for about six months, by virtue  of Notification  dated  23.6.1979 issued by the  Government  of Mizoram under 1937 Rules for the Regulation of the procedure of  officers appointed to administer justice in  the  Lushai Hills,  was neither a judicial office nor was it part  of  a judicial  service  as defined under Article  236(b)  of  the Constitution. [pp.138C-H;143F-G]                                                        114      3.5  Keeping  in view the  exigency  of  administration different  officers working with the Government of  Mizoram, including   respondent  no.9,  who  was  working  as   Under Secretary,  Law and Judicial were by the Notification  dated 23.6.1979,  appointed Assistant to Deputy  Commissioner  and were  invested  with the powers of  judicial  and  executive Magistrates  in addition to their own duties.  There was  no separate  office  with  a designation of  Assistant  to  the Deputy  Commissioner.   Under the 1937 Rules  there  was  no separation  of judiciary from the executive.  There  was  no judicial  service  as  envisaged by Article  236(b)  of  the Constitution and as such an Assistant to Deputy Commissioner could not be judicial officer in terms of Article  217(2)(a)

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of the Constitution. [pp.141E-H; 142A-B]      3.6 The office of Legal Remembrancer-cum-secretary  Law and Judicial is non-judicial office under the control of the executive.  The Mizoram Judicial Service came into existence with effect from February 17, 1986 and even if full  benefit of that service is given to the respondent for the  purposes of Article 217(2)(a) he is not qualified as the total period counted from February 17, 1986 comes to less than ten  years as required under the said Article.  Besides, he never  held any  of the judicial offices as enumerated in Schedule A  to 1989  Rules  pertaining  to Mizoram  Judicial  Service,  and unless  he has held a judicial office in a judicial  service he  does not come within the purview of  Article  217(2)(a). [p.136A-C]     3.7  A cursory look at the bio-data would show that  the respondent  was not qualified for appointment as a Judge  of High  Court  on the admitted facts which have  been  on  the official files all the time.  [p.137A]      4.   The independence, efficiency and integrity of  the judiciary  can  only  be maintained by  selecting  the  best persons in accordance with the procedure provided under  the Constitution.    These   objectives  enshrined   under   the Constitution   of  India  cannot  be  achieved  unless   the functionaries  accountable for making appointments act  with meticulous care and utmost responsibility. [p.137A-B]      5.  Ordinarily the domain in such matters  lies  wholly with the constitutional authorities mentioned in Article 217 of  the Constitution, but in exceptional circumstances  like the present, where the incumbent considered for  appointment as   a  Judge  of  a  High  Court  does  not   fulfill   the qualification as laid down expressly under the provisions of the  Constitution  itself, it becomes bounden  duty  of  the Court to see that no person                                                        115 ineligible   or   unqualified  is  appointed   to   a   high constitutional and august office of a Judge of a High Court. [p.137E-F]      6.  The  High  Court  was  not  justified  in  assuming jurisdiction  on  the  judicial  side  to  probe  into   the anomalies  in purchase of books involving  respondent  no.9. It  was  a matter purely of administrative  nature  and  was exclusively  within  the  purview  of  the  Chief   Justice. [pp.123F-G;124A]      7.  Since  on the date of issue of the warrant  by  the President of India, respondent no.9 was not qualified to  be appointed as Judge of the High Court, his appointment  would be  quashed  and the Union of India  and  other  respondents would  not administer him oath or affirmation under  Article 219 of the Constitution of India. [p.145F-G]      S.P. Gupta and others v. Union of India & Ors.,  [1982] 2 SCR 365, cited.

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Transferred Case (Civil) No.101 of 1991.      Under Article 139(A)(1) of the Constitution of India.      V.R.Reddy,   Add.  Solicitor  General,  Anil   B.Divan, P.K.Goswami, K.K.Venugopal, Ram Jethmalani, M.L.Verma, Kapil Sibal  and Shanti Bhushan, A.R.Borthakar, Advocate  General, K.N.Madhusudan,  Asstt.  Advocate General, Syed  Naqvi,  Ms. Lira Goswami, Ms. Alpana Kripal, M.J.Paul, Kailash  Vasudev, P.P.Tripathi, Shaihid Rizvi, K.V.Vishwanathan, Vinod  Kumar, S.Banerjee,  Ms.  A.Subhashini,  Ms.  Niranjana  Singh,  Ms.

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L.Krishnamurthy, Mrs. H.Wahi, S.K. Nandy, Ms. Urmila Kapoor, P.Goswami,  S.Chatterji,  D.N.Mukherjee, Anil  Katiyar,  Ms. Kamini  Jaiswal, P.K.Dey, Ms. S.Janani and Ms. Minakshi  for the appearing parties.      Shanti  Bhusan, Ms. Indira Jaisingh,  Soli  J.Sorabjee, Jitendra Sharma, Prashant Bhushan, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal,  P.H. Parekh and B.N. Aggarwal for the Intervenor.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      KULDIP  SINGH, J. The President of India by  a  warrant dated  October  15, 1991 under his hand and  seal  appointed K.N.  Srivastava as a Judge of Gauhati High Court.   He  has not as yet made and subscribed an                                                        116 oath/affirmation  as  required  under  Article  219  of  the Constitution  of India and as such has not entered upon  his office.   The question for our consideration is whether  the appointment of Srivastava as High Court Judge is  infraction of Article 217(2) and 217(1) of the Constitution of India.      Is he qualified for appointment as a Judge - If so  has the mandatory process of consultation under the Constitution been followed.      Shri  Lal  Thanhawla,  Chief Minister  Mizoram  by  his letter  dated September 29, 1989 addressed to Chief  Justice Gauhati  High Court recommended the name of  Srivastava  for appointment   as  a  Judge  of  Gauhati  High  Court   Capt. W.A.Sangama,    Governor   of   Mizoram    reiterated    the recommendation  by  his letter dated October 4,  1989.   The Chief  Justice  Gauhati High Court by his  separate  letters dated October 25, 1989 addressed to Governor of Mizoram  and chief  Minister,  Mizoram acknowledged the  receipt  of  the recommendation  and  stated  that he  would  take  necessary action  immediately after formation of a Permanent Bench  at Aizawl. Mr. Swaraj Kaushal who succeeded Capt. W.A.Sangma as Governor  Mizoram addressed a detailed letter dated  May  5, 1990  recommending  Srivastava for appointment as  a  Judge. Along   with   the  recommendation  he   enclosed   bio-data of Srivastava which is as under:              "BIO DATA OF SHRI K N SRIVASTAVA, M.J.S                  LEGAL REMEMBRANCER AND SECRETARY             LAW & JUDICIAL ETC. GOVERNMENT OF MIZORAM 1. Name                  : K.N Srivastava                            (KESHARI NANDAN SRIVASTAVA) 2. Father’s Name         : Late Sri Krishna Lal 3. Present address       : Law Department                            Civil Secretariat                            Govt. of Mizoram,                            Aizawl 796001 4. Permanent Address     : C/o Sri Chandra Mohan Srivastava                            254 Bazar Jhau Lal                            Lucknow U.P. 226001                                                        117 5. Date of Birth & Age   : 30 January 1938 (52 years) 6. Nationality/Religion  : Indian/Hindu 7. Qualification          : B.A. LL.B.                            (1957-1959 Lucknow University) 8. Service to Which      : Mizoram Judicial Service    belongs 9. Professional          : Took Training for legal  practice    Experience              in  1960 in Lucknow.                            2.  Joined Govt. of Assam in  Law                           Department  in  1966  as  Gazetted                           Officer   for   Coordination   and                           translation  of all State Laws  in                           consultation official  Legislative                           language   Commission   Govt.   Of

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                         India.                           3.   Posted  as  Law  Officer   in                           Finance Department of Govt.  Assam                           to tender legal advice and to look                           after     taxation    laws     and                           litigations.                           4. Appointed Under Secretary Law &                           Judicial Govt. of Mizoram, in 1972                           to  look after all legal  matters,                           advice,  litigation,  court  cases                           drafting of State Legislation etc.                           5. Held charge of Under Secretary,                           Secretariat         Administration                           Department, General Administration                           Department,   Revenue   Excise   &                           Taxation  Department,   Education,                           and  Social  Welfare   Department,                           Govt.  of  Mizoram  from  time  to                           time.                           6. Appointed as Registrar of Firms                           & Societies, Government of Mizoram                           from 23.3.72 to 21.12.1979                           8. Appointed Deputy Secretary  Law                           &   Judicial  and   Deputy   Legal                           Remembrancer since                                                       118                           1979 and                           9.    Legal    Remembrancer    and                           Secretary  Law and Judicial  since                           1985 and also                           10. Appointed Presiding Member  of                           one  man  Mizoram  Motor  Accident                           Claims Tribunal in 1986.                           11. D.C. (Judicial) in 1987.                           12. Presiding Officer,  Industrial                           Tribunal in October  1989.                           13.  Declared  as Law  Officer  to                           appear  and conduct cases  in  all                           courts  on  behalf  of  Govt.  for                           which also enrolled as an Advocate                           with  the  Bar Council  of  Assam,                           Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur etc.,                           Gauhati High Court Gauhati.                           14.   Attended  and   successfully                           completed    a    legal     course                           consisting    of    studies     in                           International Law & Organizations,                           Practical  &  Treaty  drafting  at                           London, U.K. from January 1980  to                           May 1980                           15.  Member,  Mizo  Customary  Law                           Committee,  and also had been  its                           Chairman during President Rule for                           September 1988                           16.    Chairman    of    Executive                           Committee,  Legal Aid  and  Advice                           Board.                           17.    Chairman,    State    Level                           Screening   Committee  under   the                           Prevention  of illicit Traffic  in                           Narcotic Drugs.                           18.   Members,  Board  of   under-                           graduate  studies,  North  Eastern                           Hill   University   Shillong    to                           consider course and prospectus for

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                         LLB course.        119                           19.  Member, Committee  to  review                           the    Implementation    of    the                           recommendation   of   All    India                           Committee on Jail Reforms.                           20.  Members,  Mizoram   Resources                           Mobilisation and Taxation  Enquiry                           Committee.                           21.  Members,  State  Level   Road                           Safety Council for Mizoram.                           22.    Member,   Works    Advisory                           Committee                           23. Member, Supply Advisory  Board                           for Assam Rifles in Mizoram                           24.  Member, Appellate  Board  for                           Water   and   Air   Pollution   in                           Mizoram.      Chief Justice High Court by his letter dated August  6, 1990 addressed to Minister of Law and Justice, Government of India  forwarded  the  recommendations,  including  that  of Srivastava,  for appointment of Judges to the  Gauhati  High Court.   The recommendation included the above  quoted  bio- data of Srivastava.  Minister of Law and Justice addressed a letter  dated  September  10, 1990  to  the  Governor  Assam bringing  to  his  notice the names proposed  by  the  Chief Justice  of  the  Gauhati  High  Court  and  called-for  his recommendations  and  those  of  the  Governors  and   Chief Ministers  of  the North Eastern State.   Shri  D.D.  Thakur Governor of Assam by letter dated October 20, 1990  conveyed his  views and those of other Governors and Chief  Ministers of  North Eastern State.  He recommended  Srivastava’s  name and also sent his bio-data (reproduced above) along with his recommendation.   The Intelligence Bureau Ministry  of  Home Affairs  Government  of India informed the Law  Ministry  on October  8,  1990  that  Srivastava  was  considered  to  be professionally  competent  and  nothing  adverse   regarding character,  integrity and political affiliation had come  to notice.  The original file regarding appointment of Judges in the  Gauhati High Court with all the proposals was  sent  to the  Chief  Justice of India.  The file containing  all  the recommendations including that of Srivastava along with  his bio-data  was  considered by the Chief Justice of  India  on November  7,  1990.   Regarding Srivastava  he  recorded  as under:                                                         120               "Shri  K.N.Srivastava is a  judicial  officer,          there  is nothing adverse against him but his  C.R.          is  not  available  ...After the CRs  of  Sri  K.N.          Srivastava  and Shri N.G.Das are obtained the  file          may be sent to me...."  The file was again sent to the Chief Justice of India along with CRs of Srivastava.  The Chief Justice cleared the  name of Srivastava in the following words:          "So far as Srivastava is concerned he is a Judicial          Officer  and there is no objection.  His  name  is,          therefore, cleared."      The  Minister of Law and Justice approved  Srivastava’s appointment  as a Permanent Judge of Gauhati High  Court  on August  14, 1991.  Thereafter a summary was prepared by  the Department  of  Justice for the consideration of  the  Prime Minister  and the President of India.  In the  said  summary Srivastava was presented as under:          "Shri K.N. Srivastava B.A., LL.B. was born on  30th          January,  1938.  He joined Government of  Assam  in

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        Law Department in 1956. He was appointed as an Under          Secretary,  LAw  and  Judiciary  in  1972  and   as          Registrar  of  Firms and Societies,  Government  of          Mizoram,   from  23.3.72  to  21.12.79.    He   was          appointed the Legal Remembrancer and Secretary, Law          and Judiciary in 1985".      The   Prime  Minister  approved  the   appointment   of September  24, 1991 and the President of India on  September 30,  1991.   The Warrant of Appointment was  signed  by  the President  on October  15, 1991 and notification  appointing Srivastava  as  a Judge, Gauhati High Court  was  issued  on October 25, 1991.      Kumar Padma Prasad, a practising advocate, filed a writ petition  under  Article 226 of the  constitution  of  India before  gauhati High Court on October 23,  1991  challenging the  selection of Srivastava for appointment as a  Judge  of the  Gauhati  High  Court  on the ground  that  he  was  not qualified  for such an appointment.  He prayed for  issuance of  a  mandamus  directing  the Union  of  India  and  other respondents  to re-call, rescind or otherwise  forbear  from giving effect to the impugned selection of Srivastava.                                                        121 for  being appointed as a Judge of the Gauhati  High  Court. The writ petition was listed the same day for hearing before a learned single Judge of the High Court.  The learned Judge issued  rule nisi and passed interim order in the  following terms:               "The stay matter shall be heard on 28.10.1991.          Meanwhile  the respondent No. 1 Union of India,  is          restrained  from  issuing  warrant  appointing  the          respondent No.9 (Shri K.N. Srivastava) as Judge  of          the Gauhati High Court till 28.10.1991."      On  October  28, 1991 the High Court noticed  the  fact that  the warrant of appointment of Srivastava  had  already been  received at Gauhati.  The petitioner was permitted  to amend  the  writ  petition and the hearing  on  the  interim relief was adjourned no November 6, 1991.  A Division  Bench of the High Court heard the stay matter on November 6, 1991. After noticing the points raised by the petitioner the  High Court observed as under:          "In view of above discussion, it is doubtful if the          respondent   a  Shri  K.N.   Srivastava   possesses          qualification  as  provided  under  Clause  (2)  of          Article  217.  Therefore, a bona fide  dispute  has          been raised, thereby showing a prima facie case."      The  High  Court  granted  the  interim  stay  in   the following words:-          "In the result, it is ordered and directed that the          warrant  of  appointment of respondent 9 Shri  K  N          Srivastava  issued by the President of India  shall          not  given  effect to by the  concerned  respondent          until  further orders.  It is further  ordered  and          directed  the respondent-9 Shri K.N. Srivastava  is          restrained from making and subscribing his oath  or          affirmation   in  terms  of  Article  219  of   the          Constitution   until  further   orders.    However,          notwithstanding  the pendency of the writ  petition          and   making  this  interim  order,   the   Central          Government  is  given  liberty  to  reconsider  the          appointment of respondent-9 Shri K.N. Srivastava as          Judge   in  a  High  Court  keeping  in  view   the          allegation made in this writ petition."      We may at this stage notice another controversy  taken- up by the High Court on Judicial side.  The Mizoram Bench of Gauhati  High Court consisting of S.K. Homchaudhuri  and  M.

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Sharma, JJ suo-moto assumed                                                        122 jurisdiction  on the judicial side presumably under  Article 226  of the Constitution of India and on November  20,  1990 passed the following order:-               "Register   a  case  under   public   interest          litigation  with  the cause  title-  The  Registrar          (Judicial),  Gauhati High Court Versus - Shri  K.N.          Srivastava,  Secretary, Law & Judicial Deptt  Govt.          Mizoram, Aizawl.          Let  notice  be  issued to  Shri  K.N.  Srivastava,          Secretary,  Law  & Judicial  Department,  Govt.  of          Mizoram show cause as to why an investigation shall          not  be  ordered  by this Court in  the  matter  of          purchase  of Law Books and journals, furniture  and          stationery  articles,  by  the  Law  and   Judicial          Department, Mizoram for the permanent Bench of  the          High Court at Aizawl; or why such further or  other          orders  should not be passed as to this  court  may          seem fit and proper.          In  the interim, we direct the Secretary,  Law  and          Judicial Department, Govt. of Mizoram to furnish  a          full  particulars  of the law  books  and  journals          purchased for the Judge’s library positively within          7(seven)  days  from the date of receipts  of  this          notice.   The  particulars should  contain  amongst          others-(1)  total  amount of fund allotted  by  the          Govt.  and  the fund spent with list  of law  books          purchased, names and particulars of  the  suppliers          and  the price thereof, (3) copies of the bills  of          the   suppliers,  (4)  date  of  payment   to   the          suppliers,  and  (5) date of receipt of  the  books          against each payment made etc.          The  notice of Shri K.N. Srivastava, Secretary  Law          and  Judicial  Department shall be  accompanied  by          copies of letter dated 23-7-1990 and the subsequent          reminders.          Let  a  copy  of  this order be  sent  to  (1)  the          Advocate  General, Mizoram, (2) Chief Secretary  to          the  Govt.  of Mizoram, (3) The  Secretary  to  the          Govt.  of  India,  Ministry of  Home  Affairs,  New          Delhi, and (4) The Secretary to the Govt. of India,          Ministry of Law and Justice, New Delhi."     The above quoted directions were used by the High  Court after                                                        123 taking note, in the same order, of the following facts:-               "After  the permanent Bench  was  established,          regular  Benches,  both Division  and  Single,  are          sitting at Aizawl.  But the great difficulties  are          faced  by the Judges in discharging their  function          of  not  having the Judge’s library  equipped  with          essential  law books and journals.  Indeed, we  are          handicapped   while  sitting  in  the  Court   when          reference books and Law journals are not  available          in  deciding important and complicated question  of          law ......A casual look at the library which mostly          filled up with books of law and Judicial Department          purchased  earlier, do not at all disclose  that  a          sum of Rs. 6,45,000- and odd was spent for purchase          of law books and journals.  Important law  journals          like-  All India Reporters, Supreme Court  Reports,          Supreme Court Cases etc. do not appear to have been          purchased for the library ......The aforesaid facts          and  circumstances and the unusual silence  of  the

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        Secretary,  Law  & Judicial Department  as  regards          furnishing of particulars of the Books and journals          purchased  for the Judge’s Library for more than  4          months, inspite of repeated reminders, gives rise to          strong suspicion that all is not well in the matter          of  purchase  of  law books and  journals  for  the          Judge’s  Library by the Law & Judicial  Department.          The Secretary Law is in duty bound to furnish  full          particulars  of  the  law  books  and  journals  so          purchased for the Judge’s Library and is  primarily          accountable     for    anomalies,    misuse,     or          misappropriation, if any, of the fund sanctioned by          the Govt. for purchase of books for Judge’s Library          and   the  consequent  non  availability   of   the          essential  law  books and journals,  is  very  much          detrimental to the function of  the High Court  and          in turn to the interest of the public at large."      We  fail  to appreciate the action of the  two  learned Judges  of  the High Court in assuming jurisdiction  on  the judicial  side  to probe into a matter which was  purely  of administrative nature and was exclusively within the purview of the Chief Justice.  Whether in the matter of purchase  of books for the High Court, Srivastava acted honestly or  dis- honestly was not a matter for the learned Judges to probe by straining  their  judicial  powers.  Mr.  K.  K.  Venugopal, learned  senior Advocate appearing for Srivastava  contended that Srivastava’s name for appointment as a Judge was                                                        124 recommended in August 1990 and by November, 1990 the process of  consultation was at final stages.  According to him  the order  dated  November 20, 1990 was passed  by  the  learned Judges with a view to stall his appointment as a Judge.   Be that  as  it  may,  we are of the view  that  there  was  no justifiable  reason for the learned Judges to  have  adopted the course they did.      The  Mizoram  Bar Association passed  a  resolution  on October 7, 1991 wherein it was resolved as under:          "While a qualified person Shri R.C.Thanga presently          Advocate  General, Mizoram is excluded at the  last          stage     under    mysterious    and     suspicious          circumstances,  a person Shri K.N. Srivastava.  who          has  no  practical experience even for a day  as  a          Magistrate  or  as an advocate,  and  against  whom          three  misappropriation  cases are pending  in  the          High  Court, (Aizawl Bench) and whose integrity  is          seriously  being  questioned, is considered  to  be          qualified  for  appointment as a Judge  of  Gauhati          High   Court   in  the  near  future.    This   Bar          Association    vehemently   urge   the    concerned          authorities to reconsider or review the matter." Shri  Lal Thanhawla, Chief Minister Mizoram, by  his  letter dated  October 7, 1991 addressed to Shri K. Vijaya  Bhaskara Reddy,  Minister  of  Law,  Justice  and  Company   Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi stated as under:               "We  had  recommended  Shri  K.N.  Srivastava,          Secretary, Law and Judicial, Government of  Mizoram          for being considered for appointment as a Judge  of          the   Gauhati  High  Court.   Subsequent   to   our          recommendation   it  has  been  reported   that   a          vigilance  case  has been instituted  against  Shri          Srivastava by the Aizawl Bench of the Gauhati  High          Court  in  regard  to  alleged  anomalies  in   the          procurement  of  law books, journals etc.  for  the          Aizawl Bench’s library.               We  understand that the case is  pending  with

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        the Gauhati High Court.  I have, therefore, thought          it  desirable  to  bring this  fact  to  your  kind          notice."                                                        125      Shri  U.L. Bhat, Chief Justice, Gauhati High  Court  by his  letter  dated  October 8, 1991  addressed  to  the  Law Minister Government of India stated:               "I am indeed happy that President has approved          the names of four persons for appointment of Judges          in   the  Gauhati  High  Court  namely,  (1)   Shri          Dhirender Nath Baruah (Assam-Bar) Shri Sujit Barman          Roy   (Tripura-Bar),  (3)  Shri   K.N.   Srivastava          (Mizoram-  service)  and  (4) Shri  Nai  Gopal  Das          (Tripura-SErvice)."      The  Chief Justice did not mention anything  about  the pendency  of  vigilance  cases or  any  other  case  against Srivastava.  The Law Minister after noticng the contents  of both  the  letters  opined that the contents  of  the  Chief Minister’s letter be ignored.      The  Chief  Secretary,  Government  of  Mizoram  by   a wireless  message  dated  November  2,  1991  informed   the Secretary to Government of India, Department of Justice that Keshari  Nandan  Srivastava,  Secretary,  Law  and  Judicial Department,  Government  of Mizoram had  been  placed  under suspension  in  view  of the case  pending  against  him  in Gauhati  High Court on corruption charges and other  serious complaints against him on corrupt practices.  It was further requested  that  the  Government of  India  should  consider cancelling his appointment as permanent Judge of the Gauhati High  Court  till allegations against  him  were  thoroughly inquired.      Srivastava  filed  special leave petition  against  the High Court order, transfer petition seeking transfer of writ proceedings  pending  in Gauhati High Court  and  also  writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.   By an  order  dated November 20, 1991 this Court  withdrew  the writ petition, filed by Kumar Padma Prasad, from the file of the  Gauhati  High Court and transferred the  same  to  this Court.  This is how the matter is before us.      Mr.  Anil Diwan, learned senior advocate appearing  for Kumar  Padma Prasad and Shri Ram Jethmalani, learned  Senior Advocate for the State of Mizoram have raised the  following points for our consideration:      1. Srivastava’s appointment as a Judge of Gauhati  High Court is violative of Article 217(2) of the constitution  of India as he does not fulfill                                                        126 the  qualifications prescribed therein.  Admittedly  he  has not been an advocate of a High Court for at least ten years. The  bio-data of Srivastava before the authorities does  not show that he ever held a judicial office in the territory of India.      2.   Srivastava  has  produced  during  the  course   of arguments,  a  notification  issued  by  the  Government  of Mizoram  showing that he was appointed as Assistant  to  the Deputy Commissioner Aizawl District during the year 1979 and he worked as such for about 6/7 months.  It is contended  by the  learned  counsel that by virtue of his  appointment  as Assistant, in addition to his own duties as Under Secretary, Law and Judicial, Srivastava did not hold a judicial  office as envisaged under Article 217(2) of the Constitution.      3.   There  has  been  no  consultation   amongst   the constitutional authorities as required under Article  217(1) of  the  Constitution of India.  It was contended  that  the Gauhati High Court Order dated November 20, 1990, the letter

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from Chief Minister Mizoram dated October 7, 1991  addressed to the Minister, Law and Justice and the factum of  pendency of  vigilance  inquiry against Srivastava were some  of  the important and relevant material which was not brought of the notice  of  the contitutional authorities and  as  such  the process of consultation  is vitiated.  Relying on  S.P.Gupta and  Ors., etc. etc. v. Union of India and Ors., etc.  etc., [1982]  2  S.C.R 365, It is contended that there has  to  be "full  and  effective consultation" on "full  and  identical facts".   The  same  material must  be  present  before  the Constitutional functionaries whose consultation is mandatory under Article 217(1) of the Constitution of India.      We  may  notice Article 217(2) of the  Constitution  of India which lays down the qualifications for appointment  as a Judge of a High Court.          "217(2)  A  person  shall  not  be  qualified   for          appointment as a Judge of a High Court unless he is          a citizen of India and-          (a)  has  for at least ten years  held  a  judicial          office in the territory of India; or          (b) has for at least ten years been an advocate  of          a  High  Court  of  two  or  more  such  Courts  in          succession;                                                        127          Explanation - For the purposes of this clause -               (a)  in  computing the period during  which  a          person has held judicial office in the territory of          India, there shall be included any period, after he          has  held  any judicial office,  during  which  the          person has been an advocate of a High Court or  has          held  the office of a member of a tribunal  or  any          post, under the Union or a State, requiring special          knowledge of law;          (aa) ................          (b) ................."   It is not disputed that Article 217(2)(b) is not attracted as admittedly Srivastava has not been an advocate of a  High Court  for  at  least  10  years.   The  question  for   our consideration is whether he has for at least 10 years held a judicial office in the territory of India as provided  under Article  217(2)(a)  or  read with  (a)  to  the  explanation therein.      Expression "Judicial Office" has not been defined under the  Constitution,  nevertheless,  it has to  be  given  the meaning  in  the  context of the  concept  of  judiciary  as enshrined  in the Constitution of India.   The  constitution seeks to establish an independent judiciary in the  country. Article  50  of the Constitution gives a  mandate  that  the State  shall take steps to separate the judiciary  from  the executive  in the public services of the State.   Chapter  V and  VI in Part VI of the Constitution proved for  the  High Courts  and  subordinate courts in the  State.   The  Scheme under  the  Constitution  for  establishing  an  independent judiciary  is very clear.  Article 236(b) defines  ’judicial service’  to  mean district Judges  and  Judges  subordinate thereto.  Under Article 234 the Governor of the State  makes appointments  of persons other than District Judges  to  the judicial service in accordance with the Rules made by him in consultation with the High Court.  Article 235 vests control over  district courts and courts subordinate thereto in  the High  Court.  The judicial service whether at the  level  of district  courts or courts subordinate thereto is under  the control of the High Court in all respects.  The  subordinate judiciary which mans the courts subordinate to the  district courts  consists of judicial officers who are  recruited  in

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consultation  with the HIgh Court.  The district judges  are recruited  for  amongst  the  members  of  the  bar  and  by promotion from the                                                        128 subordinate  judiciary.  The judicial service in a State  is distinct  and  separate from the other  services  under  the executive.   The  members of the  judicial  service  perform exclusively  judicial functions and are responsible for  the administration  of  justice in the State.  We  may  at  this stage  refer  to the relevant articles of  the  Constitution which are as under:               "233.  Appointment of district judges.  -  (1)          Appointments of persons to be, and the posting  and          promotion of, district judges in any State shall be          made  by the Governor of the State in  consultation          with  the  High Court  exercising  jurisdiction  in          relation to such State.               (2) A person not already in the service of the          Union or of the State shall only be eligible to  be          appointed a district judges if he has been for  not          less than seven years an advocate or a pleader  and          is recommended by the High Court for appointment.          235. Control over subordinate courts, - The control          over district courts and courts subordinate thereto          including  the  posting and promotion of,  and  the          grant  of  leave  to,  persons  belonging  to   the          judicial  service of a State and holding  any  post          inferior  to  the post of district judge  shall  be          vested  in  the  High Court, but  nothing  in  this          article shall be construed as taking away from  any          such person any right of appeal which he may  under          the law regulating the conditions of his service or          as  authorising  the High Court to  deal  with  him          otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of          his service prescribed under such law.          236. Interpretation.  In this Chapter -               (a)  the expression "district judge"  includes          judge  of a city civil court,  additional  district          judge,  joint  district  judge,  assistant district          judge,  chief judge of a small cause  court,  chief          presidency magistrate, additional chief  presidency          magistrate,  sessions  judge,  additional  sessions          judge and assistant sessions judge;               (b) the expression "Judicial service" means  a          service consisting exclusively of persons  intended          to fill the post of district                                                        129          judge  and other civil judicial posts  inferior  to          the post of district judge.      In  Chandra  Mohan v. State of Uttar  Pradesh  &  Ors., [1967]  1 SCR 77 this Court had an occasion to construe  the above  quoted  provisions  of  Chapter VI  Part  VI  of  the Constitution of India.  Subha Rao, CJ speaking for the  Cour held as under:          "The Indian Constitution, though it does not accept          the  strict  doctrine  of  separation  of   powers,          provides  for  an  independent  judiciary  in   the          States; it constitutes a High Court for each State,          prescribes the institutional conditions of  service          of   the   Judges   thereof,   confers    extensive          jurisdiction  on  it  to issue writs  to  keep  all          tribunals,   including  in  appropriate  case   the          Government, within bounds and gives to it the power          of superintedence over all courts and tribunals  in          the territory over which it has jurisdiction.   But

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        the  makers of the Constitution also realised  that          "it  is the Subordinate Judiciary in India who  are          brought most closely into contact with the  people,          and  it is no less important, perhaps  indeed  even          more  important, that their independence should  be          placed  beyond  question than in the  case  of  the          superior   Judges.    Presumably  to   secure   the          independence  of the judiciary from the  executive,          the Constitution introduced a group of articles  in          Ch.  VI of Part VI under the  heading  "Subordinate          Courts".   But  at the time  the  Constitution  was          made, in most of the State the magistracy was under          the direct control of the executive.  Indeed it  is          common  knowledge that in the preindependent  India          there  was a strong  agitation that  the  judiciary          should be separated from the executive and that the          agitation was based upon the assumption that unless          they  were  separated,  the  independence  of   the          judiciary  at the lower levels would be a  mockery.          So article 50 of the Directive Principles of Policy          states that the State shall take steps to  separate          the  judiciary  from the executive  in  the  public          services  of the States.  Simply stated,  it  means          that  there  shall be a separate  judicial  service          free from the executive control."          "...the real conflict rests on the question whether          the Governor can appoint as district judges persons          from services other than                                                        130          the  judicial  service;  that is  to  say,  can  he          appoint  a  person who is in  the  police,  excise,          revenue or such other service as a district  judge?          The acceptance of this position would take us  back          to  the  preindependence days and that too  to  the          conditions  prevailing in the Princely States.   In          the  Princely  States  one  used  to  come   across          appointments  to the judicial service  from  police          and other departments.  This would also cut  across          the  well-knit scheme of the Constitution  and  the          principle  underlying  it,  namely,  the  judiciary          shall  be  an independent service.   Doubtless,  if          Art. 223 (1) stood alone, it may be argued that the          Governor  may  appoint  any person  as  a  district          judge,  whether  legally qualified or  not,  if  he          belongs  to any service under the State.  But  Art.          233(1)  is nothing more than a declaration  of  the          general  power  of the Governor in  the  matter  of          appointment  of district judges.  It does  not  lay          down  the  qualifications of the candidates  to  be          appointed  or  denote the sources  from  which  the          recruitment  has to be made.  But the resources  of          recruitment are indicated in cl.(2) thereof.  Under          cl.(2)  of Art. 233 two sources are given,  namely,          (i)  persons  in the service of the  Union  or  the          State,  and  (ii) advocate or pleader.  Can  it  be          said  that in the context of Ch. VI of Part  VI  of          the  Constitution" the service of the Union  or  of          the State "mean any service of the Union or of  the          State  or does it mean the judicial service of  the          Union  or  of the State ? The  setting,  viz.,  the          chapter  dealing with subordinate courts, in  which          the expression "the service" appears indicates that          the   service   mentioned   therein   the   service          pertaining  to  courts.  That  apart,  Art.  236(b)          defines the expression "judicial service" to mean a

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        service consisting exclusively of persons  intended          to fill the post of district judge and other  civil          judicial  posts  inferior to the post  of  district          judge.  If this definition, instead of appearing in          Art. 236, is placed as a clause before Art. 233(2),          there  cannot be any dispute that "the service"  in          Art.  233(2)  can only mean the  judicial  service.          The  circumstance that the definition of  "judicial          service" finds a place in a subsequent Article does          not  necessarily lead to contrary conclusion.   The          fact  that  in  art.  233(2)  the  expression  "the          service"  is used whereas in Arts. 234 and 235  the          expression  "judicial  service"  is  found  is  not          decisive of                                                        131          the  question whether the expression "the  service"          in  Art.  233(2) must be something other  than  the          judicial  service,  for,  the  entire  chapter   is          dealing with the judicial service.  The  definition          is  exhaustive of the service.  Two expressions  in          the definition bring out the idea that the judicial          service consists of hierarchy of judicial  officers          starting  from the lowest and ending with  district          judges.    The   expressions   "exclusively"    and          "intended"  emphasise  the fact that  the  judicial          service  consists only of persons intended to  fill          up  the  posts of district judges and  other  civil          judicial posts and that is the exclusive service of          judicial   officers.   Having   defined   "judicial          service" in exclusively terms, having provided  for          appointments  to that service and having  entrusted          the control of the said service to the care of  the          High  Court, the makers of the  world  Constitution          not have conferred a blanket power on the  Governor          to  appoint  any  person  from  any  service  as  a          district judges.".      This Court has thus authoritatively laid down that  the appointment of district judges under Article 233(2) can only be  from the judicial service of the State as defined  under Article 236(b) of the Constitution.      It  is in the above context that we have  to  interpret the  meaning of expression "judicial office"  under  Article 217(2)(a)  of  the Constitution of India.   The  High  Court Judges are appointed from two source, members of the Bar and from amongst the persons who have held "judicial office" for not  less  than  ten years.   Even  a  subordinate  judicial officer  manning a court inferior to the District Judge  can be  appointed  as a Judge of a High Court.   The  expression "judicial office" in generic sense may include wide  variety of  offices  which are connected with the administration  of justice  in  one  way  or the  other.   Under  the  Criminal Procedure  Code  1973 powers of judicial Magistrate  can  be conferred  on  any person who holds or has held  any  office under  the Government.  Officers holding various posts under the  executive are often vested with the  Magisterial-powers to  meet  a particular situation.  Did the  framers  of  the constitution  had this type of ’offices’ in mind  when  they provided  a  source of appointment to the high office  of  a Judge of High Court from amongst the holders of a  "judicial office".   The answer has to be in the negative.  We are  of the  view  that holder of "judicial  office"  under  Article 217(2)(a) means the person who exercises only judicial                                                        132 functions,  determines  causes  inter-parties  and   renders decisions  in  a judicial capacity.  He must belong  to  the

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judicial  service which as a class is free  from  executive- control and is disciplined to uphold the dignity,  integrity and independence of judiciary.      This  Court  in Chandra Mohan’s case (supra)  has  held that  "Service....of the State" in Article 233(2) means  the judicial  service  as defined under Article  236(b)  of  the Constitution.   Therefore,  a  person -  who  is  holding  a judicial  office in th generic sense and is not a member  of the  judicial service of the State - is not eligible  to  be appointed  as District Judge.  Can such person be  qualified for  appointment as a Judge of a High Court? An  affirmative answer will not be in conformity with the scheme of  Chapter V  and  VI of Part VI of the Constitution and will  also  go contrary  to  the  ratio in Chandra Mohan’s  case.   When  a person  is not eligible to be appointed as a District  Judge it  would be mockery of the Constitution to hold that he  is eligible  to be appointed as a Judge of a High  Court.   The constitutional-scheme  is clear.  Independence of  judiciary is  the basic feature of the Constitution.  To achieve  that objective  there has to be separation of judiciary from  the executive.   The  judicial  service  under  Article   236(b) consists  of District Judges  who preside over the  District courts  and  the  Subordinate  Judges  who  man  the  courts inferior to the District Court.  Subordinate Judges who  are member of the judicial service are eligible for  appointment as District Judges.  It would be logical and consistent with the  constitutional scheme to read "judicial  office"  under Article  217(2)(a)  to mean an office  within  the  judicial service  of the State.  Ordinarily the District  Judges  who are superior members of the judicial service are  considered for  appointment  as  Judges  of the  ’High  Court  but  the constitution-makers  wanted  to hold-out  a  possibility  of elevation  as  a  Judge of High  Court  to  the  Subordinate Judges,   so   as  to  infuse  amongst  them  a   sense   of responsibility  and an incentive for maintaining  efficiency and it was with that objective that the expression "judicial office"   has  been  used  in  Article  217(2)(a)   of   the Constitution.  In our view the expression "judicial  office" in  the  said  article means an office which is  a  part  of judicial  service  as defined under Article  236(b)  of  the Constitution.      In Statesman (Private) Ltd. v. H.R. Dev & Ors., [1968]3 SCR  614, the question before this Court was whether a  Sub- Deputy   collector  vested  with  the  powers  of  a   first magistrate was a judicial officer in terms of                                                        133 Section  7(3)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act.   The  said section  provides that a person shall not be  qualified  for appointment  as  the  presiding officer of  a  labour  court unless he has held any judicial office in India for not less than 7 years.  H.R. Deb was holding office of the Sub-Deputy Collector  and was vested with magisterial powers  which  he enjoyed   for  about  nineteen  years.   He  was   appointed presiding  officer of a labour court.  His  appointment  was challenged  on  the  ground that he had  not  held  judicial office for 7 years prior to his appointment.   Hidayatullah, C.J.  who spoke for the Court held that since  a  magistrate exercises  judicial  functions he holds a  judicial  office. Whether his duties are partly judicial and partly other does not  in any way detract from the position that while  acting as a magistrate he is a judicial officer.  On these findings the  appointment of H.R Deb as a labour officer was  upheld. While  holding  so  the learned Chief  Justice  observed  as under:          "Nor does the argument that magistrates will  claim

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        to  be  appointed  Judges of the  High  Court  need          detain  us.  the scheme of Chapter V of Part VI  of          the Constitution has its own affect on the  meaning          of the expressions ’judicial office’ and  ’judicial          service’.   In  any  case  the  use  of  the   same          expression  in  any  other enactment  not  in  pari          meteria  can  have no bearing upon  the  Industrial          Disputes  Act and vice versa. In  the  Constitution          these words must bear the meaning which the context          dictates  and  in that connection  the  history  of          appointment of Judges cannot be overlooked."      It is thus, clear that the expression "judicial office" under  Article  217(2)(a)  of the  Constitution  has  to  be interpreted  in consonance with the scheme of Chapter V  and VI of Part VI of the Constitution.  We, therefore, hold that expression "judicial office" under Article 217(2))(a) of the Constitution means a "judicial office" which belongs to  the judicial  service  as defined under Article  236(b)  of  the Constitution of India.  In order to qualify for  appointment as a Judge of a High Court under Article 217(2)(a) a  person must  hold a "judicial office" which must be a part  of  the judicial service of the State.      We may now examine whether Srivastava is qualified  for appointment  as a Judge of a High Court on the basis of  the offices held by him as                                                        134 detailed in his bio-data reproduced above.  The Constitution of  India  in clear terms lays down  the  qualification  for appointment  as  a  Judge  of  a  High  Court.   The   Chief Minister/Chief Justice selected Srivastava for  recommending his  name for appointment as a Judge of Gauhati High  Court. Obviously on their asking Srivastava submitted his  bio-data which  we  have re-produced above and which is part  of  the appointment  files maintained in the High Court and  in  the Ministry of Law, Government of India.  Srivastava  mentioned therein  that  he  belongs  to  "Mizoram  Judicial  Service" thereby  giving  in  an  impression that  he  has  had  held judicial  offices  as a member of the  judicial  service  of Mizoram.   This  is not a correct  representation.   Mizoram Judicial  Service  Rules, 1986 came into force  with  effect from November 17, 1986.  These Rules were superseded by  the Mizoram  Judicial  Service Rules, 1989 (1989  Rules)  framed under  Article  309 read with Articles 233 and  234  of  the Constitution of India in consultation with the Gauhati  High Court.  These Rules were enforced with effect from  February 17,  1986.  Under the 1989 Rules various posts in  different grades  were  created.  Schedule-A to the 1989  Rules  which give the composition of the Service is an under:                           SCHEDULE - A                    (See rule 2(g) and rule 4) Sl. No.                       Grade & Post 1.   GRADE I (a)  SENIOR 1)   Legal Remembrancer-cum-Secy., Law & Judicial. 2)   Registrar, High Court 3)   District & Sessions Judge (b)  JUNIOR 4)   Joint Legal Remembrancer cum      Jt. Secretary. Law & Judicial 5)   Special Judge                                                        135 II   GRADE II 1)   Chief Judicial Magistrate 2)    Dy.  Legal Remembrancer-Cum-Deputy  Secretary,  Law  & Judicial

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3)   Deputy Registrar, High Court 4)   Assistant District & Sessions Judge III  GRADE III 1)    Asstt. Legal Remembrancer-Cum-Under Secretary,  Law  &       Judicial 2)    President & Recorder, District Council Court, Aizawl. 3)    Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate 4)    Assistant Registrar, High Court 5)    Judicial  Officer I, District Council  Courts,  Aizawl       and Magistrate Subordinate District Council Courts  in       Aizawl and Lunglei Districts. IV   GRADE IV 1)    Munsiffs/Judicial Magistrates 2)    Magistrate   Cum  Judicial  Officer   II,   Additional       Subordinate       District Council Courts in Aizawl  &       Lunglei Districts. 3)    Special Officer-Cum-Assistant Draftsman 4)    Translator"      Srivastava,  according to his bio-data,  was  appointed legal Remembrancer-Cum-Secretary, Law & Judicial in 1985 and has  been working as such since then.  It is on  this  basis that  he claims to be a member of Mizoram  Judicial  Service constituted  under  the 1989 Rules is  a  service  envisaged under Article 236(b) of the Constitution of India, we assume it  to  be so for the purposes of the  present  controversy. Schedule  A to the 1989 Rules enumerates  various  ’judicial offices’ such as District & Sessions                                                        136 Judge (Grade I), Chief Judicial Magistrate (Grade II),  Sub- Divisional   Judicial  Magistrate,  Judicial   officer   and Magistrates  (Grade III) and munsiffs/Judicial  Magistrates, Magistrate-cum-Judicial  officer  II (Grade IV). It  is  not disputed  that Srivastava never held any of  these  offices. He,  however,  claims  that since he has  been  holding  the office  of Legal Remembrancer-cum-Secretary Law &  Judicial, he  is member of the Mizoram Judicial Service.  That may  be so  but unless he has held a judicial office in  a  judicial service  he  does not come within the  purviews  of  Article 217(2)(a)   of  the  Constitution.   The  office  of   Legal Remembrancer-cum-Secretary Law and Judicial office under the control of the executive.  In any case the Mizoram  Judicial Service  came into existence with effect from  February  17, 1986  and even if full benefit of that service is  given  to Srivastava  for the purposes of Article 217(2)(a) he is  not qualified as the total period counted from February  17,1986 comes  to  less then ten years as required  under  the  said Article.   Srivastava, his bio-data, under the said  heading ’professional experience’, has listed 24 various offices held by  him during the course of his career.  A bare  look  into the list shows that none of those offices were/are  judicial offices   even  in  the  generic  sense.   The   office   of D.C.(Judicial)  claimed to have been held by  Srivastava  in the year 1987 is again of no consequence because even if  we assume  the  said office to be judicial office  in  judicial service  the  period counted from 1987 would  not  make  the requisite  period of ten years under the Constitution.   All the  other  officer  listed  in  the  bio-data  are  neither judicial  nor  part  of any  judicial  service.   All  those offices  were/are  under the employment and control  of  the Executive.  We, therefore, agree with Mr. Anil Diwan and Mr. Ram Jethmalani that assuming every word of Srivastava’s bio- data to be correct he is not qualified for appointment as  a judge of a High Court.      It  is for the first time in the  post-independent  era that  this  Court is seized of a situation where it  has  to

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perform the painful duty of determining the eligibility of a person  who has been appointed a Judge of High Court by  the President  of  India and who is awaiting to enter  upon  his office.   We looked into the official record  and  permitted learned counsel for the parties to examine the same.  We are at a loss to understand as to how the bio-data of Srivastava escaped  the scrutiny of the authorities during the  process of consultation under Article 217(1)  of the Constitution of India.                                                        137 A  cursory  look at the bio-data would have  disclosed  that Srivastava  was not qualified for appointment as a Judge  of the High Court on the admitted facts which have been on  the official  files  all  the time.  Needless to  say  that  the independence, efficiency and integrity of the judiciary  can only  be  maintained  by  selecting  the  best  persons   in accordance   with   the   procedure   provided   under   the Constitution.    These   objectives  enshrined   under   the Constitution   of  India  cannot  be  achieved  unless   the functionaries  accountable for making appointments act  with meticulous care and utmost responsibility.      Mr. Anil Diwan and Mr Ram Jethmalani vehemently  argued that  in case we come to the conclusion, as we have, that  - on the basis of the bio-data taken into consideration by the constitutional authorities - Srivastava is not qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court then his  appointment be  quashed on the grounds that there has been violation  of Article 217(2) of the constitution and there was total  lack of  application  of  mind on the  part  of  the  authorities responsible  for making the appointment.  We can adopt  this course  but  after  hearing  Mr  Venugopal,  learned  senior advocate  appearing for Srivastava we refrain from doing  so and  intend going into further material placed on record  by Srivastava to show that notwithstanding his bio-data  before the authority he is qualified to be appointed as a Judge  of the  High  Court.  We are fully aware of  the  delicacy  and sensitivity of the matter and the stage at which the  matter has  been brought before us for judicial scrutiny.  We  make it  clear  that ordinarily the domain in such  matters  lies wholly  with  the constitutional  authorities  mentioned  in Article   217  of  the  Constitution,  but  in   exceptional circumstances   like  the  present,  where   the   incumbent considered for appointment as a Judge of High Court does not fulfill  the qualification as laid down expressly under  the provisions  of  the  Constitution  itself,  it  becomes  our bounded duty to see that no person ineligible or unqualified is appointed to a high constitutional and august office of a Judge of a High Court.  Thus taking in view the entire facts and  circumstances  of  the case and in  order  to  do  full justice to Srivastava we gave him full opportunity to  place any  fresh  material  before  us  to  justify  that  he  was qualified  for appointment as a Judge of a High  Court  even though  such material had not been brought to the notice  of the constitutional authorities.      During  the  course of arguments Srivastava  has  filed additional affidavit                                                        138 and  placed documents before us, which were not  before  the authorities,  under  Article 217(1) of the  Constitution  of India.  Under Rules 8 and 15 of the Rules for the regulation of the procedure of officers appointed to administer justice in   the  Lushai  Hills  promulgated  on  March   25,   1937 (hereinafter called ’1937 Rules’).  Srivastava was appointed as  Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner Aizawl District  by the  Lt.  Governor  (Administrator)  of  Mizoram.   He   was

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invested  under  Rule 9 of the 1937 Rules  with  the  powers analogous  to  the powers of a judicial  magistrate  of  the First  Class as defined in the Code of Criminal  Procedures, 1973.   In  support of his contention he  has  produced  the notification  dated  June  23,  1979  which  is   reproduced hereunder :                          "NOTIFICATION"                           Dated Aizawl, the 23rd  June 1979      No.CS/MZ/APPT/79  : Under rules 8 and 15 of  the  Rules for the regulation of the procedure of officers appointed to administer  justice  in  the Lushai  Hills,  published  vide Notification  No.2530(a)A.P. dated 25th March 1937  the  Lt. Governor  (Administrator) of Mizoram is pleased  to  appoint the   following   Officers  as  Assistant  to   the   Deputy Commissioner,  Aizawl District and further to  invest  under rule  9 of the aforesaid Rules With the powers analogous  to the power of Judicial Magistrate of the First Class  defined in the Code of Criminal Procedures, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974) in addition to their duties.      Name of Officer                     Designation 1. Shri M. Lalmanzuala            Secretary Appointment 2. Shri C, Lalchhuma              Secretary, Finance 3. Shri Khuanga                   Director, L.A. T.P. & H 4. Shri Lalthamuama               Director, Supply & Tpt. 5. Shri M. Gasowaimi              Under Secy, P.W.D. 6. Shri S.P.Nag                   Deputy Director, Fisheries 7. Shri Shushil Kumar             Deputy Director, C.D. 8. Shri K.N. Srivastava           Under Secy. Law & Judicial 9. Shri A.K. Ghose                Architect P.W.D. 10.Shri S.S, Dutta                Under Secy. Finance                                                        139      Further in  exercise of the powers  conferred  by  sub- section  (1)  of section 20 of Code of  Criminal  Procedure, 1973  (Act  2  of 1974) read with the  Notification  of  the Government  of  India,  Ministry  of  Home  Affairs  No.  11 11/2/74-UTL   (iii) (S.O. 185(E) dated the 20th March,  1974 the  Lt. Governor (Administrator) is pleased to appoint  the above  mentioned officers as Executive Magistrates  also  in the Aizawl District.                          Sd/- A.J. Kundan                Chief Secy. to Govt. of Mizoram"      Rules  1,8,9,10,14,15, and 19 of the 1937  Rules  which are relevant for our purposes are reproduced hereunder:               "1.  The administration of the district  known          as  the Lushai Hills is vested in the  Governor  of          Assam,  and the Deputy Commissioner of  the  Lushai          Hills  and  his assistants and in  the  chiefs  and          headmen of villages.               8.   Criminal  justice  shall  be   ordinarily          administered  by  the Deputy Commissioner  and  his          Assistants.               9. The Deputy Commissioner shall be  competent          to  pass  sentence  of  death,  transportation   or          imprisonment up to the maximum amount provided  for          the  offence,  of whipping, and of fine up  to  any          amount     provided that all  sentences  of  death,          transportation  or imprisonment of seven years  and          upwards shall be subject to the confirmation by the          Assam High Court.               The  Assam High Court hereinafter referred  to          as  the High Court of Deputy Commissioner may  call          for  the proceedings of any officer subordinate  to          him and may reduce, enhance or cancel any  sentence          passed  or  remand  the case  for  retrial  but  no          offence  shall be punished by a sentence  exceeding

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        that awardable under the Indian Penal Code.               Assistant  to  the Deputy  Commissioner  shall          exercise  such powers as they may be invested  with          by  the Governor of Assam not exceeding those of  a          Magistrate  of the first class, as defined  in  the          Criminal Procedure Code.               10.   An  appeal  shall  lie  to  the   Deputy          Commissioner against                                                        140          any order passed by any of his Assistants.               An appeal shall lie to the High Court for  any          sentence passed by the Deputy Commissioner.               In  respect  of magisterial decisions  of  the          Commandant of the Assam Rifles, the  Superintendent          shall  exercise  the  appellate  revisional  powers          conferred  upon  the  Court  of  Sessions  or   the          District   Magistrate  by  the  Code  of   Criminal          Procedure in the case of decisions of the class  of          Magistrates with the powers of which the Commandant          of Assam Rifles has been invested.               14.   The   deputy   commissioner   and    all          Magistrates  shall keep such registers of  criminal          cases  and  submit such returns as the  High  Court          shall from time to time prescribe.          RM60               15. The administration of civil justice in the          Lushai   Hills   is   entrusted   to   the   Deputy          Commissioner  and  his Assistants, who  shall  take          special  cognizance  of  well  established   Lushai          Customs.               19.  The  High  Court and the  Courts  of  the          Deputy  commissioner  and his Assistants  shall  be          guided   by  the  spirit  of  the  Code  of   Civil          Procedures,  so  far  as it is  applicable  to  the          circumstances  of the Lushai Hills  and  consistent          with these Rules.      Mr.  Venugopal  contended that  the  administration  of justice  both  on civil and criminal side was  being  manned exclusively  by the Deputy Commissioner and  his  Assistants under  the  1937 Rules. No other  courts  were  functioning. Apart  from  administering criminal and  civil  justice  the total  administration  of the district known as  the  Lushai Hills  was  vested in the Governer of Assam   ,  the  Deputy Commissioner of Lushai Hill, and his Assistants. The  Deputy Commissioner  under  the 1937 Rules was  competent  to  pass sentence  of death, transportation or imprisonment up  to  a maximum provided for the offence and fine up to any  amount. The  Assistants to the Deputy Commissioner were to  exercise such  powers  as conferred by the Government  not  exceeding those  of a magistrate of the first class as  defined  under the  Code  of Criminal Procedure.  An appeal  lies  to   the Deputy  Commissioner against any order passed by any of  his Assistants.                                                         141 Similarly under Rule 15 the administration of civil  justice was entrusted to the Deputy Commissioner and his Assistants. Srivastava  exercised the powers of Assistant to the  Deputy commissioner  from  June  23,  1979  to  December   19,1979. According  to Mr. Venugopal the office of the  Assistant  to which Srivastava  of about six months was a judicial office. According  to  him  period for which he  held  the  judicial office  and the quality of the said office are not  relevant factors. He therefore, forcefully contended that Srivastava, having  held the judicial office of Assistant to the  Deputy Commissioner   under   the   1937   Rules    fulfills    the

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qualification  under Article 217(2)(a) read with (a) to  the Explanation  According  to  him  all  the  office  held   by Srivastava  after relinquishing the office of the  Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner required special knowledge of law and  as such whole of that period is liable to  be  included for  counting  10  years during which  he  held  a  judicial office.   Srivastava,  according to him,  is  qualified  for appointment as a judge of a  High Court.      We  have  given  our thoughtful  consideration  to  the argument  advanced by Mr. Venugopal. We are not inclined  to agree with him.      Srivastava  has  been shown at serial at No. 8  in  the notification dated June 23, 1979 reproduced above.  The post held by him on that day was that of Under Secretary, Law and Judicial.  While holding the said post  he was appointed  as Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner in addition to his  own duties.   He was further invested with the powers  analogous to  the  powers  of  a judicial  magistrate.   He  was  also appointed as Executive Magistrate in the Aizawl District. In the  said notification at serial No.9 is A.K. Ghose who  was architect  in the Public Works Department of the  Government of  Mizoram.   Similarly  at   serial  No.  2  is  Secretary Finance. Serial No. 4 Director Supply and Transport,  Serial No.5  Under  Secretary  P.W.D  and  No.  6  Deputy  Director Fisheries.   The  very  fact that  officers  from  different departments  were  appointed as Assistants in   addition  to their  duties is significant and clearly goes to  show  that there was no separate office with a designation of Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner on which these appointments  were made.   Keeping  in  view  the  exigency  of  administration different  officers working with the Government  of  Mizoram were  invested  with the powers of  judicial  and  executive magistrates  by  appointing them Assistants in  addition  to their own duties.  It would be                                                    142 travesty of justice if we hold  that an Architect working in the P.W.D. department by virtue of his being vested with the powers  of an Assistant in addition to his own duties  comes to hold a "judicial office" in term of Article 217(2)(a)  of the  Constitution  of  India.  There was  no  separation  of judiciary  from the executive under the 1937 Rules  and  the total administration of the area including administration of justice  was being done by the officers who were  under  the control of the executive.  There was no judicial service  as envisaged by article 236(b) of the Constitution of India and as such an Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner could not be a  judicial  officer in terms of Article  217(2)(a)  of  the Constitution  of India.  There is no material before  us  to show  that  there was a regular cadre of Assistants  at  the relevant time.  From the notification reproduced above it is obvious   that  the  posts  of  Assistants  to  the   Deputy Commissioner  were not separately created and only  officers working in various Government Departments were invested with the  powers  under the 1937 Rules in addition to  their  own duties.  We have further no material before us to show  that Srivastava in fact presided over any court and conducted any trial  or decided any civil cases during the said period  of six  months.  Rather there is an  affidavit filed  by  Under Secretary,   Law,   Judicial   and   Parliamentary   Affairs Department  Government of Mizoram affirming that no post  of Assistant  to  Deputy Commissioner was  created  during  the relevant period.  It is further stated in the said affidavit that Srivastava did not deal with or decide any case  (civil or criminal) during that period.      Mr. Anil Diwan relying on Smt. Kanta Kathuria v.  Manak

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Chand  Surana,  [1969]  3 SCC 268  has  contended  that  the judicial office under Article 217(1)(a) of the  Constitution of India has to  be an office which is subsisting permanent, substantive and which has an independent existence from  the person  who fills it.  In Smt. Kanta Kathuria  Case  (supra) Sikri,  J.  (as  he then was)  who  delivered  the  majority judgment  referred to with approval the definition  of  word "office"  given  by  Rowlatt, J. in  Great  Western  Railway Company  v. Bater 8 Tax Cases 231 which is in the  following terms:          "Now  it  is  argued, and to my  mind  argued  most          forcibly,  that shows that what those who  use  the          language of the Act of 1842 meant, when they  spoke          of  an  office  or employment,  was  an  office  or          employment which was an office or employment  which          was a subsisting, permanent,                                                     143          Substantive   position  which  had   an   existence          independent  from the person who filled  it,  which          went on and was filled in succession by  successive          holders;  and  if  you merely had  a  man  who  was          engaged on whatever terms, to do duties which  were          assigned to him, his employment to do those  duties          did not create an office to which those duties were          attached.  He  merely was employed  to  do  certain          things  and that is an end of it; and if there  was          no  office or employment existing in the case as  a          thing,  the  so-called  office  or  employment  was          merely  an  aggregate  of  the  activities  of  the          particular  man  for the time being.  And  I  think          myself  that  that  is sound.  I am  not  going  to          decide  that, because I think I ought not to in  the          state  of the authorities, but my own view is  that          the  people in 1842 who use this language meant  by          an  office a substantive thing that  existed  apart          from the holder."      The  Word "office" has various meanings and we have  to see which is appropriate meaning to be ascribed to this word in  the context it appears in the Constitution.  We  are  of the  view that the framers of the Constitution did  not  and could  not have meant by a "judicial office" which  did  not exist independently and the duties or part of the duties  of which  could be conferred on any person whether  trained  or not  in the administration of justice.  The  word  "Judicial office"   under  Article  217(2)(a)  in  our  view  means  a subsisting office with a substantive  position which has  an existence independent from its holder.      We have already held that "judicial office" in  Article 217(2)(a) means an office as a part of the judicial  service as  defined  under  Article 236(b) of  the  Constitution  of India.  The office of the Assistant  to Deputy  Commissioner held  by Srivastava for a period of about  six months  under the   notification reproduced above, was neither a  judicial office  nor  was it part of a judicial  service  as  defined under  Article  236(b) of the Constitution of   India.   We, therefore, accept the second contention advanced by Mr. Anil Diwan  and Ram Jethmalani and hold that Srivastava  was  not qualified  for appointment as a Judge of a High Court  under Article 217(2)(a) of the Constitution of India.      Before  parting with the point under discussion we  may notice                                                     144 another  argument  advanced by Mr. Venugopal.  He  contended that  there being no separation of judiciary in Mizoram  and justice civil and criminal being solely administered by  the

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executive  officers under the 1937 Rules they  are  judicial officers  within  the  ambit of  Article  217(2)(a)  of  the Constitution   of   India.   We  do   not   agree.    Before independence  the district judges were appointed by the  the Governor  from three sources, namely, (1) the  Indian  Civil Service, (2) the Provincial Judicial Service and (3) the Bar After  independence recruitment to the Indian Civil  Service was   discontinued   and   the   officers   of   the   India Administrative  Service  which substituted the  Indian Civil Service were not to be given judicial  posts.   The district judges have been recruited only from two sources(1) bar  and (2) judicial service.  There has been no case of a member of the executive having been promoted as a district judge.  The independence of judiciary is part of the basic structure  of the  Constitution.  The Directive Principles give a  mandate that  the State shall take steps to separate  the  judiciary from  the  executive  which  means that  there  shall  be  a separate  judicial service free from the executive  control. The  constitution-scheme, therefore, only permit members  of the  judicial  service as constituted in  terms  of  Article 236(b) of the Constitution to be considered for the post  of district  judge and that of the High Court Judge.  It  would be  useful  to refer to Article 237 of the  Constitution  of India  :           "237.  Application  of  the  provisions  of   this          Chapter to certain class or classes of  magistrate.          The Governor may by public notification direct that          the  foregoing provisions of this Chapter  and  any          rules  made thereunder shall with effect from  such          date as may be fixed by him in that behalf apply in          relation to any class or classes of magistrates  in          the  State  as they apply in  relation  to  persons          appointed  to  the judicial service  of  the  State          subject to such exceptions and modifications as may          be specified in the notification."      In   Chandra  Mohan’s  case  (supra)  Subba   Rao,   CJ interpreted Article 237 in the following terms :          "Art.  237  enables the Governor to  implement  the          separation  of  the judiciary from  the  executive.          Under  this Article, the Governor may  notify  that          Arts. 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the this                                                       145          Constitution  will apply to magistrates subject  to          certain  modification or exceptions; for  instance,          if  the Governor so notifies, the said  magistrates          will  become members of the judicial service,  they          will have to be appointed in the manner  prescribed          in Art. 234, they will be under the control of  the          High Court under Art. 235 and they can be appointed          as  District Judges by the Governor  under  Art.233          (1).   To state it differently, they will  then  be          integrated in the judicial service which is one  of          the sources of recruitment to the post of  district          Judges.  Indeed, Art. 237 emphasises the fact  that          till  such  an integration is  brought  about,  the          magistrates  are  outside  the scope  of  the  said          provisions.    The  said  view  accords  with   the          constitution theme of independent judiciary and the          contrary view accepts a retrograde step."      It  is  thus obvious that the Magistrates who  are  not appointed  to  the  judicial service of  the  State  can  be brought  into the judicial service by way of a  notification under  Article 237 of the Constitution Of India.   Till  the time  there  is separation of judiciary  or  a  notification under  Article  237 of the Constitution of India  is  issued

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there  is no question of considering the executive  officers or even Magistrates for appointment to the post of  District Judge  or  a  High Court Judge  even  though  the  executive officers  or Magistrates concerned have the adornment  of  a judicial  office.  We, therefore, reject the  contention  of Mr. Venugopal.      The  view  we have taken on the first  and  the  second points,  the very interesting and learned discussion on  the third  point  need not detain us and we express  no  opinion about it.      We  allow  transferred  writ petition  of  Kumar  Padma Prasad  and  declare that K.N. Srivastava, on  the  date  of issue  of  warrant  by  the  president  of  India,  was  not qualified to be appointed as a Judge of the High Court. As a consequence,  we  quash his appointment as a judge   of  the Gauhati  High Court. We direct the Union of India and  other respondents  present  before us not to  administer  oath  or affirmation  under Article 219 of the Constitution of  India to   K.N. Srivastava.  We further restrain  K.N.  Srivastava from making and subscribing an oath or affirmation in  terms of  Article  219 of the Constitution of India  and  assuming office of the Judge                                                146 of  the High Court.  We direct the Registry to send  a  copy of  this  judgment  to  the  President  of  India  for   his consideration and necessary action in terms of our judgment. There shall be no order as to costs. R.P.                                     Petition allowed.                                                        147