03 December 2010
Supreme Court
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KULDEEP SINGH Vs G.M.,INSTRUMENT DESIGN D&F. CENTER

Bench: P. SATHASIVAM,B.S. CHAUHAN, , ,
Case number: C.A. No.-010231-010231 / 2010
Diary number: 4540 / 2007
Advocates: R. C. KAUSHIK Vs BALBIR SINGH GUPTA


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REPORTABLE     

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.                OF 2010 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 4137 of 2007)

Kuldeep Singh              .... Appellant (s)

Versus

G.M., Instrument Design Development  and Facilities Centre & Anr.        .... Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T  

P. Sathasivam, J.

1)  Leave granted.

2) This appeal is filed against the judgment and order of  

the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh dated  

31.10.2006 in CWP No. 8774 of 2005 wherein the Division  

Bench of the High Court confirmed the award passed by  

the Labour Court, Ambala and dismissed the writ petition  

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filed by the appellant  herein for  reinstatement with full  

back wages and other consequential benefits.

3) Brief facts:

(a) It  is  the  case  of  one  Sh.  Kuldeep  Singh,  the  

appellant/workman,  that  on  08.10.1990,  he  was  

appointed as Data Entry Operator on daily wages and he  

worked as such till 28.11.1991 and thereafter on ad-hoc  

basis  and worked up to  26.05.1992 without  any  break  

when  his  services  were  terminated  by  the  Instrument  

Design  Development  and  Facilities  Centre  (IDDC)-the  

respondent/management  herein.   According  to  him,  no  

notice  or  compensation  in  lieu  thereof  was  given  for  

terminating his  services though he had worked for  240  

days  in  the  preceding  12  months.   According  to  the  

appellant workers junior to him were retained and even  

fresh appointments were made after the termination of his  

services which is in violation of provisions of Sections 25F  

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to H of the Industrial  Disputes Act,  1947 (in short “the  

Act”).  

(b) It is the case of the respondent/Management that the  

appellant/workman was working on daily wages to meet  

the  exigencies  of  work  and  his  contract  of  employment  

was on day to day basis and that the workman did not  

render  duty  for  requisite  number  of  days  in  the  12  

preceding months as claimed.  It was further denied that  

any worker junior to the appellant was retained in service  

or any fresh appointment was made.  

(c) On 12.12.2003, the Labour Court, after adverting to  

the reference made by the Governor of Haryana as to the  

non-employment  of  the  appellant  and  after  framing  

necessary  issues  has  held  that  the  

respondent/Management  is  an  industry  within  the  

meaning  of  Section  2(j)  of  the  Act  and  found  that  the  

workman rendered the duty for more than 240 days in the  

12 preceding months but the Management terminated his  

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services without complying with the provisions of Section  

25F of the Act, so the order impugned is illegal, null and  

void and deserves to be set aside.  Having found so on the  

material  issues  1,  5  and  6  in  favour  of  the  workman,  

however,  on the ground of  delay in raising the demand  

and  finding  that  the  reference  is  bad  and  incompetent  

being  raised  so  belatedly  dismissed  the  claim  of  the  

workman.  

(d) Aggrieved by the dismissal of his claim, the workman  

filed Civil Writ Petition No. 8774 of 2005 before the High  

Court  of  Punjab  &  Haryana  at  Chandigarh.   By  the  

impugned judgment dated 31.10.2006, the Division Bench  

of  the  High  Court  by  holding  that  the  unexplained  

inordinate delay has rendered the dispute in question as  

patently stale accepted the award of the Labour Court and  

dismissed the writ  petition.   Questioning  the same,  the  

workman  has  filed  the  above  appeal  by  way  of  special  

leave.  

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4) Heard  Mr.  B.S.  Mor,  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant/workman  and  Mr.  Shishpal  Laler,  learned  

counsel for the respondent/Management.  

5) The point for consideration in this appeal is whether  

the Labour Court and the High Court justified in rejecting  

the claim of the workman merely on the ground of delay  

when  the  Labour  Court  concluded  in  categorical  terms  

that the termination of the services of the workman by the  

Management  without  complying  with  the  provisions  of  

Section  25F  of  the  Act  is  illegal,  null  and  void  and  

deserves to be set aside.  

6) It is not in dispute that the appellant was terminated  

from  service  w.e.f.  26.05.1992.   It  is  the  claim  of  the  

workman that he has worked as Data Entry Operator from  

08.10.1990 to 28.11.1991 and thereafter, on ad hoc basis  

from 28.11.1991 to 26.05.1992 and since he had worked  

for more than 240 days in the 12 preceding months and  

his  juniors  were  retained  in  service  and  fresh  

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appointments were also made after his termination,  the  

act of the Management is in violation of the provisions of  

Section 25 F to H of the Act.   

7) After  prolonged  correspondence,  the  Governor  of  

Haryana  in  exercise  of  power  conferred  under  Section  

10(1)(c)  of  the  Act,  has  made  the  following  reference  

between  the  appellant/workman  and  the  

respondent/Management to the Labour Court, Ambala for  

adjudication  by  way  of  notification  bearing  No.  62638  

dated 22.11.1999:

“Whether  the  termination of  services  of  the  workman  

Kuldeep Singh is valid and justified, if not so, to what  

relief including back wages is he entitled?”

8) Before  considering  the  order  of  reference,  it  is  

worthwhile to refer Section 10 of the Act.  Chapter-III of  

the  Act  speaks  about  reference  of  Disputes  to  Boards,  

Courts or Tribunals.  We are concerned with Section 10 (1)  

which reads as under:

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“10.  Reference  of  disputes  to  Boards,  Courts  or  Tribunals.- (1) Where the appropriate Government is of  opinion  that  any  industrial  dispute  exists  or  is  apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing-

(a) refer  the  dispute  to  a  Board  for  promoting  a  settlement thereof; or  

(b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or  relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or  

(c) refer  the  dispute  or  any  matter  appearing  to  be  connected  with,  or  relevant  to,  the  dispute,  if  it  relates  to  any  matter  specified  in  the  Second  Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or

(d) refer  the  dispute  or  any  matter  appearing  to  be  connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether  it  relates  to  any  matter  specified  in  the  Second  Schedule or the Third Schedule,  to a Tribunal  for  adjudication:   xxx xxxxx”

Based on the above provision, on the application of the  

workman,  the  Government  of  Haryana  made  the  above  

reference to the Labour Court, Ambala.  On receipt of the  

reference from the State Government, the Court assigned  

it as reference No. 254 of 1999.  Both the workman and  

the Management filed their written statements before the  

Labour Court.  The Labour Court, based on the claim of  

both  the  workman  and  the  Management  framed  the  

following issues for trial:-

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(1) Whether  the  termination  of  services  of  workman  Kuldeep Singh is  valid  and justified?   If  not  so  to  what relief including back wages is he entitled?

                                                   (2) Whether the reference is not maintainable as alleged  

in  preliminary  objection  No1  of  the  written  statement?  OPM

(3) Whether the respondent-Management is an industry,  if so, to what effect?  OPM

(4) Whether the reference is bad on account of delay and  laches as alleged in preliminary objection No.2 of the  WS?  OPM

(5) Whether the workman was appointed on ad hoc basis  and against a specific work and after the completion  of work his services came to an end and if so, to what  effect?  OPM

(6) Whether the workman did not complete mandatory  240 days as alleged?  OPM

9) Before  the  Labour  Court,  both  the  parties  led  

evidence  in  support  of  their  respective  claims.   The  

workman,  as  WW-1,  reiterated  about  his  service  

particulars as stated in his claim petition and also marked  

documents  A-E in  support  of  his  claim.   On the  other  

hand, one Balbir Singh, S.O., was examined as MW-1 on  

the side of  the Management.   Appointment letter of  the  

workman  was  marked  as  Exs.M1  &  M2.   The  relevant  

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pages of the attendance register are marked as Exs. M3 to  

M16.  MW-1 asserted that the Management never removed  

the workman from service and he has not rendered the  

duty  for  240  days  in  the  preceding  12  months.   After  

considering the claim of both parties in the form of oral  

and documentary evidence, in respect of issues 1, 5 and 6,  

the Labour Court, in para 19, has concluded thus:

“Workman rendered the duty for more than 240  days in  the  12  preceding  months,  as  I  held  above,  but  the  Management terminated his services without complying  with  the  provisions  of  Section  25F  of  the  Industrial  Disputes Act, so the order impugned is illegal, null and  void and deserves to be set aside.  Accordingly,  issue  Nos. 1, 5 & 6 are decided in favour of workman.”  

10) It is clear that the Labour Court, on appreciation of  

oral  and documentary evidence,  has concluded that the  

termination of  the  workman i.e.  the  appellant  herein  is  

illegal, null and void and deserves to be set aside.  This  

finding has become final since the Management did not  

question the same by way of writ petition.

11) It is not in dispute that with regard to issue No.3, the  

Labour  Court  has  concluded  that  the  Management-the  

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respondent herein is an industry within the meaning of  

Section 2(j) of the Act.  

12) The Labour Court has concluded that the workman  

had raised the demand of reference after more than five  

and a half  years of his termination and has not offered  

plausible and convincing explanation.  On the other hand,  

it is the claim of the workman that though his services  

were terminated on 26.05.1992, all along, he was agitating  

the issue with the Government in one form or other and  

by making representation to various authorities.  Having  

found the termination void and contrary to the provisions  

of the Act, the Labour Court dismissed the claim of the  

workman only on the ground of delay.   

13) The appellant/workman has furnished the following  

information  to  show  that  after  termination,  he  made  

several representations to various authorities.  They are:   

(i) Representation  dated  10.06.92  to  the  Hon’ble  Minister of respondents’ department.

(ii) Representation  dated  11.05.93  to  the  Chief  Secretary of Haryana State.

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(iii) Representation  dated  7.12.94  to  the  General  Manager, IDDC., Ambala

(iv) Representation  dated  4.1095  to  the  General  Manager, ID.D.C., Ambala

(v) Representation  dated  16.7.96  to  the  Manager,  HARTON, Chandigarh.

 Besides that,  he attempted for  the same job twice as  under:

(i) Applied and interviewed for the same post out of 4  vacancies  advertised  in  the  Tribune  dated  19.09.92.

(ii) Applied and interviewed for the same post out of  60  vacancies  in  the  Sunday  Tribune  dated  14.5.1995.

The factual details have not been seriously denied by the  

Management.

14) We have already noted that the Labour Court  held  

that  the  appellant  has  completed  240  days  in  12  

preceding  months  and  the  respondent/Management  

terminated  his  services  without  complying  with  the  

provisions of Section 25(f) of the Act and that the order of  

termination dated 26.05.1992 is illegal, null and void and  

deserves to be set aside but only on the ground of delay  

rejected his claim in its entirety.

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15) Let us consider whether the Labour Court  and the  

High Court justified in rejecting the claim of the workman  

only on the ground of delay in making the reference, more  

particularly,  when  the  Labour  Court  found  that  the  

termination is bad and contrary to the Act.  It is not in  

dispute that there is no limitation prescribed for making  

reference to the Government under Section 10 of the Act.  

It is useful to refer to the decision of this Court in Sapan  

Kumar  Pandit vs.  U.P.  State  Electricity  Board  and  

Others, (2001) 6 SCC 222 which is directly on the point in  

the  case  on  hand.   In  that  case,  the  appellant  was  

appointed  as  a  Clerk  on  01.01.1974  in  the  Electricity  

Distribution Division, Mathura of the U.P. State Electricity  

Board,  but his services were terminated on 17.07.1975.  

He raised an industrial dispute that the termination of his  

services was illegal.  The State Government, by an order  

dated  29.03.1993,  referred  the  dispute  to  the  Labour  

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Court  for  adjudication  as  per  Section  4-K  of  the  U.P.  

Industrial Disputes Act.

“Whether termination of the appellant on 17.07.1975 by  the employer was proper and legal;  if  not so, to what  reliefs the workman is entitled?”

The Labour Court took up the reference as Adjudication  

Case No. 158 of 1993. The respondent Board filed a writ  

petition  before  the  Allahabad  High  Court  assailing  the  

aforesaid  reference order  and also  praying for  quashing  

the adjudication case pending in the Labour Court. The  

appellant  was arrayed as  Respondent  No.  5  in  the  writ  

petition. A Single Judge of the High Court took the view  

that the delay is so inordinate that the dispute has ceased  

to exist by efflux of time and hence no reference under the  

U.P. Act should have been made. Accordingly, the order of  

reference passed by the Government was quashed by the  

High Court holding that the workman kept silent for more  

than 15 years and he woke up only after the petition of  

other co-workmen was allowed and he made no efforts to  

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get  his  dispute  referred  to  the  Industrial  Tribunal  or  

Labour Court.  By holding so, allowed the writ petition of  

the Management.  The decision further shows that along  

with  the  appellant,  the  Board  retrenched  ten  other  

workmen.   Though  the  Industrial  Tribunal  passed  an  

award  granting  retrenchment  compensation  and  certain  

further other reliefs, the Union was not satisfied with the  

said award and they filed a writ petition in 1980 before the  

High Court of Allahabad.  On 28.04.1988, the High Court  

allowed that writ petition and held that retrenchment was  

bad in law and the workmen concerned are entitled to be  

reinstated.  Though the Board filed special leave petition  

in this Court which was dismissed in 1989.  According to  

the appellant, he was entertaining the expectation that the  

Board  would extend the  same benefit  to  him.   He  was  

proceeding with his request to the Board that he should  

be treated on par with eight workmen some of whom were  

reemployed by the Board.  When the appellant found that  

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this was not done, he approached the Conciliation Officer  

appointed by the State Government.  His application for  

condoning the delay in initiating conciliation proceeding  

was disallowed by the Conciliation Officer.  However, the  

Deputy Labour Commissioner went to his rescue as the  

delay was condoned and the conciliation proceedings were  

revived.   This  happened on 28.01.1992.   It  was  in  the  

aforesaid  background  that  the  State  Government  made  

the reference for adjudication on 29.03.1993.  Section 4-K  

of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act is almost in tune with  

Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and also  

there is no time limit fixed for making the reference for a  

dispute for adjudication.  Considering the identical words  

i.e., “at any time” used in Section 10 (1) of the Act and  

Section 4 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, considered  

the main question namely, “Was the industrial dispute in  

existence on the date of reference for adjudication?”  While  

considering  the  same,  a  three-Judge  Bench  decision  of  

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this  Court  as  to  the  scope  of  the  very  same provision,  

namely,  Section 4-K of  the U.P.  Industrial  Disputes Act  

was cited before the Bench.  In M/s Western India Match  

Co.  Ltd. vs.  The  Western  India  Match  Co. Workers  

Union and Ors., (1970) 1 SCC 225 = AIR 1970 SC 1205,  

the learned Judges made the following observations:-

“Therefore,  the  expression  ‘at  any  time’,  though  seemingly without any limits, is governed by the context  in which it appears. Ordinarily, the question of making  a  reference  would  arise  after  conciliation  proceedings  have been gone through and the Conciliation Officer has  made  a  failure  report.  But  the  Government  need  not  wait until such a procedure has been completed. In an  urgent case, it can ‘at any time’, i.e., even when such  proceedings have not begun or are still pending, decide  to refer the dispute for adjudication. The expression ‘at  any  time’  thus  takes  in  such  cases  as  where  the  Government  decides  to  make  a  reference  without  waiting  for  conciliation  proceedings  to  begin  or  to  be  completed.  As  already  stated,  the  expression  ‘at  any  time’ in the context in which it is used postulates that a  reference  can  only  be  made  if  an  industrial  dispute  exists or is apprehended. No reference is contemplated  by  the  section  when the  dispute  is  not  an industrial  dispute, or even if it is so, it no longer exists or is not  apprehended,  for  instance,  where  it  is  already  adjourned or in respect of which there is an agreement  or  a  settlement  between  the  parties  or  where  the  industry in question is no longer in existence.”

Based on the interpretation of the three-Judge Bench, it  

was concluded:  

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“15. There are cases in which lapse of time had caused  fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept  the  dispute  alive  during  the  long  interval,  it  is  reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that  the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when  the dispute remained alive though not galvanised by the  workmen  or  the  union  on  account  of  other  justified  reasons, it does not cause the dispute to wane into total  eclipse. In this case, when the Government has chosen  to refer the dispute for adjudication under Section 4-K  of the U.P. Act the High Court should not have quashed  the reference merely on the ground of delay. Of course,  the  long  delay  for  making  the  adjudication  could  be  considered  by  the  adjudicating  authorities  while  moulding  its  reliefs.  That  is  a  different  matter  altogether. The High Court has obviously gone wrong in  axing  down  the  order  of  reference  made  by  the  Government  for  adjudication.  Let  the  adjudicatory  process reach its legal culmination.”

After saying so, allowed the appeal of the workman and  

set aside the judgment of the High Court.

16) Learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  Management  

heavily relied on the decision of this Court in Nedungadi  

Bank Ltd. vs.  K.P. Madhavankutty and Others, (2000)  

2 SCC 455, particularly, the ultimate conclusion in para 6  

which reads thus:

“6. Law  does  not  prescribe  any  time-limit  for  the  appropriate  Government  to  exercise  its  powers  under  Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be  exercised  at  any  point  of  time  and  to  revive  matters  which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised  reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to  us  to  be  no  rational  basis  on  which  the  Central  

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Government has exercised powers in this case after a  lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the  respondent  from  service.  At  the  time  reference  was  made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said  to  have  been  apprehended.  A  dispute  which  is  stale  could  not  be  the  subject-matter  of  reference  under  Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said  to  be  stale  would  depend  on  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.  When  the  matter  has  become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous  that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act  in  the  circumstances  like  the  present  one.  In  fact  it  could be said that there was no dispute pending at the  time when the reference in question was made. The only  ground advanced by the respondent was that two other  employees  who  were  dismissed  from  service  were  reinstated.  Under  what  circumstances  they  were  dismissed  and  subsequently  reinstated  is  nowhere  mentioned.  Demand  raised  by  the  respondent  for  raising  an  industrial  dispute  was  ex  facie  bad  and  incompetent.”

17) Though this  decision  lays  down that  law  does  not  

prescribe  any  time  limit  for  appropriate  Government  to  

exercise its power under Section 10 of the Act, the Court  

has  concluded  that  the  said  power  is  to  be  exercised  

reasonably and in a rationale manner.  In that case, the  

Central  Government exercised its power after a lapse of  

about seven years of the order dismissing the workman  

from service.  A perusal of the said decision shows that  

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the  workman  has  not  furnished  adequate  

reasons/materials  for  such  a  long  delay  and  the  only  

ground  advanced  by  him  was  that  two  other  similarly  

placed employees dismissed from service were reinstated.  

18) It  is  true  that  following  the  decision in  Nedungadi  

Bank Ltd. (supra), another two-Judge Bench of this Court  

in  Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank vs.  

Neelam, (2005) 5 SCC 91 accepted the similar claim of the  

Management and non-suited the workman on the ground  

of delay.  

19) We  have  already  pointed  out  that  there  is  no  

limitation prescribed in the Act or in any other local Act  

prescribing  such  period.   We  have  also  referred  to  the  

materials  placed  by  the  workman.   By  making  various  

representations  from  the  day  when  his  services  were  

terminated  and  till  his  last  representation  dated  

16.07.1996  to  the  Manager,  HARTON,  Chandigarh  the  

workman has proved that he was agitating his termination  

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one way or other with all the authorities concerned.  The  

particulars  furnished  clearly  show  that  the  

appellant/workman was fighting for his cause before the  

Management  as  well  as  with  the  State  Government  

including  the  Chief  Secretary  and  the  Minister  of  the  

concerned Department.  Ultimately, the State Government  

has made a reference on 22.11.1999 to the Labour Court  

for adjudication.   

20) The view expressed in Sapan Kumar Pandit (supra)  

which is identical  to our case has been considered and  

followed  in  the  subsequent  decision,  namely,  S.M.  

Nilajkar  and  Others vs.  Telecom  District  Manager,  

Karnataka, (2003) 4 SCC 27.  In both the decisions, the  

principles  laid  down in  Nedungadi  Bank (supra) have  

been  considered  and  distinguished.   We  have  already  

mentioned  that  in  Sapan Kumar  Pandit  (supra),  this  

Court  followed the  principles  enunciated in  three-Judge  

Bench decision of Western Indian Match Co. (supra).  At  

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this  juncture,  it  is  useful  to  remind  and  reiterate  the  

finding rendered by the Labour Court on issue Nos. 1, 5  

and 6 holding that the termination of the services of the  

workman/appellant  herein  without  complying  with  the  

provisions  of  Section  25F  is  illegal,  null  and  void  and  

deserves to be set aside.  Undoubtedly, the Management  

has  to  follow  the  provisions  of  the  Act  while  effecting  

termination,  in fact,  which was accepted by the Labour  

Court and the Management has not challenged the same  

before any forum.  

21) In  view of  the  above,  law can be summarized that  

there  is  no  prescribed  time  limit  for  the  appropriate  

Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the  

Act.  It is more so in view of the language used, namely, if  

any  industrial  dispute  exists  or  is  apprehended,  the  

appropriate government “at any time” refer the dispute to  

a Board or Court for enquiry.  The reference sought for by  

the workman cannot  be said to  be delayed or  suffering  

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from a lapse when law does not prescribe any period of  

limitation for raising a dispute under Section 10 of  the  

Act.  The real test for making a reference is whether at the  

time of the reference dispute exists or not and when it is  

made  it  is  presumed  that  the  State  Government  is  

satisfied with the ingredients of the provision,  hence the  

Labour Court cannot go behind the reference.  It  is not  

open to the Government to go into the merit of the dispute  

concerned and once it is found that an industrial dispute  

exists then it is incumbent on the part of the Government  

to make reference.  It cannot itself decide the merit of the  

dispute and it is for the appropriate Court or Forum to  

decide  the  same.   The  satisfaction  of  the  appropriate  

authority in the matter of making reference under Section  

10(1) of the Act is a subjective satisfaction.  Normally, the  

Government cannot decline to make reference for laches  

committed  by  the  workman.   If  adequate  reasons  are  

shown, the Government is bound to refer the dispute to  

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the appropriate Court  or Forum for adjudication.   Even  

though, there is no limitation prescribed for reference of  

dispute to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, even so,  

it is only reasonable that the disputes should be referred  

as  soon  as  possible  after  they  have  arisen  and  after  

conciliation  proceedings  have  failed,  particularly,  when  

disputes  relate  to  discharge  of  workman.   If  sufficient  

materials  are  not  put  forth  for  the  enormous  delay,  it  

would  certainly  be  fatal.   However,  in  view  of  the  

explanation offered by the workman, in the case on hand,  

as stated and discussed by us in the earlier paragraphs,  

we do not think that the delay in the case on hand has  

been so culpable as to disentitle him any relief.  We are  

also satisfied that in view of the details furnished and the  

explanation offered,  the workman cannot  be blamed for  

the delay and he was all along hoping that one day his  

grievance would be considered by the Management or by  

the State Government.

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22) In the light of the above discussion and conclusion,  

we set  aside  the  award of  the  Labour Court  insofar  as  

holding that the reference by the State Government is bad  

and incompetent being raised so belatedly and dismissing  

the claim statement on this ground and the order of the  

High Court dated 31.10.2006 in C.W.P. No. 8774 of 2005  

affirming  the  said  order  of  the  Labour  Court  and  

dismissing the writ petition filed by the workman.  In view  

of the conclusion of the Labour Court with regard to Issue  

Nos. 1, 5 and 6 deciding in favour of workman holding  

that  the  Management  terminated  his  services  without  

complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act  

and the said order is illegal, null and void deserves to be  

set  aside,  we  order  reinstatement  of  the  appellant-

workman with consequential service benefits but without  

back  wages  within  a  period  of  eight  weeks.   Since  the  

appellant  is  fighting  for  his  survival  for  more  than  a  

decade, we award a cost of Rs.50,000/- to be paid by the  

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respondent-Management  directly  to  the  

appellant/workman within the same period.   

23) The appeal is allowed to the extent mentioned above.

...…………………………………J.                   (P. SATHASIVAM)                                   

...…………………………………J.           (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)  

NEW DELHI; DECEMBER 3, 2010.           

  

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